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Foreword
‘Between Peace and Conflict in the East and the West’ is the title of the second
edition of the OSCE Academy’s edited compilation of the discussion of events and
developments in the remarkable years 2020–21. In the light of the global pandemic
and dramatic political shifts, from North America all the way across the Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) region to Central Asia, this
compilation has gathered a number of timely contributions describing and analyzing
paradigm shifts in the struggles for power and conflict resolution during the global
lockdown. The dramatic halt of migration and remittances, the increase in rates of
poverty and unemployment, and the despair in coping with mounting challenges in
everyday life have turned silent hostilities into protracted violence and war in some
regions of the OSCE and triggered the rise of populist movements in others. The
wars and border disputes in the Caucasus and Eastern Ukraine and between former
neighboring states in Central Asia re-emerged or were exacerbated over the course
of the past year. Continuous threats to weakly established border regimes in some
regions, the full closure of borders in others, and the constant stress put on general
state capacity to manage the pandemic and its multidimensional fallout have put the
OSCE’s key policies and efforts for conflict resolution, the promotion of democracy
and human rights, and media freedom to a test—not least in a ‘remote’ phase.
In this volume, scholars, academics, and independent researchers sum up some
of the most far-reaching developments of transition and transformation over the past
years, many of them cumulating or breaking out during the year of the pandemic. In
their chapters on Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, Gawrich and Oberson highlight
how the OSCE Minsk agreements and missions and allied states aim to keep peace
and promote dialogue between hostile parties, seemingly against all odds and despite
numerous infringements and lockdowns. A closer look reveals the complexity of the
challenges ahead: some of the violent conflicts in the OSCE region are between
different state and non-state parties or between paramilitaries and faith-based or
nationalistic groups. Financing peacebuilding and finding states to take a lead in
v
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peacebuilding becomes a daily challenge for the OSCE. The pathway to peace is
often the lack of political will of key stakeholders among the participating States, as
Vieira points out in his chapter.
But the OSCE region is also a geographic bridge and land link between China
and Europe. Many of its 57 participating States are host to China’s Belt and Road
Initiative’s (BRI) infrastructural projects. China’s influence and its penetration of the
OSCE region, especiallyCentralAsia, have consistently increasedover the past years.
The BRI today matters for policy-making in many participating States and hence
shapes OSCE policy debates. Murat, Muhamedov, Marat, and Pomfret highlight the
political and economic changes this holds for the region as a land linkage between
East and West and the challenges the BRI poses for upholding human rights and
democratic standards among the participating States, in particular in the wider region
of Eurasia.
The dramatic events around the October 2020 parliamentary elections in
Kyrgyzstan illustrate the consequences that can follow from COVID-19 and its
subsequent lockdowns, the halt of migration, and the closure of borders. In their
contributions on developments in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Stimac and Aslanova,
Bakiev, Doolotkeldieva, and Aleef study the effects of religious movements and the
adoption of anti-terrorist laws and inquire about the conditions for the rapid rise of
populist leaders to power and the role of organized crime in changing and shaping
political regimes over the past years.
The rise of civil society and the growth of a mobile, cosmopolitan young elite and
their striving for more transparency and accountability across the region point toward
opposite trends and developments in the OSCE region. Albania’s efforts to finally
hold perpetrators to account for past wrongdoings is described by Stasa, and the
rising sensitivity to gender gaps in education in Mongolia as shown by Khajikhan
give reason to believe that civil society, victims, and gender-bias affected groups
are striving for more equality, human rights, and freedom. The effects that COVID-
19 had on international collaboration in conflict zones in Georgia, as shown by
Javakhishvili, and how the pandemic changed the paradigms of international relations
and regionalism in Central Asia, discussed by Dzhuraev, formulate a demand for
more research in the region. This is further highlighted by Mihr’s study on how
global politics and norms impact local actions, adding further complexity to rising
‘glocal governance’. Lambert, in the end, shows that a look back into the past can
offer advice for the way forward in his discussion of US classified documents from
the early 1990s that already back then outlined a possible roadmap between peace
and conflict for the Caucasus.
With this second edition, theOSCEAcademy inBishkek aims to highlight someof
the recent research and scholarly work conducted over the course of the years before
and during the pandemic. The OSCE region is a ‘regional laboratory’ for global
trends of political and societal transformation and development. The rise of civil
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society and of protest movements is confronting the (short term) manifestation of
autocratic and populist leaders in an era of lockdowns and closed borders. It remains
to be seen how the medium and long-term impact of the pandemic will change once
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Part I
From Conflict to Peace in East and West
Chapter 1
Conflict Management, International
Parliamentary Assemblies and Small
States: The Cases of Georgia
and Moldova
Andrea Gawrich
Abstract The parliamentary assemblies of the Organization for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe and theCouncil of Europe have reputations as bridge-building insti-
tutions between western and post-socialist countries. However, territorial disputes
between member states pose a challenge to the parliamentary diplomacy of these
international parliamentary institutions (IPIs). This article examines how IPIs address
conflicts in the cases of two small states facing “frozen” secessionist conflicts, where
Russia’s hegemony is involved, namely Georgia with its territorial disputes in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia along withMoldova and its secessionist dispute with Transnis-
tria. This contribution unpacks IPI strategies by applying conceptual approaches from
parliamentary diplomacy, conflict management and small-states literature, as well as
the respective arguments on hegemonic strategies.
Keywords Small states · International relations · International organizations ·
International parliamentary institutions · OSCE · Council of europe · Secessionist
conflicts
1.1 Introduction1
The parliamentary assemblies of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE) have reputations as bridge-building
institutions between western countries and post-socialist states. However, territorial
disputes between member states pose a challenge to the parliamentary diplomacy of
these international parliamentary institutions (IPIs). This article examines the cases
of two small states facing “frozen” secessionist conflicts, where Russia’s hegemony
is involved: First in Georgia with territorial disputes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia
and second in Moldova with its long-standing secessionist territory in Transnistria.
1 This work was supported by the LOEWE Research Cluster ‘Conflict Regions in Eastern Europe’
at Justus Liebig University Giessen.
A. Gawrich (B)
Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Giessen, Germany
e-mail: andrea.gawrich@sowi.uni-giessen.de
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As both IPIs have members from hostile conflict parties, the IPIs face the dilemma
of how to position themselves for or against member state activities and how to
contribute to international conflict-management strategies vis-à-vis small states.
This contribution aims at explaining variances regarding both IPIs’ strategies
to cope with these “frozen” territorial conflicts by applying conceptual approaches
from parliamentary diplomacy, conflict management and small-states, as well as the
respective arguments on hegemonic strategies. An IPIs self-perception as part of
conflict management is best illustrated by the OSCE PA’s position: “Their elected
status gives parliamentarians the independence and advantages that can at times
open doors to dialogue…[when] regional tensions flare, multilateral meetings of
parliamentarians can foster communication and promote peaceful solutions” (OSCE
PA 2018b).
Evidently, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly perceives itself as a conflict
management actor. It sketches an ideal scenario, which, however, requires the will-
ingness of parliamentarians from conflict states to cooperate. To maintain coopera-
tion is a fundamental challenge of any International Organization (IO) with member
countries having (territorial) conflicts and ignoring fundamental IO norms on non-
violence. As IO institutions, IPIs are challenged to address (territorial) conflicts
where their parliamentarians’ home countries are involved.
Against this background, the essential aim of this contribution is to investigate the
strategies IPIs apply to cope with such conflicts. The empirical cases are small states
as conflict parties as it is assumed that such states face higher vulnerability at the
international level. IPIs are understood as additional international arenas for small
states to seek support. There are a number of questions deriving from this, which
are to be addressed in this article. It will be explored how both the OSCE PA and
PACE pursue their ambition to facilitate conflict-related dialogue between high-level
authorities from the small states, the secessionist regions and Russia. Further, do they
over- or underestimate their role as confidence-building or mediating institutions?
In terms of political stability, territorial conflicts within or between IO member
states pose a risk to any IO. They constitute ongoing violations of fundamental
IO norms including state sovereignty, territorial integrity and peaceful coopera-
tion.Moreover, hostile states within an IO undermine intergovernmental cooperation
and—within their IPIs—the work of parliamentarians. As a consequence, the IO’s
overall efficiency is diminished.
Although the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) is
regarded as the “second most powerful” IPI after the European Parliament (Šabič
2008: 262), neither PACE nor the OSCE PA is particularly powerful due to their lack
of budgetary control and inability to check the power of the executive. PACE ranks
among the oldest international parliamentary institutions and has managed to expand
its influence over recent decades, establishing itself as Europe’s “moral conscience”
and is seen as a “school of democracy and human rights” for parliamentarians from
Central and Eastern European countries (Gawrich 2014, 2017; Habegger 2005). In
comparison, the OSCE PA has less formal power and, although it was explicitly
created to foster dialogue between parliamentarians from participating states, the
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OSCE PA has an underdeveloped institutional infrastructure, restricting its output
(Gawrich 2014; Habegger 2010).
Also, consensus mechanisms and bargaining procedures at the intergovernmental
level restrict their roles. Generally speaking, IPIs have greater flexibility to address
conflicts in a frank manner. They can much easily exchange with conflict parties than
national governments would do. Undoubtedly, the Russian annexation of Crimea in
2014 eroded PACE’s and the OSCE PA’s relations with the Russian delegation and
authorities. Yet the two IPIs’ responses to other territorial conflicts in the post-Soviet
space remain largely unexplored. Building upon previous research on the implica-
tions of the hybrid war between Ukraine and Russia (Gawrich 2017), this paper
examines the IPIs’ strategies towards two small countries engrossed in protracted
“frozen” conflicts, namely Moldova (Transnistria) and Georgia (South Ossetia and
Abkhazia), as well as Russian hegemony.
This article expands upon three strands of literature: first, approaches to IPI diplo-
macy, second, conflict-management strategies and third, small-states’ foreign policy
analysis, including approaches on hegemons within IOs as Russia’s role in these
conflicts merits consideration.
1.2 Conflict Management and Strategies of Parliamentary
Diplomacy
While referring to Burton and Dukes (1990), Michael Butler conceives of conflict
management as “any effort to control or contain an ongoing conflict between politi-
cally motivated actors, operating at the state or sub-state level, typically through the
involvement of a third party” (Butler 2009: 13). He defines international conflict
management as the “efforts of third parties [to] limit the spread or escalation of a
conflict, to minimize suffering and to create an environment for interaction without
resorting to violence” (Ibid., p.15).
International actors, at a minimum, employ strategic conflict containment.
However, in contrast to more powerful actors who might directly partake in interna-
tional conflictmanagement via classical international conflictmanagement tools (e.g.
crafting legal settlements, brokering agreements, setting upmonitoring missions, see
e.g. Bercovitch andRegan (2004) per Butler 2009: 14), IPIs havemore limited capac-
ities. Their tactics are confined primarily to: first, encouraging compliance with an
IO’s authoritative norm (e.g. PACE’s membership monitoring, which might refer to
territorial conflicts or theOSCEPA’s election observations, which usually do not) and
second, utilizing deliberate, dialogue-based instruments such as informalmeetings to
mediate between conflicting parties. Whereas the first strategy is rooted in rationalist
views (with little potential to sanction), the second is grounded in social construc-
tivist approaches and focuses on persuasion related to IO norms (for dialogue based
instruments and socialization within IOs, see e.g. Checkel 2005; for conditionality,
see, e.g. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005).
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The parliamentary diplomacy strategies (Cofelice and Stavridis 2014; Cutler
2006; Jančić 2015a; Weisglas and Boear 2007) IPIs choose might be explained by
their lack of substantial powers of control. IPIs compensate for their weak formal
power by focusing on control through communication (e.g. with intergovernmental
level or member states) or policy dialogue (e.g. monitoring) (Jančić 2014). They
predominantly focus on human rights, democracy and conflict management (Šabič
2008, 262f; Marschall 2005, Jun and Kuper 1997; Lotter 1997). The rise in the
number of international institutions and networks since the ColdWar has forged new
opportunities for IPIs to act as norm entrepreneurs, albeit dependent on the different
domestic constraints, financial limitations and individual engagement (Šabič 2013).
Based on international liberal peace norms, international institutions seek to
contain conflicts within their sphere of influence to mitigate insecurity. Further-
more, both PACE and the OSCE-PA operate under the assumed mandate to uphold
European peace. However, they possess limited power and restrict their activities to
supervision and dialogue.
Two distinctive IPI strategies are thus evident to approach the cases of Georgia
and Moldova (building especially on Cutler 2001, 217; Cutler 2013; Gawrich 2017;
Šabič 2008; Marschall 2005, Jun and Kuper 1997; Lotter 1997; Stegen 2000; Šabič
2013):
(i) Supervision of compliance with IO rules, including operational activities in the
form of monitoring reports on a country’s compliance with IO rules or election
observations in member countries;
(ii) Conflict-related dialogue, whereby PAs counterbalance their lack of formal
power through soft communicative activities to foster dialogue among
conflicting parties at different diplomatic levels.
1.3 Conceptualizing Small States and Hegemons in IOs
Against this backdrop of supervision and dialogue, small states, like Georgia and
Moldova, at the international level are considered as vulnerable, lacking both power
and capacities (Katzenstein 1985), and pursue a host of strategies (e.g. bandwagoning
with great powers) to cope with their disadvantages (Gvalia et al. 2013; Ingebritsen
et al. 2006; Mouritzen and Wivel 2005; Thorhallsson 2018).2 Two strategies are
frequently pursued by small states at the international level:
Status-seeking strategies: Small states suffer from status insecurity more than
medium or great powers do (Carvalho and Neumann 2015: 1). Consequently, they
aim to improve or maintain their place in the international hierarchy. Status-seeking
strategies within an IPI related to frozen conflicts are operationalized related to
attempts by Moldovan and Georgian MPs’ to stress their country’s national integrity
2 See on indicators Statistics Times Country Statistics (2018); Bertelsmann Foundation (2018);
World Population Review Country Statistics (2018).
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within both assemblies. It is assumed that the conflict framing builds on the own
countries’ victimization within the conflicts.
Shelter Seeking Strategies: They compensate for their vulnerability through
joining IOs and allying with more powerful states (Thorhallsson 2018: 26). Hence,
they avoid isolation and stagnation. The territorial conflicts in Georgia and Moldova
have contributed to domestic social stagnation due to heavy costs, both material, for
example in border management, security provisions, trade embargos; and immate-
rial costs, such as mistrust or hatred between majority and secessionist entities, and
Russian propaganda. For the purpose of this article, shelter seeking is understood as
Georgian and Moldovan MPs’ attempts to push for PACE and OSCE PA activities to
blame the Russian government for its role within the secessionist territories. In this
regard, IPIs would be perceived as “neutral brokers”.
Although status- and shelter-seeking strategies provide appropriate starting points
to examine the relevance of both IPIs to Moldovan and Georgian conflict manage-
ment, the other side of the coin must be considered as well, namely the role of
hegemons within an IO involved in the respective conflicts, in this case Russia. As
hegemons are active in IOs and spend resources to push them in a certain direction,
small states hope hegemons will respond to an IO’s directives (Hurrell 1995; e.g.
Mattli 2010). According to the self-perception of both IPIs as trust-generating institu-
tions, their activities towards Russian hegemony include blaming and conflict-related
dialogue.
Lobell et al. explain a state’s behavior (referring to both hegemons and less influ-
ential states) within an IO as when a “state has two or more games or arenas in
which it must choose between alternate strategies seeking to maximize beneficial
outcomes. The opposing actor in each game will be different and will have its own
set of strategies and outcomes. Each game can be thought of as a different arena in
which a particular factor is the overriding concern” (2015: 150).
Transferred to this field of study, this article operationalizes the hegemonic
strategy of Russian representatives, for example, Russian MPs within both PAs
and Russian officials communicating with both PAs, to reject accountability for
norm violations through their involvement in the Moldovan and Georgian territorial
conflicts.
In this context, five types of activities can be identified which actors involved
in IPI conflict management efforts might use. The IPIs first apply their legal rights
to compliance supervision and, second, they implement conflict-related dialogues
towards the parties of each conflict (hence,Georgia+Russia andMoldova+Russia).
The third and fourth strategies refer to Georgian and Moldovan MPs’ shelter- and
status-seeking. Finally, the fifth rejection strategy refers to those, which engage with
Russian MPs and Russian authorities.
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1.4 Short Characterization of the Conflict Cases and Both
PA’s Initial Positions on the Conflicts
1.4.1 The Case of Moldova
The Transnistrian conflict erupted shortly before the dissolution of the USSR in
November 1990 when Transnistrian authorities and the central government funda-
mentally disagreed on Moldova’s state language policy and its political orientation
(see Axyonova and Gawrich 2018). After increased violence between the Moldovan
Army, secessionist and Russian forces in March 1992, a ceasefire was agreed upon
in July. Although several hundred died and approximately 100,000 were internally
displaced, this has been the least violent post-Soviet territorial dispute.
As concerns both PAs, they referenced the conflict at an early stage: As Moldova
became a participating state of the CSCE (later OSCE) shortly after its independence,
the CSCE PA (later OSCE PA) demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from
Moldovan territory as well as a ceasefire agreement (CSCE Parliamentary Assembly
1992).
Prior to Moldova’s accession to the CoE in 1995, PACE was considerably
optimistic on improved prospects for conflict settlement (PACE 1995). However,
various international mediation efforts have not resolved the conflict and it persists
in a “frozen” or “protracted” state (Baban 2015). Nevertheless, progress at prac-
tical and technical levels is visible (Hill 2018). This has been broadly driven by
Moldova’s Europeanization efforts. Transnistria benefits fromMoldovan integration
into the EU’sDeep andComprehensive Free TradeArea,which requires trade-related
exchange between Tiraspol and Chis, inău (Waal and Twickel 2020).
1.4.2 The Case of Georgia
The South Ossetian conflict in Georgia has deep historical roots and intensified after
the dissolution of the USSR 1991 (see Axyonova and Gawrich 2018), when the
Georgian government intended to reincorporate the region. However, South Ossetia
pursued reunification with Russian North Ossetia. Russia brokered a ceasefire agree-
ment in June 1992, but hostilities have resumed at frequent intervals, e.g. in 2004,
followed by minor conflict spikes in subsequent years. A full-fledged five-day war
erupted in August 2008 over Tbilisi’s renewed strategy to increase control over
South Ossetia. Russian military directly supported secessionist South Ossetia and
later recognized the region’s independence (Fischer 2016). Hence, the respective
ceasefire agreement left the status of the secessionist entity unresolved (BBC 2008)
and remains contested by the Georgian government to date.
The Abkhaz conflict similarly has historical and linguist-nationalistic roots
(Petersen 2008). After the collapse of the USSR, the 1992 war led to thousands
of civilian casualties and 250,000 IDPs (Hansen 1999), followed by a 1993 Abkhaz
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counter-offensive aided by the Russian military (Fischer 2016). Russia brokered a
ceasefire agreement in May 1994 which largely held. The Russo-Georgian War in
August 2008 spilled into Abkhazia and led to the Russian recognition of the region’s
independence. The conflict in Abkhazia has since remained frozen. As concerns both
secessionist regions, there have been no recent substantial changes to the status quo
and it is broadly expected to remain frozen for the time being (Waal and Twickel
2020).
When Georgia joined the Council of Europe in 1999, PACE acknowledged
Georgia’s efforts to improve the political climate through increased exchange with
both secessionist regions (PACE 1999). In contrast, the CSCE PA’s annual declara-
tions of 1993, 1994 and 1995 never referenced either conflict (CSCE Parliamentary
Assembly 1993, 1994; OSCE PA 1995).
1.5 The Moldovan and Georgian Conflict Cases
in the PACE
PACE established a considerably powerful monitoringmechanism over time inspired
by the accession of new members in the 1990s. This does not allow for immediate
sanctions but empowers PACE with naming and shaming capacities (see Gawrich
2015). The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ensuing war in Eastern Ukraine
marked a turning point in PACE’s strategy towards Russia. In April 2014, PACE
suspended the Russian delegation’s participation rights, which PACE has used
sparingly (e.g. not during the Russian-Georgian war in 2008).
This PACE strategy towards Russian MPs in the context of the Ukraine war led
to spill-over effects in the treatment of the frozen conflicts in Moldova and Georgia:
a parliamentary “Sub-Committee on Conflicts between Council of Europe Member
States” was established in 2016 to reinforce its conflict-related strategies (PACE
2015; PACE Monitoring Committee 2016b). The Sub-Committee performs specific
monitoring activities and encourages conflict-related dialogue between MPs from
Russia, Georgia, Moldova and other inter-state disputes in the region.
As concerns Moldova, the conflict in Transnistria has been under constant PACE
supervision. The conflict’s freezing occurred prior toMoldova’s accession to the CoE
in 1995 and PACE has consistently demanded “rapprochement” between Moldova
and Transnistria (PACE Monitoring Committee 7/13/2015b). PACE’s strategy to
monitor the social, economic and political conditions both in Moldova as well as
in Transnistria evokes criticism from Moldovan authorities given their skepticism
towards any quasi-statehood concessions to Transnistria. However, PACE’s demand
for full reintegration of the country under Chis, inău’s government does not quell the
fears of Moldovan officials (PACE Monitoring Committee 2008a, b, 2012, 2015,
2016a).
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Even though the frozen conflicts in Georgia turned hot during the August 2008
war, its two breakaway regions did not receive much attention from PACE’s Moni-
toring Committee before 2008 (PACE Monitoring Committee 2008a). Prior to and
after the 2008 war, PACE’s overall strategy towards Georgia called for peaceful rela-
tions with the secessionist entities. Yet, monitoring reports also reveal patience for
Georgia’s lack of democratic and institutional progress, acknowledging the chal-
lenges the Georgian administration faces in coping with the regions (e.g. PACE
Monitoring Committee 2004, 2006). PACE pursues a balanced approach, not only
supporting Georgian efforts to unify the country, but demanding Georgian author-
ities treat non-Georgian minorities fairly (including Russians, South Ossetians and
Abkhaz people) (PACE Monitoring Committee 2010), e.g. through demanding fair
prosecution of violations committed by all conflict parties (including Georgians)
after the 2008 war (PACE Monitoring Committee 4/30/2009).
Russia is still regarded as a hegemon in the region anddesigns its role in all regional
organizations covering Eurasia through a number of influential strategies (Willerton
et al. 2015). As for the treatment of this still remaining Russian hegemony in these
territorial conflicts, PACE did not systematically refer to its activities in Moldova
or Georgia and did not repeatedly qualify Russia as an aggressor in these conflicts
while monitoring developments (e.g. PACE Monitoring Committee 2002). Instead,
PACEmainly referred to shortcomings related to democratic values and human rights
violations in the Russian Federation itself (PACE Monitoring Committee 2016a).
Russian hegemonic strategies, on the other hand, are more limited since the
Russian PACE delegation had its membership credentials suspended between April
2014 and June 2019 during which its MPs could not vote or participate in the leading
Assembly bodies, leading Russia to withdraw from parliamentary participation in
2015 (Steininger 2018). Furthermore, Russia’s rejection of PACE’s sanctioning of
Russian MPs is visible: According to Chairman Leonid Slutsky of the International
Committee of the Russian State Duma, the sanctions are “anti-Russian hysteria” and
accused PACE of being influenced by a “Russophobic minority” (2018).
PACE reinforced its general commitment to territorial integrity and sovereignty
as the Georgian-Russian war in August 2008 compelled the Assembly to formulate
a resolution on national sovereignty and statehood (PACE 2011). This document
was meant to become PACE’s point of reference in future territorial conflicts among
member states.
To sum up, Russia was not sanctioned for its involvement in either conflict.
Moldova and Georgia were encouraged to increase their internal relations with the
secessionist entities (despite profound skepticism) and to treat all people equally.
Instead of qualifying Russia as an aggressor too sharply, the 2008 Russo-Georgian
War contributed to PACE’s norm reinforcement related to territorial disputes in
general. Russia’s self-imposed role and understanding as a peace broker in Eurasia
is well-illustrated by its contribution to the negotiation of the ceasefire agreement,
which ended the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan between September and
November 2020, as well as its attempt to keep other international organizations out
of this conflict zone (Sporrer and Knoll 2021).
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As PACE’s supervision mechanism towards both small states and the regional
hegemon focuses on demanding Moldova and Georgia pursue reunification rather
than strongly criticizing Russia, its approach avoids unilateral blaming and empha-
sizes the responsibility of all conflict parties. Consequently, the status- and shelter-
seeking preferences of Georgian and Moldovan representatives could not align with
PACE’s priorities.
1.6 Conflict-Related Dialogue
Within PACE’s conflict-related dialogues, MPs visit Moldova and the breakaway
Transnistrian region. They have met with de facto secessionist authorities to discuss
normalization of relations and a potential conflict resolution (PACE Monitoring
Committee 2008b). This strategy is ambiguous as Moldovan authorities fear that
PACEMP’s dialogue with Transnistrian authorities reinforces its international legit-
imacy. However, PACE repeatedly demanded conflict-related dialogue between
Moldovan and Transnistrian officials (see e.g. PACE Monitoring Committee 2012)
and perceives its role as a platform for conflict-related dialogue (e.g. multiple
PACE presidents have offered the Moldovan parliament dialogue facilitation with
Transnistria) (PACE 2006, 2012).
PACE was less successful in establishing dialogue with the authorities from the
breakaway regions in Georgia, as it failed to arrange meetings in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia in 2013. Instead, they held meetings in Tbilisi and Moscow and publicly
denounced the contradictory views on the 2008 war (PACE Monitoring Committee
2013). Hence, PACE was more cautious in pushing for dialogue between Georgians
and secessionists than in the Moldovan case (PACE Monitoring Committee 2009).
Hence, according to its perceived advantage of parliamentary independence,
PACE pursued conflict-related dialogue with all involved parties in both cases.
However, the conditions were comparably more conducive in Moldova than in
Georgia, where PACE did not get access to the breakaway regions.
1.7 Status-Seeking, Shelter-Seeking and Hegemonic
Strategies
Modest use of shelter-seeking and status-seeking strategies can be discerned amongst
parliamentary “motions” initiated by Moldovan parliamentarians. Since joining the
CoE in 1995, around 65 MPs or substitute MPs have represented Moldova.3 Of
3 For information on the Moldovan PACEMPs, as well as on the activities of single MPs, see http://
www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/AssemblyList/MP-Search-Country-ArchivesEN.asp?CountryID=
28 (accessed 07.01.19). The overall number ofMPs of all national delegations depends on the length
of the term of each MP. The Moldovan PACE delegation consists of 5 delegates. Furthermore, how
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those, more than 30 never participated in any visible parliamentary activity such
as initiating a motion, posing a question to the CoE ministers, etc. Generally, the
number of Moldovan PACE MPs who initiated motions or drafted declarations and
questions related to Transnistria has been low.
Hence, they have infrequently used shelter-seeking strategies: In 1998, a
Moldovan parliamentarian supported by nearly 50 MPs from various countries
(among them four Moldovans and a handful of Romanians) initiated a motion to
condemn Transnistrian separatist activities, however the motion was not heard in the
plenary discussion (PACE 1998). In 2000, the same MP initiated a similar motion
with the support of around 20 MPs which again failed to reach the plenary (PACE
2000). Both motions called for improved conflict settlement efforts by all conflict
parties. A further unsuccessful attempt came after the political climate reignited
following the 2014 annexation of Crimea when another Moldovan MP attempted
to rally PACE to strengthen legal standards preventing separatism in CoE countries
(PACE 2014). Clearly, themoderate shelter-seeking strategy byMoldovanMPs since
1995 failed to gain substantial support due to a lack of interest among other PACE
parliamentarians.
Apart from motions related to Transnistria, a spattering of Moldovan MPs
supported initiatives related to other regional conflicts (e.g. the Balkan conflicts or
the annexation of Crimea) or conflict management in general (PACE 2018). Further-
more, MPs attempted to pursue status-seeking strategies related to Moldova’s defi-
cient democracy standards for which a few Moldovan MPs attempted to increase
pressure from the CoE to push their governments into a more compliant direction
(e.g. PACE 2003, 2016a, d). It can be concluded that Moldovan parliamentarians
within PACE were not especially active in employing shelter- and status-seeking
strategies. There is no obvious pattern explaining this behavior. Were it due to a lack
of experience with PACE’s procedures shortly after Moldova’s CoE accession, then
their activities would later increase, which has not been observable. There is also no
pattern in the age of active or passive MPs, hence, their political socialization during
the Soviet era or after does not provide an alternative explanation.
The Georgian example strikes a contrast: Since Georgia joined the CoE in 1999,
four years after Moldova, the number of total GeorgianMPs in PACE is considerably
lower, although the size of both countries’ delegations has remained at 5 MPs. Of
the 58 Georgian MPs and their substitutes, more than two-thirds showed evident
parliamentary activity.4 Hence, Georgian MPs were considerably more enterprising
than their Moldovan colleagues. However, only a small number supported (or initi-
ated) motions, resolutions or written declarations related to the conflicts in South
Ossetia or Abkhazia and their consequences, none of which reached the plenary
level. Their activities sought to increase pressure on Russia, addressing its influence
often a MP was represented by his/her substitute cannot be traced. Hence, both groups of MPs,
representatives and their substitutes, are treated in the same way for this analysis.
4 For information on the Georgian PACE MPs, as well as on the activities of single
MPs, see http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/AssemblyList/MP-Search-Country-Archives-EN.
asp?CountryID=16 (accessed 08.01.19).
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on the separatist territories and its unilateral recognition of both territories. Some of
these initiatives explicitly framed the conflicts, e.g. as a Russian “de facto annex-
ation” of both territories and blamed the international community for its “lack of
serious international attention” before the 2008 war (PACE 2001a, b, 2002, 2008).
Georgian MPs attempted to use shelter-seeking strategies by blaming the Russian
hegemon for its non-compliance with CoE rules and criticizing its annexation of
Crimea and hybrid war in Ukraine (PACE 2016c). Similar to Moldovan MPs, Geor-
gian MPs have backed motions or declarations related to other Eastern European
conflicts and urged PACE to devote more attention (PACE 2016b).
This evidence reveals how both countries’ delegations deployed status- and
shelter-seeking strategies in PACEand that their attempts constituted amodest pattern
as they were not especially prolific. Georgian MPs pursued visible parliamentary
activities more often than Moldovan MPs and more frequently tried to raise conflict
issues at plenary debates.
The Russian delegation is comparably bigger with 18 members in PACE.5
Between Russia’s (internationally highly contested) accession to the CoE in 1998
and the suspension of its delegation in 2014, the delegation’s general level of activity
rose in the late 2000s. However, any action related to conflicts involving Russia was
avoided entirely. What is more: the CoE monitoring reports on Georgia and Ukraine
which take into account the challenges imposed on these countries by Russia are
flatly rejected by individual MPs. The Russian rejection strategy is also accompa-
nied by a misdirection strategy known as “whataboutism”, by which MPs direct
attention away from Russia to other international actors, with “worse” infractions
than Russia—without facing sanctions (for more, see Dougherty 2014).
1.8 The Moldovan and Georgian Conflict Cases
in the OSCE-PA
The OSCE PA’s capacity to effectively supervise norm compliance and initiate
conflict-related dialogue differs substantially from PACE. The parliamentary work
is less institutionalized. The PA has less power to monitor non-compliance among
OSCE states or conflict parties due to the lack of a specific monitoring committee.
Nevertheless, the OSCE PA’s Rules of Procedure do cover policy-related dimensions
which explicitly define a responsibility to “develop and promote mechanisms for the
prevention and resolution of conflicts” (Rule 3 Responsibilities and Objectives of
the Assembly, par. c) OSCE PA 2018d).





Evidence of the OSCE PA’s strategy to supervise participating state compliance is
primarily found in the declarations and resolutions announced in its annual plenary
sessions, which are the most influential and visible PA documents.
In contrast to the Russian PACE delegation, the Russian OSCE PA representa-
tives were not suspended after the annexation of Crimea. This was attributed to the
greater number of presumably pro-Russian national delegations such as Belarus and
Central Asian countries. Nevertheless, the OSCE PA was remarkably vocal at its
Annual Session declaration in Berlin 2018 when it urged Russia to “withdraw its
military units from the territory of Georgia and reverse its recognition of Abkhazia,
Georgia, and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia, as independent States”.
The PA also articulated its support of “the policy of the Government of Georgia
towards a peaceful conflict resolution, directed towards the de-occupation of Geor-
gian regions, on the one hand, and reconciliation and confidence-building between
the communities divided by occupation lines, on the other hand” (OSCE PA 2018a).
As declarations and resolutions from other annual sessions show, the OSCE PA’s
supervision of non-compliance related to the Georgian and Moldovan conflicts has
been ongoing (OSCE PA 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017a, 2018a). For example, in a special
resolution onMoldova articulated at the 2016Annual Session inTbilisi, theOSCEPA
deemed the Transnistrian conflict “a serious threat to security and stability in Europe
and the OSCE area”, framing the issue as a hazard for all of Europe (OSCE PA 2016).
At the 2015 Session in Helsinki, on the 40th anniversary of the signing of the OSCE’s
founding 1975 Helsinki Document, the OSCE PA adopted a resolution on Russia
broadly deriding its non-compliance with OSCE commitments, including its role
in the conflicts in Moldova and Georgia, while affirming the “right of Georgia and
the Republic of Moldova to be free of coercive external influence from the Russian
Federation and [reconfirming] its support for their independence, sovereignty, and
territorial integrity” (OSCE PA 2015). However, a specific decision denouncing a
hegemon like Russia for its involvement in two conflict areas is rare. Thus, the
OSCE-PA’s contribution to conflict containment by using a strategy of supervision
of a hegemon is limited to announcing its position prominently and framing the issue
in a particular light.
1.9 Conflict-Related Dialogue
As introduced above, the OSCE PA’s self-perception refers to its alleged ability
as a facilitator of dialogue in situations of regional tensions (OSCE PA 2018b).
The PA’s principal strategy in addressing political conflicts is to appoint Special
Representatives (SR) for various fields of parliamentary diplomacy. Three such SRs
have been assigned with mandates relevant to the conflicts under examination.
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The SR on the South Caucasus was installed in 2010 (OSCE 2011) to promote
dialogue and confidence-building measures in the region (Armenpress 2013). The
post was held by Bulgarian MP Kristian Vigenin (OSCE PA 2018c), who resigned a
few years later due to his lack of power. SR Vigenin concluded that his position “in
the current conditions will remain purely ceremonial [as] the situation on the ground
does not provide an opening for broader dialogue and initiatives which reach beyond
the well-known zone of comfort for the players [and] there is no financial support
for his/her work” (Vigenin 2018). Although the SR on the South Caucasus visited
Nagorno-Karabakh, the disputed border region between Armenia and Azerbaijan
(OSCE PA 2017b), he was not allowed inside the secessionist territories in Georgia,
a fact which the OSCE PA lamented in its 2018 resolution (OSCE PA 2018a). Hence,
the PA was hindered in establishing conflict-related dialogue in the disputed territo-
ries of Georgia. Russia has been made explicitly responsible for the denial of access
to international monitors in both regions, whereas the Georgian government’s efforts
to normalize relations has been valued highly by PA documents (OSCE PA 2019a).
In 2017, the OSCE PA appointed an SR on Eastern Europe whose mandate
included “spheres of parliamentary diplomacy, confidence building, reconciliation
and dialogue facilitation”. Although this position was held by former OSCE PA
Vice-President Kent Harstedt, the SR did not appear to be especially active and
the position ceased to exist after Harstedt departed the PA (for the mandates of the
individual SRs, see OSCE PA 2019b; OSCE Parliamentary Assembly International
Secretariat 2019).
The position of the SR on Mediation, created in 2016 for some years pursued
conflict-related dialogue. The office was held by former OSCE PA President and
ex-Finish Foreign Minister Ilkka Kanerva with a mandate to strengthen “the PA’s
preparedness for mediation and dialogue facilitation” (for the mandates and initial
reports, see OSCE PA 2019b). SR Kanerva has concentrated on raising the profile
of parliamentary mediation among influential OSCE bodies (OSCE PA Interna-
tional Secretariat 2017), and from early she did emphasize the potential outbreak
of Transnistrian conflict in Moldova (Kanerva 2016).
In 2000 the OSCE PA established a specific mechanism to foster conflict-related
dialogue inMoldova, a Parliamentary Team “to promote peace, stability and the rule
of law…, while affirming the unity of the State, by engaging in and promoting
dialogue between…different sections of the Moldovan population” and with a
priority on resolving the status of Transnistria (OSCE PA 2010a), which managed to
establish contacts between both conflict parties (OSCE PA 2010b; OSCE PA Inter-
national Secretariat 2012). High-level meetings with the two conflict parties were
also held by then-PA President Petros Efthymiou (OSCE PA International Secre-
tariat 2011b), who emphasized conflict dialogue within the OSCE area as his priority
(OSCEPA International Secretariat 2011a, 2016a), as did the then PAPresident Ilkka
Kanerva in 2015 towards Duma representatives. He lamented the “absence of [our]
Russian colleagues from the Annual Session” in the aftermath of the Annexation
of Crimea. He valued “the important contribution of the Russian Delegation to the
OSCE PA” and framed their prospective return to the PA as part of the PA’s attempt
to contribute to “a diplomatic resolution to the crisis in and around Ukraine” (OSCE
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PA International Secretariat 2015). Similar inclusive approaches towards Russia have
been pursued by other PA presidents (e.g. OSCE PA International Secretariat) and
build on earlier traditions as could have been shown after the Russian-Georgian war
in 2008 (OSCE PA International Secretariat 2008a, c).
Overall, the OSCE PA contributed differently to the conflict-related dialogues in
both states. In the case ofGeorgia, frustrationover theSR’s lackof success dominated.
In contrast, the Parliamentary Team on Moldova initiated dialogue with the conflict
parties more successfully. Evidently, the OSCE PA’s parliamentary independence,
which it frames as an advantage, was only fruitful in the Moldovan case. As for the
PA’s involvement with the Russian delegation, its attempts to maintain close and
positive cooperation has been evident.
In times of growing alienation between Russia and other OSCE participating
states, hence,we arewitnessing somedegree of erosion of the relation betweenRussia
and other European states. Nevertheless, the OSCE’s PA strength is its maintenance
of channels of communication among members of parliament of all member states,
by keeping the dialogue on equal footing and without pressure to produce a specific
outcome of any kind.
1.9.1 Status-Seeking, Shelter-Seeking and Hegemonic
Strategies
TheOSCE PA does not provide detailed information about the activities or initiatives
of individual MPs. Hence, there is limited empirical knowledge about its Georgian
and Moldovan MPs status- and/or shelter-seeking strategies. Nevertheless, high-
level authorities in both countries have been observed cooperating with representa-
tives of the OSCE PA and thus appreciate the PA’s support for dialogue-based solu-
tions to the conflicts (e.g. OSCE PA International Secretariat 2008b, 2010, 2011a,
2018). However, there is no indication that representatives from Georgia or Moldova
consider the OSCE PA an institution capable of elevating their international status
or providing shelter against threats. This was apparent when the SR on the South
Caucasus remarked in early 2018: “My assumption that parliamentarians are more
flexible and more free to embrace new options and ideas was wrong in this setting—
when it comes to issues of high sensitivity, related to national security and core
national interests, Parliaments inevitably respect and follow strictly the general line
established by Presidents and governments” (Vigenin 2018).
Although this pessimistic view is mainly directed towards the SR’s experiences
in pursuing dialogue in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, his findings are relevant
to all three South Caucasian countries. The SR’s conclusion identifies fundamental
skepticism towards international parliamentary diplomacy in conflict-prone settings.
In high-level politics, members of the OSCE PA tend to primarily follow their
own government’s foreign policy priorities instead of crossing the lines of national
interests towards broader joint parliamentary coalition-building.
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In addition, there is no evidence that RussianMPs pursued a strategy related to the
country’s conflicts with other OSCE states. On the one hand, Russian MPs showed
their willingness to dialogue with GeorgianMPs at the Fall Session 2008 (see above)
shortly after the Russian-Georgian war and repeated this after the start of the hybrid
war in Ukraine (see Gawrich 2017). On the other hand, there is no indication that
the Russian delegation attempted to divert the OSCE PA’s conflict perception.
1.10 Conclusion
Studies on IPI’s parliamentary diplomacy strategies regarding territorial conflicts
between small states and a hegemon require improved conceptual foundations and
empirical tests. This article sets out to identify the strategies with which both PAs
operate to address conflicts between member states as well as the outcome of these
strategies. Such an approach allows for the following results:
The Supervision of compliance is a fundamental strategy in both PAs, albeit far
better equipped in PACE than in the OSCE PA. Both PAs deployed their supervision
strategies to address the conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, yet the
PAs only intermittently engaged the issue. More generally, Russia’s hegemony was
frequently monitored and criticized mainly as it pertained to severe regime-related
breaches of both IOs’ norms. However, criticism regarding the conflict regions was
not central to either PAs’ Russia-related documents.
As far as conflict-related dialogue is concerned, both IOs showed similar ambi-
tions and self-perceptions to act as platforms for dialogue for all conflict parties.
Consequently, the ambition to facilitate conflict-related dialogue between high-level
authorities from the small states, the secessionist regions and Russia was visible in
both IPIs and went hand in hand with the PAs’ overestimation of their own capac-
ities. Their rhetoric revealed a struggle to define their own roles as mediators as
opposed tomere intergovernmental arenas. However, although there is little evidence
of progress in conflict management, the effects of international parliamentary discus-
sions on the conflicts and effects of international parliamentary confidence building
through dialogue with authorities might not be measurable as they do not provide
visible effects. Nevertheless, more influential intergovernmental formats (e.g. the 5
+ 2 talks in Moldova and the Geneva International Discussions on Georgia) were
also unsuccessful.
This article’s findings have shown there is a tangible gap between the IPIs’ percep-
tions of their capacities asmediation platforms between conflict parties. Furthermore,
the Georgian and Moldovan MPs alongside their national counterparts do not (in the
case of the OSCE PA) or only to a low degree as in the case of PACE, perceive the
PAs as adequate havens for shelter or support in their conflicts. This is mirrored by
Russia’s reactions as the regional hegemon involved in the conflicts. In the case of
PACE, Russia modestly rejected any blame and attempted to pursue diversionary
tactics. In the case of the OSCE PA, there was no need to do so.
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To conclude, three issues are now clear: First, the presumed benefit of IPI MPs
in dialogue facilitation cannot be confirmed. One explanation could be that PACE
could only feebly suspend conflict parties (a now defunct tool), while the OSCE PA
never could. Second, the Georgian and Moldovan MPs have shown little effort in
encouraging the IPIs’ supervision and dialoguemechanisms. Thismight be explained
by an inability to garner the support ofMPs frombigger andmore influential countries
or their relative inexperience at the international level. Third, however, although we
cannot measure substantial effects, IPIs must be conceptualized as part of multi-track
diplomacy in international conflict management, which has been mostly overlooked.
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Chapter 2
Peacebuilding in the OSCE
Region—An Analysis
of the Juxtaposition Between the Conflict
Prevention Center with the United
Nations Peacebuilding Fund
Maurício Vieira
Abstract This chapter introduces the perspective on juxtaposition to explain how
different international organizations cooperate through similar structural depart-
ments. Juxtaposition is presented based on an analysis of a relationship between
the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) with the Conflict Prevention
Center (CPC) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
with regard to how these respective institutional departments deal with their own
notion on peacebuilding. Through a qualitative analysis on both the PBF and CPC,
juxtaposition enables our comprehension to identify peacebuilding dynamics in both
organizations and how the UN and the OSCE collectively design strategies aiming
peace.
Keywords Juxtaposition · OSCE · Peacebuilding · United nations · Conflict
prevention
2.1 Introduction
In October 2016, the United Nations (UN) Department for Political and Peace-
building Affairs (DPPA) launched a Liaison Office in Vienna, Austria, in order
to deepen the cooperation with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) (DPPA 2020a). The launch of the office was justified based on the
need “to advance the Secretary-General’s objective of strengthening partnerships
under Chapter VIII [of the UN Charter]” (DPPA 2020a), in which the DPPA and
the OSCE would be collectively motivated “by the shared goal to strengthen inter-
national security and prevent conflicts using multilateral tools and mechanisms of
high-level dialogue” (DPPA 2020a).
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Despite the fact that a partnership between the UN and the OSCE was initiated in
1992 when both international organizations decided to work together in the promo-
tion of peace; launching the office in Vienna is the materialization of a collective
effort between the UN-DPPA and the OSCE in the field of international security and
prevention of conflicts, based in three main fronts:
First, the UN-OSCE Liaison Office channels expertise from various departments
of the UN Secretariat to the OSCE, including by ensuring effective information
sharing on relevant peace and security issues as well as relevant policy documents;
Second, the inter-agency forums are regularly organized to facilitate and support
high-level and working-level engagements between the OSCE and the UN;
Third, strengthen senior- and working-level engagements between both organi-
zations on various thematic issues on the European continent (DPPA 2020a).
The importance of launching an office in Vienna, as part of a UN’s broad role
in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, reflects its policy-design embedded in the
improvement of its institutional capacity in dealing with emergent conflict needs and,
also, on how the UN could benefit from the engagement of different organizations
on this issue.
As of writing, Europe is facing the recurrence of hostilities in Eastern Europe,
and, among other places, theNagorno-Karabakh conflict betweenArmenia andAzer-
baijan was—and still is—“one of the several conflicts in the post-Soviet space where
the OSCE became involved as a mediator in the peace negotiations” (Gasparyan
2019: 2). Despite the fact that Russia has played a prominent role in the peace
process between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in 2020 over the Nagorno-Karabakh
territory, the Russian involvement in the conflict had an impact on sidelining not only
the Western powers (Roth and Safi 2020) but also the role the OSCE and the UN
could play in mediating this conflict. This perspective becomes more comprehen-
sible when taking some historic aspects of this conflict. On the side of the UN, the
institution has failed when its involvement intended to bring an end to the fighting
among Armenians and Azerbaijanis in 1993 (Bekiarova and Armencheva 2019).
From the OSCE’s side, its role through the mediation efforts led by the Minsk
Group proved to be not successful in producing a permanent solution to other
conflicts, such as in Eastern Ukraine (Askerov 2020, see also chapter by Oberson
in this volume). Since the OSCE Minsk Group is co-chaired by the United States,
Russia, and France, three of the fiveUN permanent members of the Security Council,
their role is challenged because a sustainable resolution of the conflicts and a peaceful
settlement of the conflict puts them in difficult positions, both in the UN Security
Council and as members of the Minsk-Group, because they are co-Chairs who were
engaging with both sides in the conflict (OSCE 2020e, f, g, h).
This historical context of the conflict reflects not only that their role in the Minsk
Groups was the first conflict-mediation effort undertaken by the OSCE, but that the
OSCE failing in this mediation “would hurt the institution’s credibility to mediate
other conflicts” (Cavanaugh 2017: 5). Cavanaugh’s argument goes straightforward in
criticizing the role of the Minsk Group, since their engagement proved to be “unable
to revitalize the peace process” (Cavanaugh 2017: 1). Such criticism complements
what Rácz (2020) points out about the role of multilateral diplomacy in mediating
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the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. For him, multilateral diplomatic efforts have little
chance of achieving a ceasefire, as well, in the case of the OSCE, it “finds itself
hamstrung by its model of consensus-based decision-making, which prevents it from
acting quickly when an armed conflict erupts between its own member states” (Rácz
2020: 2).
2.2 Juxtaposition
Embedded in this challenging scenario of finding a conflict resolution and a peace-
building niche in and for Europe, both the UN and the OSCE are in what I call a
juxtaposition. Juxtaposition, in the scope of this chapter, reflects a dynamic between
external offices from, at least, one of the institutions involved in an interchange-
able cooperation through a joint-work on expertise, decisions and partnership. In
more pragmatic terms, juxtaposition occurs, for example, when the UN establishes
a Liaison Office in Vienna to deal exclusively on issues where the OSCE plays
a role through its Conflict Prevention Center. Hence, the juxtaposition builds on
the UN experience on peace and security to improve its role in the region OSCE
has an expertise. As the UN can be considered a peacebuilding actor due to the
way the organization coopted the term into its institutional practices and because
its peacebuilding role is based in a partnership with its UN agencies, such as FAO,
UNICEF, UNWOMEN, UNDP andWFP, this juxtaposition perspective between the
UNand theOSCEreveals another dynamic level of cooperationbetween international
organizations.
Now, the challenge of peacebuilding within the OSCE through its CPC hinges on
the fact that it also promotes peacebuilding and post-conflict rehabilitation (OSCE
2020j), associating it to a post-conflict phase in which there is a need for a nuanced
approach for promoting and achieving peace as a process after the identification of
the societal, economic, political and humanitarian chaos. In this case, juxtaposition,
here,works as a process ofmutual reinforcement of institutional beliefs and practices.
Although these threemain objectives aim to reinforceUNandOSCE jointwork in the
field of peace, security and cooperation, I argue that, in the scope of this chapter, the
Liaison Office in Vienna represents a UN desire to diffuse its peacebuilding agenda
in the OSCE region through mutual sharing and learning from what was conceived
by the role of the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). The PBF is an inherent part of
the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA), in conjunction with the Peacebuilding
Commission (PBC) and thePeacebuildingSupportOffice (PBSO),whichwas created
in 2005 by the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly twin-resolutions
(UNDoc. S/RES/1645 (2005), UNDoc. A/RES/60/180) to provide financial support
to countries facing post-conflict challenges.
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During its functioning since 2005 until October 2020, the UN-PBF allocated
funding to 61 countries.1 From this list, only seven are OSCE-participating states,
namely Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH), Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro, Serbia,
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and with the inclusion of financial support to Kosovo
based on the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).2 Although they represent
a limited number in face of the 57 OSCE-participating states at the time of writing,
what is in question in this analysis is not how many OSCE-participating States
implement peacebuilding projects or programs with funding from the PBF, but that
funding allocations by the PBF evidences, on the one hand, a common ground of a
UN peacebuilding agenda these OSCE-participating States are being benefited from,
and, on the other hand, a dynamic on money flows, which enables a comprehension
of which UN-member states are the main ones engaged in financially supporting
peacebuilding in the OSCE region. It is important to mention that the PBF, since
then, does not provide a role in specific regions, such as the Caucasus or in the
conflict involving Azerbaijan and Armenia, when compared to the role of the PBC
in the Sahel region of Africa, due to its importance in mitigating environmental
degradation and climate change (Sherman and Krampe 2020; Krampe 2019).
However, a scenario for the PB fund could be an important aspect for future
engagement in the OSCE region due to the need for building resilience in the context
of post-peace agreement among Azerbaijanis and Armenians led by Russia in 2020.
Therefore, my point is not that the OSCE plays a role in the functioning of the PBF
to some extent, but that there are different levels of juxtaposition in the dynamics
in which they co-exist. Such juxtaposition evidences some nuances to what extent
the peacebuilding needs of some OSCE-participating States face interference in the
construction of a common agenda for recovery and reconstruction through the UN
in the OSCE region; and, also, that being an OSCE-participating States is a labelled
condition in which such a label cannot be easily detached from these countries even
though they interact in different international organizations rather than the OSCE.
1 From this list, 6 countries were exclusive on the agenda of the PBC: Burundi, Central African
Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone; while the remaining ones engagedwith
the PBF throughfinancial support only,which are:DemocraticRepublic of theCongo,Côte d’Ivoire,
Somalia,Mali,Kyrgyzstan, Sudan,Niger, South Sudan,Yemen,Guatemala, Colombia,Madagascar,
Chad, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea, Myanmar, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Haiti, Gambia,
Comoros, Cameroon, Solomon Island, Lebanon, El Salvador, Libya, Mauritania, Honduras, Philip-
pines, BiH, Tajikistan, Togo, Zimbabwe, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nigeria, Albania, Tunisia, Congo,
Rwanda, Ethiopia, Kosovo, Uzbekistan, Lesotho, Gabon, Kenya, Benin, Tuvalu, Serbia, Marshall
Island, Kiribati, Timor-Leste, Montenegro, Tanzania.
2 The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) decides and authorizes UNMember States and
relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo (UN
Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
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2.3 Juxtaposition and Peacebuilding
The notion of juxtaposition between the UN and the OSCE resembles the similarities
of the work from the PBF and the OSCE’s Conflict Prevention Center (CPC). Never-
theless, before addressing the juxtaposition among them, it is important to point out
that, historically, both organizations evidence a common background on juxtaposi-
tion through what became conceived of their partnership through the adoption of
the UN Security Council Resolution 1631 in 2005. That was the year that the UN
established its current Peacebuilding Architecture.
In the 2005 resolution, the UN Security Council expressed its determination to
further develop cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, such as
the OSCE—but also others such as the EU, AU or OAS—in maintaining inter-
national peace and security (OSCE Annual Review 2005 (2006a: 134), UN Doc.
S/RES/1631(2005)). Along with their partnership, the OSCE refers to itself as “the
largest and most inclusive regional organization under Chapter VIII of the UN
Charter” working closely with the UN through political consultations and practical
cooperation (OSCE Annual Review 2009 (2010: 105)).
A result is that today the UN and the OSCE work not only in improving their
aims collectively, but being pragmatic in furthering “high level political dialogue,
as well as working-level synergies, collaborating in a pragmatic, results-oriented
manner” (OSCE Annual Review 2013 (2014: 92)). As 2005 was the year UN and
OSCE enhanced each other multilaterally officially, 2015 was the year in which this
juxtaposition became more pragmatic.
In 2015, the OSCE consolidated its cooperation with the UN in areas such as the
conflict cycle, mediation and sustainable development (OSCE Annual Review 2015
(2016: 95)), and in the following year in 2016, enhanced the cooperation among them,
focused on priority areas such as peacekeeping and peacebuilding, disarmament and
transnational threats, tolerance and non-discrimination, as well as women, peace and
security (OSCE Annual Review 2016 (2017: 99).
Cooperation increased over the years, growing also through the number of
conflicts. In 2017, the enhanced interaction through the UN Liaison Office on Peace
and Security in Vienna contributed to further strengthening working contacts and
institutional dialogue (OSCE Annual Review 2017, 2018: 99), and in 2018, the
enduring partnership between the UN and the OSCE advanced in a number of
strategic areas that are critically important for peace and security in the OSCE region
(OSCE Annual Review 2018 (2019: 91)). In 2019, both organizations endorsed the
Joint Statement to Supplement the UN-OSCE Framework for Cooperation and Coor-
dination, in which the parties committed to further enhancing their cooperation in
the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of respect
for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law (OSCE Annual Review
2019 (2020k: 90)).
Against this backdrop and on the evolution of how the UN and OSCE combined
their strengthens through juxtaposition over the past decade, it becomes clear that
their aims and challenges have an encountering point marked by the applicability of
28 M. Vieira
the concept of peacebuilding, despite the fact that CPC and PBF were established in
different moments in time.
While the CPC was established by the Charter of Paris in 1990, the PBF was
embedded in the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2005. It is impor-
tant to emphasize, therefore, that, on the one hand, peacebuilding is a core concept for
the functioning of the PBF, since the entire Peacebuilding Architecture was institu-
tionally designed fromwhat became conceived by Boutros Ghali’s Agenda for Peace
(UN 1992). On the other hand, within the OSCE-CPC, peacebuilding emerges in a
fragmentedmanner, evidencing that it belongs to a conflict cycle approachwithin four
interrelated phases, namely: early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management
and post-conflict rehabilitation.
In essence, peacebuilding is generally defined and institutionally conceived as a
holistic approach aiming for peace,with a framework capable of intersecting different
levels of engagement in a conflict context. As defined, peacebuilding is a multi-
faceted task that implies a commitment to establishing the military, legal, political,
economic, structural, cultural and psychosocial conditions necessary to promote a
culture of peace in opposition to a culture of violence (Lambourne and Herro 2008:
279). The perspective Lambourne and Herro (2008) applies for peacebuilding comes
from what Galtung (1976) stated for this concept in the 1970s and on how the UN
framed it, making peacebuilding an international policy in which countries facing
post-conflict needswould have access to it. In a different point of view, peacebuilding
was never mentioned when the establishment of the CPC within the OSCE struc-
ture. Nevertheless, the role CPC plays as part of its conflict cycle approach makes
peacebuilding a coherent and holistic design for countries in need of “early warning,
conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation”.
Despite the differences, peacebuilding was conceived by the UN and the OSCE,
both organizations deal with peacebuilding in a way that enables applicability of this
concept into two complementary frameworks. My argument on this aspect refers to
the fact that, within the OSCE, peacebuilding is being put into practice through the
Conflict Prevention Center that, in parallel, has the support of the UN through the
Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). Since the PBF provides financial support to countries
facing post-conflict needs, this financial support the UN controls benefits some of
the OSCE-participating States, such as Albania, Bosnia &Herzegovina, Kyrgyzstan,
Montenegro, Serbia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the territory of Kosovo.
2.4 UN-OSCE Conflict Prevention Center
The idea of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre was established by the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) during the Paris Summit3 in
November 1990. It was as a collective commitment by CSCE-participating States
3 The Paris Summit took place on 19 November 1990 in Paris, and “marked a turning point in the
history of the CSCE in the post-Cold War era” (OSCE, 2020j). At the Summit, “the participating
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aiming to settle disputes by peaceful means (CSCE 1990: 5). At that time, Europe
was facing a collapse as a result of the end of the Cold War, and the CPC emerged
more as an agreement between the CSCE-participating States in which it would be
required to develop mechanisms for preventing and resolving conflicts among them
(CSCE 1990), rather than an institutional practice in the field of peacebuilding at
first glance.
As Ackerman (2003) explains, the end of the Cold War was a political aspect
that contributed to transforming the CSCE from an international regime to a regional
security organization, which made it increasingly engaged in the prevention and
management of conflicts. Although its focus was, primarily, at the intrastate level,
its preventive capacity role rested on the idea and the necessity to build constructive
and cooperative relationships on an interstate level in the Cold War era (Ackerman
2003: 6).
At the beginning of its establishment, the Charter of Paris expressed a desire
for an era of democracy, peace and unity in Europe and, within this context, the
CPC’s design was embedded to provide support with regard to the implementation
of confidence and security-building measures (Steinmeier 2016).4
Hence, the OSCE-CPC was not established within a specific peacebuilding
approach or strategy by the OSCE, which the OSCE never had. Nevertheless, its
historical process marked by a transition from the auspices of the CSCE to the OSCE
evidences where peacebuilding fits into its functioning. Its aims did not advance the
concept of peacebuilding within the CPC nor contribute to it in becoming a peace-
building actor in Europe. Any OSCE objectives in this matter are embedded in the
Ten Principles of the Final Act from 1975, which reaffirmed CSCE-participating
states’ “commitment to peace, security and justice” (CSCE 1975: 3).
As the Ten Principles are the landmark for comprehending much of the
CSCE/OCSE involvement in peace and security issues in Europe, I would affirm
that these principles are the first framework for identifying where peacebuilding lies
within the CPC. They congregate a holistic approach, varying from respect for the
rights inherent in sovereignty, to the inviolability of frontiers, peaceful settlement of
disputes, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and equal rights and
self-determination of peoples (CSCE 1975). In this regard, the establishment of the
CPC within the evolution of the CSCE to the OSCE was a process of aligning itself
with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations from 1945
(CSCE 1975: 4).
States signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, adding an active operational structure to the
OSCE role as a forum for negotiation and dialogue” (OSCE 2020j).
4 That are, first, mechanisms for consultation and co-operation as regards to unusual military
activities; secondly, the annual exchange of military information; thirdly, the communications
network; fourth, the annual implementation assessment meetings; and fifth, co-operation as regards
to hazardous incidents of a military nature (CSCE 1990).
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2.5 Communication Network
In addition, much of its role, initially conceived through the 1990 Charter of Paris,
focused on information sharing rather than any other institutional practice aiming at
stability in the region. Such an assumption is corroborated by the fact that a commu-
nications network is mentioned as the most successful aim within the CPC since it
“complements traditional diplomatic channels with secure and reliable infrastructure
that enables information exchange and dialogue” (OSCE 2020j). In the scope of this
chapter, information exchange and dialogue among diplomatic fields is one of the
main characteristics that enables juxtaposition within international organizations’
bureaucratic structures, since this is what posits them side by side in their respective
shared roles and partnerships.
At that stage, CPC was limited in providing a broader role for the advancement of
the term peacebuilding in the region. An improvement in its role came only when the
CSCE faced a transitional phase to the OSCE during the Budapest Summit in 1995.
As Cohen points out, while, on the one hand, the 1990 Charter of Paris marked the
transition from the OSCE’s role as a forum for negotiation in this confrontational era
to an organization for security through cooperation and the promotion of democracy;
on the other hand, the Budapest Summit Meeting “cast the OSCE as a ‘primary
instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management’, with a
‘flexible and dynamic’ approach” (Cohen 1999: 8–9).
Evidently, the assertion is that CPC had its role improved while advancing
concepts that relate to peacebuilding as a core element for its functioning So far, the
OSCE’s peacebuilding does not differ from the UN’s approach for peacebuilding,
Rather the OSCE’s design over a conflict cycle is the innovative aspect the organiza-
tion could contribute to the dynamic of conflict mediation. In this scenario, as Gheciu
explains, the OSCE “emerged (…) as the Euro-Atlantic security institution with a
clear and innovative mandate to promote a new, cooperative, and inclusive model
of security” (2008: 116). Thus the OSCE, in its own regional area, could enable the
emergence of newmechanisms, procedures and political instruments to facilitate this
role (Cohen 1999: 9).
As Gheciu (2008) argues based on the Charter of Paris, “the security discourse
articulated by the OSCE following the end of the Cold War is based on the assump-
tion that the establishment of stable liberal democracies is a key recipe for regional
stability and international security” (Gheciu 2008: 116). As the author continues, the
OSCE’s approach has been similar to, as well as, a source of inspiration to the EU
and NATO (Gheciu 2008: 116). And here I include the approach the UN applied for
over its 70 years as well, since these institutions have played—and still play—a role
on peace, security, political transitions and stability.
Although CPC emerged to work in the pursuit of collective problem-solving in
the former-CSCE region, it was not designed to become a static body under its
own domain. Following Cohen, the need to develop a more sophisticated conflict
prevention capacity necessitated strengthening of the political instruments and organs
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of the CSCE and a reconsideration of the types of intervention that would be feasible
(Cohen 1999: 8).5
AsCPC is inserted in aEuropean political contextmarked by challenging,mutable
and interventionist-driven approach. Embedded on the notion of conflict prevention,
crisis management, post-conflict peacebuilding, and peaceful settlement of conflicts
(Ackerman 2003: 5). Hence, in order to provide a more elicit explanation of these
reasons, one comes to George and McGee, who mentions that the dramatic rise in
the conflict that has been seen since the end of the Cold War has burdened the OSCE
with “the same challenge as all international organisations” (George and McGee
2006: 81). In this regard, as George and McGee evaluate, what emerged from this
period was a new, more sophisticated approach to conflict prevention which entailed
creating institutions, structures and tools to address the specific needs of the different
stages of the conflict cycle (2006: 84).
The OSCE Budapest Summit in 2006 was the momentum for reforming its struc-
ture while providing a more pragmatic role for the challenges Europe was facing
with the end of the Cold War. During the Summit, the participating member states
of the OSCE enabled an improvement of the CPC into a more pro-active role
in peace settlements in the region; an improved CPC scope with the adoption of
different conceptualizations to designate its role in a post-conflict European context
for rehabilitation.
Evidently, the post-conflict rehabilitation concept for the CPC brought it closer to
peacebuilding as a central aspect of its functioning. However, the OSCE has never
explicitly outlinedwhat “post-conflict”means andwhere the lines are drawn between
conflict management, conflict settlement and rehabilitation activities (George and
McGee 2006: 89). Despite some scholars arguing that there was vagueness in
these concepts within the role of the CPC, the process of institutionalizing peace-
building became expressed in 2011when theOSCE designed a framework for its role
embedded in a conflict cycle approach as it is expressed in the document Elements of
the Conflict Cycle, Related to Enhancing the OSCE’s Capabilities in Early Warning,
Early Action, Dialogue Facilitation andMediation Support, and Post-Conflict Reha-
bilitation (OSCE Doc. MC.DEC/3/11). The document is based on the Ministerial
Council (MC) Decision 3/11 during the Vilnius Meeting. Once again, the document
is an alignment of OSCE’s adherence to the Charter of the United Nations (OSCE
5 Since its emergence to date, CPC co-ordinates the activities of the OSCE’s field operations,
helping to address all phases of the conflict cycle through proactive guidance and advice on relevant
tools and instruments (OSCE Annual Report 2005 (2006a): 129; 2007 (2008): 92; 2013 (2014):
43; 2015 (2016): 32); assisting field operations in accordance with respective mandates, being a
focal point in the Secretariat for developing the OSCE’s role in the politico-military dimension
(OSCE Annual Report 2005 (2006a): 129; 2007 (2008): 92; 2013 (2014): 43; 2015 (2016): 32).
In addition, the CPC is responsible for supporting the Chairmanship, the OSCE Secretary General
and the decision-making bodies in implementing OSCE tasks in the areas of its conflict cycle
(OSCE Annual Reports 2005 (2006a: 129); 2007 (2008: 92); 2013 (2012): 43; 2015 (2016): 32;
2016 (2017): 36; 2017 (2018): 32; 2018 (2019): 32; 2019 (2020k): 32), while promoting regional
co-operation with other international organizations (OSCE Annual Report 2013 (2014): 43) aiming
to find lasting political settlements for existing conflicts (OSCE Annual Report 2019 (2020k: 32)).
32 M. Vieira
Doc. MC.DEC/3/11) and, most importantly, adequacy of its structure in the face of
the challenges in Europe.
But mechanisms of early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management
have always been at the core of the OSCE since early 1990s and were not new, and
did not go beyond the basic notion of peacebuilding. For Ackermann, such decisions
reflected a “timely document, as other international organizations have developed
their crisis- and conflict-response capacities over the years, especially in the case
of the European Union” (2013: 9), which required a “concrete action by the OSCE
Secretary General, in consultation and co-operation with the OSCE Chairmanship
and other executive structures” (Ackerman 2013: 9).
2.6 Peacebuilding Under the CPC Policy
TheOSCE recognizes the need for adequacy in conjunctionwith the role of theUNon
the same issues of peace and security, and builds upon a juxtaposition processwith the
UN, creating a space where both institutions can provide support to each other since
they work under the same conceptualization and institutional approaches.6 Conflict
prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict rehabilitation and peace-building strate-
gies involve efforts to address violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
as well as intolerance and discrimination, and the absence of strong democratic
institutions and the rule of law, as highlighted by the OSCE today (OSCE Doc.
MC.DEC/3/11, page 2–3).
An illustration of the OSCE involvement in peacebuilding through its conflict
cycle approach is, on the one hand, through the inclusion of an early warning
approach; and, on the other hand, through the human dimension within the missions
the organization deploys. Examples from the OSCE’s engagement in Ukraine,
Caucasus, Tajikistan—to mention a few—and its role on border issues in Fergana
Valley between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia are an
evidence of both perspectives of engagement (OSCE Annual Report 2006a, 2007,
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020k).
Nevertheless, the challenge early warning and human dimension posit to the OSCE
reveals its issue of concern or, in other terms, its weakness or fragility: on how to deal
with mediation on themes and situations that threaten not only the European territory
but the organization as a whole. This becomes more visible during the annexation of
Crimea by Russia in mid-March 2014. Such an episode came as a surprise to most
analysts who concluded that the absence of the OSCE in Crimea was the reason that
6 Such a perspective is corroborated by what peacebuilding embraces for the OSCE’s action in
both conceptual and pragmatic terms based on Galtung’s (1976) contribution, when he enabled
a comprehension of the term within three stages in the promotion on peace as an interventionist
model: peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. Based on his study, the term peacebuilding
reflects a different connotation from the previous two, in which it embraces structures that must
be found in order to remove the root causes of civil wars and, hence, being capable to offering
alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur (Galtung 1976: 298).
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made the international community blind and unable to engage in early crisis response
on that specific case (Tanner 2016: 242). In the case of the Caucasus, which includes
the Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia/South Ossetia conflicts, the OSCE paved the
way forward by trying to capitalize on the momentum for seeking a comprehensive
political settlement (VanHoye 1999: 256). Although theOSCE’s role became limited
to being an actor capable of providing a direct influence on these issues, its role is now
more oriented towards a post-conflict phase in the region. The case of Tajikistan’s
borders differs to some extent, especially because the OSCE is permanently involved
in the training of Tajik, Kyrgyz and Afghan border officials, aiming to detect and
intercept illegal border movements and helping them to uncover chemicals used for
drug production that are smuggled to Tajikistan from China or Kyrgyzstan (OSCE
2020l).
This multidimensional role of the OSCE in these conflict settings above explains
the reason for thinking of a juxtaposition within the OSCE-CPC and UN-PBF. This
perspective depends on the notion that when the CPC was established in the 1990s,
that period was also marked by the institutionalization of the term peacebuilding into
the UN roots through what was conceived by Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace in
1992. At that time, peacebuilding was defined in the context of the aftermath of a
civil war as an ad continuum strategy responsible for “rebuilding the institutions and
infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful
mutual benefit among nations formerly at war” (UN 1992: 2).
Since its emergence in the UN Agenda for Peace, peacebuilding was enlarged by
the Brahimi Report which defined it as an activity which is undertaken on the far
side of the conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for
building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war
(UN 2000: 3).
Looking at the above, one can conclude that OSCE-CPC was not built under a
peacebuilding approach. But its functioning enhanced an institutional practice on
peace through what became conceived as an institutional framework in between the
lines, which gain strength when other international organizations enhance the term
through their own practices.
2.7 Juxtaposition in the Field of Peacebuilding
The rationale behind the juxtaposition in the field of peacebuilding lies on what
became conceived in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter from 1945 which delimitates
UN involvement with other regional organizations. As the former OSCE Secretary-
General Lamberto Zannier in 2015 pointed out, Chapter VIII evidences an encour-
agement from the side of the UN-member states that have entered into regional
arrangements such as the OSCE (Zannier 2015: 97). It makes every effort to achieve
pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such
regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council and, an enforcement
action (Zannier 2015: 97). The UN Security Council in return could utilize the OSCE
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to keep fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and
security.
When the UN provided such an arrangement in its foundational Charter, it did not
consider how this joint-workwould function at that time, but that such a juxtaposition
would be required for an enhancement and improvement of its respective institutional
practices. As the 90 s are considered a decade marked by a high level of instability
in the world due to geopolitical changes after 1989-collapse, the UN was confronted
at that time “with an unprecedented number of challenges to stability and peace in
many regions of the world” (Zannier 2015: 97).Within this context, as Zannier points
out, new approaches to peacemaking and peacekeeping were emerging as part of the
UN role on this matter. Consequently, the UN interests in improving its engagement
with regional organizations due to their regional expertise gained in attraction and
importance (2015: 97). From that time on, the UN-OSCE joint-work improved what
I refer to as juxtaposition among them while defining key strategies in the pursuit
of common achievements. After the resolution that gave birth to their joint-work, in
1993 both organizations agreed on the design of the Framework for cooperation and
coordination between the United Nations Secretariat and the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (UN Doc. A/48/185).
Therefore, the juxtaposition between the UN and OSCE can be seen as a result
of international challenges calling for “new approaches to peacemaking and peace-
keeping. Zannier argues that over the past decades the UN and the OSCE have
worked together, experienced episodes of success and failure, and shared lessons
learned” (Zannier 2015: 97).With regard to current conflicts, “lessons learned” can be
applied to the notion that organizations build their institutional capacity in combining
successes and failures through the improvement of their partnership.
The strength of the juxtaposition between the UN and the OSCE is in the area
of post-conflict recovery through joint Commissions. The resolution points out that
the Peacebuilding Commission has been an important opportunity for cooperation
and close contact with regional and subregional organizations in post-conflict peace-
building and recovery (UN Doc. S/RES/1631 (2005)). In this regard, juxtaposition
between the UN and the OSCE through the establishment of the Peacebuilding
Commission is taken as an important aspect of their role in the field of peacebuilding.
Through the resolution, the UN was, just to mention a few, stressing the impor-
tance of developing regional and subregional organizations’ ability to deploy peace-
keeping forces rapidly in support of UN peacekeeping operations and requesting the
UN Secretary-General to include, in his regular reporting to the Security Council
on peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations under its mandate, assessments of
progress in the cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional
organizations. As it becomes evident, juxtaposition in this case reflects a process in
which monitoring and evaluation are inherent part building expertise, establishing
cooperation and working through a common agreement on information sharing.
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The second landmark dates to August 2013, when the UNSC Presidential State-
ment underscored the importance of further developing and strengthening co-
operation between the UN and regional organizations in the fields of conflict early
warning, prevention (UN Doc. S/PRST/2013/12).
In my perspective, the need for enhancing juxtaposition between the UN and the
OSCE lies in the notion that the OSCE is a security organization that has much to
offer since it is embedded in a comprehensive security concept encompassing three
main dimensions of security: politico-military, economic-environmental and human
dimensions (Zennier 2015: 99). Hence, it is an organization built on principles that
reinforce the UN-led international order while maintaining close contact at senior
and operational levels with numerous UN agencies and institutions (Zennier 2015:
102). These two landmarks gain relevance when the Peacebuilding Fund started its
operationalization through the financing of peacebuilding projects in Albania, BiH,
Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro, Serbia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the Kosovo territory.
2.8 Financing and Building Peace
The above-mentioned Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is an inherent part of what became
labelled as the Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) under the domain of the UN,
in conjunction with the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Peacebuilding
Support Office (PBSO). It was originally conceived when the United Nations’ Secu-
rity Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) approved the resolutions
establishing the PBC in December 2005 (UN Doc. S/RES/1645 (2005), UN Doc.
A/RES/60/180).
In the beginning, the PBF was designed to be a multiyear standing fund for post-
conflict peacebuilding and to be funded by voluntary contributions. Its focus was
on the immediate release of resources needed to launch peacebuilding activities and
the availability of appropriate financing for recovery as well as on the support of
interventions that were considered critical to the peacebuilding process ((UN Doc.
S/RES/1645 (2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180), UN Doc. A/60/984).
Despite the fact that the PBF was designed in late 2005, it gained a formal struc-
ture only eight months after the adoption of the UNSC and UNGA’s decisions on
the PBC in August 2006. At that time, the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
launched the Arrangements for Establishing the Peacebuilding Fund, which was
a document that explained the whole design of the PBF. Financing is an impor-
tant aspect for peacebuilding since it comes attached to an ideology on what the
institution decides must be financed. Money is designated for implementing and
disseminating a common agenda, even though this agenda aims at the promotion
of peacebuilding. PBF “constitutes a global fund of monies received from volun-
tary contributions, designed to support several country situations simultaneously”
(Lambourne and Herro 2008: 282).
Response Facilities are yet other tools in this context, for example the Immediate
Response Facility (IRF) “is designed for wherever peacebuilding opportunities arise
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in the immediate aftermath of political crisis or conflict” (PBSO 2014: 9); and the
Peacebuilding Response Facility (PRF), “is applied within several years following
the end of a conflict to support national efforts and consolidate peacebuilding” (PBSO
2014: 9).
The difference between them depends on the amount of money donated to a
specific country and the timeframe to develop the peacebuilding project or program.
Since 2005, the PBF has provided financial support to 61 countries and seven of them
are the unique ones that are OSCE-participating states, as it is in the case of Albania,
BiH, Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro, Serbia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan; with support also to
the Kosovo territory.
The OSCE role in these countries varies from an agenda centered on justice and
electoral reform, the rule of law and progress towards gender equality in Albania
(OSCE 2020k: 56), to environmental governance and the consolidation of demo-
cratic society in BiH (OSCE 2020k: 58). From intercommunity dialogue and gender
equality and youth participation in Kosovo to strengthening democratic institutions
and building a free, resilient and professional media in Montenegro, and from an
accountable security sector in combating organized crime in Serbia (OSCE 2020k:
60–64). Countering terrorism and transnational threats and border management in
Kyrgyzstan and in Tajikistan, and so-called transnational threats, transparency in
governance, fighting corruption, combating money laundering in Uzbekistan are
part of this mechanism (OSCE 2020k: 80–86).
As Table 2.1 evidences below, 25 projects were financed by the PBF in these
respective countries, Kyrgyzstan being the one that received more funding for
more diversity-themed projects, emphasizing what the UN peacebuilding agenda
Table 2.1 OSCE-participating States benefited by funding from the PBF
Country Project theme n of projects Amount in US$
Albania Emergency—W3 1 2,999,745
BiH Emergency—W3 3 5,933,294
Kyrgyzstan Democratic Governance 6 8,921,524
Security 6 5,424,835
Youth Employment/Empowerment 3 4,605,329
Public Administration 1 950,200
PBF Support 1 551,653
Emergency—W3 17 23,038,916
Kosovo Emergency—W3 1 2,772,780
Montenegro Emergency—W3 1 946,335
Serbia Emergency—W3 1 1,304,364
Uzbekistan Emergency—W3 1 2,199,370
Tajikistan Emergency—W3 2 4,600,000
Source UNDP-MPTF (2020)
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is, centered on issues of democratic governance, security, the role of youth, and
public administration, just to mention a few.
In addition, the emergency relief (W3) evidenced above is a type of financial
support common to the three countries. On this point, I would emphasize that emer-
gency per se is a type of funding that prioritizes the UN peacebuilding agenda under
the main clusters evidenced previously but that has a limited amount of money and
faces an urgent need.
In the case of BiH, for example, Dialogue for the future: Promoting Coexistence
and Diversitywas its emergency financial need, in which the project implemented by
UNICEF, UNDP and UNESCO in mid-July 2014 would create spaces for dialogue
that will enable a country-wide peacebuilding process that promotes coexistence,
trust building and appreciation of diversity; increase participation, awareness and
influence of youth in policy dialogue on issues impacting B&H’s development and
reform agenda; ensure that education supports greater social cohesion; and that
citizens and communities advance common peacebuilding goals through culture
(UNDP-MPTF 2020).
When this project was implemented in BiH, the OSCE mission was facing anti-
government protests that shook the country in February, and devastating floods and
landslides led to the largest post-war humanitarian crisis in May (OSCE Annual
Report 2014: 58). One of the responses was to invest in the empowerment and
capacity of Youth. The OSCE established the region’s first Youth Advisory Group
in line with the Swiss Chairmanship priority on youth involvement (OSCE Annual
Report 2014: 58). The purpose was to empower youth and stimulating new ideas
within the Mission that would serve as a model to be replicated elsewhere in the
region (OSCE Annual Report 2014: 58).
Although the CPC and the PBF were not officially partners in the pursuit of
peacebuilding, the role of the OSCE mission in BiH at the same moment the PBF
finances a project on enhancing youth role in policy dialogue reflect a synergy that
the OSCE designed as part of its approach to peace and to what had been designed
by the PBF as a UN model for peacebuilding. In parallel to this project in BiH,
the financial support by the PBF also benefited Montenegro and Serbia, while they
were implementing the “Dialogue for the Future”, which aimed for building social
cohesion in and betweenBiH,Montenegro and Serbia. Thismeans that some projects
under the PBF bring an integrative component while dealing with conflict issues that
tend to negatively spread to neighboring countries or territories.
The neighboring country ofKosovo faced similar challenges. The PBF allowed for
investing in the project Empowering Youth for a Peaceful, Prosperous, and Sustain-
able Future in Kosovo, which reverberates to the role OSCE plays in the territory.
And that youth also became an issue of concern in Albania, with the PBF approved
project on “Supporting the Western Balkan’s collective leadership on reconcilia-
tion: building capacity and momentum for the Regional Youth Cooperation Office
(RYCO)”.
In Central Asia, in the conflict zone of the Fergana Valley, the inclusion of Uzbek-
istan under the PBF was for the implementation of Youth for Social Harmony in the
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Fergana Valley”, aiming at achieving social cohesion within neighboring communi-
ties. Across the border in Tajikistan, the Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable
Peace and Development was an emergency project under the cluster of security the
PBF financed for, and co-implemented by, the FAO, UNICEF, UNWOMEN, UNDP
and WFP in 2015. It aims to increase cooperation and trust between communities in
pilot Tajik-Kyrgyz village clusters towards mitigating immediate risks of renewed
cross-border violence (UNDP-MPTF 2020).
Although throughout the OSCE region the UN involvement through its peace-
building funding apparatus is sensitive to such cross-border projects, this specific
theme was an often recurring one under the role of the OSCE in Central Asia. The
Desk in Central Asia contributed to a CPC-organized expert assessment mission
to Tajikistan in order to identify areas for assistance in strengthening border secu-
rity and management (OSCE Annual Report 2006: 90). Later, it worked with the
Centre in Dushanbe and the Tajikistan authorities on the development of border-
related projects aimed at strengthening Tajikistan’s borders (OSCE Annual Report
2007: 93). In the year of the implementation of the project in Tajikistan through PBF
funding, the OSCE office in Tajikistan continued to lead the unique “international
initiative providing capacity-building support of an operational, planning and prac-
tical nature for border security and management to the Tajik, Afghan and Kyrgyz
border services” (OSCE Annual Report 2015: 86).
In the context of the project financed by the PBF, the OSCE office in that country
focused on improving border agencies’ abilities to detect and interdict illegal cross-
border movements across both the Tajik-Afghan and Tajik-Kyrgyz borders (OSCE
Annual Report 2015: 86). As the PBF finances projects that aim to address emergent
issues based on what have been considered challenging aspects for the role of the
OSCE, projects under the PBF do not start from scratch, rather they are built upon
needs already mapped by the OSCE in which the PBF engage with.
In the case of Kyrgyzstan, a country within the OSCE region that has benefited
the most from the PBF, the Desk office has implemented 17 emergency projects in
the context of peacebuilding agenda (Table 2.1). Examples are projects that aim at
reinforcing security matters,7 youth and women,8 and public administration9 issues
7 On security, the project approved was Infrastructure for Peace - Policy Dialogue and Preventive
Action (Kyrgyzstan).
8 On youth and women, PBF approved the projects Empowering Youth, Women and Vulnerable
Communities to Contribute to Peacebuilding and Reconciliation in Kyrgyzstan, the one on Empow-
ering Youth to Promote Reconciliation and Diversity (Kyrgyzstan); Women Building Peace, Trust
and Reconciliation in Kyrgyzstan;Women as Peaceful Voters &Women as Candidates (Kyrgyzstan);
and Building the evidence base to facilitate responsive gender policy and programs for equality
and lasting peace in Kyrgyzstan, Women and Girls as Drivers for Peace and Prevention of Radical-
ization in Kyrgyzstan, Youth as Agents of Peace and Stability in Kyrgyzstan (NUNO), Addressing
Social Disparity and Gender Inequality to Prevent Conflicts in New Settlements, Cameras in hand:
Transformation and empowerment of Kyrgyzstani girls and boys, Kyrgyzstan’s youth cohesion and
interaction towards Uzbekistan, Strengthening capacity of young women and men in Kyrgyzstan to
promote peace and security, and Empowering women.
9 On public administration: the project is Administration of Justice (Kyrgyzstan).
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in the country; combined with projects on minor issues such as natural resources10
and media.11
Since the PBF became involved in the OSCE region through the financing
of projects considered of great importance for the role in Kyrgyzstan, the PBF
also financed a similar project in the neighboring Tajikistan under the same
title: Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development. These
similar projects in both countries are being implemented by UN agencies: FAO,
UNICEF, UNWOMEN, UNDP and WFP. In both countries, these projects “aims to
increase cooperation and trust between communities in pilot Tajik-Kyrgyz village
clusters towards mitigating immediate risks of renewed cross-border violence.”
(UNDP-MPTF 2020).
As cross-border violence and conflicts are a common challenge for both Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan, not divergent, this issue of concern was a recurrent one with regard
to the engagement of the OSCE-CPC in that country. The scenario was marked by a
role played by the Central Asia Deskwhich conducted a Barrier-2015 border security
exercise in August 2015 in partnership between the Centre and Kyrgyz authorities,
and in close co-ordination with the OSCEOffice in Tajikistan (OSCEAnnual Report
2015: 84).
The examples taken from the projects financed by the PBF in BiH, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan and, in parallel, through the role and engagement of the CPC in these
respective countries enable an understanding of where lies the juxtaposition between
the UN and the OSCE in the field of peacebuilding.
The analysis is based on the first decade of the PBA (2005–2015) and, hence,
prioritizes the same timeframe for analyzing CPC’s role in the same countries PBF
engaged with. There is no information of close collaboration among the PBF and the
CPC with regard to this specific peacebuilding work. It does not neglect the fact that
the PBF and the CPC coexist, but that the partnership among them is restricted to a
partnership of a different UN department rather than the UN Peacebuilding Archi-
tecture. As the OSCE Annual Report 2007 already points out, the experiences in
mediation and conflict resolution among the UN and the OSCE includes a coopera-
tion with the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Geneva Centre for
Security Policy (GCSP) in organizing high-level consultations to draw key lessons in
the OSCE’s area (OSCE Annual Report 2007 (2008: 93)). It can be stated that in the
evolutionary aspect of the peacebuildingwithin theUN, theDPA—created in 1992—
was slowly transforming into a peacebuilding concept by UN, following the reform
of the United Nations peace and security infrastructure, bringing it together with
United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (DPPA 2020b), which is the manager
of the PBF.
10 On water, PBF approved the Cultivating Peace - Using Water-based Agriculture to Facilitate
Reconciliation among Multi-ethnic Residents of Kara Suu (Kyrgyzstan).
11 On media, the project approved was Strengthening Media Capacity to Promote Peace and
Tolerance in the Kyrgyz Republic.
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2.9 OSCE–UN Partnerships
So far the partnership between the UN and the OSCE has evolved as a result of what
both organizations do in juxtaposition with each other. Based on BiH, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan, the Peacebuilding Fund provided financial support to projects that
could represent a dissemination of the institutional values of the UN and at the same
time enhance a peacebuilding agenda in these respective countries through a joint-
work with agencies and local actors that identify challenging and promising issues
to be coopted by the PBF. As became evident from the three OSCE-participating
States, there is a cooptation of the UN agenda for peacebuilding and of what the
PBF finances in the scenario OSCE operates through the CPC, creating a space for
a common ground on projects for peacebuilding.
Based on Lambourne and Herro’s analysis of the Australian-led Regional Assis-
tance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and on the US-led interventions in
Iraq and Afghanistan, these and other interventions operating outside the UN frame-
work “need to make a particular effort to learn from the UN’s extensive experience
and to incorporate the priorities identified by peacebuilding theory and best practice,
which are being consolidated in the operations of the PBC” (2008: 288). Although
they mention the PBC as a reference for UN framework intervention, I would say
that it is on the PBF that the framework for peacebuilding becomes more explicit
since the PBF is the channel through which countries face eligibility for their respec-
tive peacebuilding projects, interact with different UN agencies and local actors in
designing the projects, get money for implementing the projects and, hence, coopt an
agenda for peacebuilding through the engagement of different organizations rather
than the UN.
One can conclude that by lessons learned, the UN intervention framework can
work as an external perspective in which the OSCE could adapt to this reality. The
OSCE’s role, through the engagement of other UN agencies, and as the PBF does
through its financial apparatus, is a strategy that could enhance not only the juxtapo-
sition between them, but put the OSCE in a leading position of acting proactively in
the region.
Since the PBF depends on voluntary contributions by UN-member states, in the
beginning of this chapter I mentioned that juxtaposition reflects that being an OSCE-
participating States is a labelled condition in which such label cannot be easily
detached from these countries, even though they interact in different international
organizations rather than the OSCE. In this specific case, the Peacebuilding Fund is
not only a UN body dealing with financing for peacebuilding, but a platform in which
OSCE-participating States co-exist, be they donors or recipients of PBF funding.
Table 2.2 illustrated that from the 57 OSCE-participating States, only 29 engaged
with the PBF as donors. The OSCE plays a role in the functioning of the PBF, but the
amount UN-member states donate for peacebuilding reflects their level of interest in
enhancing peacebuilding through the UN framework.
By level of interest by the UN-member states, it can be illustrated that these
UN-members do not directly fund projects in specific countries through the PBF,
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since the PBF finances projects designed under its peacebuilding framework which
are institutionally evaluated and scrutinized. What is in question is that the PBF
was created for countries facing post-conflict challenges and this notion permeates
and motivates UN-member states in their decisions for financing the PBF. Shown
below, Sweden and Germany donate the most, followed by countries such as United
Kingdom and the Netherlands.
Based on Table 2.2 above, Western European countries are the main donors to
the PBF, in contrast to what the PBF receives from Russia, Canada and the United
States, respectively (UNDO-MPTF 2020). The point, here, is to evidence that the
amount donated by all of them reflects not only what these countries prioritize for
peacebuilding and, mainly, how their financial apparatus to peacebuilding through
multilateralism impacts on the UN and OSCE role on this field.
Table 2.2
OSCE-participating
States12as donors to the PBF
(2005–2020)
Austria 2,108,550 Netherlands 123,055,332
Belgium 8,057,228 Norway 88,463,975
Canada (CIDA) 33,855,496 Poland 580,235
Canada (Gov.) 25,183,829 Portugal 1,069,280
Croatia 148,000 Romania 147,210
Cyprus 40,000 Russia 18,000,000
Czech Republic 356,399 Slovakia 756,828
Denmark 35,609,871 Slovenia 41,688
Estonia 608,028 Spain 17,917,677
Finland 28,286,519 Sweden 208,252,105
France 5,239,740 Switzerland 10,334,452
Germany 183,742,480 Turkey 2,900,000
Iceland 1,000,000 UK (DFID) 156,111,710
Ireland 24,887,958 UK (Gov.) 60,108,240
Italy 9,565,992 United States 550,000
Luxembourg 6,680,330
Source UNDP-MPTF (2020). All amounts in US$ from 2005 to
October 2020
12 The OSCE-participating States that did not engage with the PBF in financial terms during the
period in analysis: Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Holy See,
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,Malta,Moldova,Monaco,Mongolia, North
Macedonia, San Marino, Turkmenistan and Ukraine (OSCE 2020j).
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2.9.1 Conclusion
The perspective on juxtaposition between the UN and the OSCE through the Peace-
building Fund and the Conflict Prevention Center, respectively, enables an under-
standing that institutional decisions on establishing liaison offices abroad reflect
a strategy of diffusion of organizational values and agenda based on a permanent
cooperation partnership.
The evidence through the role the OSCE plays in countries that benefited from
the PBF, such as Albania, BiH, Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro, Serbia, Uzbekistan, Tajik-
istan and the Kosovo territory, as well as the peacebuilding agenda PBF finances in
countries and territory included in the OSCE region, enables identifying what both
organizations understand as being their peacebuilding approaches.
As illustrated in this chapter, the UN involvement in Europe and the OSCE region
is underrepresented in comparison to its role in countries in the Africa continent, for
example. The UN counts heavily on the peacebuilding engagement of the OSCE and
its donors in the region. In respect to Africa, countries concentrate more than 50% of
the financial support through the PBF as well as in the quantity of projects financed.
In this regard, the role of the Peacebuilding Fund in countries such as Albania, BiH,
Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kosovo territory, emphasize
how the UN has designed its peacebuilding agenda during the functioning of the
UN Peacebuilding Architecture. Its engagement in parallel to the engagement of the
OSCE in these respective countries contributed to identify challenges that the PBF
could provide support for in alignment to its peacebuilding agenda.
To conclude, the UN and OSCE complement each other through what they design
for their respective peacebuilding approaches. It is important to affirm that this
complementarity is far from being perfect due to the domain the UN has in the
field of peacebuilding. Nevertheless, the promising aspect among them puts both
organizations far from competing in this domain, hence the UN withholds its scarce
resources and funds wherever the OSCE and its overall Western European member
states jump into. This also avoids not only double funding by member-states, but
legitimizes the UN decision on launching a Liaison Office in Vienna in order to more
closely coordinate the partnership with the OSCE.
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Chapter 3
OSCE Special Monitoring in Ukraine
Frederic Oberson
Abstract The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Eastern Ukraine
(Donbas) offers an interesting case study of what international organizations do
during a war. The current conflict is tricky and multilayered. The SMM is the only
international observing mission deployed permanently in this war zone, but thus
far has received little academic scrutiny. Daily reports are published online so that
anyone can be part of the observation process and a witness to what is going on
in Donbas. But does the mission contribute to a “revival” of the OSCE? Is it an
adequate, accurate, and objective monitoring tool? Is it helping to improve the situa-
tion in the field and tomake life easier for the population? Finally, should the SMM to
Ukraine be modified, replaced by another type of mission, or assisted in some way?
In answering these questions, the chapter also considers the future of such missions
in the context of the current crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Keywords Minsk process · OSCE SMM · Peace building · Peacekeeping ·
Politics · Russian federation · Secession · Security studies · Soft power · Soldiers ·
Transnistria · Ukraine · United nations ·Watchdogs
3.1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian Euromaidan protests, pro-Russian and anti-
government separatists’ groups aimed for independence from Ukraine in the Eastern
part of the country, the Donbas region. These separatist movements followed the
March 2014 annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and escalated into an
armed conflict between the separatist forces and the Ukrainian army. Pro-Russian
citizens were supported by volunteers, paramilitaries and materiel from Russia. The
conflict is ongoing at the time of writing. The OSCE launched the first Special
MonitoringMission (SMM) to Eastern Ukraine shortly before that conflict and it has
lasted until today.
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There is thus far little written about the OSCE’s SMM in member countries, and
even less about its current monitoring mission in Ukraine. It rarely shows up in
the media. But that Mission offers an interesting case study of what international
organizations do during a war, and raises questions about the future of monitoring
missions and peacekeeping operations elsewhere in the world. Thus, the case of
Ukraine helps us to look closely into the impact and consequences of a monitoring
mission and to look deeper into four issues of SMMs:
(i) Is it an adequate, accurate, and objective tool of monitoring?
(ii) Is it helping to improve the situation in the field and making life easier for the
population?
(iii) Should it bemodified, replaced by another type of mission, or assisted in some
way?
(iv) Do SMMs have a future?
To respond to these questions requires a general understanding ofwhatmonitoring
means in the context of war and armed conflict. By doing so, this chapter is aiming
to contribute to the debates about the role of international organizations in conflict
prevention, peacekeeping, andmonitoring.One can assess the quality of amonitoring
mission’s work by looking at the outcome and value such missions have for the
local population in terms of peace, stability, and safety, and its role vis-à-vis the
expectations of the OSCE participating States.1
3.2 War in Ukraine
The ongoing conflict and war in Donbas, in Eastern Ukraine, started in April 2014
between Russian militias and Ukraine military forces.2 The geographical dimension
is very different from previous OSCE experiences and SMMs, such as in Georgia or
Transnistria in the 1990s and beyond because the area of Donbas comprises 53,000
km2 and hence is larger than Switzerland, and the line of contact on the Russian
border is almost 500 km long. The intensity of the fighting also differs significantly
1 Field research was carried out in July–August 2017, July–October 2018, and February-March
2019, in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Mariupol, and Kramatorsk. Desk research included face-to-face and online
interviews of 17 mission members, 3 diplomats, 5 academics, and the general public. All are
anonymous, with some exceptions. Survey samples consisted of 42 persons in Kyiv, 31 in Karkhiv,
21 Mariupol, and 14 in Kramatorsk. Focus groups included inhabitants of Kharkiv (7 males, 5
females), Kramatorsk (4 males and 4 females), and Mariupol (5 males and 5 females). I visited the
Mission’s offices and monitors in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kramatorsk. I followed a patrol and witnessed
a “window of silence” exercise. For evidence, I analyzed the content of 147 reports published by the
Mission (2017–2020), and I compared the SMM with other field missions launched by the OSCE
and other organizations. The OSCE SMM never employed me in any way. I am grateful to Dr. Anja
Mihr, Alexander Hug and Giselle Weiss, my first readers, for their kind and very useful help. I am
also grateful to Pascal Delumeau of the French Foreign Ministry for his support and explanations.
2 Unian.info: “OSCE SMM’s Alexander Hug: the reality of our work is much more complex than
just describing it as blindness,” 15 March 2017.
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from other contexts. Since 2014 more than 13,000 people have died, including 3,000
civilians, and 35,000 have been wounded. The main causes of casualties are shelling,
namely about 50%; and mines/UXOs (unexploded ordnances), namely about 35%
of casualties. Shelling has become a daily routine, meant to keep the enemy on
both sides in check. Nearly two million people have left the region, heading either
westward to Ukraine or northward toward Russia. Many have become internally
displaced persons (IDPs) in the process. More than a thousand persons have been
reporting missing and no permanent governmental commission or institution has
been set up to handle prisoner exchanges despite ongoing but sporadic exchanges
since 2019.
International mechanisms, including the OSCE talks inMinsk, under the auspices
of the so-called Minsk-Group mandate for conflict prevention, are seen as inefficient
by many, since ceasefire violations occur on an almost daily basis.3 The distance
between the trenches at the contact-line is short, under 50 meters in some places, and
fighting often breaks out by accident. This unstable stalemate is increasingly pulling
the two parts of Donbas apart. But it is not a frozen conflict yet. A comparable
situation, rarely invoked in the Western media, is that of Nagorno-Karabakh, which
is also considered an “active armed conflict” as defined by the Uppsala Conflict
Data Program based at the University of Uppsala.4 At the time of writing, that other
conflict between two participating states of the OSCE (Armenia and Azerbaidjan) is
coming back to the frontline.
As always, civilians, caught between a rock and a hard place, suffer the most.
While Russia “Chechnyafies” the problem,5 Ukrainian politicians exploit it in the
pursuit of personal goals. The immediate questions that come to themind are,Why all
the suffering? and What can be done to stop it? The answer to the first question is
very complex; the answer to the second, in contrast, is simple: the sides have only
to retire and remove their heavy weapons. However, at present there is neither the
incentive nor the political will to make that happen.
One of the reasons for this is that the creation of the two separated republics of
Eastern Ukraine, in 2014, was not only a result of dirty politics (Matveeva 2018).
The war triggered tremendous generosity on the part of ordinary people from both
sides. As help from the state was slow coming, volunteers organized themselves.
People in general are resilient, and those living in the conflict zone preserved a strong
regional identity and a density of interpersonal linkages (Sasse 2017a). Crossing the
contact line has become a daily routine for about 40,000 persons, and represents
a counterpoint to the dividing efforts of the parties to this war. In a recent survey,
57% of the respondents on “rebel” territory have family members or friends in the
Ukrainian-controlled part of Donbas and are in touch with them at least twice a week
(Sasse 2017b). People in Donbas continue to present themselves as both Ukrainian
and Russian. When displaced persons in Ukraine were asked who was responsible
3 OSCE Minsk Group website: https://www.osce.org/mg.
4 https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/methodology.
5 Author’s interview with Andrew Wilson, London, May 2018.
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for the war, less than half gave the official answer: The Russian Federation (Sasse
2017a). Hence, the causes of the conflict have many facets.
3.3 A Monitoring Mission Operating in an Active Conflict
The SMM is arguably the first field operation operating for such an extended period
of time on both sides of an active conflict and it is the only international observing
mission deployed permanently in this war zone. But does it contribute to a “revival”
of an international organization that has been mostly ignored by the general public
over the last 30 years? To answer that additional question, we need to understand
the context in which the Mission was launched, in the wake of the clash between
pro-Euromaidan and anti-Euromaidan Ukrainians.Maidan is the name of the central
square inKyiv—MaidanNezalezhnosti (Independence Square)where demonstrators
gathered during “Euromaidan” (or “Revolution of Dignity”), which started back in
November 2013. The demonstrations started peacefully with people being in favor
of a closer trade and working agreement with the EU. But it would have negatively
impacted Ukraine’s trade agreements with Russia. When the Ukrainian government
eventually aimed to back out of signing the agreement with the EU, awave of protests
started,which came to be known asEuromaidan. Clashes became violent and resulted
in deaths, including police officers. Eventually, 98 protesters died in clashes with the
police and were later celebrated as the “Heavenly Hundred.” Endemic corruption
was but one trigger behind the protests. Many Ukrainians, especially in the Western
regions, wanted to be part of the EU. When the incumbent president changed his
stance, after an encounter with the Russian head of state, they felt betrayed. At
the same time, in Eastern Ukraine, where the population has strong ties with Russia,
peoplewatched the protestwith a critical eye, themore sowhen someMaidan activists
portrayed Russia as the archenemy and stressed the need to impose Ukrainian as the
sole official language. The reaction against Euromaidan came to be known as the
“Russian Spring.” Supporters spoke of the “natural borders” of the Russian world
and used the concepts of Malorossiya, meaning “Little Russia,” the territories of
the Black Sea taken from the Ottoman Empire under Catherine the Great and of
Novorossiya, translated as “New Russia,” or the “ideal land for Russian speakers”
(Fig. 3.1).
In response to these events, in February 2014, Russia managed to invade Crimea
and soon afterward, the war in Donbas started. Generally speaking, wars of territo-
rial conquest are no longer considered a normal instrument of external policies. The
Helsinki Final Act of 1975—and predecessor of the OSCE—consecrated the terri-
torial status quo in Europe, and the UN International Court of Justice in The Hague
upheld the uti possidetis principle meaning “as you have, so you shall possess.”6
Recent attempts to conquer territory by force similar to the Iran-Iraq war, the Falk-
lands War, and the Iraq war failed. But effective deterrence depends on the volume
6 Burkina Faso vs. Mali decision (1986).
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Fig. 3.1 Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 11 February 2021. Source OSCE SMM,
12/02/2021
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and quality of forces deployed (Tertrais 2018), and at the time, Ukraine’s potential
for deterrence was very weak.
What followed in April 2014 was that the Ukrainian authorities launched an “anti-
terrorist operation” in Eastern Ukraine. But the army was not prepared. It could
only mobilize about 1,500 soldiers and a poorly trained and equipped “volunteers
corps” to fill the gap. The war was presented by the Ukrainian High Command as
an affair of a few months, an echo of the “fleur au fusil” spirit of 1914 in France,
but instead it lingered. The Ukrainian army quickly became more professional and
progressively integrated the volunteer groups (Lebedev 2017). Then, in May 2014, a
pro-Maidan demonstration in Odessa of about 2,000 people, attended by right-wing
activists armedwith weapons, clashed with a smaller 300-people-strong anti-Maidan
group. 42 of the anti-Maiden group died after a building they were in was set on fire.
The gap broadened.
An initial ceasefire was signed inMinsk (Belarus) on 5 September 2014, known as
the Minsk-1 agreement. But in February 2015, with Russian help in manpower and
militias, the separatists won the decisive battle of Debaltseve, and another round of
negotiations was called, resulting in theMinsk-2 agreements. By that time, the OSCE
had already launched the SMM, in March 2014. It happened by default, as no other
organization was ready for the job. Monitoring peace agreements is traditionally a
task undertaken by the United Nations (UN). But after the disastrous experiences
during the civil war in former Yugoslavia, the UN Security Council, in which Russia
holds a veto, was unable to go back to peacekeeping in Europe. An EU7 mission was
out of the question due to Russia’s opposition, to say nothing of a NATO operation.
3.4 The Role of the OSCE in This Conflict
In a comprehensive study of international election monitoring, Norris noted that
“regional intergovernmental organizations possess unique sources of leverage, legit-
imacy, and long-term engagement that make them—perhaps surprisingly—the most
consistently effective norm defenders.”8 Field operations are rightfully considered
to be the backbone of the OSCE’s conflict resolution capability. As was written
elsewhere, “one of OSCE’s most significant comparative advantages is its ability
to get actively involved in conflict resolution processes on multiple levels through
its network of field operations and the activities of its institutions.”9 Yet, the OSCE
remains generally true to its origins today as a platform for dialogue. The non-binding
status of its charter10 provides that organization with some flexibility. The OSCE is
based on consensus by its 57 member states and it exerts no sanctions, which is both
7 Today, the EU helps the SMM, contributing to staff costs and assisting in satellite imagery.
8 Norris and Nai 2017, pp 55 & 69.
9 OSCE conference: Promoting Lasting Solutions, p 4.
10 Based on the Helsinki Final Act (1975), the Paris Summit (1990) and the Istanbul Charter for
European Security (1999).
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an advantage, as the member states would never have agreed to a more stringent
process, and a drawback.
But since thebeginningof the conflict inUkraine in 2014,we see that theOSCEhas
been caught in a vortex of diplomatic competition. Against this backdrop, the inter-
national organization runs another, separate field mission, at Russia’s checkpoints
Gukovo and Donetsk on the international border between Ukraine and Russia. But
these two small checkpoints are the only ones Russia allows the OSCE to observe
along a 400 km border. Moreover, the small size and very limited mandate of that
mission make it a very ineffective field operation, consisting as it does of only 20
permanent international staff.
Notwithstanding, war-like armed conflicts in Eastern Europe go back for decades
and the tensions between the OSCE and the Russian Federation are not new. Euro-
maidan was only the last drop in the bucket that let the violent clash emerge again.
It already began at the OSCE Istanbul summit in 1999, when the OSCE member
states called for a political settlement in Chechnya and adopted a Charter for Euro-
pean Security. This event marked a turning point, as Moscow started to view the
OSCE as a tool in the hands of Western powers and decided to undermine it (Ivanov
2002). Tensions increased between Russia and other participating states after the
“color revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, which Moscow attributed,
not without reason, to meddling by the CIA in its former sphere of influence. At
the Munich Security Conference in 2007, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin,
accused the United States of manipulating international law in violation of funda-
mental principles such as state sovereignty, and of transforming the OSCE into an
instrument designed to promote its foreign policy. Since then, the Russian govern-
ment has been promoting its idea of comprehensive OSCE reform. At the same time,
it has acknowledged the role of theOSCE inUkraine, while proposing a new setup for
monitoring the conflict, as we shall see, namely the Minsk Group and its subsequent
agreements.11
In 2014, the SMM was mandated to contribute to reducing tensions, facilitating
dialogue, helping foster peace, security, and stability, engaging with authorities at
all levels, gathering information, and reporting on the situation.12 In addition, field
missions often perform, as we shall see, functions not initially planned, such as
socialization, quiet diplomacy, and good offices. In doing so, they sometimesmanage
to keep open certain channels of communication.
11 See, for example, the analytical report of the Russian Centre for Current Poli-
tics, “Beskoneqny tupik. Sostonie i perspektivy processa politiqeskogo
uregulirovani konflikta medu Ukraino i respublikami Donbassa. K pervo
godovwine minskih soglaxeni,” February 11, 2016.
12 Decision n° 1117 of the OSCE Permanent Council, 21 March 2014.
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3.5 The OSCE Mission in Eastern Ukraine (Donbas)
The Mission’s initial budget was EUR 5 million in 2014, and it is now around
EUR 100 million annually. Of course, as for any mission, the budget is key to its
effectiveness and whether it is sufficiently equipped to fulfill its tasks. Intelligence-
led missions can now use a whole range of new technologies to support and sustain
monitors (Dorn 2016). But it costs money. The OSCE participating States showed
some flexibility when it managed to cover the cost of the Mission in its early stage
of deployment using savings from other operations and contingency funds.13 The
remainder was financed through voluntary contributions, mostly from the United
States.14
To make sense, a monitoring mission means a sufficient number of personnel
but requires less qualified staff than a capacity-building mission, such as the ones
currently deployed by the OSCE in Kosovo, for example, where it was difficult to
find experienced policemen and judges to materialize the tasks in the agreements
signed with the government in Pristina.
ByMay 2020, the SMMhad 1,280members, including 723 internationalmonitors
and 436 national staff. It is the first OSCE mission of this size and duration during
a war. All monitors are “seconded,” meaning that their respective states pay their
salary of approximately EUR 4,500 per month. The head offices (HQ) are in Kyiv,
and the monitoring teams work in the ten biggest cities of Ukraine that are Kyiv (12
monitors and 51 staff at the HQ), Donetsk (355monitors), Luhansk (245), Chernivtsi
(9), Dnepropetrovsk (10), Ivano-Frankivsk (11), Kharkiv (10), Kherson (7), Lviv
(11), and Odesa (13). Thus, the two de facto republics share the greatest number of
monitors at around 600, which makes sense (Fig. 3.2).
Monitoring the war zone is not only a safety challenge and a security threat for
OSCE observers and staff, but also an emotional and moral challenge to cope with.
Asked to recount a striking memory of the field, one observer said: “When I go back
to some villages where I had met people during a previous visit, and find them dead,
it is quite upsetting. I tell myself that, as long as I have some emotional reaction it
means I am still ok.”15
For their protection, monitors wear flak jackets, helmets, and travel in armored
4 × 4 vehicles. Each team is composed of three monitors, including a paramedic.
In April 2017, Joseph Stone, an American paramedic, was killed on patrol when
his vehicle accidentally hit an antitank mine on a country road near the village of
Prychyb. The other two observers in the car were wounded but survived. It is, so far,
the first and only death of a mission member.16 Since then, monitors are no longer
allowed to drive on non-asphalted roads, which further prevents them from observing
13 Institute of World Policy (2016), p. 10.
14 Point 9, Decision 1117, Permanent Council of the OSCE (21 March 2014).
15 Author’s interview with Alexander Hug, Kyiv, July 2018.
16 https://www.voanews.com/europe/american-osce-monitor-killed-ukraine-identified-joseph-
stone.
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Fig. 3.2 OSCESMMpatrol near theDonetskFiltrationStationduring aWindowofSilencemission.
Source (photo: Frederic Oberson, March 2019)
remote places. In May 2015, eight monitors were taken hostage by the separatists
for a month, the only incidence of kidnapping involving Mission’s members.
Before each patrol, a security risk assessment ismade, both at the base and theKyiv
HQ.Any risk ismitigatedwith the followingmeasures: getting additional information
from the sides, getting additional equipment, changing the route, or canceling the
patrol. When they arrive in a location where firing is going on nearby, monitors
immediately return to their cars and wait, listening to the firing with microphones
installed in their vehicles. If it does not stop, they leave in a direction where they
will be safe. Later, they go back to the location, listen again, and consult HQ, which
decides whether to allow them to carry on. In areas where violence is known to
occur frequently, the monitors drive to the vicinity of the villages they had planned
to observe, get out of the car, and listen for 15–20 min. If they hear nothing, they
continue their journey. A problem is that they usually do not know if the firing
is aimed at them, planned, or simply random. Nevertheless, intentionally targeting
monitors is very rare and it only happened, rarely, at the beginning of the conflict.17
Today’s mission policies, security measures and practice date back to the expe-
riences gained in former Yugoslavia in the late 1990s. Since then, the professional-
ization of international monitoring has made notable progress. Today, most missions
provide guidelines, handbooks, and training to their staff.Drawing onUNexperience,
the OSCE published handbooks and a code of conduct containing principles such as
17 Author’s interview with eight OSCE SMMmonitors, in Kramatorsk (August 2018) and Kharkiv
(February 2019).
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impartiality, compliance with human rights standards and discretion. A few instances
of a breach of that code occurred in Ukraine that led to a decrease of trust in the
mission and its observers. For example, in April 2016, photos of monitors attending
the wedding, in June 2015, of a Russian separatist were found on social media. In
a post to its official Facebook page, on 7 April, the OSCE expressed regret over the
incident: “The unprofessional behavior displayed by the monitors in the picture is an
individual incident that should not be abused to cast a shadow on the reputation of
other mission members.” The monitors were dismissed,18 but the picture continued
to circulate on social media. Nevertheless, the violations of the code of conduct are
infrequent even though most remain unreported, especially when they result from
monitors’ naivety and/or lack of training.19 Somemonitors havemilitary training and
most have worked previously in other OSCE related missions.20 They all underwent
an in-house training program, the “General Orientation Programme,” in Vienna.21
It lasts five days and covers basic requirements for new mission members. They
also follow a five-day Hostage Environment Awareness Training (HEAT) course, in
cooperation with the Austrian Army. The trainees are then invited to the Kyiv HQ
for a week of “induction training,” after which they are deployed in the field. During
their course of assignment, monitors acquire other elements of training, for example,
on weapons recognition or impact-site assessment, as well as a special “outreach”
course that instructs them on communicating with the civilian population.
Amongother criteria for service,monitorsmust hold a license for armoredvehicles
above 3.5 tons. The reason is that they drive the cars themselves, unlike in other
missions, to reduce the risk of misunderstanding between international monitors and
local drivers who do not speak the same language. Moreover, monitors usually stay
in a country for a much longer period than observers of other OSCEmissions, which
is an additional asset, as it arguably enables them to develop some expertise and best
practices.
Question arises whether these technical tools are adequate to the monitors’ tasks.
Apart from binoculars, walky-talkies, and microphones, monitors use unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV), static cameras, and satellite imagery for two main reasons.
One is to observe at night when fighting mostly takes place and, secondly, because
they are often prevented from accessing certain parts of the territory.22 Unmanned
vehicles,UAVs, can, for example,work inside theZolote disengagement area and spot
18 “OSCE Expresses ’Regret’ After Staff Shown At Separatist Wedding In Ukraine,” Radio Free
Europe, 6 April 2016.
19 I have, personally, witnessed a few, in countries such as Belarus or Afghanistan. Although they
raise doubts about the quality of the mission, they generally do not have a major impact.
20 Stephanie Liechtenstin, Interview with A. Hug, Security & Human Rights Monitor, 24 Feb 2015.
21 Dijkstra H, Petrov P & Mahr E (2016), p. 34.
22 UAVs are of three types: mini, mid-range, and long-range. In 2019, the Mission was equipped
with 53 mini-UAVs, 11 mid-range UAVs, and only one long-range UAV that is able to fly at an
altitude of 5 km and to cover a distance of 160 km. The two sides also use their UAVs to observe
each other and to prevent the Mission from working, as the following example illustrates: “while
positioned inRaivka (non-government-controlled) to conduct amini-UAVflight, the SMMobserved
a non-SMMUAV flying at an altitude of about 70 m over its position for around three minutes. The
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a newly dug trench.23 They can thus be useful, though costly, tools, and are frequently
targeted by all sides.24 Another weapon with which observers have to deal is the AK-
47, also known as a Kalashnikov. It can easily fire at small ormid-range UAVs, while
the long-range ones are targeted by surface-to-air missile systems. Sometimes the
observers are able to recover them by risking their lives.25 The Mission’s UAVs
are also often interfered with by electronic warfare equipment, called jamming.
It causes remote SMM pilots to lose their GPS signals. But mid-range and long-
range UAVs are equipped with emergency systems using different frequencies that
allow them to evade interference most of the time. For example, when the SMM’s
UAV experienced repeated jamming while flying over areas near Shyroka Balka, the
interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometers
of the UAV’s position.26 As the example shows, it is difficult to identify the origin
of the attacks.
Another category of technical tools used in SMMs are cameras. In 2019, the
Mission in Ukraine counted 13 cameras installed in various areas of the conflict zone
and planned to put eight more in place. It contracted a civilian company to install
them and a specialized staff such as photo analysts, operators, and IT specialists
to evaluate the images. Occasionally, cameras are damaged, or the sides prevent the
observers fromaccessing them.Quoting fromexperiences, it is reported, for example,
that “barbed wire was placed around the mast of the SMM camera in Stanytsia
Luhanska […] which impedes the SMM’s access to it”,27 or that the camera at the
Donetsk Filtration Station recorded an explosion “assessed as an impact 600–800 m
south, projectile in flight from north-west to south-west”,28 or that the camera at the
Oktiabr mining area recorded “a projectile in flight from south-east to north-west and
a projectile from south-south-east to north-north-west, followed by a total of twelve
undetermined explosions.”29
By no means do these stories include a clear statement on responsibility for viola-
tions of the ceasefire. Boris Gryzlov, Russia’s official representative to the Trilateral
Contact Group (TCG), inMinsk (Belarus), declared: “It is very difficult for theOSCE
monitors, because shootouts mostly take place at night, and at night the mission
doesn’t work. They can only register the presence of shots, but do not even deter-
mine from which side the grenades, mines, or just someone’s bullets are flying.”30
Mission left the area/…/ and had to abort (its) mini-UAV flight”, See: SMM daily report 84/2020,
p. 4 and 6, under “other impediments.”
23 And Second: “On the eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled), an SMM mini-UAV
spotted, for the first time, 46 anti-tank mines /…/ assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed
Forces”, Daily Report, OSCE SMM, 7 June 2018.
24 Daily report 93/2020, 20 April 2020, p. 6.
25 For example, Daily Report, OSCE SMM, 19 April 2020.
26 Daily Report, OSCE SMM, 8 June 2018.
27 SMM daily report 84/2020, p. 3.
28 Daily Report, OSCE SMM, 7 June 2018.
29 Daily Report, OSCE SMM, 7 June 2018.
30 Sputnik News: “OSCE monitors can’t determine who starts skirmishes in D,” 21 June 2017.
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When asked to comment on that statement, a Mission member said: “It is untrue,
partly […] because the cameras can show, approximately, the provenance of the
heavy weapons’ rounds.”31 But that is not enough to silence critics, and it would be
better if the monitors were able to register the provenance of the shots with greater
precision and detail. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that reporting a higher number
of violations with greater precision will make any difference in bringing the sides to
the negotiation table.32
The “Package of Measures” that is part of the Minsk agreements also refers to the
use of satellite imagery to enhance the SMM’s monitoring capacity. The Mission is
entitled to obtain imagery through individual OSCE participating states or from the
EU satellite center in Spain.33 This imagery enables monitors to look into the past
and observe, for example, whether new trenches have been dug. Acoustic sensors
were added more recently, in 2018, in the hope that, under certain circumstances,
they would make it possible to determine the origin of a weapon that has just been
fired.34
3.6 Mission’s Reporting Scheme
Observers of the monitoring mission cannot intervene, only report. Scholars who
have studied the monitoring and reporting work of international organizations such
as the OSCE are often focused on election observation, a widely used tool since
the end of the Cold War, but less on monitoring missions during a conflict (Kelley
2012, Norris and Nai 2017).35 Judith Kelley has shown that election observation
can promote progress only under certain conditions, for example in the case of
constructive international incentives, domestic pressures for reforms, less conflict-
prone settings, and internationalmonitoringorganizations that are persistent, capable,
and free of political baggage.36 That is not necessarily the case during a conflict.
Viewed through this lens, the SMM meets only a few of the same criteria that apply
to election observation missions, since international incentives are far from neutral
and constructive in the Ukrainian context, and the ongoing conflict is close to a
zero-sum situation, at least in the opinion of major stakeholders (Fig. 3.3).
31 Author’s interview with a OSCE SMM monitor, Kiev, August 2019.
32 A Mission member told me (November 2020) that the amount of data the cameras installed on
UAVs manage to get is so huge that the Mission lacks the staff to process and analyze it. Therefore,
only part of that data shows up in the reports.
33 In Torrejón. See Frederic Oberson (1998) Intelligence cooperation in Europe: the WEU Intel-
ligence Section and Situation Centre, in Politi, A. (ed.). Towards a European Intelligence Policy,
Cahier de Chaillot 34, EU-ISS.
34 Author’s interview of Alexander Hug, June 2018.
35 Hyde (2011).
36 Kelley (2012).
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Fig. 3.3 OSCE SMM camera near a checkpoint in Donbas. Source (photo: Frederic Oberson,
September 2019)
A comparison with international election monitoring is worth drawing when
understanding the limits and possibilities of a mission. During election observa-
tion missions, for example, for logistical, financial, political, and security reasons,
monitors can only observe a few polling stations, attend a few meetings, and cover
only a fraction of the country in which elections take place. Authoritarian govern-
ments undertake their utmost to prevent election observers from entering certain
cities and towns, or polling stations, to witness possible election fraud. Moreover,
election monitors stay for only a limited time in a country, a few days or weeks only,
contrary to SMM monitors who can stay up to several years.
Transposed to the context of Ukraine, SMM monitors can theoretically provide
credible information, therefore improving transparency and assigning responsibility
for some violations and increasing accountability. But there are side effects. Pippa
Norris, a political analyst at Harvard University, showed that when international
organizations publish reports highlighting problems without identifying remedies
and sanctions, it can encourage public cynicism.37 Mechanisms to ensure compli-
ance are essential,38 because without accountability, information about flaws and
failures can be ducked by politicians through blame avoidance.39 But international
organizations are complicated actors, and monitoring is a complex job. In the case
of elections, for which the OSCE has developed expertise, scholars have stressed




that they involve very complex issues that stretch far beyond E-Day. That said, the
collection of strong, substantiated facts not based on hearsay, assumptions, or suppo-
sitions go to the very heart of monitoring. Monitors must consider multiple types of
evidence and corroborate their findings, according to established standards of proof
developed over years.
Against this backdrop and when considering the OSCE Mission’s reporting
methods and the quality of the information, reports and evidence are essential. Is
the SMM reporting adequately, without bias, and with clarity, precision, and rele-
vance, having checked every piece of information? Does the SMM provide relief for
the population living in conflict areas?
The SMM is publishing daily reports online, so that anyone can be part of the
observation process and a passive witness to what is going on in Donbas. The reports
are published in three languages: English, Ukrainian, and Russian. In doing so, the
SMM fulfills its duty to make the conflict transparent whilst aiming to be neutral,
but it also exposes the organizers to heavy scrutiny and critics, by delivering “very
uncomfortable truths,” as one Mission member said.40
Public reporting is not unique in the history of monitoring, but it is unique within
the framework of the OSCE or any other international organization of that quality.
Normally reports and evidence from ongoing conflicts are sent to the participating
states foreign services or governments only. Another issue is that the local population
often view monitors as strangers lost in translation and feel disappointed with the
international community. “In the war zone, people have very few contacts with the
Mission and know very little about its work. Its image is globally negative and
there is a misunderstanding of its work,” as one said.41 But does that mean monitors
are not doing their work properly? A Mission member responded: “they call us
blind monitors because our reports are making them uncomfortable. Monitoring is
different from verifying. Its effects are hard to see. We come to a village with a pen
and notebook and observe the suffering.”42 The Mission’s credo is to report only
facts in a very mobile conflict. “There is always a risk of discrediting the whole
mission if we are not careful. If a side opens fire, it may be in response to another
fire. As a monitor, you don’t always have the full picture.”43 There is no hotline,
but the public can make reports using an e-mail address. Nevertheless, the Mission
does not respond to individual requests. Perhaps a hotline would be a good idea,
increasing contacts between the population and monitors who spend most of their
time in armored vehicles, working in compliance with very strict security protocols.
The SMM might also consider using a crowdsourcing platform such as Ushahidi.
Hence, the Mission issues two types of reports, the Daily Reports and the Spot
Reports, which are written when something important happens between two daily
reports. In addition, it produces a Weekly Summary for the participating states only.
It is a compilation of the Mission’s findings. Observers send their drafts to their
40 Unian (2017), OSCE SMM’s Alexander Hug interview, Unian.info, 15 March 2017.
41 Author’s interview with Ioulia Shukan, University of Paris-Nanterre (Paris, April 2018).
42 Author’s interview with a SMM monitor, Paris, April 2018.
43 Author’s interview with a SMM monitor, Kyiv, August 2017.
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head office in Kyiv, which forwards them to OSCE HQ in Vienna for reviewing and
clearance before publication.
The Daily Reports are by far the most important source of information provided
by the SMM. Moreover, a comparison of reports in the earlier years of the mission
after 2014 with those published in 2020 and 2021 shows that their structure and
content have undergone substantial change. The presentation has improved with the
introduction of charts and tables, making them more reader-friendly. The content of
theDaily Reports is structured in the followingway, for example: ceasefire violations,
types of weapons used, civilian casualties, disengagement areas and restrictions on
the Mission’s freedom of movement, damage to houses and civilian infrastructure.
Each report always starts in the same way, informing the reader of whether the
Mission recorded more, less, or the same number of ceasefire violations in the two
conflict zones, in Donetsk and Luhansk, compared to the previous day. The daily
reports also list the number and kind or arms and weapons used, including multiple-
launch rocket systems, surface-to-air missile systems, howitzers, tanks, anti-tank
guns, mortars, mines and UXOs, automatic-grenade-launchers, heavymachine guns,
and small arms fire.
People traveling on the contact line can often see billboards bearing the words: nié
pokidaitié dorogy, meaning “don’t deviate from the road,” a warning against mines
and other dangerous arms left on the side roads. Eastern Ukraine has become one of
the most heavily mined territories in the world and has the highest rate of anti-vehicle
mine casualties. Reportedly, it would take 10 to 15 years to demine it.44 There has
been some limited progress on de-mining, but 262 civilians have fallen victim to
these weapons over the past three years.45 The OSCE SMM recruited some Mine
Action Officers and regularly publishes vacancies for such positions.46
Unexploded ordnances (UXOs) are also a big issue. For example, in June 2018, the
SMM followed up on reports of a boy injured while handling unexploded ordnance
at a hospital in Horlivka. “The boy, who was amputated, told the SMM that he had
found a thin pen-like object measuring 10–15 cm in length with a red clasp, which
he brought home, where it exploded.”47 Another example states that monitors spoke
by phone with a woman’s fiancé who found her lifeless on the floor inside a house
in Shyroka Balka on 9 April 2020, covered in blood.48 These are only two of the
many examples of gloomy life in the war zone. They show that when the monitors
observe, meet the population, and report on casualties, they contribute to informing




46 For example: https://jobs.osce.org/vacancies/mine-action-officer-vnsmus01124.
47 Daily Report, OSCE SMM, 7 June 2018.
48 Daily Report 93/2020 issued on 20 April 2020.
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3.7 Withdrawal of Weapons
Observing the withdrawal of weapons is an important part of the SMM’s mandate.
Unfortunately, the Minsk-1 and -2 agreements are vague on this key issue and the
fight over interpretation leads to tensions.49 Furthermore, the agreements include no
instructions on the sequence in which their provisions should take place. To make
things worse, the numerous denials of access to many sites are another hindrance to
the Mission. For example, as reported by monitors, in violation of withdrawal lines,
in non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw three stationary self-propelled
howitzers (2S1Gvozdika, 122mm) close to an abandoned building about 2 km south-
west of Donetsk city’s Kirovskyi district50; and in “violation of withdrawal lines, in
government-controlled areas, an SMM mid-range UAV observed six self-propelled
howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152 mm) in Yablunivka.”51 The cases illustrate that the
Mission’s monitors report precisely on the type of violations of the disengagement
process, independently and transparently, which could contribute to establishing the
responsibilities of the sides. But they frequently observe weapons that cannot be
verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria for identi-
fying them that were set by the Mission on 16 October 2015, in its notification to
the signatories of the Minsk agreements’ Package of Measures. The with-drawal of
weapons is part of any demilitarization effort, also known as DDR process (Demil-
itarization, Demobilization and Reintegration) of any peace building and conflict
managing process, which is also applied by the UN in conflict zones. It is the first
step to peace, but as in the case of the Donbas, not successful yet. But when we look
at similar long-lasting violent conflicts and DDR processes, such as the Good Friday
Agreement in Northern Ireland in 1997, we see that demilitarizing the 2,500 men
in arms was a very difficult task. In comparison, the armies of the two self-declared
republics of Eastern Ukraine are more than ten times larger, to say nothing of the
Russianmilitary that equips the paramilitaries withweapons and resources (Fig. 3.4).
So far, military positions have remained almost unchanged on the line of contact
between thewarring sides, since theBattle ofDebalsteve (2015).Both sides use heavy
weapons, target populated areas, lay more mines, and prevent the Mission’s patrols
from carrying on their work. The stakeholders are using the conflict to pursue their
interests, with few incentives to find a solution. The ceasefire might even reduce the
perception of injury that motivates parties to make compromises.52 In this context,
the war allows for a whole array of manipulations and narratives. At present, the
population is still resilient. But, as a Mission member said, quoting Simon Perez:
“Although there is a light at the end of the tunnel [the civilians are the ones keeping
that light on], the problem is that there is no tunnel [no process through which the
hopes and the needs of the people can be put forward].”53
49 Kadri Liik (2015), The Diplomatic Battle for Ukraine, ECFR article online, 27 April 2015.
50 Daily Report, OSCE SMM, 13 February 2018.
51 Daily Report, OSCE SMM, 3 February 2018.
52 Tanner, F. (2017), Advantages of a Civilian Mission.
53 Author’s interviews with A. Hug, Kiev, June 2019.
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Fig. 3.4 Mines near a checkpoint in Donbas. Source (photo: Frederic Oberson, March 2019)
Another task is to monitor the disengagement process in pilot areas that have
been agreed upon, in Minsk, on 21 September 2016. In 2020 there are only three
disengagement areas, namely Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote, and Petrivske. The last two
were added after Russia applied diplomatic pressure to have them on the list. That
part of the monitoring record is also negative, as reflected by the reports. Two of the
pilot areas (Zolote and Petrivske) saw some disengagement just after the agreement
was signed; but the sides fully re-engaged in the fight soon afterward, undermining
the spirit of the disengagement areas.
3.8 Contact Line and Freedom of Movements
The sides make life very difficult for the population, and manning of checkpoints
on both sides is appalling. But the fact that so many civilians cross the contact line
indicates that people don’t believe in this conflict.54 There should be more crossing
points or, as they are called, “entry-exit checkpoints” (EECPs), working around the
clock, with fewer bureaucratic procedures. The five crossing points are Maiorska,
Marinka, Hnutove, and Novotroitske in Donetsk and Stanytsia Luhanska in Luhansk.
The latter is a pedestrian-only bridge that about 150,000 people cross monthly. It was
repaired in November 2019, after much negotiation between the conflicting parties.
54 A report estimated the total number crossing every day from 27,000 to 42,000. See UNHCR,
“Crossing the line of contact,” November 2017.
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Fig. 3.5 OSCE SMM monitor near the contact line, hearing some shots. Source (photo: Frederic
Oberson, March 2019)
It is unclear to what extent the Mission played a role, but it is probable that the
repetitive mentions of the disastrous state of the bridge in the reports contributed to
pressure on stakeholders.
OSCE observers are frequently prevented from fulfilling their tasks, as reflected
in many reports. There are two main types of restrictions, namely those that the
Mission imposes itself and those that are imposed by the sides. Denial of access
is more frequent than conditional access. For example, when “a group of National
Guard officers, citing orders from their superior, denied the SMM entry to a military
compound in Manhush (government-controlled), 111 km south of Donetsk”,55 or
when “at a checkpoint south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (…) members of the
armed formations denied the SMMpassage, referring to the closure of the checkpoint
due to COVID-19.”56 Moreover, observers sometimes face pressure and harassment:
“We facedmore andworse impediments and incidents in non-government-controlled
areas, including aggression, intimidation, harassment, and violence”57 (Fig. 3.5).
But there are also success stories to be told, namely the “Windows of Silence” that
are temporary local ceasefires that enable maintenance and repairs of vital civilian
infrastructure. Observers and monitors conduct simultaneous patrols, on both sides
of the contact line, and coordinate by radio or telephone. Since June 2018 theMisson
55 Daily Report, OSCE SMM, 13 February 2018.
56 SMM Spot Report 15/2020.
57 Cheysheva, O. (2017) “Interviewwith Alexander Hug”, One Quart Magazine, May 2017 (https://
onequartmagazine.com/life/05/2017/oksana-chelyssheva-interview-with-alexander-hug/).
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dispatched around 40 patrols every day around the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS),
securing the water supply for around 300,000 people on both sides of the line. The
local population sees that as positive: “the SMM has a poor image amongst people
I met in Donbas. Nevertheless, the fact that it facilitates repair work is seen as
positive.”58 But the infrastructure is often damaged during the night, and the teams
have to start from scratch the next day. Per Fischer, the Coordinator of the Economic
Working Group at the Minsk Talks, said that the SMM helps improving the life of
the population in a number of ways, such as the payment of the water bills by the
separated republics, which has to be done in cash, due to the war, and brought every
month to the contact line, under the auspices of the SMM. Another positive thing
he mentioned is the Windows of Silence tool, making repair work possible. “It is a
success, but very shaky.”59
TheMission negotiates with the sides to obtain explicit security guarantees before
sending its patrols, but it cannot be certain that local fighters will abide by them. For
instance, on 13 April 2020, a patrol at the non-governmental controlled railway
station in Yasynuvata was monitoring adherence to a localized ceasefire to facilitate
the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, when they heard explosions, despite
having been provided security guarantees.60 As a Mission member commented:
“Very often, when we ask for security guarantees, the sides continue to fight, but
to a lesser degree. It is difficult to explain to civilians what these localized cessations
of fire, so-called “Windows of Silence,” are good for, not least because the OSCE
is not a humanitarian agency but facilitates the access of those who can deliver aid
or repair infrastructure.”61 Here is another example: “in Luhansk region, the SMM
monitored adherence to a Window of Silence and facilitated reportedly a transfer of
funds from non-government to government-controlled areas in relation to a water
utility payment.”62 Moreover, the Window of Silence tool confronts the monitors
with a dilemma when they need to find a balance between secrecy, for the protection
of civilians, and transparency to report on the conflict on a daily basis. But it is a tool
that has proven essential in enabling repair of basic infrastructure such as water, gas,
electricity, and telephone communications. In this sense, the Mission can rightfully
be called a facilitator of humanitarian aid and civilian relief.
58 Author’s interview with Ioula Shukan, an academic working on Ukraine, Paris, April 2018.
59 Author’s Skype interviews with Per Fischer, 10 October & 1st November 2018. Since May 2015,
the four working groups (Political, Humanitarian, Economic, Security) within the Trilateral Contact
Group (TCG) are meeting every two weeks in Minsk (Belarus), at the Hotel & Conference Center.
The Minsk negotiation format is one of the rare arenas where the separatists can receive attention
and express their views in front of a panel of experts, since their representatives are present in each
of the four working groups.
60 OSCE SMM Spot Report 12/2020.
61 Alexander Hug’s interview with the author, Kiev, June 2018.
62 Daily Report, OSCE SMM, 8 June 2018.
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3.9 Impact of SMM
The purpose of anymission is not only to inform about a conflict but also to contribute
to improving the situation and to making life easier for the population. This second
aim is taken for granted by domestic and international actors. Unsurprisingly, the
Mission claimed to have been proven effective in deterring violence and reducing
tensions.63 Nevertheless, its work has not yet been subjected to a thorough examina-
tion. Given the great number of obstacles, skeptics would argue that such a mission
is unable to bring about any change. But, theoretically, its presence might raise the
cost of violence.
Nevertheless, as this study shows, violence and compliance with rules are amatter
of degree and gains are never global, but restricted to certain domains, which, of
course, is better than nothing. SMM staff can ease and improve conditions on the
ground in various ways and reinforce the utility of such missions in the long run. By
their repeated patrols and daily reports, they help to provide basic needs to the popula-
tion to water, electricity, heating, etc., and by doing so improving the commitment of
local actors to keep up telephone communication, crossing points and even prisoner
exchange. Arguably, monitors even play a role in deterring an escalation of violence,
in certain cases. But these glimmers rarely last, making the work of the Mission a
task similar to that of Sisyphus, condemned to roll a boulder up a hill forever. Lastly,
given the limited framework of this study, it is impossible to determine whether this
SMM has had any success in helping to improve the behavior of the OSCE and its
participating States, as the mechanisms of influence and diplomacy are very difficult
to assess.
3.10 Learning from Experience
“It seems highly unlikely at least in the near term that a need would arise for an
OSCEmilitary peacekeeping force as opposed to a civilian one,” Ambassador Adam
Kobieracki, Director from Conflict Prevention Centre of the OSCE, concluded in
2013 in Vienna.64 Ever since its first SMM in 2014, the OSCE had the possibility
to deploy a military peacekeeping force, but has not done it so far. In Ukraine,
it is already cooperating with other UN agencies and missions, in particular the
Human Rights monitoring mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), but not in the context of
a “helmed” one. In the 1990s and beyond it proved capable of working closely with
the UN in Kosovo, within the “pillar system,” when the OSCE was in charge of the
institution-building pillar, within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution
1244. But the 567-staffed OSCE mission in Kosovo was under a different mandate
63 My interviews with 14 Mission members, in 2016–2020. See also the factsheets published by
the SMM, which are stressing its role in reducing tensions.
64 OSCE conference: Promoting Lasting Solutions, p 7.
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and in close cooperation with 5000NATO soldiers, 360-staffed UNmission and even
150 staff from the EU. An exception, so far, not the norm.
Nevertheless, there have been attempts for peacekeeping missions already back in
2015. In light of the Minsk agreements, the Ukrainian government in Kyiv, followed
byMoscow, proposed a UN peacekeepingmission for Ukraine in 2015. Russia circu-
lated a draft UN Security Council resolution that was a hybrid arrangement, with
UN peacekeepers protecting SMM monitors, while the Ukrainian draft was about a
robust operation enforcing the ceasefire, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but
with no reference to the SMM. Two years later, Russia launched another proposal,
but Kyiv disagreed on the question of themandate and insisted that the futuremission
should not include peacekeepers from Russia. Some OSCE officials reacted nega-
tively to both proposals, stating they did not require any force for protection: “Why
bother with a blue helmet force? It would be another obstacle for us. There is no
peace to be kept yet (…) It won’t make any difference in the field.”65
Thus, SMM monitors often find themselves in the middle of a political entan-
glement they have no power to address. With little leverage, they are at the mercy
of the political will of participating states (Lehne 2015). They work as auditors,
providing third-party evidence to accusations of violence andmalpractice, but cannot
impose costs on those responsible for violations, let alone sanctions. For that reason,
some say that other forms of field action are needed, so-called “second-” and “third-
”generation missions that include a strong mandate and enough armed personnel to
enforce compliance. In this respect, does the SMM need to be transformed into a
peacekeeping mission or to be associated with a second mission with a peacekeeping
mandate?
Some believe it does. The Hudson Institute for policy research stated that the
SMMmission played an “important and courageous role” in monitoring the conflict,
but lacked the leverage to resolve it. Nevertheless, even if a major peacekeeping
operation became feasible, “it would be prudent to keep the SMM in place as a
fallback in case the new force stumbles.”66
If we look at the different types of missions and monitors deployed in recent
history (Doyle and Sambanis 2006), we see that the SMM monitors can only serve
as observers without any enforcement powers, let alone a military mandate. Other
types ofmissions have stronger powers, for example those that have ‘policing’ in their
mandate, such as the so-called “second-generation” missions, which are addressing
the roots of conflicts, for example: economic reconstruction, reform of the police,
army, judiciary, and elections. As for the “third-generation”missions, they are autho-
rized to use force. Nevertheless, the SMM is partly undertaking tasks devoted to these
other categories, since it plays the role of an intermediary between the sides and of a
facilitator of humanitarian aid and economic reconstruction, through the “Windows
of Silence” tool.
65 Author’s interview with a Mission member (OSCE SMM), Kiev, June 2018.
66 Gowan, R. (2018), “Can the United Nations Unite Ukraine?,” Hudson Institute, February 2018,
Hudson Institute, pp. 11 & 20.
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Adaptive peacebuilding and monitoring have been receiving more attention in
recent years (de Coning 2018). Some argue, drawing on the ongoing experience
of Georgia, that unarmed missions without a mandate for enforcement have little
effect on peace duration when they operate in the context of ongoing conflicts since
2009, and that they may even increase the level of aggression toward the civilian
population. To take a position in that debate, I will look at other conflicts and field
missions, using a comparative analysis.
There are examples of successful monitoring missions over the past decades.
One of them is the EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh Province, Indonesia, deployed
when the separatists signed an agreement with the government after almost 30 years
of war, in 2006.67 That mission, which had both civil and military components,
successfully monitored the disarmament, human rights, and amnesty processes.68
Amnesty, in particular, was essential, as fighters only agreed to disarm once they
were convinced they had a future similar to what transpired in Nicaragua, when the
war between the Sandinistas and the CIA-backed Contras ended after many efforts
to find a solution.69 But the time is not yet right for this approach in today’s Ukraine,
where the questions of amnesty and local elections, among others, still divide the
population and politicians.
Another example worth mentioning, although it can hardly be called a success, is
the UN mission to North and South Cyprus, an island that has been divided by the
Greek and Turkish speaking inhabitants for more than 50 years. The Mediterranean
island has been ridden by conflict over territory, sovereignty, and identity, despite
the efforts of international monitoring and peacekeeping. American diplomats such
as Henry Kissinger and the government of Turkey played a significant role in this
affair because of the strategic importance of Cyprus.70 Talks finally resumed in 2014,
but no signs of progress are in view, despite the UN commitment. Nothing is more
revealing than this stalemate, full of the dawdling and backtracking of the main
players, as Lawrence Durrell showed in the autobiographical work Bitter Lemons,
about the three years he spent on Cyprus.71 Former British Prime Minister Anthony
Eden sums up the problem in his memoirs: “For geographical and tactical reasons,
the Turks have the most rights in Cyprus, for reasons of race and language, it is the
Greeks, for strategy, the English.”72
Transnistria, officially part of Moldova and bordering Ukraine, is yet another
region within the OSCE region that provides for comparison. Russia exercises a dual
role as mediator and party to the conflict in Transnistria, and the OSCE initiated a
67 Institute of World Policy (2016), “Conflict Settlement Practices Around the World: Lessons for
Ukraine,” p. 11.
68 Schulze, K. (2009), “AMM (Aceh, Indonesia),” in ESDP: The First Ten Years (1999–2009),
Grevi, G., Helly, D. & Keohane, D. (eds.), Institute for Security Studies, Paris, France.
69 Oberson, F. ¡Sandinista! The Clash en Nicaragua (www.fragmentsoftime.net).
70 Brendan O’Malley & Ian Craig (1999), The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the
Turkish invasion, I. B. Tauris, London.
71 Faber and Faber, London, 1957.
72 Anthony Eden (1960), Full circle, Cassell, London, p. 405.
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mediation but achieved very little, formore than 20 years.Moldova is still offering the
region autonomy, while Transnistria insists on international recognition and a loose
confederation of equals. In 2003, Moscow proposed a federation with autonomous
status, the “Kozak memorandum,” named after Vladimir Putin’s confident, Dmitri
Kozak. But the final draft provided for long-term status for Russian military forces,
and for that reason, the Moldovan president withdrew his initial approval. The status
of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (TMR) remains unclear to this day. It finds
itself in an existential dilemma between its uncompromising political orientation
on Russia and its economic connectedness with Moldova, Ukraine, and the EU.
Moreover, its geographical situation would make unification very costly for Russia,
while reintegration in Moldova would come at an even greater cost (Fischer 2016).
This dilemma is similar to that of Eastern Ukraine. The only success is the two
bilateral accords agreed between Ukraine and Moldova, on November 2015, with
the support of the UE border assistance mission, to fight smuggling and illicit trade
at the border.73
The Republic of Georgia is another country where the combined efforts of the
OSCE and EU achieved very little. The head of the EU investigation team on the
2008 Russo-Georgian War recalled the challenges she had to deal with when, for the
first time in its history, the EU created an independent fact-finding commission to
determine what went so badly wrong and how to avoid a repetition. According to her,
“a factor for thatwarwas the lack of progress, formore than 15 years, in the resolution
of the two frozen conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, despite the presence of
the UN, the OSCE, and the EU. The international community looked the other way
as if it had given up on upholding an increasingly fragile cease-fire.”74 Indeed, from
1993 to 2008, UN observers were deployed to monitor the secessionist region of
Abkhazia, but that small mission, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia,
found itself “substantially dependent on Russia’s policies and preferences.”75
The last, but not least, comparison is the current conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.
At the time of writing, thousands of lives have already been lost as a consequence of
the worse fighting since the 1990s between Armenia and Azerbaijan in that disputed
enclave, showing that the conflict was not frozen at all. It also has geopolitical
implications, since Russia and Turkey hold strategic interests in the region. When
full-scale fighting resumed a few months ago, the OSCE was sidelined. A ceasefire
brokered by Russia came into effect in November 2020, after Azerbaijan retook
much of the land it had lost during the 1992–1994 war. Moscow deployed around
73 For a recent global survey, see: https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trade/Publications/ECE_
TRADE_433E.pdf.
74 Heidi Tagliavini, “Lessons of the Georgian Conflict,” 30 September 2009, The New York Times..
75 Bruno Coppieters, “The UNOMIG,” in Joachim A. Koops, Borrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy,
and Paul D. Williams, The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 446.
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2,000 peacekeepers and the ceasefire deal allowed Azerbaijan to keep the territories
it recaptured, a concession that fueled outrage in Armenia.76
Why wasn’t the OSCE more active in the current temporary settlement? Russian
President Vladimir Putin explained that, given the urgency,77 “there was no time
for holding additional consultations within the framework of the OSCE Minsk
Group.” Co-chaired by the United States, Russia, and France, that group had also
been in charge of negotiating a peaceful settlement. It is unclear at the time of writing
what role the OSCEwill play in the future. Nonetheless, some elements of the recent
ceasefire were based on the peace plan that had been negotiated within that OSCE
framework over a period of many years. Moreover, the High-Level Planning Group
of the Minsk Group was mandated to devise a plan for a multinational OSCE peace-
keeping force. The group could, in the near future, propose a plan to replace the
Russian peacekeepers, but only if the stakeholders agree, in particular the Biden
administration in the United States, which took office in January 2021. As OSCE
chair in 2021, Sweden could also play a role.
Consequently, the OSCE could very well be asked to use the expertise and lessons
learned fromUkraine over the last five years to set up amission inNagorno-Karabakh
that would resemble the OSCE SMM in Donbas.
One additional problem is that the COVID-19 pandemic is currently preventing
Minsk Group visits to the field and most meetings are taking place virtually, making
it even harder for the OSCE to get involved more actively.
3.11 Conclusion: Future Challenges for the OSCE SMM
in Ukraine
The OSCE’s SMM in the Donbas region of Ukraine provides a good example for the
possibilities and limits of international conflict monitoring missions. Until recently,
no one really knew whether international monitoring was a good idea, because it had
received little real scrutiny.78 The situation has improved a little over the last years,
with several analyses and surveys on some missions.
It is important to stress that the OSCE can only monitor, not resolve, the conflict,
not having neither the means nor the mandate to do it. Only the sides can initiate
a sustainable peace process. Nevertheless, the SMM is worth receiving more atten-
tion due to its importance, size, funding, and duration. It is an example for review
and lessons-learned systems.79 But the current conflict in Eastern Ukraine has been
76 It was also found that around 1,000 Syrian fighters working for a private Turkish company has
been deployed in the region, as reported by The Guardian (https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2020/oct/02/syrian-recruit-describes-role-of-foreign-fighters-in-nagorno-karabakh).
77 Stephanie Liechtenstein, “With Multilateral Efforts Bypassed in Nagorno-Karabakh, OSCE
Struggles to Find Role,” IPI Global Observatory, 3 December 2020.
78 Kelley (2012).
79 Tammikko, T., Ruohomäki, J. (2019), p. 5.
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suffering from a lack of member states interest in recent years, and the current
COVID-19 crisis is bound to make things worse (Mustasilta 2020). Moreover, the
COVID-19 confinement resulted in a reduction of the Mission’s staff, with the repa-
triation of a number of internationalmonitors (based on individual choice), and social
distancing for those who stayed.80
War is a deceptively simple event. One side fights another in order to gain or
preserve territory and they tend to create a new reality of their own and prevent any
attempts at ending the conflict. SMMs have to respond to this reality.
Starting as a war of attrition, the fight in Ukraine progressively transformed itself
into a war of position and is now driving toward a “frozen”—or “protracted”—
conflict, similar to the situations in Transnistria and northern Georgia. It could last
for decades, but if it does, it is not the fault of the OSCE SMM, which is not the
root cause of the conflict. Hence, it cannot resolve it, but only ease it and facilitate
a peace building process, based on the evidence it has and the neutrality it aims to
provide.
Fundamental provisions of the Minsk Agreements are not implemented in the
field. When the sides re-commit themselves to implementing the ceasefire, the viola-
tions drop drastically on the following day, but fighting resumes a few days later.81
These cycles of commitment and re-commitment are creating fatigue, and a war
routine is well installed, as a quote from an interview with a Ukrainian soldier illus-
trates when explaining: “Our mornings begin with militant attacks—the separatists
wish us ‘good morning,’ and we return favors […] and yesterday is repeating.”82
A gray economy is also well-entrenched, reducing the willingness of stakeholders
to seek a negotiated settlement; the ecological situation is also appalling.83 Never-
theless, studies have mapped economic connectivity, underlining connections across
the divide (Mirimanova 2017).
The current conflict inUkraine is tricky andmultilayered, but certainly not absurd.
It is not a Catch-22 situation.84 It is at the nexus of many conflicting interests of a
political, geopolitical, economical and emotional nature. At the root of the problem is
the total absence of trust between the sides, who not only lack the will to implement
the peace process but also fear that if they were to endeavor to start unilaterally, they
would be abused by the other. Ultimately, this conflict can only be resolved through
dialogue and trust. Meanwhile, the SMM continues to facilitate an indirect dialogue
between the sides.
Against this backdrop, what are the real achievements of the Mission, the biggest
the OSCE has deployed so far? The effects of international observation have been
80 Author’s Skype interview with Ambasador Çevik, the Mission’s Chief Monitor, 24 April 2020.
81 For example, there was a 90% drop from 4 to 9 March 2018, followed by a rise of about 500
violations, on 10 Marc. OSCE SMM Daily reports, March 1st-12, 2018.
82 “Hero of Ukraine Valeriy Chibineev,” Unian.info, 7 December 2016.
83 “The Real Price of Coal in the wartime Donbas: a human rights perspective,” Heinrich Böll
Stiftung, Kyiv & Justice for Peace in Donbas, 2017, p. 21.
84 In “Catch-22”, his satirical novel of 1961, Joseph Heller depicts a tricky problem and a no-win,
absurd situation.
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documented in a series of studies focusing on elections (Hyde 2011; Kelley 2012;
Donno 2013; Norris and Nai 2017). These authors built their assessment on the
logic that international observers provide unbiased information, therefore deter-
ring malpractice, raising the cost of cheating, and triggering diplomatic pressure.
In Ukraine, the SMM is the only actor that can provide that sort of information.
There is evidence that international monitoring is ineffective unless it is coupled
to mechanisms of accountability and compliance, ranging from soft to hard power,
including agreements, re-commitment to ceasefires, applying diplomatic pressure,
and providing technical assistance. In that respect, the Mission has shown that by
developing soft power it was able to provide both credible information and technical
assistance, which I have attempted to assess in this chapter. It also proved flexible.
But it cannot solve the conflict outright and can only bring small improvements to the
everyday lives of the people living in the war zone. I suggest that some improvements
are due to a combination of diplomatic engagement, mediation, shaming, and long-
term monitoring. I also argue, with Walter Kemp, that the Mission is a test of OSCE
capacity and effectiveness (Kemp 2016). Few have praised OSCE missions so far,
apart from the small one deployed in Kyrgyzstan, in 2005.85 Assessing the SMM
in 2015, a panel of experts published a report stressing the need to strengthen the
OSCE’s operational capability.86
Furthermore, the concept of organizational learning can help to assess whether the
Mission has undergone changes resulting from lessons-learned (Argyris and Schön
1978, Adebahr 2009). But it is difficult to be sure that changes actually result from
learning and not fromother factors, such as decisions taken by the sides to the conflict.
Still, I would argue that, for five years, SMM monitors have improved their skills
and developed best practices that will guide future missions. The SMM is therefore a
solid, if incomplete, step toward the professionalization of international monitoring
and its capacity-building process. As monitors improved their skills, their reports
becamemore precise and accurate. This is amatter ofmethodological progress (using
the lessons-learned process and assessment of prior field missions). In comparison,
the EU has not been able to better learn to deploy its civilian capabilities.87 The
Mission has assumed the multiple roles of observer, monitor, journalist (i.e. war
correspondent), chronicler, witness, mediator, and facilitator (of humanitarian aid,
mainly). But it is often wrongly perceived as playing the role of investigator, law
enforcement officer, peacekeeper, or watchdog.
TheOSCE SMM inDonbas has consistently provided stakeholders with objective
information as to the realities on the ground, even though that information may be
incomplete. Everyone is nonetheless able to make an assessment on facts and not
on hearsay, unverified rumors, or allegations, which are known to have triggered
violence in other conflicts. But the observation tools and methods of the Mission are
85 Rybachenko A, (2016), p. 23: “the OSCE center in Bishkek was key to developing a timely and
effective crisis response.”
86 Interim Report & Recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a
Common Project.
87 Dijkstra H, Petrov P & Mahr E (2019), p. 2.
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far from satisfactory. Not only are the monitors prevented from entering certain areas
in the war zone, but their tools are often damaged or destroyed: “Our observation
tools are limited. Our cameras are regularly sabotaged and our UAVs are shot down.
We have limited access to the border.”88
The mandate and toolbox of the OSCE were assessed as being well-tailored
to conflict resolution during moments of ripeness for third-party action, but only
if equipped with the political will of the participating states.89 This statement
summarizes the crux of the conflict in a nutshell.
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Chapter 4
China and The OSCE’s Security Identity
Crisis
Assel Murat and Rustam Muhamedov
Abstract This study attempts to explore how China as an external actor bordering
the OSCE region facilitates and amplifies the norm contestation in the OSCE’s wider
region.We argue that China can use theOSCE’s internal leadership and security crisis
for its own strategic advantage by further weakening the OSCE participating States’
commitments in the human dimension and their support for democratic institutions.
We discuss the aforementioned through the case of the persecution of Muslims in
Xinjiang. The research findings indicate that China uses its policy tools to accomplish
its objectives: it seeks to expand and strengthen the network of supporting states in
regard to Xinjiang; it uses its diplomats as outlets of propaganda and disinformation
to deny the persecution of Muslims in Xinjiang and to present China as a benign
actor; it uses multilateral institutions such as Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as
a platform to build support for its alternative regional security governance model.
We conclude that this policy posture undermines the work of the OSCE and trust in
its values, norms, and practices.
Keywords Xinjiang policies · OSCE identity crisis · OSCE commitments · The
BRI · Authoritarianism · Democratic norms contestation
4.1 Introduction
In a time of debates about revolving and changing national identities, it is worth
looking at how geopolitics also change and impact the policies and identities of
International Organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE). We look at how the OSCE’s 54 participating States respond to
the organizations’ bordering states, namely to China’s policies and human rights
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abuses in the western Chinese region of Xinjiang, all whilst upholding their OSCE
commitments.
In July 2020, the OSCE was thrown into a crisis that was caused by three member
states, Turkey, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan, who objected to the reappointment of the
organization’s representative for freedom of the media and the head of the human
rights office. In the ensuing infighting, all four senior OSCE officials and candidates
for these positions failed to be reappointed, leaving the organization rudderless (Hall
et al. 2020). This political impasse undermined the OSCE’s vital work in seeking
concerted solutions to alarming processes that have shaken the region: the COVID-
19 pandemic’s disruptive impact on all spheres of human activity, the re-explosion
of the violent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh in
late September 2020, political turmoil in Kyrgyzstan in October 2020, and Belarus
following the fraudulent elections in August 2020, which led to massive human
rights violations and a breach of constitutional rights within these states. Though
the organization continued to perform its important duties at a minimum level in the
field of election observations and peace building, its overall responsive capacity was
noticeably impaired.
This decline in trust in multilateralism and the political polarization among the
member states in the OSCE is not completely novel, however. For over two decades
now, the OSCE has been perturbed by the identity crisis caused by participating
States’ diverging attitudes toward the institution’s core norms, values, and practices
(Lehne 2015; DeWaal 2017). The OSCE has a strong normative identity; it embraces
a vision that consolidated democratic institutions, respect for human rights and rule
of law are crucial prerequisites for genuine security and stability, both at the national
and regional levels because they help resolve “political, economic, social, and envi-
ronmental challenges at multiple levels of society” (Lewis 2012). Accordingly, the
OSCE advances a holistic approach to security, placing both humans and the state at
the core of its agenda. It seeks to facilitate the diffusion of these democratic values
and practices through constructive dialogue with its participating States, aspiring
to build a “security community” in its wider region—a community of states united
by common goals and shared values (as is stated in 1990 Charter of Paris, 1999
Charter for European Security, 2010 Astana Commemorative Declaration). Rhetori-
cally, all the participating States support this identity and vision; in reality, however,
political elites in a number of the OSCE participating States have been persistently
challenging it, refuting the promotion and upholding of the values they rhetorically
support (Dunay 2017; Lehne 2015). This provides us the platform to discuss how
external actors can use this “security gap” to pursue their strategic interests.
Much of the literature on the subject focuses on the dynamics of these processes
as inner developments in the OSCE-wide region. In this chapter, we seek to explore
howChina, being an external actor bordering the OSCE region, andmember states of
Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan andTajikistan, all with diverging security
vision and strategic interests, facilitates and amplifies the norm contestation in the
OSCE’s wider region. China and the OSCE converge in expressing certain threat
concerns, such as extremism and terrorism. Given this, China welcomes the OSCE’s
efforts in contributing to the stability in regions, such as in Central Asia, that are
4 China and The OSCE’s Security Identity Crisis 79
crucial for the success of its geostrategic projects, such as theBelt andRoad Initiative,
which cuts through most of the OSCE region.
At the same time, the OSCE and China have fundamental divergences in how they
conceptualize threats, how they signal their root causes and identify proper responses.
China champions the state-led security discourse, seeking to protect the vital interests
and preferences of its authoritarian ruling regime. Therefore, Chinese authorities
clearly acknowledge that the OSCE’s robust democratic identity can constrain their
increasingly assertive efforts to circumvent and revise democratic rules and norms
of the international order to better accommodate their interests.
Against this backdrop, we argue that China can use the OSCE’s internal leader-
ship and security crisis, as indicated above, for its own strategic advantage by further
weakening the OSCE participating States’ commitments in the human dimension
and their support for democratic institutions. We looked into how Chinese author-
ities legitimize their repressive policies in Xinjiang internationally, specifically the
persecution of Muslim minorities in western Chinese territories. One may wonder
and ask why we selected this case, as China is not an OSCE participating State and
hence, how do these developments relate to the OSCE and its work?
First of all, as the continuingfighting and the ensuingpolitical crisis inAfghanistan
demonstrate—another bordering state to the OSCE—the developments that occur at
the doorstep of the OSCE do have implications on the OSCE participating States and
the organization overall, causing unease due to the possibility of a spillover into the
OSCE-wide area. Second, due to this reasoning, the OSCE has been strengthening
dialogue and relations with Partners for Co-operation, a number of states in Asia
and the Mediterranean region, seeking to promote its vision to ensure stability in
the neighboring regions. The OSCE’s and its participating States’ reactions to the
situation in Xinjiang send a strong signal to its partners about the organization’s
ability to stand for its ideals and to pursue its security vision that is based on liberal
values.
We selected this issue as a case study because it provides a fertile ground to discuss
the argument we put forward. The findings of our study indicate that China uses a
number of policy tools to attain its objectives: it seeks to expand and strengthen the
network of supporting states in regard to Xinjiang; it uses its diplomats as outlets of
propaganda and disinformation, notably those diplomats who are engaged in “wolf-
warrior diplomacy” to deny the persecution and to present China as a benign actor; it
uses multilateral institutions, namely the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),
as platforms to build support for its alternative regional security governance model.1
We conclude that this policy posture undermines the work of the OSCE and trust in
its values, norms, and practices.
1 Though the authors attempted to discern key developments regarding the subject, this study has
limitations that are derived from the scope and focus of the research. This study does not claim to
provide a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of themotives behind each of theOSCEparticipating
states’ reaction on the issue (Xinjiang policies), particularly the possible multitude of underlying
factors that influence the policy approach. Instead, the study focuses on the implications these
reactions can have for the OSCE’s institutional cohesion and its liberal normative agenda.
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The academic literature on this issue is only recently emerging. The currently
scarce literature is mainly devoted to discussing: the implications that Xinjiang poli-
cies have for Sino-West and Central Asia relations (Bitabarova 2018; Raza 2019;
Hayes 2020); for bilateral relations with China, particularly given the shared ethnic
identity and kin state relations, such as a study on implications for China-Kazakhstan
relations (Bitabarova 2018; Liao 2019; Bohr et al. 2019); reactions of Muslim states,
given the shared religious identity (Kelemen and Turcsányi 2020). At the time of
writing, there are no studies that explore the issue in linkage to regional security archi-
tectures in-depth. Russo and Gawrich (2017), and Gawrich in this volume, explore
it inter alia, examining the implications of “overlapping” and “nesting” member-
ship of post-Soviet states in a number of security structures that have conceptual
divergences.
We seek to contribute to this emerging literature and spur further discussion on
China-OSCE relations in light of the latter’s strong normative identity as outlined
above. The findings of this study can contribute to discussions on how China’s secu-
rity interests relate to the OSCE, what policy instruments and narratives China uses
to advance its position and how, whether it succeeds in its endeavors, andwhat course
of action is required to effectively counterbalance them, to name but a few. In addi-
tion, we seek to contribute to larger discussions on Central Asia states and OSCE
relations, and the role of external actors in these processes. In the proceeding parts
of this chapter, we first recapture China’s core security interests and China’s policies
in Xinjiang, followed by a discussion of the OSCE participating States diverging
reactions to Xinjiang policies, and end with a conclusion that summarizes the key
findings.
4.2 The Xinjiang Case and China’s Core Security Interests
Xinjiang isChina’s northwestern province and home to predominantlyMuslim ethnic
communities, the largest of which are the Uighurs, officially recognized as one of
the 55 national minorities in China. In recent years, members of Muslim commu-
nities have faced a massive crackdown by Chinese authorities, suffering arbitrary
incarceration, forced labor, sterilization, and round-the-clock intrusive surveillance,
as discussed below.
Since 2017, human rights groups, UN officials, foreign governments, policy
experts, and scholars have been drawing international attention to the issue of the
drastic expansion of the detention facilities network inXinjiang,where localMuslims
have been arbitrarily held and subjected tomistreatment (HRW2018; Amnesty Inter-
national 2018; Bitabarova 2018; Raza 2019; Hayes 2020). Former detainees, who
fled China, shared their stories of inhumane conditions there, such as sleep depriva-
tion, torture, interrogations, sexual abuse, and forceful renouncement of their cultural
and religious identity. In addition, detainees were forced to demonstrate “loyalty to
the Chinese Communist Party” by pledging, singing praises for communism, and
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learning Mandarin (HRW 2019b). UN human rights experts reported that more than
a million people were held in these facilities at the time (Soliev 2019).
Uighurs have also been subjected to forced labor; reports indicate that around
50,000 former detainees were relocated to other parts of China to work in low-
tech or textile factories since 2017; many of these factories are linked to 83 global
brands. These laborers reportedly experience similar living conditions as in detention
camps: they are forbidden to observe religious practices, are subjected to ideological
training, and are forced to live in segregated dormitories (Graham-Harrison 2020).
China has also been eager to control the reproduction rates in the region. Chinese
authorities have been administering injections, implanting intrauterine contraceptive
devices, enforcing surgical sterilization, and “using internment as punishment for
birth control violations”; as a result, natural population growth in the province has
declined rapidly in recent years (Zenz 2020).
These repressive measures are aided further with an intrusive surveillance system.
The 2019HumanRightsWatch report shed light on how authorities use the Integrated
JointOperations Platform, developed bymajor state-ownedmilitary contractorChina
Electronics TechnologyGroupCorporation, and other applications to harnessmasses
of data on local Muslims (HRW 2019a). Authorities use this data to arbitrarily detain
persons or restrict them in their movement. The data interpretation algorithm is
discriminatory; it marks local Muslims as suspects from the start, using dubious
criteria for detecting “suspicious” behavior (HRW 2019b). In addition, authorities
collect biometrics, including DNA samples, fingerprints, iris scans, voice samples,
and blood types of all local residents aged 12 to 65; use GPS tracking, require
installing mobile activity monitoring applications, and maintain a system of virtual
fences (Leibold 2020; Godbole 2019).
The evidence suggests that authorities are expanding the detention facilities
network; the 2020 report prepared by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, using
satellite imagery analysis, shows that it now includes 380 facilities, expanded or
newly built since 2017. Furthermore, 61 facilities were constructed or renovated in
the last year alone, around 50% of which were high-security facilities (Ruser 2020).
The available scarce data also suggests that public security spending in Xinjiang has
been steadily ramped up, increasing tenfold in the past decade and outpacing other
administrative units (Feng 2018).
China strongly defends its case, rebuking the outside criticism of its policies in
Xinjiang. In the beginning, Chinese authorities denied the existence of detention
camps in the province. Upon being confronted with the evidence that suggested
otherwise, Beijing pivoted to presenting these facilities as “vocational education and
training centers”, which served two major purposes: to help largely backward local
population develop marketable skills and better integrate, and to insulate them from
being influenced by extremist ideas (Maizland 2020). Referring to the past “outbursts
of violence” in the province, officials claim Xinjiang hosts radical extremists who
threaten to destabilize the region (Bhattacharji 2012). The fact that the region has not
experienced a terrorist attack since December 2016 is often reiterated by the officials
as an indication of the success of its policy posture in Xinjiang.
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The Xinjiang case transcends far beyond Xinjiang itself; it represents the qualita-
tive shift in China’s foreign policy in light of the reassessment of its role as a rising
power in the international order. The 19th National Congress offered a glimpse on
how China envisages its engagement with this order in the years to come; it aspires
to expand its influence, seeking to “take an active part in reforming and developing
the global governance system” (Mazarr et al. 2018) and offer “Chinese wisdom and
a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind” (Tao 2017). At the
heart of this ambition is the urge to safeguard the unconditional rule of the Chinese
Communist Party, the legitimacy of which depends on its ability to deliver economic
growth, protect the sovereignty, and territorial and functional integrity of the state,
and insulate itself and the country from democratic ideas (Mazarr et al. 2018). This
aspiration to become a leading global power bears a considerable significance to the
present and the future of the OSCE.
Nevertheless, China and the OSCE converge on certain security issues, particu-
larly when it comes to Central Asia; both identify combating terrorism, drug traf-
ficking,militant groups, andorganized crime, and fosteringdevelopment as important
goals to deliver regional stability and security (Wuthnow 2018).
Notwithstanding, today China and the OSCE diverge in their deeper normative
foundations; simply put, they do not speak the same language when it comes to
defining what the threats are and how to deal with them as is exemplified by the
Xinjiang case. The OSCE’s understanding of security proposes constraints on state
sovereignty as the state itself can be a source of insecurity, exacerbating social
inequality, marginalization, and exclusion as can be seen in the discussion above.
China, on the other hand, advances an alternative set of norms and beliefs that prior-
itize state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. For the political
regimes that rely on authoritarian practices akin to those of China, this set is a
compelling alternative to legitimize their own repressive actions, both domestically
and internationally. Given that a number of the OSCE participating states are still
failing to commit to genuine democratic development, for the OSCE this means that
the more attractive this Chinese model becomes in its region, especially if linked to
tangible economic, financial, and political dividends, the greater are the prospects
for norm contestation and for the proliferation of polarized positions. Consequently,
the space for mutual understanding shrinks further, leading to lesser opportunities
for finding effective and concerted solutions to common threats. Furthermore, the
emphasis on the state-led security discourse that China endorses risks downplaying
and silencing actors, such as civil society institutions, that have played critical roles
in supporting and promoting the OSCE’s democratic ideals and their benefits for the
common good at the local levels. The ensuing part of our study discusses these points
in more detail in the context of China’s attempts to legitimize its actions in Xinjiang
internationally and the reactions of the OSCE participating states to these attempts.
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4.3 The Reactions of the OSCE Participating States
to the Xinjiang Case: Support, “Neutrality”,
and Contestation
China is eager to form a “global partnership framework” and has been active in its
efforts to expand its partnership network, establishing new ones and strengthening
the existing ones, such as the SCO in 2003 and launching the BRI in 2013. By
consolidating this “block” of states, China strives to attain several objectives as
follows. It gains an invaluablemeans to secure the success of its grand project that has
global outreach. It also gains important leverage in shaping the favorable international
environment to advance its interests that resonate with like-minded states. China uses
this partnership network to stifle the criticism of liberal states on sensitive issues,
such as human rights violations and other dubious activities.
Furthermore,China seeks to gain a strategic advantage in the number of supporting
states to circumvent and weaken those international norms and practices that
constrain its actions or do not correspond to its internal practices (Mazarr et al. 2018,
19). As such, China intends to “change the rules of the game” to accommodate its
needs. To exemplify this, China uses international human rights platforms, such as
the UN Human Rights Council and its human rights mechanism and procedures.
One of them is the Universal Periodic Review on Human Rights (UPR), to which
China adheres and submits reports on its human rights compliance and performance.
During the 2009 and 2013 UPR, China has successfully mobilized authoritarian
states that have been receiving China’s investments and aid to stifle the criticism
for its poor human rights record. The “block” of sympathizing states defended the
rhetoric that China made accomplishments in its efforts to protect human rights.
In 2013, support was attained from Cuba, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine,
Uganda, Venezuela, Uzbekistan, Yemen, and several African states, and hence also
OSCEparticipating States. During the 2018UPR, a similar strategywas employed by
China to avoid negative responses to the concerns raised over Xinjiang re-education
camps (Chen 2019).
Western states oppose Chinese narratives about the peaceful intentions of reed-
ucation camps, expressing concern and condemnation instead. Notably, during the
UN Human Rights Council’s 41st session in Geneva in July 2019, twenty-two states
prepared a collective document that urged China “to uphold the highest standards in
the promotion and protection of human rights and fully cooperate with the Council”,
requesting the UN Human Rights Council to consider this document (Mills 2019;
Liao 2019). Given the aforementioned, the increase in numbers of China’s sympa-
thizers can shift the balance in the former’s favor. As a result, it can give China
an additional leverage to better legitimize its stance or block unwanted decisions,
appealing to the number of supporters. Overall, such a strategy can undermine trust
in the role of existing formal institutions, their mechanisms, and the ideals they stand
for. The expansion of the partnership network affects the involved states’ behavior
not only in formal institutions.
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Due to the fact that China’s partnership network is mainly strengthened by the
financial stimulus the country gives to many states along the BRI; states that signif-
icantly benefit from them willingly refrain from engaging in actions that can repel
their major lender. This also relates to a number of the OSCE participating States as
well, primarily the bordering states. For instance, Turkey initially criticized Xinjiang
policies at the beginning of 2019 as part of broadcasting its “leader of the Muslim
world” narrative. This posture changed following Erdogan’s visit to China later that
year, where he stated that “the peoples of China’s Xinjiang region live happily in
China’s development and prosperity” (Reuters 2019). Given that China is Turkey’s
second largest trade partner (Alemdaroglu and Tepe 2020), the criticism would have
likely undermined this beneficiary trade relationship for the latter. Similarly, Serbia
under Vucic’s leadership has become vocal in supporting China on several sensi-
tive issues because of China’s investments; Vucic expressed support for China’s
policy stance on Hong Kong and Taiwan and promoted a positive image of China
in Serbia during the COVID-19 pandemic (Conley et al. 2020a). As can be seen,
China conveniently uses its economic might as leverage to ensure their partners’
“self-censorship”, which also helps it to avoid an “imposing actor” image. In addi-
tion to the “self-censorship”, some states feel compelled to align their foreign policy
posture with China’s interests.
China’s financial stimulus packages, particularly under the BRI project, elevate
the risk of a “debt trap”; de facto forming dependencies. This allows Beijing to take
a higher-status partner role, influencing how partners set their political, security and
economic agenda. Consequently, the economic dependence becomes politicized and
transforms into a “dominant and subordinate” interrelation (O’Neill 2014). China
conveniently exploits such interrelations to expand its strategic presence and influ-
ence the regional processes aswas the case in Sri Lanka. The latter’s inability to repay
its loans to China forced it to relinquish the country’s port in exchange for a 99-year-
long lease. Through this move, China got the opportunity to establish a strategic
foothold, both in commercial and military terms (Ferchen and Perrera 2019). Relin-
quishment can take other forms as well, common being permitting access to natural
resources: Angolan oilfields, cocoa fields in Ghana, and goldmines in Tajikistan
(Mattlin and Nojonen 2015, 713; Eurasianet 2018).
In total, twenty-five states that are part of the BRI project are classified as being
susceptible to the debt trap, including some of the OSCE participating States, namely
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Hurley et al. 2018). In regard to the latter two, the “debt
trap” places an additional burden on the political elite, which already has to support
China’s policies in the international arena. It has a distressing effect domestically,
pressing state institutions to deal with escalating tensions that result from growing
inequality, increasing unemployment, and frustration with government’s handling of
resources (Nurgozhayeva 2020). In themselves, these manifestations showcase the
failure of these states to pursue their OSCE commitments in the human dimension.
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China does not discuss political conditionality beforehand (Tian 2018, 21;Umarov
2020); partners have to adapt to them as they go, such as adhering to the “One-China”
principle or supporting China’s narratives on global issues, including on Xinjiang,
which often leads to deportation of Uighur asylum seekers (Mattlin and Nojonen
2015). These discussions are hidden from the public eye, andChina has been continu-
ously criticized for attaining its objectives through opaquemeans, such as “behind the
closed door” negotiations (Hayes 2020, 44). Thereby, this policy approach presents
another fundamental challenge to the OSCE; China’s engagement has a deleterious
effect on the rule of law and governance in its participating States. This effect is most
pronounced in Central Asia andWestern Balkans, where democratic institutions and
practices are either non-existent, weak, or are strongly undermined.
Chinese investments attract authoritarian governments because they do not require
political and/or economic conditionality (O’Neill 2014). As was pointedly stated by
the now former President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, in his interview to
Chinese journalists: “China has never dictated [its] own conditions and China has
never told [us] how to live as the West did”, adding that “China does not provide
help under the condition to become as China, which is attractive and appealing”
(Radio Azattyk 2019). China does not require transparency or public accountability;
moreover, Chinese authorities are often themselves involved in compounding the
corruption and poor governance to secure their interests (Tian 2018; Nurgozhayeva
2020). In 2016, the Chinese Consulate General provided a mayor of the Kyrgyz
city of Osh with a Toyota Land Cruiser as a gift, causing disapproval in Kyrgyz
society, which interpreted it as a bribe (Toktomushev 2018). Likewise, in 2016, Kaza-
khstani leadership attempted to benefit from land rent initiatives that would allow the
leasing of land to foreigners for up to 25 years. This initiative was perceived by the
public as one that would benefit Chinese companies seeking to make further inroads
in the country; following mass protests the leadership dropped the initial proposal
(Kassenova 2017; Toktomushev 2018). Similar developments are occurring in the
Balkans as well, where a number of high-profile corruption cases involving Chinese
investments have been put under the spotlight, such as the Kicevo-Orhid highway
project in North Macedonia (Conley et al. 2020b). The implications of such prac-
tices for the OSCE are immense; they further strengthen local patronage networks
and political opportunists who directly benefit from the lack of transparency and
accountability that Chinese investments are associated with. Furthermore, the lack
of conditionality significantly speeds up the lending process for showcase projects,
which can be used to boost local political figures’ public image, particularly during
election campaigns. These practices, hence, erode trust in consolidated democratic
institutions and practices, and undermine their responsiveness to citizens’ needs.
China is also keen to accuse “theWest” of politicizing human rights. China holds the
strong conviction that the liberal normative agenda reinforcesWestern hegemony and
that liberal values are inapplicable to the developing world (Mazarr et al. 2018). This
view strongly resonates among the states that have political systems akin to China’s.
As Roza Nurgozhayeva, Vice President-General Counsel at Nazarbayev University
in Kazakhstan (2020) argues, China’s political model serves as “a robust reference
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point that helps States to protect the regime’s legitimacy”. The table below illus-
trates this point; thirty-five states supported China during the 41st UN Human Rights
Council’s session as discussed above, refuting claims that China violates human
rights in Xinjiang province. Instead, these states emphasized China’s remarkable
success in human rights observation (Mills 2019). Notwithstanding, the majority of
OSCE participating States condemn China’s policies in the Xinjiang province as
illustrated in Table 4.1.
China being a “robust reference point” for some of the participating States ampli-
fies this “politicizing human rights”message that has already been often employed by
a number of the OSCE participating States in regard to the organization’s norms and
practices. The OSCE participating States that condemn China’s policies in Xinjiang
are the ones that strongly support the OSCE’s democratic identity and put the orga-
nization’s human dimension issues on equal footing with politico-military ones. Not
all the OSCE participating States share the same vision; since the early 2000s, a
Table 4.1 ‘States response to China’s policies in Xinjiang’
States that support China’s policies in
Xinjiang
States that condemn China’s policies in
Xinjiang
2019 Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Belarus,
Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Cuba,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt,
Eritrea, Gabon, Kuwait, Laos, Myanmar,
Nigeria, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan,
Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria,
Tajikistan, Togo, Turkmenistan, United
Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK
2020 Angola, Bahrain, Belarus, Burundi,
Cambodia, Cameroon, the Central African
Republic, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba,
Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea,
Eritrea, Gabon, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea
Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Kiribati, Laos,
Madagascar, Morocco, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan,
Palestine, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South
Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania,
Togo, Uganda, the UAE, Venezuela,
Yemen, Zimbabwe
Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Haiti,
Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, the Marshall Islands,
Monaco, Nauru, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway,
Palau, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States
Table 4.1 States that have explicitly expressed their position on China’s policies in the
Xinjiang province, specifically in regard to the persecution of Muslim minorities by Chinese
authorities. States highlighted in bold are OSCE participating states. Sources Catherine Putz
“2019 Edition: Which countries are for or against China’s Xinjiang policies” in the Diplomat,
accessed November 25, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/2020-edition-which-countries-are-
for-or-against-chinas-xinjiang-policies and Catherine Putz “2020 Edition: Which countries are for
or against China’s Xinjiang policies” in the Diplomat, accessed November 25, 2020, https://thedip
lomat.com/2019/07/which-countries-are-for-or-against-chinas-xinjiang-policies/
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number of post-Soviet states led by Russia intensified their criticism of the OSCE,
accusing it of “double standards” and political bias, and using its human rights
rhetoric to meddle in what they regarded as their internal affairs. In reality, unwilling
to engage in genuine democratic transformation, they became simply “irritated”
with the OSCE’s “capacity to put a spotlight on their more dubious activities” (De
Waal 2017; Dunay 2017). These states, though, often expressed their discontent
with the organization’s emphasis on human rights in a rather reactive and defen-
sive manner. Having a strong reference point now embodied by China, they can
make their stances more pronounced and use the organization’s consensus-based
decision-making to undermine the institution. For instance, Tajikistan was repeat-
edly criticized by the OSCE officials for human rights violations, such as restrictions
of fundamental political freedoms and poor conduct of elections.
As a result, in 2020, Tajikistan and Turkey blocked the reappointment of Ingibjorg
Solrun Gisladottir as the head of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODIHR). And in the same year, as mentioned earlier, Tajikistan
and Azerbaijan similarly blocked the reappointment of Harlem Desir as the OSCE
Representative on Freedom of the Media (Pannier 2020). Such actions impair the
proper functioning of the OSCE and its institutions and put the organization into
an identity crisis, especially its tasks in vital areas, such as in conflict zones, which
require strong leadership and common positions. Furthermore, these actions intend
to pressure the organization to dial down its harsh rhetoric against human rights
violators in return for their support in passing through crucial decisions.
The “nesting” or “overlapping” membership of some of the OSCE participating
States in the structures, where China is able to exert strong influence, can similarly
contribute to the norm contestation as outlined above. China uses its membership in
regional organizations, particularly the SCO, to make its narratives more appealing
and legitimize its actions through multilateral means, as is the case with Xinjiang
policies. China is keen to use this multi-track strategy to secure its interests: by
actively participating in such formats, it projects an image of a reliable partner to
ease fears of its growing assertiveness.At the same time, it uses regional organizations
to strengthen its position as a regional hegemon (Mazarr et al. 2018; Lewis 2012).
As mentioned earlier, the SCO and the OSCE share some of the key security
concerns (Russo and Gawrich 2017), but overall have diverging perceptions on the
relevance of human rights, including minorities’ rights when defining security. The
OSCEviewsminorities’ struggle for autonomy (in some cases separatism) as a funda-
mental human right and legitimate action, while the SCO is against such conceptual-
ization, labeling it as a security threat (Lewis 2012). As such, the SCO states can use
vague definitions of such a “security threat” to support and legitimize their repressive
responsive measures. In regard to Xinjiang, China defends its case by referring to
combating the “three evils”, namely separatism, extremism, and terrorism and its
corresponding narratives. In a similar vein, this discursive construct is used by other
SCOmembers to pursue oppressivemeasures to intimidate activists and other groups
disfavored by the ruling regime, to limit personal freedoms and rights, and to expand
security services’ oversight. This course of action has implications for the OSCE
as five out of six SCO member states are also OSCE participating States. These
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states are also authoritarian political systems that have long voiced criticism over
the OSCE’s democratic identity. Using the SCO and its rules as a reference point,
they appealed to the need to reshape the norms to better reflect the consideration of
each state’s domestic legislation and individual political context, thereby avoiding
criticism (Ambrosio 2008; Russo and Gawrich 2017).
In addition to actions in the offline space as discussed above, China is similarly
proactive in contesting democratic norms and institutions online. China fully real-
izes the benefits of shaping the online “discourse power”, taking advantage of the
Internet’s reach, and its decentralized and democratic nature. China strives to formu-
late and disseminate the narratives that align with the interests of the ruling regime
and suppress dissent. In this regard, the “wolf-warrior diplomacy” is a development
worthy of note. This is the approach that is increasingly being used by China’s diplo-
matic corps to defend China, even aggressively. More than 170 Chinese diplomats
are online now, using social media as a “bully pulpit” (Brandt and Schafer 2020).
China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, for instance, mocked American concerns
over the Xinjiang case, pointing to examples of racism in the United States, denoting
that it was in fact the US that had issues with human rights (Zhu 2020). Chinese
diplomats have used these platforms to deflect the criticism over Xinjiang and to
spread the content that promotes the positive image of its human rights practices,
and to spread conspiracy theories over the coronavirus pandemic and its outbreak
(Brandt and Schafer 2020). In addition, Chinese diplomats follow the same strate-
gies during interviews when responding to questions on Xinjiang. For instance, on
May 28, 2019, Zhang Xiao, Chinese ambassador to Kazakhstan, was asked about the
detentions of Kazakhs in re-education camps and he angrily denied this, labeling it as
disinformation (RFERL 2019). Chinese officials reverse the criticism over Xinjiang
policy as an anti-Chinese element as it happened in the case of China’s ambassador
to the UK, who denied the abuses of the rights of the Muslim minority in Xinjiang
(The Guardian 2020). The implications of such actions are evident; upon necessity,
Chinese diplomats can similarly shape and promote content that will sow frustra-
tion and amplify false messages to erode citizens’ trust in democratic institutions or
erode trust in multilateralism and cooperation between actors to the strategic benefit
of their home country.
China’s online assertiveness manifests itself in another crucial way. China is one
of the leading powers in terms of digital development, making a significant leap in
recent years. Given the growing importance of the information space for geopolitical
contestation, China is eager to shape the global information architecture according
to its preferences. It tries to lead in several strands. First, it expands the market for its
surveillance technology that is being actively used in Xinjiang. A study published by
the Open Technology Fund documented sales of these types of technology to over
73 states, including to democracies (Dirks and Cook 2020). The OSCE region is
no exception; Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan are installing Chinese surveil-
lance systems as part of their “safe city” initiatives (Yau 2019a, b), Turkmenistan is
also considering such cooperation. The import of these technologies raises twomajor
concerns: first is its potential use by the authoritarian regimes of the region to curb
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dissent or intimidate human rights activists, following the similar use of these tech-
nologies in Xinjiang; the second point is directly related to China, as by exporting
their products into new areas, China can spy on governments and gain access to
sensitive data as was the case with the African Union scandal (Gramer et al. 2020).
In addition, the export of such technologies allows China to enhance algorithms of
their own AI-enabled technologies, which can be used to intimidate activists and
regime critics at home and abroad (Jardine 2019; Yau 2019a, b).
Second, China is also interested in shaping the international norms that govern
the information space; along with Russia, it endorses a vision that places significant
authority in the hands of the government, which would enable it to “pull the plug”
and disrupt the Internet if it is used to challenge the regime, as has been recently
demonstrated in Belarus during mass protests against Lukashenka’s regime. China’s
actions and strategies in the online domain are equally deleterious to the OSCE’s
normative agenda as its offline actions and strategies.
Despite these alarming developments, several OSCE participating States are
already emulating the Chinese model of Internet governance, among them Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan; many other states are debating of following suit. As
digital development is the defining reality of our times, the ability of the OSCE to
counterbalance China’s efforts in this strand will mean much for security, protec-
tion of fundamental human rights, and inclusive and sustainable development in the
OSCE-wide area in the foreseeable future.
4.4 OSCE Security Identity Crisis
As was stated in this study, we attempted to demonstrate that the case of Xinjiang is
not limited toChina alone; it needs to be viewed as part of the larger agenda that China
is pursuing regionally and globally, namely how it penetrates OSCE security and
human rights policies. The Chinese Communist Party has long sought to establish an
unchallenged control over China’s restive regions, such as Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong
Kong, and is currently pursuing these goals. Furthermore, the Chinese ruling regime
continues to undermine the stability in South Asia region, projecting its hard power
and intimidating the neighboring states. AsChina’s foreign policy andBRI is actively
making inroads in the OSCE-wide area, mainly in the form of investment projects,
the aforementioned developments along with policies in Xinjiang demonstrate that
if required, China will not shy away from securing its interests by all means possible.
Thereby, we aimed to illustrate howChina can undermine the vision of security that is
promoted by the OSCE and how this will affect the organization and its participating
States. Whereas the OSCE and overall ODIHR aims to reconcile security measures
with human rights norms and democratic standards, for example in terms of human
security and the concept of securitization, China uses security policies to combat its
internal and external political enemies.
We conclude that China’s security approach challenges the OSCE by under-
mining its participating States’ commitments in the human dimension, particularly
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in Western Balkans and Central Asia where democratic institutions are either non-
existent or are not strongly consolidated. China advances an alternative set of norms
and beliefs, including through multilateral means, which is regarded as compelling
to the states that similarly have poor records of human rights protection and are
ruled by authoritarian elites. China’s actions have a deleterious effect on good gover-
nance and rule of law, contribute to endemic corruption and poor transparency and
accountability, which aggravate further the living conditions of the general public
in a number of the OSCE participating States. The public’s growing discontent,
hence, can lead to instability and even conflict, particularly in those states that have
not developed adequate institutions of civic engagement and resolution of societal
concerns. Altogether, these actions amplify the already existing identity crisis in the
OSCE, contributing to the value-based division and undermining theOSCE’s respon-
sive capacity to pressing security challenges and threats. It is highly likely that the
OSCE will continue to be perturbed by the ongoing security identity crisis in the
foreseeable future, causing unease to its democratic majority as it makes the OSCE
region vulnerable as a whole. The future relevance of the organization depends on
how this democratic majority of states can revitalize the dialogue so as not to alienate
the states that are failing to fulfill their commitments and push them toward China’s
orbit of interests, while not compromising the democratic values that underpin the
organization.
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Chapter 5
China’s Emerging Political and Economic
Dominance in the OSCE Region
Uraimov Marat
Abstract The presence of China in the OSCE region is becoming resilient, partic-
ularly after Beijing began providing infrastructural loans to OSCE states. The size
of the issued infrastructural loans in less developed economies is disproportionate
to national economies, resulting in the borrowing countries becoming incapable of
paying back the loans. In this chapter, I argue that China’s practices of infrastructural
loans and China’s overall standing on minority issues and democratization contra-
dicts the OSCE core principles and undermines OSCE integrity. To illustrate this, I
use, first, the example of the promotion of non-democratic practices through non-
transparent procurement, surveillance of civilians, and supply of police hardware
for suppression and control of political dissidents (based on evidence from Eastern
and Central Europe, and Central Asia) and, for the second example, I illustrate the
violation of minority rights in re-education camps in the Xinjiang region (based
on political and civic reaction from Central Asia), which Chinese authorities call
“Vocational Education andTrainingCenters.” The first example helps to analyze how
Chinese foreign loans contradict the democratic commitments of the borrowing coun-
tries. Chinese infrastructural loans promote non-democratic practices in borrowing
countries throughunfair, non-transparent procurement in infrastructural development
projects. The Chinese side also provides surveillance systems and anti-protest police
vehicles and ammunition which help to undermine individual rights and freedoms.
The second example helps to analyze the reaction of Central AsianMuslim countries
toward China’s treatment of kin-groups, namely the lack of critical reaction of CA
states despite their OSCE-membership and commitment toward promotion of indi-
vidual rights and freedoms (including freedom of faith). China has been providing
infrastructural loans to most OSCE member states over the past two decades; and
these member states have not officially responded to Chinese treatment of their own
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kin-groups, such asKazakh,Kyrgyz, andUyghurminorities—according to theOSCE
core principles on minority rights. The OSCE core principles are categorized under
the “human dimension” to ensure OSCE states’ “respect for individual rights and
fundamental freedoms” and their commitment to “abide by the rule of law; promote
principles of democracy; strengthen and protect democratic institutions” Yamamoto
(2015). Most likely if there were no infrastructural loans from China, the OSCE
countries under analysis would respond to Chinese domestic policy toward ethnic
minorities critically. Most likely, by providing surveillance and police machinery,
China tends to support the existing political regimes in borrowing countries and, by
its non-transparent procurement, it does not encourage enforcement of laws.
Keywords Infrastructural loans ·Minority issues · Democratization · OSCE ·
OSCE-states · OSCE-principles · Non-transparent procurement
5.1 Introduction
China’s emerging political and economic dominance in the OSCE region and its
consequences for development and transformation can be best illustrated by the case
of Chinese infrastructural loans in the region. The reasons and need for these loans
date back to the beginning of the OSCE in the 1990s in the aftermath of the collapse
of communism. In the newly emerged states, an economic and political vacuum
appeared across the Central Asian region. In response, emerging and great powers
sought to increase their influence and presence in the region, through organizations
such as the BRICs and the European Union.
Other organizations such as the OSCE slowly became a player in maintaining
regional security, political transition and democracy, which became a new political
ideology to secure economic development at large. Meanwhile, a political transition
in this regionwas in some statesmore successful, such as in theBaltic states orCentral
Europe, or less a success as in Tajikistan (Foroughi 2010) and post-Yugoslav states
(Woodward 1995) which endured periods of civil war and severe conflict. Econom-
ically, these states faced more difficulties such as hyperinflation and productivity
deficits and looked for any economic and financial opportunity from abroad (Gordon
et al. 2013; Sakwa and Webber 2010). Soon, but not among the first, Chinese loans
and investments gained more and more influence, even before the official launch of
the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since the 1990s, Chinese investment and
enterprises in the OSCE region became resilient, particularly after Beijing began
providing foreign aid and foreign investment to OSCE states in Albania as early
as in the 1950s (in the form of development aid among communist states) and in
Central Asian states since the 1990s (Copper 2016a, b). The size of issued infras-
tructural loans and investments in less developed economies is disproportionate to
their national economies, resulting in the borrowing countries becoming incapable
of paying them back.
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In this chapter, I will illustrate and argue that China’s practices of infrastruc-
tural loans and its contradicting policies conflict with the OSCE core principles and
undermines OSCE integrity in terms of observing individual rights and fundamental
freedoms and rule of law. China, in contrast to Western countries, puts human rights
and democratization issues secondary, because China emphasizes the importance
of and thus gives priority to “securing economic and security interests” along with
“regime survival” (Chen and Kinzelbach 2015).
This is best exemplified by the Chinese promotion of non-democratic practices,
for example, non-transparent procurement, surveillance and police hardware for
suppression and control of political dissidents; and the responses and reactions of
OSCE member states overall in Central Asian states toward re-education camps in
the Xinjiang region that imprison their kin-groups.
Although on the UN level these states oppose Chinese policies in the Xinjiang
region in Northwestern China, the Kazakh andKyrgyz governments did not officially
respond1 to Chinese treatment and human rights violations of Kazakh, Kyrgyz and
Uyghurminorities inChina.One could argue that if therewere no infrastructural loans
and investment policies from China, Central Asian States would respond to Chinese
domestic policy toward ethnicminorities critically.China tends to support the existing
political regimes in borrowing countries and its non-transparent procurement does
not encourage enforcement of laws.
This argument can best be illustrated by benchmarking Chinese domestic poli-
cies toward its national minorities against OSCE and ODIHR core commitments,
mandates, and functions. For example, themandate of theOSCEHighCommissioner
on National Minorities (HCNM) and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights (ODIHR) has the aim to stress OSCE’s standing as an organi-
zation that stands for minority rights and freedoms, as well as its democratization
efforts. Later, the chapter discusses China’s infrastructural loans (major projects)
in the OSCE states and argues for China’s promotion of non-democratic practices
in the OSCE region, namely it discusses promotion of non-transparency, supply of
surveillance and police hardware for suppression and control of political dissidents in
less developed OSCE member states. The final part examines re-education camps in
Xinjiang and the reaction of the OSCE participating states receiving Chinese funds,
in particular the Kyrgyz and Kazakh governments.
5.2 China’s Economic Policies
China has become one of the world’s most rapidly growing economies over the
last 40 years thanks to Deng Xiaoping’s unprecedented economic reforms of 1979.
Since 2010 after surpassing Japan, it has been the world’s second largest economy
1 They officially responded that this matter is Chinese domestic policy and Chinese domestic affairs
to which they cannot interfere. In other words, the Chinese action has been approved despite it
breached OSCE and other international norms on minority treatment.
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in terms of real gross domestic product just behind the United States. It was only in
the mid-1970s when Beijing launched its “open door” policies. In 1982 the country
adopted an “independent foreign policy” framework (Lijun 1994). With the aim of
opening China to the world, China initially launched so-called “special economic
zones.” These economic zones were designed to support the export of Chinese goods
following Deng Xiaoping’s emphasis on development of foreign economic relations
and the Politburo’s third plenum meeting decision in 1978 (Ibid.). Initially, four
economic zones were established in 1979, but later in 1984, given the successful
experience with existing economic zones performance, the Politburo approved the
status of “special economic zones” in fourteen other seaside cities and the island of
Hainan (Barnett 1985).
According to Garver (2016), the Chinese economic rise that took root after the
“open door policies” consists of two major steps: (1) promotion of export and (2)
import of technology. The author continues, noting that China imported technology
with the profits it gained from exports (Ibid.). Imported technology was utilized to
improve the competitiveness of Chinese products, including technology. However,
from 2005 a new task was set up, according to which China was not targeting the
import of new technology, but rather making an effort to “turn the PRC into a global
leader in technological innovation” by 2050 (Garver 2016, p. 699). According to this
plan, China aims to become a world “center” of technology and innovation.
Despite a long year history of Chinese aid, there is no agreement on how to
properly define it. Although China officially declares its foreign aid and/or foreign
investment as “South-South cooperation” in the White Papers issued in 2011 and
2014, and in other official publications, China avoids using certain terms for its
financing (Carter 2017, p. 2). TheWhitePaper only presents fiveprinciples ofChinese
financing for how to deliver aid (State Council 2011, 2014). The White Paper does
not differentiate between types of existing financing instruments, but prefers to list
“grants (aid gratis), interest-free loans and concessional loans,” and eight forms
of aid known as “complete projects, goods and materials, technical cooperation,
human resource development cooperation, medical teams sent abroad, emergency
humanitarian aid, volunteer programs in foreign countries, and debt relief” under the
category of “Chinese financial aid flows” (State Council 2011).
China’s format of aid is different too. Bräutigam, for example, notes that China
does not provide financing to other countries in cash, despite emergency situations
(Bräutigam 2009). She also notes that Chinese financing is usually “delivered in
kind, as exports of Chinese goods and services” (Ibid., p. 125). Others stress the
“government-to-government” model that leads the Beijing-way of investing (Carter
2017, p. 2; Poskitt et al. 2016, p. 5). However, this model gives little room for
other non-state or private actors to be part of the negotiation processes (Bräutigam
2009; Copper 2016a, c; Tian 2018). In addition to the lack of agreement on Chinese
foreign investment, Bräutigam argued that China’s aid programs lack transparency
and therefore create uncertainty (2011).
Finally, China tends to support non-democratic governments that show a high
level of corruption (Bräutigam 2009; Copper 2016a, b, c; Dave 2018; Tian 2018;
Toktomushev 2018), for example in Tajikistan or Turkmenistan.
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Against this backdrop, one can conclude that China is pragmatic and considers
merely economic incentives vis-à-vis governments, therefore it is not concerned
about partnering with undemocratic systems. On the other hand, Chinese loans are
attractive for most developing countries or countries under crisis because China
does not ask for a political conditionality in exchange, let alone any positive human
rights record. Loans and grants of the World Bank, European Union or US financial
institutions, in contrast with the Chinese government, are accompanied with condi-
tions related to economic reforms, democratic governance, observance of human
rights and freedoms, transparency, etc., making financing access difficult to less-
democratic regimes (Copper 2016c). Copper (2016c), in his book “China’s Foreign
Aid and Investment Diplomacy,” wrote: “Western aid, including US Foreign assis-
tance is also said to be “tied” to efforts to promote democracy and human rights,
which makes it less effective in promoting development and thus less attractive to
African leaders.” (p. 82).
Therefore, there is a tendency for less democratic developing countries to prefer
contracting with Chinese rather than other investment giants, which impose their
own conditionality such as rule of law-based compliance and requirements, as well
increasing the transparencyof investments and level of accountability.Chinaobserves
non-intervention principles into the internal affairs of investment-recipient countries
and allows them to choose own development model (Tian 2018).
This makes China a flexible investor in comparison with the western investors
that put forward many conditionalities. For example, since 1960 China has invested
in African countries dominated by patronage politics, such as Zimbabwe, Sudan,
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia in Africa and Myanmar, Burma and
Cambodia in Asia (Copper 2016b, c), whereas western investors do not risk investing
in volatile unstable countries (Kazianis 2011). Finally, China tends to solve domestic
problems through providing foreign investment. For example, China provides foreign
investment to Muslim countries like Indonesia because it “proved an effective tool”
(Copper 2016b, p. 2) to build diplomatic relations and polish its bad reputation vis-
à-vis Muslim countries and hence to resolve its own “Islamic problem at home and
with countries of the Middle East.” (Ibid.)
Less democratic states within the OSCE region and with weak state institutions
are also primary aid receivers from Beijing. These regimes risk managing aid in non-
transparent and unaccountable ways, resulting in debts. Beijing’s loans are ostensibly
opaque and troublesome to weak states and put these countries in over-debt and
dependent on China. For instance, in 2020, Kyrgyzstan’s external debt to China
reached 1,774 million USD, while the country’s budget is 163 billion Kyrgyz soms.2
Thus, China remains a leading loan-owner for Kyrgyzstan. According to the report
issued in 2018 by the Center for Global Development, Kyrgyzstan is listed among
2 Ministry of Finance of Kyrgyz Republic. 2018. “Struktura gosudarstvennogo vnexnego
dolga KR po sostoni na 31.05.2020 goda—Novosti vedomstva—Ministerstvo
finansov Kyrgyzsko Respubliki.” (The structure of the state external debt of




eight states which are overly indebted to China and could suffer from debt distress.
The report states: “We find that of the 23 countries identified above, there are 10–15
that could suffer from debt distress due to future BRI-related financing, with eight
countries of particular concern. These countries are Djibouti, the Kyrgyz Republic
(Kyrgyzstan), Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Laos), the Maldives, Mongolia,
Montenegro, Pakistan, and Tajikistan.” (Hurley et al. 2018, p. 11).
Four Central Asian OSCE member states (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro,
andMongolia) are highly indebted due to the disproportionate size of loans compared
to the countries’ GDP. China’s resulting economic policies pose many challenges.
For instance, Tajikistan was already unable to pay back a Chinese loan in 2011 and
was forced to cede 980 km2 to Beijing (Karrar and Mostowlansky 2020) and in
2019 the Tajik government was criticized for leasing Tajik land to a Chinese mining
company.3 In 2020, as the Kyrgyz government was not able to service its debt to
China, they attempted several times to request Beijing to reschedule and restructure
the debt, but China kept silent in response. The Kyrgyz government sought help from
the population and launched a money collection campaign to return the debt.4
As a consequence, China is often depicted both as a peaceful power and as a
“threat” or “neo-colonial” power, and authors like Yahuda note that Chinese leaders
endeavor to deny the political consequences of economic relations (Yahuda 1997).
Whereas others, such as Heilmann and Schmidt, note that China has increasing geo-
political aspirations by highlighting that “Chinese leaders have decided to play a
larger role in shaping international mechanisms through the G20, becoming a “rule
maker” rather than a “rule taker” when it comes to such things as regulating financial
markets, stabilizing the international monetary system, and preventing protectionist
practices” (2014, p. 27).
On the local level, for example, in relations between the South-East Asian
Economic Association (ASEAN) and China, there are complaints about unfair trade
relations. For example, Indonesian and Thai producers claim that their markets are
flooded by Chinese goods, while Malays worry that China’s increasing influence
might turn into a threat (Ibid.). This bias in trade relationships will not easily be
resolved despite the 2020 agreement on a trade union between China and ASEAN.5
Similar tensions occurred between China and Central Asian states in response to
the inflow of Chinese workers into construction works and an anxious labor market.
For instance, in Tajikistan, a non-experienced Chinese firm took construction of
the Dushanbe–Khujand–Chanak highway in 2010 despite there being local compa-
nies with good experience (see Pantucci and Lain 2017). For example, in 2017
3 Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. 2019. “Silver Lining? Tajikistan Defends Controversial Deci-
sion To Give Mine To China.” Accessed at https://www.rferl.org/a/silver-lining-tajikistan-defends-
controversial-decision-to-give-mine-to-china/30199786.html.
4 Radio Azattyk. 2021. “ºkm8t bdet tolturuuda lden ardam surat.” (Radio
Free Europe, Radio Liberty. 2021 The government is asking its population for help with budget
shortfalls) Accessed at https://www.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan-budget-help/31036352.html.
5 VOA News. 2020. Trade Deal Raises Questions About China’s Dominance. Accessed at https://
www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/trade-deal-raises-questions-about-chinas-dominance.
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in Kyrgyzstan,6 and in 2009, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2015 and in 2018 in Kazakhstan,7
Chinese labor in localmarkets led to public dissatisfaction and even resulted in violent
conflicts between Chinese workers and local residents. Later in 2019, so-called “Chi-
nese expansionism” was blamed during public protests that gathered more than 300
people in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan8 and which continued in 2020. In Kaza-
khstan, the protestors were demanding transparency when dealing with China, while
in Pakistan9 and in Kyrgyzstan10 rallies were held against depleting natural resources
being exploited by China.
Depending on the recipient country’s economic and resource capacity, China
pursues either political or economic benefits, or even both. However, this is not to
say that trade and commerce are more important for China than its political interests
or vice versa. Many scholars note that China has been successful in applying its
economic strength by providing aid and loans to accomplish its foreign policy objec-
tives. Among its successes cited is recognition of the One China policy and political
support in international arenas for China’s game-changing behavior on different
agendas, including human rights. Today, Chinese infrastructural loans are issued to
Chinese partner states—along with its political conditionality—in search of natural
resources, enhancing trade connections and establishing new market zones.
5.3 Chinese Investments in the OSCE Region
Chinese investment interests in the OSCE region have matured since the 1990s
after the initiation of the so-called second phase of “foreign investment” in the 1980s
with pragmatic considerations promoting trade and commerce (Copper 2016a).More
precisely, Chinese foreign investment into and infrastructural loans to other countries,
with its economic and political gains, have been provided after 1978 when Deng
6 RadioAzattyk. 2013. “Massova draka vKurxabe.FOTO.” (Radio Free Europe, Radio
Liberty. 2013 Mass fight in Kurshab. Photo.) Accessed at https://rus.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan_kurs
hab_mass_brawl/24819123.
7 KARAVAN Media Portal. 2018. “Protivostonie kazahstancev i kitacev: v
qem priqina konfliktov, proishodwih na kitaskih neftnyh predpritih.”
(KaravanMedia Portal. 2018. Opposition of Kazakhs and Chinese. What causes conflicts occurring
in Chinese oil enterprises.) Accessed at https://www.caravan.kz/news/protivostoyanie-kazakhsta
ncev-i-kitajjcev-v-chem-prichina-konfliktov-proiskhodyashhikh-na-kitajjskikh-neftyanykh-predpr
iyatiyakh-423556/.
8 Radio Azattyk. 2019. “Qem moet obernuts dl Kyrgyzstana usilenie
antikitaskih nastroeni?” (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty) Accessed at https://rus.
azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan_china_politics/29703213.html.
9 Nikkei Asian Review. 2018. “Pakistan struggles to contain rise of anti-China sentiment.”
Accessed at https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Pakistan-struggles-to-contain-rise-
of-anti-China-sentiment.
10 Radio Azattyk. 2018. “V Kadamae naqalos rassledovanie po faktu uderani
kitaskih predprinimatele v kontenere.” (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty) Accessed
at https://rus.azattyk.org/a/29513370.html.
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Xiaoping resumed power as head of the Chinese communist party and government.
Under his unprecedented economic reforms, China has embarked on a free-market
capitalist economy path which boosted the country’s economic growth by opening
its doors to Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and international trade. As a result, the
Chinese ability to sustain high savings and low consumption rates could increase the
Chinese potential of giving and offering infrastructural loans, mostly in a manner of
traditional “tribute diplomacy,” especially when it comes to small developing states
with minor geopolitical significance.
Due to the unequal economic development of OSCE region since the early 1990s,
the former post-Soviet as well as Balkan states are most vulnerable to Chinese attrac-
tive infrastructural loans, despite development and investments efforts have been
carried out by other stakeholders such as the European Union (Pavlićević 2019).
These countries have been destinations for Chinese FDI, in particular after and
during global financial crisis of 2008. For instance, there are more than 1600 “green”
Chinese enterprises in the EU countries of South East and Eastern Europe, which
employ more than 50 thousand local workers (Szunomár and Biedermann 2014).
However, it should be noted that Chinese state-owned enterprises are also perceived
as a subject for “political guidance directly from the Communist Party,” because
around 72% of Chinese investments in Europe came from state-owned enterprises.
Meanwhile, engagement of the Chinese private investor sector is low (Ibid., p. 24).
Since 2013, the BRI project has been the most discussed investment project in the
OSCE region. It aims to connect countries and regions with China through its land
and sea routes and crosses the entire region via pipelines, railroads, roads, and air.11
Millions of Chinese cargo containers cross the region every year by land and sea
routes,12 for instance, through newly-built railroad going from China through Kaza-
khstan the number of cargo containers have increased from 2,000 containers in 2011
to 42,000 containers in 201513 in this Eurasia region, China had begun to provide
infrastructural loans much earlier than when it announced the BRI. It is important to
note that through the BRI, China contributes to the promotion connectivity benefiting
economic growth and development of OSCE member states by increasing the flow
of trade and investment and by developing and maintaining transport infrastructure
(Wolff 2018). According to two White Papers that were issued in 2011 and 2014
by the Chinese government, the policies intend to connect infrastructure of coun-
tries under the BRI to enable buying and selling, to promote open markets, enhance
and build joint financial markets with China, and to reinforce “people-to-people”
11 Mercator Institute for China Studies. 2018. Mapping the Belt and Road Initiative: this is where
we stand. Accessed at https://merics.org/en/analysis/mapping-belt-and-road-initiative-where-we-
stand.
12 Freight Waves. 2019. Port Report: China’s massive growth in ocean box shipping and over-
the-road trucking. Accessed at https://www.freightwaves.com/news/port-report-chinas-massive-
growth-in-ocean-box-shipping-and-over-the-road-trucking.
13 Forbes. 2016. Why The China-Europe ‘Silk Road’ Rail Network Is Growing Fast. Accessed
at https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/01/28/why-china-europe-silk-road-rail-transp
ort-is-growing-fast/?sh=2557054659ae.
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contacts.14 China is largely investing in the improvement and construction of trans-
port infrastructure connecting Beijing with the west and the rest of the world. In
this context, the OSCE member states in Central Asia and East-Central Europe have
become transit corridors for Chinese commodities, as have Kazakhstan, Serbia and
Poland, on the way to the western parts of Europe, including to Germany, Italy and
France.
5.4 OSCE Policies on National Minorities
and Democratization
The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) are the two main structures
within OSCE along with others which work to ensure and to promote minority rights
and democratization in the OSCE region. Their norms and standards in transparency,
accountability and participation, and their overall respect for minority and human
rights in the OSCE region often have been hindered by foreign investments and
policies of third countries, such as China, (Bräutigam 2009; Copper 2016a, b, c; Dave
2018; Tian 2018). HCNM and ODIHR run their offices and programs throughout
the OSCE region, with intense activities, in particular in post-Communist states in
Eurasia. Post-Communist OSCEmember states are described asweaker democracies
and economies and yet with a number of ethnic, linguistic and religious minority
groups issues concerning OSCE’s two main structures (Dave 2018; Tian 2018).
The recent report issued by a democracy measurement project at the University
of Gothenburg in Sweden, the V-Dem research project, overall demonstrates that
democratic backsliding in the region is worryingly occurring broadly in post-Soviet
countries (see Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). This backsliding opens the doors to
non-transparent, opaque and “governments only” agreement between China and its
counterparts (Bräutigam 2009; Copper 2016a, b, c; Tian 2018). Yet, OSCEminority,
democratization, and human rights policies programs are aimed at avoiding exactly
this, namely that the governments were transparent and less able to make economic
or trade agreements behind closed doors without including other actors or groups
that are affected by it in the negotiation process (Mihr 2020).
Back in July 1992, as a response to inter-ethnic tensions after the fall of commu-
nism and the collapse of the Soviet Union which led to the establishment of many
new republics that are today the main target of Chinese investments, the Helsinki
Summit decided to establish the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities
due to the alarming rise of violence and discrimination against ethnic, linguistic
and religious minorities in the OSCE region. HCNM has ever since developed an
alerting and conflict prevention mechanism, and according to its mandate the High
Commissioners’ office in TheHague carries out “‘early warning’ and, as appropriate,
14 Mercator Institute forChinaStudies. 2018. “Mapping theBelt andRoad initiative: this iswherewe
stand.” Accessed at https://www.merics.org/en/bri-tracker/mapping-the-belt-and-road-initiative.
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‘early action’ at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national
minority issues” (Diacofotakis 2002). HCNM works independently, in a confiden-
tial manner and applies a “quiet diplomacy” approach. The High Commissioner
undertakes regular visits to the OSCE member states to assess national minorities’
situation and provides recommendations to governments to improve inter-ethnic
relations. According to key principles and guidelines adopted since 1996,15 and to
the ODIHR’s activities such as human rights monitoring, OSCE participating states
commit themselves to observe and promote minority rights, individual rights and
freedoms, rule of law and democratic values in general.
However, since China began its financial intervention, these values among OSCE
participating states increasingly became of little importance, at least because of their
financial dependence, if not because of the fear of losing a “sponsor.” In particular,
tender procedures of the OSCE states are undermined because the Chinese side inter-
venes into domestic procurement regulations, for example, resulting in a breach of
rule of law in theOSCE region.Chinese surveillance equipment andpolicemachinery
received by some OSCE member states such as Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan, as part of unspecified bilateral agreement, are used to monitor and
suppress opposition protests, breaching OSCE core principles of individual rights
and freedoms. Finally, the Kyrgyz and the Kazakh governments did not, so far, offi-
cially respond to Chinese treatment of their kin-groups in Xinjiang, even after the
launch of international reports in 2017 that illustrated the breach of minority rights,
individual rights and freedoms in the North-Western Chinese province. According
to human rights watch report (2018), “Xinjiang’s domestic policy16 has also had
implications abroad. […] targeting people with connections to an official list of “26
sensitive countries”, includingKazakhstan,Malaysia […]” (p. 4). These countries are
characterized as “the governments [having] close relationship with Beijing” (p. 5).
For instance, Kazakhstan preferred “developing good relations with China” to “sup-
porting ethnically and culturally close Uyghur population in Xinjiang” (Burkhanov
2018, p. 154). Based on it, “the Chinese government has stepped up pressure on
other governments to forcibly return Uyghurs in their countries to China” (p. 4).
It might indicate that Chinese partner-countries are not only in solidarity with each
other regarding the Chinese principle of non-interference but also “supports Beijing’s
fundamental diplomatic and political stances prior to receiving any funding” (Tian
15 HCNM core documents are: The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights
of National Minorities and Explanatory Note (1996), The Oslo Recommendations Regarding the
Linguistic Rights of National Minorities and Explanatory Note (1998), The Lund Recommenda-
tions on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life and Explanatory Note
(1999), Guidelines on the use of Minority Languages in the Broadcast Media and Explanatory Note
(2003), Recommendations on Policing inMulti-Ethnic Societies and Explanatory Note (2006), The
Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations and Explanatory
Note (2008), The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies and Explanatory Note
(2012).
16 Beijing introduced specific policy “StrikeHardCampaign against Violent Terrorism” inXinjiang,
a tool used by local governments to effectively fight crime, that have been “highlighted the abusive
nature of these drives” leading “to numerous arbitrary arrests and summary executions” (Human
Rights Watch 2018, p. 12).
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2018, p. 26). Hence, one can correlate that the financial dependence to China of some
member states is challenging the integrity of OSCE principles as outline by HCNM
and ODIHR.
5.5 Non-transparent Policies in OSCE Region
Not long after China announced the BRI in 2013, its investment and loan poli-
cies became key world financing strategies. As stated earlier, Chinas is providing
foreign aid, loans and infrastructure investments to developing countries, including
the OSCE region. Central Asian Countries, as well as countries in Western Balkan
or Belarus, are key target countries for Chinese investments and loans.17 However,
it is important to note that these states might receive infrastructural loans and invest-
ments under different conditions because there are not yet any single loan issuing
regulations introduced by Beijing to manage its capital (Copper 2016a; Dave 2018).
It is likely that China is applying multifarious approaches in designing its capital
to look unique and different from traditional donors and creditors (Ibid.). As prac-
tices of financing infrastructure projects demonstrate, Beijing is using its economic
strength for attaining its long- and short-term goals. In other words, the way China
provides investment and infrastructural loans is designed not only to manipulate but
also to outmaneuver established international and regional rules and norms (Ibid.).
Chinese investments and infrastructural loans tend to support non-democratic prac-
tices (Bräutigam 2009; Copper 2016a, b, c; Dave 2018; Toktomushev 2018). One can
speak in turn about non-transparent procurement by Chinese companies and Chinese
goods, Chinese support of surveillance and provision of police equipment which is
used by the incumbent regimes to repress and control political dissidents (Cave et al.
2019; Dave 2018; Tian 2018).
First, Chinese investments and infrastructural loans in theOSCE region are accom-
panied by Chinese goods and products, Chinese labor forces and workers (See Laru-
elle 2018). It is argued that infrastructural projects rely on Chinese companies and
Chinese labor to guarantee efficient investment given that underdeveloped coun-
tries where China bankrolls projects can be lacking in professionals with required
technical skills. However, the Chinese “guaranteed contract” approach promotes
non-transparency and violates domestic procurement policies, which contradicts the
17 According to China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT), Kyrgyzstan between 2013 and 2020
has received in total USD 4.34 billion foreign investment and construction finances. Because the
amount cited by CGIT is larger than the total debt of Kyrgyzstan to China, these numbers might
include other unspecified foreign aid, including police machinery and ammunitions. Tajikistan,
in contrast to Kyrgyzstan, received its biggest share of loans during the pre-BRI period. Tajik
total foreign investment between 2013 and 2020 amounted to USD 540 million which is 25% of
the total numbers Tajikistan received since 2005. With regards to Belarus, CGIT reports that the
country received in total USD 6.03 billion from 2005 to 2020. Similar to Tajikistan, the largest share
(around 70%) Minsk received comes to the pre-BRI period.
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OSCE’s rule of law and anti-corruption commitments. China’s way of doing invest-
ment in OSCEmember countries contributes to anti-democratic and non-transparent
practices. In the OSCE participating states discussed below, China is both an investor
and contractor with a potential winning position that questions its transparency.
In 2015, Hungary—which is facing a serious investigation by the European
Commission for its breach of rule of law and high level of corruption—was the first
European country that welcomed China’s BRI under which a 350 km railway road
between Budapest and Belgrade in Serbia was planned. The Budapest and Belgrade
railway connection was planned to be invested in by China and partially by Hungary.
The non-transparent procurement process for the Chinese investment to construct a
high-speed railway connection between Budapest and Belgrade resulted in serious
discussions among the EU administration and western countries. The 166 km section
in Hungary on the Budapest-Belgrade high-speed railway, which has an estimated
value of USD 2.9 billion, became a procurement scandal case in 2017, according
to the Warsaw Institute (2019), because it breached the EU procurement procedures
as no public and transparent tender was announced. The Chinese company took a
“guaranteed contract” and was considered as a preferred contractor to construct the
railway in 2020. The EU’s accusation of a non-transparent procurement by Hungary
resulted in a special investigation commission by the EU to check the issue of the
EU’s internal procurement regulations breach (Ibid.).
In a similar way, in other Eastern and Central European states, China again
promoted non-transparent procurement. InMontenegro, although not an EUmember
state, China used its own company to construct a road to connect Bar port with Serbia
with an e800 million loan from the Exim Bank of China.18 Whereas in Macedonia
China had invested and launched the construction of a 57 km road connection with a
e373 million loan from Exim Bank of China by the state-owned Chinese Sinohydro
company, the project was later stopped by the Ministry of Transport and Communi-
cation due to incompliance that disadvantaged the state budget for a sum of e155
million.19
The EU’s concerns about Chinese engagement within EU member states, as well
as in its neighboring states—of whichmany seek long-termmembership in the EU—
as the investor and contractor in 16 + 1 states, are legitimate. Chinese investment
practices violate both domestic and EU procurement rules and procedures, according
to which these practices are evaluated as non-transparent and non-competitive.
Unlike Eastern Europe, Central Asian states are even more vulnerable to Chinese
non-democratic practices because they are not EU members nor under EU member-
ship consideration. Therefore in these countries, EU norms and standards concerning
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms are not under consideration when it
comes to receiving infrastructural loans, let alone negotiation of respective issues
between the governments of borrower and loan issuer (see Laruelle 2018). For
18 Reuters. 2014. “Montenegro, China’s Exim Bank agree $1 billion highway deal.” Accessed at
https://www.reuters.com/article/montenegro-highway-idUSL5N0SP4BI20141030.
19 Balkan Insight. 2017. “Poor Planning Halts Macedonia Highway Projects.” Accessed at https://
balkaninsight.com/2017/06/20/poor-planning-halts-macedonia-s-highway-projects-06-20-2017/.
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example, Kyrgyzstan’s procurement in favor of a Chinese company in 2017 became a
true nightmare while modernizing its largest heating plant.20 The Chinese company,
the Tebian Electric Apparatus company (TBEA), rehabilitated and equipped “TEC
Bishkek” underChinese infrastructural loans in 2017.21 However, the heat plant expe-
rienced an accident (leakage) right after its renovation.22 Local popular grievances
after the accident resulted in serious investigations and imprisonments of high-rank
state officialswith corruption charges.23 Aswas later revealed, theChinese contractor
of the “TECBishkek” never provided the Kyrgyz government with a detailed budget.
Prices in the budget were unrealistically increased.24 The Kyrgyz side seemed to
be aware only about a total amount of budget without its per-item prices. The
notorious Chinese TBEA company was also a contractor to construct the Datka-
Kemin electricity transmission line project in June 2012 in Kyrgyzstan.25 Under the
Datka-Kemin electricity transmission line project, two objects were constructed: (1)
a national power transmission line from Datka to Kemin and (2) a substation in
Kemin. The total cost of the project was evaluated at 389.74 million USD.26 Despite
the project being successfully accomplished in 2015, in 2018 it was discovered
that the budget was groundlessly increased against market prices.27 With the rise of
BRI, Kyrgyzstan is anticipating a number of BRI-related infrastructure project loans
supplied by the Chinese EXIM Bank. These include several hydropower plants, a
railway connecting China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, a number of road construc-
tions, and the finalization of Central Asia–China gas pipeline, during the imple-
mentation of which non-transparent procurement in favor of China is most likely to
occur.
In the same way, when constructing highways in Kyrgyzstan with Chinese infras-
tructural loans, only Chinese labor was used despite the local labor surplus.28 Exclu-
sively Chinese companies were involved in construction activities using exclusively
Chinese labor and recruiting only a modicum of local labor—mainly for administra-
tive and translation purposes (Garibov 2018; Jaborov 2018). During the construction
of the Bishkek–Naryn–Torugart corridor, Chinese labor prevailed over local (Dirk
van der Kley 2020). Of note is that Kyrgyz labor migrants in Russia and Kazakhstan
20 The New York Times. 2019. A Power Plant Fiasco Highlights China’s Growing Clout in Central






25 AzattykYnalgysy. 2018. “Datka-Kemin kinqi	Bbolobu?” (Radio Free Europe,




28 Radio Azattyk. 2015. “V Kyrgyzstane 70% immigrantov—gradane iz Kita.”
(Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty 70% of immigrants in Kyrgyzstan—citizens of China) Accessed
20 September 2020. https://rus.azattyk.org/a/26936205.html.
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by February 2017made up 594 thousand people,29 clearly demonstrating the internal
labor surplus in Kyrgyzstan. This practice does not bring in any social capital devel-
opment or contribution to the well-being of communities along the BRI.30 According
to some, China needs to employ its workers abroad in order to affect the unemploy-
ment situation in China, which has been a problem for Chinese leaders as it could
“engender social and political instability” (Copper 2016b, p. 120). However, one
of the main reasons behind the usage of Chinese labor forces and workers, as well
as using only Chinese products in infrastructure projects abroad (Copper 2016a, c;
Jaborov 2018), including the artificial increase of market prices, as the case of TEC
Bishkek31 confirmed, is because Beijing tries to significantly save on its expenses
(see Laruelle 2018). In other words, much of the capital is returned back to China,
minimizing its risk of investment returns (Ibid.). Taking this into consideration, it
might be true that China stands in a winning position.
Second, along with Chinese infrastructural loans, OSCEmember states in Central
Asia received security-related equipment32 and support in an effort tomaintain agree-
ments with the countries’ leaders on infrastructural loans with Beijing’s relative
winning terms and position unquestioned. China’s achievement of relative gains with
weak governments can be explained by recipient country leaders’ personal interests
throughout the whole process of loan agreements (Bräutigam 2009; Copper 2016a,
c; Tian 2018; Toktomushev 2018). Since the terms and conditions of infrastructural
loans are kept secret and could be known only to the leaders of recipient countries
(Ibid.), incumbent leaders appear to be convenient for China to cooperate with until
loan-related interests and goals are no longer being attained (Ibid.). For instance, a
bilateral infrastructural loan contract between China and Malaysia signed in 2016
was recently questioned byMahathirMohamad, the newPrimeMinister ofMalaysia,
after an assessment of the loan contract signed by his predecessor Najib Razak found
that the terms of the deal were not favorable to Malaysia.33
As a result of raising and uncovering unknown details of a “secret” project, China
had to reconsider and had no other choice than to give concessions.34 To avoid
29 Rossiskisovetpomedunarodnymdelam (RSMD),AnalitikiiKommentarii.
2017. “Kyrgyzstan vEA	S:rezultatyuqasti.Qast vtora.” (The Russian Council
on Foreign Affairs (RSMD), Analysts and Comments. “Kyrgyzstan in the EAEU: participa-
tion results. Part two.”) Accessed at https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/columns/eur
asian-economy/kyrgyzstan-v-eaes-rezultaty-uchastiya-chast-vtoraya/?sphrase_id=1721103.
30 BBC News. 2017. “China’s secret aid empire uncovered.” Accessed at https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-china-41564841.
31 The New York Times. 2019. A Power Plant Fiasco Highlights China’s Growing Clout in Central
Asia. Accessed at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/06/world/asia/china-russia-central-asia.html.
32 Radio Azattyk. 2019. “Kita peredal Kyrgyzstanu policesku tehniku na
milliony dollarov.” (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. 2019. Shina donated millions of
dollars worth of police equipment and machines to Kyrgyzstan.) Accessed at https://rus.azattyq.
org/a/29978604.html.
33 The Diplomat. 2019. Malaysia: Revised China Deal Shows Costs Were Inflated. Accessed at
https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/malaysia-revised-china-deal-shows-costs-were-inflated/.
34 Ibid.
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similar situations, China tends to support regimes in power by providing surveil-
lance and police equipment. China believes that weak governments are interested in
preserving their power through suppression of anti-government protests, as well as
using administrative resources or even sometimes through manipulation of voting
results in elections which raise OSCE concerns.
For instance, the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan have recently signed contracts with Chinese surveillance companies
on the installation of high-technology cameras in the streets of the main cities.35
Huawei, China’s controversial telecommunication giant, is also engaged in surveil-
lance projects of the region, which are being accused by the West of using 5G tech-
nology for cyber espionage. Social activists and citizens of the region are against
street video monitoring system with facial recognition technology as it poses risks to
private data and human rights, and as it is unclear whether a foreign country (China)
has access to data collection and processing. Additionally, China’s involvement in
this regard is associated with its surveillance system over its Muslim population in
the Xinjiang region where scandalous “re-education camps” are built to forcefully
detain and re-educate Muslims against their will and without trial. In particular, in
politically unstable Kyrgyzstan which experienced its third coup-d’état since inde-
pendence and which has a vibrant opposition, Chinese water cannons were used by
the police to suppress opposition-led protests in 2020 in Bishkek in support of pres-
idential candidate Sadyr Japarov.36 It is important to note that similar police equip-
ment was not used for peaceful protests. For instance, in June 2020 and December
2019 during Bishkek protests organized by civil society groups and labelled as
“Reakci,” “REakci 2.0,”37 and “REakci 3.0” (“Reaction,” “Reaction 2.0,”
“Reaction 3.0”),38 called for the now ex-president Sooronbai Jeenbekov to offer a
“reaction” toward Azattyk journalists’ investigation into corruption in the customs
system, and for Jeenbekov’s reaction to a draft law on information manipulation. By
providing surveillance and police machinery made in China, China tends to support
the existing political regimes of partner-countries they invest in, by enhancingmerely
its domestic development policies, particularly those efforts to reduce local unem-
ployment and enhanced domestic stability in mind (Copper 2016a, c; Jaborov 2018;
35 Eurasianet. 2019. “China Taking Big Brother to Central Asia: China is exporting its model of
invasive, all-encompassing surveillance to Central Asia.” Accessed at https://eurasianet.org/china-
taking-big-brother-to-central-asia.
36 Kloop blog. 2020. “Miting v podderku aparova zaverxils razgonom, est
zaderannye.” (The rally in support of Japarov ended in dispersal, there are some detainees)
Accessed at https://kloop.kg/blog/2020/03/02/live-miting-storonnikov-zhaparova-v-bishkeke/.
37 Radio Azattyk. 2020. “Reakci 2.0:V Bixkeke proxla akci protiv korrupcii i
cenzury.” (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. 2020. Reaction 2.0: Action against corruption and
censorship was held in Bishkek) Accessed at https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30331476.html.
38 Radio Azattyk. 2020. “Reakci 2.0: V Bixkeke proxla akci protiv
zakonoproekta «O manipulirovanii informacie.» (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty.
2020. Reaction 2.0: In Bishkek, action was held against the bill “On information manipulation.”)
Accessed at https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30696065.html.
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Tian 2018). Development in third countries serves primarily China’s domestic inter-
ests (Ibid.). Chinese non-transparent procurement does not encourage enforcement
of laws.
China remains a leading loan-owner to Central Asian states. This broadly means
that the countries indebted to China have to act in accordance with Chinese interests
and to share China’s standing on democracy and sensitive issues, such as minority
and human rights. As I discuss in the following section of the chapter, two Central
Asian states—Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—kept silent toward Chinese inhumane
treatment of their kin-groups, the ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz in Chinese detention
camps (Human Rights Watch 2018), despite strong local civic displeasure toward
re-educational camps and treatment of ethnic kin in China.
5.6 Re-educational Camps in Xinjiang and Reactions
With a population of 22million, theXinjiangUyghurAutonomousRegion (XUAR)39
of China is located in the western part of the PRC, and here a TurkicMuslimminority
make up the largest percent of the population (around 60%) of the region, which
includes Uyghurs, the largest linguistic, ethnic and religious minority, and ethnic
Kazakhs and Kyrgyz who share common culture, religion and the Turkic language.
This part of China is less developed with its poor infrastructure and depressed socio-
economic life in comparison to the fast-developing Chinese East. The presence of
ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz in the territory of present-day China is due to those
groups fleeing from their homeland during the Central Asian mass revolt of 1916—
also known as “Urkun”—against the expansion of the Russian Empire.40 After Xi
Jinping’s rise to power in 2012, the minority issues related not only to Muslims, but
also to other non-Muslim groups, became increasingly questioned by the Chinese
authorities (Human Rights Watch 2018). Their cultural and religious freedoms, for
example, to learn and speak their native language and exercise their religion, had
worsened, with minorities increasingly became suppressed and monitored (Ibid.).
International reports and evidence of re-education camps and facilities had
appeared already by 2016 after Chen Quanguo, the new governor of Xinjiang,
was appointed as a chief Communist Party Secretary of the region (Ibid.). These
39 The locals in particular Muslims name the region as East Turkistan (Uyghuristan).
40 International Institute for Asian. 2016. “The Time of Ordeal: a story of the 1916 revolt in Central
Asia.” Accessed at https://www.iias.asia/the-newsletter/article/time-ordeal-story-1916-revolt-cen
tral-asia.
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camps are a legacy of “the cultural revolution” which took place from 1966 to 1976
in China, during which millions of political opponents, dissidents, and minorities
were imprisoned, tortured, executed, enslaved, and “reeducated” in camps (Hauling
2005; Human Rights Watch 2018; Zainab 2019). Some western officials charac-
terize Chinese re-education camps as “modern-day slavery camps,”41 because the
imprisoned people are forced to work without payment.42 Since 2016 many Chinese
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz have begun disappearing or have been later found
detained in the political education camps (Ibid.). Relatives and friends living abroad,
concerned about their disappearance have raised the alarm and made known to
the public the existence of political education camps in Xinjiang which purpose-
fully targeted the Muslim population in the region. Chinese officials have explained
its extraordinary policy measures as necessary for combatting increasing religious
extremism of Xinjiang’s Muslim population. However, Chinese officials’ explana-
tion justifies these camps, but cannot clarify the legality of their actions after it was
revealed that China was hiding the process of re-educating Chinese Muslims. Accu-
sations against the Chinese government have been made not only by international
human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, which have mentioned
“mass arbitrary detention, torture and mistreatment” (Human Rights Watch 2018,
p. 111) of the Turkic population of the Muslim faith in Xinjiang and their family
members but also during protests against Chinese authorities in cities inKyrgyzstan43
andKazakhstan,44 where the protesterswho showed solidaritywith their kin inChina,
who were imprisoned and deported by their police forces. For example, in 2017,
several residents of Bishkek have publicly addressed the Kyrgyz government and the
President to assist in releasing detained relatives and friends in Xinjiang camps from
the Chinese KizilSu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture (KKAP), who after returning
to KKAP disappeared,45 despite possession of Kyrgyz citizenship. A Chinese ethnic
Kyrgyz who has been living in Kyrgyzstan for a long time was detained in China by
forcing his relatives to call him and ask him to travel back to KKAP if he wants his
relatives to be released. In this regard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan
did not react to the Kyrgyz citizen’s illegal imprisonment owing to the Chinese
counterpart reasoning that the Chinese ethnic Kyrgyz did not renounce his Chinese
41 BBC News. 2020. “Xinjiang: China defends ‘education’ camps.” Accessed at https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-asia-china-54195325.
42 Democracy Now. 2020. “Modern-Day Slavery”: China Is Forcing Muslims into Forced Labor,
Prison and Indoctrination Camps. Accessed at https://www.democracynow.org/2020/1/9/inside_chi
nas_push_to_turn_muslim.
43 01.KG. 2018.VBixkekproxlaakcipozawitepravtniqeskihkyrgyzovvKitae.
(Action to protect the rights of ethnic Kyrgyz in China was held in Bishkek). Accessed at https://
www.01.kg/news/2249574/v-biskeke-prosla-akcia-po-zasite-prav-etniceskih-kyrgyzov-v-kitae.
44 The Diplomat. 2021. Small Protests Persist Outside Chinese Consulate in Kazakhstan.
Accessed at https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/small-protests-persist-outside-chinese-consulate-in-
kazakhstan/.
45 Azattyk/nalgysy. 2017. “Kytalyk kyrgyzdar basym k\q
g
n\n atuuda.” (Radio
Free Europe, Radio Liberty. 2017. Chinese Kyrgyz say that pressure has intensified) Accessed at
https://www.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan_china_ethnic_minority_rights_kyrgyz/28688593.html.
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citizenship before applying for Kyrgyz citizenship.46 Another young ethnic Kyrgyz
from China, a grandson of the Manas-epic-teller Jusup Mamai, who was a student
in a university in Bishkek, and a popular figure performing the Kyrgyz dance Kara
Jorgo on Kyrgyz TV programs and radios, was incarcerated in a re-education camp
after visiting China, on condition that his relative would be released. However, the
Kyrgyz government, as a deeply indebted country to China, had to ignore the Chinese
mistreatment of ethnic Kyrgyz, even if some of the detained also held Kyrgyz citi-
zenship. Similar cases were reported from Kazakhstan where two Chinese ethnic
Kazakhs faced litigation in Almaty in December 2019 for illegally crossing the
state border from China to Kazakhstan in pursuit of asylum and safety. Two months
earlier they had been informed by the Kazakh authorities that they will be deported
back to China despite applying for asylum.47 There is mutual agreement on deporta-
tion between the two governments, sending back those who illegally cross the state
borders, even without a public hearing. Another 43-year-old ethnic Kazakh woman
with her family, born in Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture of the XUAR province
in China, entered Kazakhstan in the same illegal way. She had to apply for asylum in
Sweden with the assistance of the United States Embassy in Almaty and the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees after her asylum application was rejected
by the Kazakh government.48
In brief, the Kazakh and the Kyrgyz governments preferred to not intervene in
Chinese domestic policies and instead decided to maintain bilateral agreements.
Nor do they pose any sanctions upon China for the detention without trial in re-
educational camps of ethnic Kazakh and Kyrgyz living in China’s North-Western
province. By this political practice, the governments violate OSCE norms and stan-
dards on minority and human rights. Kyrgyz ex-president Sooronbai Jeenbekov,
during the Annual Press Conference with journalists in 2018, stated that Kyrgyzstan
cannot intervene into the domestic affairs of China due to bi-lateral agreements.49 In a
similar way, the Kazakh government is afraid to openly comment on these issues and
to criticize Chinese mistreatment of ethnic minorities. At the same time, Kazakhstan
andKyrgyzstan are some of the largest recipients of Chinese infrastructural loans and
Foreign Direct Investment (Vakulchuk and Overland 2019), which increased since
2013. Financial dependency, among other, makes these countries vulnerable and
explains well why Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan did not officially respond to Chinese
46 Ibid.
47 Radio Azattyk. 2019. “KNB: perexedxih granicu tniqeskih kazahov peredadut
obratno v Kita.” (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. 2019. KNB: ethnic Kazakhs who crossed
the border will be transferred back to China) Accessed at https://rus.azattyq.org/a/30311302.html.
48 Radio Azattyk. 2019. “Saragul Sauytba, ne poluqiv ubeiwa, pokinula
Kazahstan.” (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. 2019. Sairagul Sauytbai, not receiving asylum,
left Kazakhstan.) Accessed at https://rus.azattyq.org/a/kazakhstan-sayragul-sauytbay-pokinula-kaz
akhstan/29978459.html.
49 Radio Azattyk. 2018. “nbekov o kitaskih kyrgyzah: 	to gradane Kita,
my ne moem vmexivats.” (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. 2019. Jeenbekov on the
Chinese Kyrgyz: They are citizens of China, we cannot interfere.) Accessed at https://rus.azattyk.
org/a/29664421.html.
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mistreatment of ethnic minorities, even if that silence means that they violate and
disregard core principles on the protection of ethnic, linguistic, and religious minori-
ties. One can only speculate whether, if there were no infrastructural loans from
China, both countries would respond to Chinese domestic politics toward ethnic
minorities critically.
5.7 Conclusion
As illustrated by the cases of the Kyrgyz and Kazakh response to China’s detention
policies and infrastructural loans, China’s overall standing on minority issues and
non-transparent practices contradict the HCNM and ODIHR core principles. Conse-
quently, this dilemma undermines the OSCE’s integrity. The re-education camps
in Xinjiang region and the promotion of non-democratic practices, namely non-
transparent procurement, surveillance, and police equipment for suppression and
control of political dissidents in theOSCE region are examples of a breach ofOSCE’s
norms and values. This broadly means that countries indebted to China have to act
in accordance with Chinese interests and share China’s standing on governance and
the treatment of religious minorities.
Various sources define Chinese financing as foreign aid, investment and loans at
the same time, while China tends to avoid any definition on development or gover-
nance and prefers miscellaneous interpretations. For example, the meanings of “Chi-
nese way and characteristics” or “Chinese way of reaching harmony” are not always
clear to outsiders. However, what is clear is that Chinese foreign financing and the
BRI’s primary goal is largely aimed at the strengthening of its domestic economic
development, and overall to increase unemployment in China, not outside China,
as well as boosting its political influence in the international arena and overall in
Eurasia.
Like elsewhere, China is a leading loan-owner to many OSCEmember states, not
only to the less developed countries but also to countries that already receive large
sums of EU funding, such as Central and Eastern European countries. The presence
of China in the OSCE region became resilient after Beijing began providing infras-
tructural loans to those countries that are within the BRI realm. As demonstrated, the
size of the issued infrastructural loans in less developed economies are dispropor-
tionate to national economies, making debtor countries incapable of paying back the
loans. Financial dependence on China makes these countries vulnerable in terms of
OSCE’s norms and standards of fundamental freedom rights, good governance, and
rule of law and for this reason undermines the impact of OSCE programs to promote
democracy and human rights.
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Chapter 6
The Role of Securitization
in the Relationship Between State
and Religion—The Example
of the Kyrgyz Republic
Zrinka Štimac and Indira Aslanova
Abstract In this paper, we discuss the challenges of developing secular framework
in relation to religion inKyrgyzstan, thefirstCentralAsian republicwhere democratic
institutions were established after the collapse of the Soviet Union and which has
been strongly challenged in maintaining its democratic achievements during the
Tulip Revolution and other revolts in 2010 and 2020. The question we aim to answer
is how processes of securitization shape the relationship between state institutions
and religious organizations, knowing that Kyrgyzstan is still influenced both by the
Soviet understanding of secularism and by models of secularity and governance
from countries and societies with different histories and conditions of development.
We look at different phases of the relationship between state and religion starting
with the regime change and the establishment of a democratic state. Secondly, the
establishing of a legal framework for state policy on religious organizations. Thirdly,
the time of the adoption of measures to protect the interests of all citizens, believers
and non-believers, and the beginning of the process of active influence of state policy
on the situation in the religious sphere. And finally, the new (mis)understanding of
the relations between the state and religion, both on the side of the state and religious
organizations. Our theoretical point of departure is the concept of securitization, and
from there on we take a discursive approach focusing on the different actors in this
arena, such as state institutions and the various religious organizations and groups.
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6.1 Introduction
The interlinkage between religion and security is an emerging area of study within
securitization theory, and its implications for research are still open. Apart from
securitization theory, we introduce the normative approaches of “spiritual security”
and “human security”, as they shape both the context of the main discourses as well
as the perception and the action of different actors in Kyrgyzstan.
Since Buzan et al. and the theoretical approach of the Copenhagen School three
main concepts have been developed and discussed: securitization, sectoral security
and regional security complex theory.1
Securitization was first embedded in theories of international relations (IR),
looking into the role of identity and culture for security.2 Within this school, there is
a strong focus on speech acts. It can be paraphrased as such: “by labeling something
a security issue […] it becomes one”.3 Other authors claim that, “when an issue
or problem has been securitized, the issue gets additional values such as threats and
defense, and is often associatedwith solutions that come from the state only”.4 Hence,
classical concepts of security put the state on the frontline of guaranteeing the safety
and security of its citizens, with the concept of securitization this focus shifts toward
other actors and stakeholders, such as civil society and religious organizations.
Consequently, the Copenhagen School has opened the following questions for
analyses, namely, who defines what is and is not a security issue, and secondly, where
does the securitization take place? Securitization can take place at the level of state,
society or international systems; and in a diverse set of sectors such as economic,
military, political and educational. This approach based on discourse has been crit-
icized by Thierry Balzacq, who introduces the structural argument and claims that
“securitization theory can capture that the power of the elite can shape certain issues
as threats and determine how to deal with these issues”.5
According to Claire Wilkinson, the critique of the securitization theory is based
on the question of whether it is suitable for analyzing the situation in countries like
Kyrgyzstan at all. Some voices point to the fact that although new epistemologies are
introduced into the IR theories, the underlying assumptions on which these are built
are rarely questioned.6 Consequently, securitization theory does focus on identity
and culture but in a very specific way based upon Euro-American-centric views of
1 Buzan, Barry/Ole Wæver (2003): Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security.
Cambridge University Press.
2 Buzan, Barry/Wæver, Ole/de Wilde, Japp (1998): Security: A New Framework for Analysis.
Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
3 Carsten Bagge Lauststen/Ole Weaver, 2000: In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for
Securitization,Millennium—Journal of International Studies 2000 29, p. 708.
4 Buzan, B. O. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Colorado: Lynner Rienner, p. 62.
5 Balzacq et al. 2015. “Securitization” revisited: “theories and cases.” Sage Journals International
Relations 201, Vol 30 (4) 494–531.
6 Wilkinson C. (2007). The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is securitization theory
useable outside Europe? Security dialogue, 38 (1), 5–25.
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Westphalian assumptions that put the nations as the main identity of a state and
national identity as collective identity.7 Wilkinson claims that “the focus on state-
level politics means that the analysis is in danger of obscuring informal politics and
their dynamics, which can possess significant influence and legitimacy”.8 This is
highly relevant for Central Asia. Nevertheless, she concludes that “securitization
theory is […] ideally suited to an exploration of security discourses and their relative
successes”.9
When religion is analyzed in the context of threat and security, there are two
perspectives. The first is when religion and religious freedom are exposed to a threat,
as inWeaver.10 The second perspective analyzes how religion is framed as a threat in
itself.11 Sune Lægaard does not differentiate between religion as theology, religion
as identity and religion as politics—to mention only a few. According to Lægaard,
securitization processes in relation to religion are “processes where political actors
put single religion out for special political concern. This opens the way for polit-
ical measures in relation to religiously defined objects that would otherwise not be
considered permissible”.12 In both perspectives, namely religion under threat and
religion as a threat, the question of freedom of religion or the question of what
consequences the process of securitization has for certain internationally guaranteed
rights is decisive.
6.2 Spiritual Security
In the context of Central Asia, most of the countries including the Kyrgyz Republic
are defined by the influence of the Soviet and post-Soviet heritage when it comes
to dealing with religion. One of the elements of this heritage touches upon the legal
position of Churches and religious communities and the idea of “spiritual security”.
According to the historian Julie Elkner: “The concept of spiritual security […] can
be traced to the March 1992 Russian federal law on security […]. At the time,
an emphasis on ‘spiritual values’ […] was intended to flag a shift away from Soviet
militant atheismand fromstate persecutionof religious believers”.13 Another point by
7 Ibid., p. 10.
8 Ibid., p. 10.
9 Ibid., p. 13.
10 Carsten Bagge Lauststen/OleWeaver, 2000: In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for
Securitization,Millennium—Journal of International Studies 2000 29: 705–739
Balzacq et al. 2015. “Securitization” revisited: theories and cases.” Sage Journals International
Relations 201, Vol 30 (4) 494–531.
11 Sune Lægaard (2019): Religious toleration and securitization of religion. In: Spaces of Toler-
ance. Changing Geographies and Philosophies of Religion in Today’s Europe. Edited By Luiza
Bialasiewicz, Valentina Gentile, Routledge.
12 Ibid., p. 2.
13 Julie Elkner: Spiritual security in Putin’s Russia http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/
papers/spiritual-security-in-putins-russia.
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Elkner is that the government’s focus on spiritual security is designed “to preserve and
strengthen traditional Russian values”. The traditional values “invoked in connection
with Russia’s spiritual security often turn out upon closer inspection to have their
roots […] in the Soviet past, and in the Soviet regime’s attitude towards ideological
subversion in particular”.14
According to an OSCE report, “in Russia [today], for example, many officials
rely on the term ‘spiritual security’, when they mean that the state must defend a
religious foundation for the public welfare. Sometimes this may result even in the
expulsion of foreign missionaries, whose preaching has nothing to do with violence
or hatred […]”.15 As we will show, both traditionalism and spiritual security are
important elements when dealing with the legal position of religious organizations in
Kyrgyzstan. The concept of spiritual security has been criticized intensely.According
toPatriciaDuval: “Thevery concept of State “spiritual security” violates international
human rights law and standards that countries have committed to”. She claims:
“Although religions are totally legitimate in ensuring the orthodoxy of beliefs and
practices of their followers, the intervention of States in this matter is illegitimate
under international human rights standards and the principle of State neutrality in
religious matters. […] It is interesting to note that religious minorities considered
as a threat to the spiritual security or health or wellbeing of citizens continue to be
systematically labeled as “cults” and repressed”.16
6.2.1 Human Security
Another normative framework on the issue of security is focusing on identifying
existential threats to individual human security. According to Rita Floyd, “[it] offers
an outlet to all those dissatisfied with security analysis, who are more interested
in achieving securitization than simply analyzing it”.17 Here we concentrate on the
14 Ibid.
15 Aleksandar Verkhovsky: Discrimination against religious groups in the context of security
concerns Address to the Advisory Panel of Expert. https://www.osce.org/cio/15606?download=
true.
16 Patricia Duval: The Concept of Spiritual Security and The Rights of Religious
Minorities https://freedomofbelief.net/articles/the-concept-of-spiritual-security-and-the-rights-of-
religious-minorities. Article 9.2 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides for very
specific limitations which can be allowed to restrict the right to freedom of religion or belief. Those
limitations have to be prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others. Similarly, Article 18.3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights provides that “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others”.
17 Floyd, Rita: Human Security and the Copenhagen School’s Securitization Approach: Conceptu-
alizing Human Security as a Securitizing Move. Human Security Journal, Volume 5, Winter 2007,
p. 45.
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documents provided by the OSCE and especially by the Council of Europe through
the activities of the Venice Commission.
In the publication “Freedom of Religion or Belief and Security. Policy Guidance”
of 2019, the OSCE/ODIHR defines the relationship between religion and security
as follows: in OSCE terms, security is understood as “comprehensive, co-operative,
equal, indivisible and grounded in human rights […] and has three complemen-
tary dimensions: politico-military, economic and environmental, and human”.18 In
discussing security-related issues in the human dimension, the OSCE policy paper
offers an example from Kyrgyzstan. From the comments by the Venice Commission
on the provisional Kyrgyz laws on the freedom of religion, it can be seen what kind
of limitation of these rights is at issue.19 Even though the OSCE does not address
these individual problems in Kyrgyzstan explicitly in the main text, but rather in a
footnote, it does filter issues relating to (a) the registration of new religious commu-
nities, (b) “extremist” speech and literature, (c) screening, monitoring and searches
in places of worship and meeting places, and (d) restrictions on conversion and limi-
tations on religious or belief community activities that have a foreign connection. As
we will show below, the state in Kyrgyzstan has detected these issues as potentially
problematic for national cohesion and thus for the national security of the state.
6.3 Phase One: New Political Structures and New Religious
Rights in 1991
At the time of the collapse of the USSR, The Republic of Kyrgyzstan introduced a
democratic regime and built institutions led by a multi-party system, a constitution
that embraced fundamental freedoms and rights, and free elections. On 12 October
1991, Askar Akayev was elected president and in May 1993 a new constitution was
adopted. The president took a clear course toward democracy and liberalization of
the legislation. Consequently, the Supreme Board of the Kyrgyz Republic, only a few
months after independence, adopted the Law “OnFreedomof Religion andReligious
Organizations” on 16 December 1991,20 which aimed to restore the position and
role of religion in society and to establish relations between state institutions and
religious organizations.21 This law, based on the norms of the Final Document of
the Vienna Meeting of 19 January 1989, minimized state and legal interference in
the activities of religious organizations regardless of their provenance, ensured their
18 OSCE/ODIHR: Freedom of Religion or Belief and Security. Policy Guidance, p. 9.
19 Ibid, “Joint Opinion on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations in the Republic of
Kyrgyzstan”, OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission, CDL-AD(2008)032, 28 October 2008.
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2008)032-e.
20 The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On Freedom of Religion and on Religious Organizations” of
December 16, 1991. Laws and regulations adopted by the eighth session of the Supreme Council
of the Kyrgyz Republic of the twelfth convocation. Chap. 1. Bishkek, 1993, pp. 251–259.
21 Ismayilov N.A. Constitutional and legal framework for religious organizations in the Kyrgyz
Republic. Bishkek, 2008, p. 28.
122 Z. Štimac and I. Aslanova
full participation in public life and, for the first time in the history of the Republic,
provided for the effective independence of religious organizations from the state.22
Moreover, the law also guaranteed freedom of religion to all religious movements,
enabled free missionary activities and open access to foreign religious educational
institutions. According to official data, at the time of theDeclaration of Independence
there were 103 actively operating religious organizations, the largest of which were
the Russian Orthodox Church (26) and various Islamic organizations (40).23 By the
end ofAkayev’s presidency in 2005, about 1,800 Islamic organizations, 300Christian
organizations as well as Jewish, Buddhist and other new religious movements and
institutions were registered. At that time, each religious group must have registered
separately andmust have at least 10 resident founding citizens.24 The only restriction
here was the establishment of political parties based on religion. As a result of this
development, reports from organizations such as the US State Department and the
Helsinki Committee have stated that Kyrgyzstan guarantees the highest level of
human and ethnic minority rights in the whole of Central Asia.25
6.3.1 Securitization Through Religious Organizations
In the first decade of political and institutional transition of the country, represen-
tatives of various churches and religious communities showed themselves to be
those who gave the discourse a special character. Already in 1994 both the lead-
ership of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan (SAMK, declare
to represent Sunni Islam, Hanafi school), represented by Mufti Kimsambai Azhya,
and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), represented by Father Vladimir Savitsky,
appealed to the government. They demanded a change to the existing Law on Reli-
gion to restrict the activities of “non-traditional” religions.26 According to Nazira
Kurbanova, the reason given was that the new religious movements represented an
unwelcome “religious and cultural expansion through the tradition of alien. More-
over, they are said to be “a factor of threat to state and national security and a source
22 Kurbanova N.U. Religion in social and political life of Kyrgyzstan at the turn of XX–XXI
centuries. Bishkek, 2010, p. 25.
23 Cited by: Kurbanova N.U. Religion in social and political life of Kyrgyzstan at the turn of
XX–XXI centuries. Bishkek, 2010, p. 23.
24 KabakD.,EsengeldievA.Freedomof religion in theKyrgyzRepublic: overviewof legal provision
and practice. Bishkek, 2011, p. 15.
25 Kyrgyzstan. Political conditions in the post-soviet era.Alert series. September, 1993.Washington
DC, p. 4.
26 Kimsambai azhy, father Vladimir Savitsky. To the government of the Kyrgyz Republic. Sects—a
threat to peace/Appeal of the leaders of the Muslim clergy and the Russian Orthodox Church in
Kyrgyzstan. Word of Kyrgyzstan. 04.10.1994, p. 4.
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of tension in society”.27 Such dictates were widely disseminated in the mass media
and public discourse.28
As a result of this discourse and the insistence of “traditional” religious organiza-
tions, inAugust 1995 the government adopted a resolution “On the religious situation
in the Kyrgyz Republic and the role of the authorities in shaping state policy in the
religious sphere”. The document notes that “there is indeed a deliberate introduc-
tion of various religious denominations and movements, which affects not only the
public, but also official religious centers and associations. While Christian mission-
aries of a Protestant nature aim at a continuous evangelization of the population of
the Republic, including the indigenous population, the missionaries of “holy Islam”
are obsessed with the idea of building an Islamic state”.29 Consequently, the govern-
ment has recognized the missionary activity of Islamic preachers and preachers of
so-called “non-traditional religions” as the main cause of instability in the religious
sphere.
As a consequence of the growing sentiment against the so-called sects, a number of
important legal and administrative acts have been adopted with the aim of systemati-
zation the activities of religious organizations and establishing control over “destruc-
tive phenomena” in the religious sphere.30 A number of religious organizations, such
as Akramya and Hizb-ut-Tahrir,31 were banned because they pose a “threat to state
and public security and social stability”. Another consequence of the initiatives was
the establishment of the State Commission for Religious Affairs (SCRA) by Pres-
idential Decree in 1996. The main tasks of this Commission were the formulation
and implementation of the State’s religious policy.
27 Kurbanova N.U. Religion in social and political life of Kyrgyzstan at the turn of XX–XXI
centuries. Bishkek, 2010, p. 151.
28 Look at: Sects—a threat to peace. Word of Kyrgyzstan. 04.10.1994, p. 4; Kakhanov N. Word
about longevity. Komsomolskaya Pravda. 26.07.1996, p. 8; Kakhanov N. Crumbs of conquered
truth. Word of Kyrgyzstan. 19.12.1996, p. 13; Andreeva V. What did Adam and Eve sow in the
garden ofEden?VecherniyBishkek. 13.12.1996, p. 3; Psychological portrait or secrets of totalitarian
sects. Vecherniy Bishkek. 10.10.2000, p. 4; PletnevaM., Skorodumova E. Afraid of Alien Prophets.
Vecherniy Bishkek. 08.09.2000, p. 10. etc.
29 Resolution No. 345 of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic of 10 August 1995 “On the
religious situation in theKyrgyzRepublic and the tasks of government bodies in shaping government
policy in the area of religion”.
30 Decree of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic of 14 November 199 «Onmeasures to implement
the rights of citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic to freedom of conscience and religion»; temporary
regulations: Temporary Regulations on the registration of religious organizations; Temporary Regu-
lations on the registration of missions of foreign organizations; Temporary Regulations on religious
education. Government Decision No. 20 of 17 January 1997 on the implementation of Government
Decision No. 345 of 10 August 1995 “On the religious situation in the Kyrgyz Republic and the
tasks of the authorities in shaping State policy in the religious sphere”. Resolution of the Govern-
ment of the Kyrgyz Republic dated February 19, 1998 “On the organization and implementation of
pilgrimages to Mecca (Hajj Umra)” and others.
31 Thomas Kunze, Michail Logvinov: Islamistische Bedrohungen für Zentralasien, P. 141, Hizb ut-
Tahrir lehnt politische Kompromisse ab und akzeptiert als einziges Ordnungsmodell allein einen auf
der Scharia basierenden islamischen Staat. Jeder Verfassungsartikel und jegliche Rechtsprechung
sollen aus der Scharia abgeleitet werden. OSCE Jahrbuch.
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However, these processes of opening up toward religious freedom were first
seen as ambivalent and finally as negative by individual public figures and by the
academics. Policy makers, media and some intellectuals criticized the “excessive
liberality” of the law and the “implified registration system for different faiths, move-
ments and sects, and the almost unlimited freedom of action”.32 As a result, the posi-
tion that described new religious actors as distructive, extremist and occult began to
spread in the country. In addition, the propaganda of Islamic fanaticism, which is
mainly represented by Hizb-ut-Tahrir, was increasingly perceived.33
The conversion of ethnic Kyrgyz as well as representatives of other ethnic
minorities to some Christian free churches (different Pentecostal denominations,
Seventh Day Adventists, Baptists, etc.) and Jehovah’s Witnesses as a result of
active missionary activity was discussed in a socially extremely critical manner.
The converts were regularly perceived by the local population as traitors not only
to the “religion of the fathers”34 but also to the people as a whole.35 This is not
surprising, since official data on the number of believers in the country were also
based on the ethnic component—the statement of over 80% of the Muslim popula-
tion of Kyrgyzstan.36 At this point, it becomes clear that many people in Kyrgyzstan
make no distinction between ethnic and religious identity and often perceive them
as one identity. This provides not only a direct link between religion and ethnicity,
but also fertile ground for discourse on “traditional – non-traditional religions” and
for the prejudiced use of terms such as “destructive sects”, “totalitarian cults” in the
media and the speeches of officials.37
32 Kurbanova N.U. Religion in social and political life of Kyrgyzstan at the turn of XX–XXI
centuries. Bishkek, 2010, p. 26.
33 Kurbanova N.U. Religion in social and political life of Kyrgyzstan at the turn of XX–XXI
centuries. Bishkek, 2010. Murzakhalilov K., Mamataliev K., Mamayusupov O. Islam in conditions
of democratic development of Kyrgyzstan: comparative analysis. Central Asia and Caucasus, 2005,
No. 3 (39), pp. 53–65. Maltabarov B.A. Religious organizations as a special form of volunteerism
in the Kyrgyz Republic. Bulletin of KNU. 2014. http://arch.kyrlibnet.kg/uploads/KNUMALTAB
AROVB.A.2014-2.pdf.
34 T. A. Abdyrakhmanov, N. U. Kurbanova. Problems of ethno-confessional relations in modern
Kyrgyzstan: search for solutions/Islam in CIS. 03.11.2010. http://www.islamsng.com/kgz/opinion/
404#_ftn2.
35 T. A. Abdyrakhmanov, N. U. Kurbanova. Problems of ethno-confessional relations in modern
Kyrgyzstan: search for solutions/Islam in CIS. 03.11.2010. http://www.islamsng.com/kgz/opinion/
404#_ftn2.
36 Alisheva A. Religious situation in Kyrgyzstan. Central Asia and the Caucasus, 1999. https://ca-
c.org/journal/cac-05-1999/st_09_alisheva.shtml.
37 Look at: Sects is a threat to peace.Word of Kyrgyzstan. 1October 1994, p. 4; LytkinY. Hypocrisy.
VecherniyBishkek, 10 February 1995, p. 3; SkorodumovaE.WillGod save us?Epicenter. Vecherniy
Bishkek, 24 November 1997, p. 2.
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6.3.2 Local and Regional Standards on Security
In the first years of the new republic, there were a number of local and regional
events that shaped the way security and religion were dealt with and understood. For
example, the Batken Conflicts, caused by the militant “Islamic Movement of Uzbek-
istan” (IMU), of 1999 and 2000, gave new impetus to the legal situation. The Kyrgyz
government adopted an action plan to combat religious extremism and prevent the
politicization of Islam. A number of local scholars considered Afghanistan and the
Taliban and their support for the IMU and the Uighur separatists as a direct threat to
Kyrgyzstan and predicted the destabilization of the entire region.38 The politicization
of religion was seen in line with religious extremism, moreover, as its manifestation.
Related to this is the recognition ofHizbut-Tahrir as an extremist organization and the
prohibition of its activities in Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian states. The main
sources of Islamist ideas were considered to be the strengthening of the influence of
“external” Islam and preachers from Saudi Arabia and other places.
The urgency of the fight against religious extremism and terrorism was also made
clear by the processes taking place in the international arena. As a result of the
terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001 and the subsequent military actions in Afghanistan,
international organizations and governments in a number of countries have been
forced to review existing approaches to ensuring international and national security.
The concept of securitization received more attention in the aftermath of the attacks
and the wars that followed. Some researchers stated that at the time of these events
therewas a “stable tendency in theworld to shift the focus of thefight against terrorism
toward “hard” measures, forced tightening of legislation and the introduction of
various types of restrictions on civil rights and freedoms”.39
At the regional level, two actors are of relevance to security policy in Central
Asia: the Russian-dominated Collective Security and Treaty Organization (CSTO)
and the Russian and Chinese-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Within the framework of both organizations, the actors have modified and signed
various treaties in accordance with the new need to guarantee regional security.
For example, the Collective Security Treaty signed in 1992 was transformed into the
CollectiveSecurityTreatyOrganization in 2002.Oneof themain areas of cooperation
of the CSTO was the “fight against terrorism, political and religious extremism”.40
Another important document is the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism,
Separatism and Extremism of 15 June 2001,41 which established cooperation in
38 Knyazev A. A. Security problems in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia in the context of the
Afghan war history, 1990s. Summary of the thesis. Bishkek. 2001. Scientific Library of Theses
and Abstracts disserCat. http://www.dissercat.com/content/problemy-bezopasnosti-kyrgyzstana-i-
tsentralnoi-azii-v-kontekste-istorii-afganskoi-voiny-199#ixzz4hbTo9C56.
39 OstroukhovV.V. Actual challenges of countering international terrorism at the present stage. Law
and security. No. 3–4 (8–9) December 2003. http://dpr.ru/pravo/pravo_6_1.htm.
40 CSTO Secretary General Nikolay Bordyuzha: We are a single security space. 22.05.2008. http://
old.redstar.ru/2008/05/22_05/1_01.html.
41 Shanghai Convention on fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism. http://eng.sectsco.
org/documents/. It is worth mentioning the previously signed agreements such as the Bishkek
126 Z. Štimac and I. Aslanova
the regional anti-terrorism field, defined terrorism and other fundamental concepts
necessary for the criminalization of terrorist acts and proposed an institutional system
for their implementation.42 Although they were of paramount importance for the
region, theywere criticizedmainly by non-governmental organizations. For example,
reports by the International Federation for Human Rights state that “the tragedy of
9 September 2001 gave new impetus to the justification of a strict security policy,
often leading to repressivemeasures against civil society and to serious violations”.43
Another report by the same organization claims that human rights violations result
directly from the norms of regional cooperation and from the implementation of
relevant agreements. In concrete terms, human rights violations include “violations
of the right to privacy, freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association, the
right to asylum and protection from torture, which are increasingly documented. The
victims of these violations have little or no access to effective remedies at national
level”.44
6.4 Phase Two: Religious Extremism Versus Securitization
During the presidency of Kurmanbek Bakiev, who won the elections after the so-
called “Tulip Revolution” in March 2005, the laws that are still in force today were
passed. During this period, the state intensified its activities related to the prob-
lems that “require urgent solutions: problems of proselytism, interdenominational
conflicts, the intensification of extremism in society”.45 To address these problems,
inMay 2006 the Government adopted Resolution No. 324 “On the Concept of Public
Policy in the Religious Sphere of theKyrgyzRepublic”. TheConcept emphasized the
Sunni Islam ofHanafi school and the RussianOrthodoxChurch as the traditional reli-
gious associations of the country and stressed that “interreligious and state-religious
relations in Kyrgyzstan depend largely on the state’s relations with these religious
Memorandum on Cooperation and Interaction of Law Enforcement Agencies and Special Services
of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People’s Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian
Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan dated 2 December 1999, the Agreement on Cooperation
of the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism dated
4 June 1999, and others.
42 Chernyadieva, N. A. Antiterrorist agreements of CIS and SCO: the main problems of intercon-
tractual coordination (in Russian). Eurasian Security. 3 (82)2015. https://www.eurasialaw.ru/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7280:2015-04-23-05-57-58&catid=557:2017-03-14-
14-06-29&Itemid=821.




45 Kurbanova N. U. Religion in social and political life of Kyrgyzstan at the turn of XX–XXI
centuries. Bishkek, 2010, p. 29.
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organizations.46 The significance of “The Concept” lies above all in the fact that a
broad social discourse about so called traditionalism of religions has been initiated.
In June 2006, during the Kyrgyz national conference of legislation on religion
in Bishkek, the State Secretary of the Kyrgyz Republic A. Madumarov proposed to
tighten legislation in the religious sphere and to put all financial flows from abroad
in support of religious communities under strict control of the state.
The aim was to minimize religious extremism in the country. In this context, he
said: “This is in the interest of the security of the Kyrgyz citizens. A large number of
religious personalities are coming to us. What do they teach? What are they raised
with? The state is obliged to know all this”.47 The background of these statements
reflects the Soviet understanding of secularism, which is still widely in place in
the post-soviet Central Asia, today, namely prioritizing state control over freedoms
and individual responsibility, and which overlap with the current notion of security.
At the same time, the obligatory registration procedure for all entities from the
religious sphere was discussed and appropriate reforms were introduced in the legal
framework of Kyrgyzstan. Consequently, the first document signed by President
Bakiyev three days after his inauguration, on 17 August 2005, was the law “On
Combating Extremist Activities”.48
There are different interpretations of this anti-extremism law. According to the
lawyer Leyla Sydykova, the response of the Kyrgyz government and other govern-
ments in the region to the rise of religious extremist groups since 2002 shows “a
fairly high degree of urgency in the fight against extremism, which is actively gaining
strength and is taking on not only a regional or local, but also an international char-
acter of propagation”.49 She also points out that this circumstance formed the basis
for the development of the Model Law “On Combating Extremism” by the Inter-
parliamentary Assembly of CIS Member States in 2009.50 However, the political
analyst at the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Kyrgyzstan Iqbol Mirsaitov
assumes that China, in particular, had a major influence on Kyrgyz policy in the
drafting and adoption of the law.51 The reason for this lies in the Uighur minority in
China, who from the Chinese perspective are considered separatists and who are said
to have been involved in secret activities in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Mirsaitov
paraphrased that “The law was passed primarily to please a strategic partner and
46 Concepts of state policy in the religious sphere in the Kyrgyz Republic. Approved by Resolution
No. 324 of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on 6 May 2006 (expired). http://Cbd.minjust.
Gov.kg/Handeln/ansehen/Ru-Ru/57409?Cl=Ru-Ru.
47 The Kyrgyz leadership intends to tighten its legislation on religion. https://24.kg/archive/ru/com
munity/4118-2006/07/12/4414.html/.
48 Zhusupaliev E. Kyrgyzstan has adopted a law on combating extremism. 07.09.2005. http://www.
fergananews.com/articles/3951.
49 Sydykova L.C. Fighting extremism in Kyrgyzstan: problems of legislative regulation. KRSU
Newsletter. 2016. Volume 16, No. 6, pp. 84–87, p. 84.
50 Ibid.
51 From an interviewwith IqbolMirsaitov to the news agency “Fergana”, 07.09.2005. Zhusupaliyev
E. V. Kyrgyzstan adopted a law on combating extremism. http://www.fergananews.com/articles/
3951.
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neighbor like China”.52 This opinion shared some other analysts who stated that
there are still no serious extremist structures in Kyrgyzstan that could threaten the
state order. However, it should be noted that the accelerated adoption of the law was
also influenced by armed attacks by extremist groups that took place in the south of
the country from March until July 2006, when disparate clandestine groups, splin-
tering from the IMU, attacked law enforcements and important services in Osh and
Djalal-Abad regions.53
Further legalmeasures to combat extremism followed shortly, such as the 2006 law
“On Countering Extremist Activities”. It lays down the basic principles of counter-
terrorism and the organizational and legal framework for preventing and combating
extremism and the subsequent terror that could come from extremist groups. To
implement and monitor the law, an anti-terrorism center was established under
the authority of the National Security Body of the Kyrgyz Republic.54 The terms
“extremism activities” and “anti-terrorism center” indicate that the state law lacks
differentiation between extremism, violent extremism, and terrorism. Although the
Law on “Countering Extremist Activities” does not define “religious extremism”,
the list of the extremist and terrorist banned organizations indicates that all of them
have a religious background.55 Moreover, at that time this list was published solely
on the website of the State commission for religious affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic.
The former head of the State Department for Religious Affairs of the Govern-
ment of the Kyrgyz Republic, Toigonbek Kalmatov, claimed that “about 500 reli-
gious organizations operate illegally, including the already forbidden radical Hizb-
ut-Tahrir party, Satanists, the White Brotherhood, the Maharishi cult and others”.56
He proposed further tightening state control over religious organizations by devel-
oping the relevant legal framework. The way was paved for a new law. Consequently,
the Kyrgyz Parliament, also called the Supreme Council or Jogorku Kenesh, adopted
a “Resolution on the Establishment of a Parliamentary Commission to Investigate
the Religious Situation in the Kyrgyz Republic” (NR. 409-IV) on 22 May 2008.
This resolution emphasized, the members of Jogorku Kenesh noted that on the basis
of appeals by citizens, politicians and scientists various totalitarian groups, reac-
tionary sects and extremist movements were operating illegally in the countries.
These “illegal operations” included the participation of Kyrgyz youth in Protestant
organizations, the activities ofmissionaries, preachers of Islam, also called daavatists,
the uncontrolled and non-approved construction and opening of mosques, madrasas
and churches, and also the lack of control of religious education as well as of the Hajj
52 Ibid.
53 “Hot” Spring and Summer 2006 of the law enforcement agencies and special services of
Kyrgyzstan. 23.08.2006. https://24.kg/archive/ru/news-stall/5705-2006/08/23/6027.html/.
54 Law of the Kyrgyz Republic No. 178 dated 8 November 2006 “On Combating Terrorism”. http://
cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/1971.
55 For the list of organizations whose activities are prohibited in the Kyrgyz Republic see: State
commission for religious affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic. http://religion.gov.kg/ru/religion_organi
zation/blocked.
56 Kyrgyz authorities intend to strengthen control over the activities of religious organizations.
Interfax-Religion. 12 July 2007. http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=19219.
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organization.57 They all posed a threat to inter-ethnic harmony. The Parliamentarian
Commission had one month to inquire on the religious situation and the relations
between state and religion and to make proposals for improving the legislation.
The results of the analysis formed the basis for the Law on Religious Freedom
and Religious Organisations, which was approved in December 2008. The main
provisions of this law were: the prohibition of proselytism, the transfer of the legal
authority of registration of organizations and missionaries to SCRA, and the increase
in the number of initiators in the registration of religious groups from 10 to 200.58
Government officials made no secret of the fact that the new law was an attempt
to “protect society from the existence of small sects”59 The counter-terrorism law
has been subject to constant criticism. Ever since, human rights organizations have
considered the increase in the number of believers as discrimination against religious
minorities, as it significantly limited their ability to obtain registration. Some experts
noted that it was possibly precisely the state’s “measures that could lead to the state
being the main cause of the radicalization of the religious part of the Muslim popula-
tion”.60 Due to the lack of distinction between religious radicalization and political
terrorism within the legal frameworks, counter-terrorism raids have been misused
to deal with radicalization in the country (HRW report https://www.hrw.org/report/
2018/09/17/we-live-constant-fear/possession-extremist-material-kyrgyzstan).
6.5 Phase Three: New Polarizations, New Clashes
Since the change of constitution and shift of pollical system in 2011 after dramatic
and violent clashes in 2010, a new episode in the relationship between state and
religion was marked by the presidency of Almazbek Atambayev, from 2011 to 2017.
He started using stronger nationalistic rhetoric. The president publicly positioned
himself against religious extremism, allegedly imported from outside the country.
He condemned the so-called Arabization of the population and the wearing of the
headscarf, and strongly opposed any “harmful” influence of Western culture such as
LGBTIQ rights, or of other sexual minorities. The president also left a train of incon-
sistent policy of introducing secular values, which seemed to have the opposite effect
57 Resolution of the Jogorku Kenesh of KR “On establishing a parliamentary commission to study
the religious situation in the Kyrgyz Republic” dated May 22, 2008, # 409-IV. http://cbd.minjust.
gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/50383.
58 Law No. 282 of 31 December 2008 on Freedom of Religion and Religious Organizations in the
Kyrgyz Republic. http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/202498.
59 Kurbanova N.U. Religion in social and political life of Kyrgyzstan at the turn of XX-XXI
centuries. Bishkek, 2010, p. 30.
60 Expert assessment of risks and security based on the results of a study of the religious situation
in the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic. 05.11.2008. http://www.easttime.ru/analitic/3/11/
516p.html.
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and intensifies opposition between secular and religious positions in the country.61
Similar to the religious-traditionalist positions, one can find foreshortenings in the
secular positions: an increased rejection of religious lifestyles and the manifestation
of any form of religiosity in public life, as well as the perception of any religious
activity as attempts at proselytizing.
With regard to religion, the concept of state policy in the religious sphere (2006)
as well as the Law on Religious Freedom (2008) continued to apply. In the mean-
time, however, both have come under criticism from human rights organizations
and religious organizations. There was an active debate in the media whether these
documents should be understood as too “liberal” or as “reactionary”. Local human
rights organizations such as “Open Viewpoint”, “Kylym Shamy” and others have
sometimes spoken of a tightening of legislation and its implementation, which has
resulted in a preference for traditional religious organizations.
Meanwhile, so-called “traditional religious organizations”, which had long been
regarded as religious communities loyal to the state, also found themselves in growing
tensionwith the government and, in particular, with SCRA. The tensions between the
Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan (SAMK), the largest religious
organization in the country, and SCRA are particularly striking. The trigger for these
tensions since 2010 was the question of whose competence the organization of the
Hajj lies—SAMK or SCRA. In 2011, there was an open confrontation between the
Director of the State Commission, Ormon Sharshenov, and theMuslim-ledMuftiate,
in which both institutions lost much of their public credibility.62
Tensions also arose with the second “traditional organization”—the Russian
Orthodox Church in Kyrgyzstan. It had, up to then, been loyal to all state initiatives
in the field of religion. Here the trigger was the question about the new registra-
tion of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Russian Orthodox Church encountered
difficulties in re-registration due to a change of name of the diocese in connection
with the revival of the principle of territorial division of metropolitan areas, which
was applied in pre-revolutionary Russia. After introducing a new religious law in
2008, all changes in religious structure must go through SCRA, and all organiza-
tions that have “head offices” were automatically understood to be a mission. So
Russian Orthodox Church in Kyrgyzstan faced a challenge not to belong to the local
“traditional” religious organization any longer, but to be understood as a missionary
of foreign Russian religious organization.
61 Indira Aslanova. Challenges and Achievements in The Implementation of the Concept of State
Policy in the Religion Sphere in Kyrgyzstan. Cabar Asia, 06.12.2016. https://cabar.asia/en/indira-
aslanova-challenges-and-achievements-in-the-implementation-of-the-concept-of-state-policy-in-
the-religion-sphere-in-kyrgyzstan/.
62 Bakyt Nurdinov: We have a record where the head of the State Commission for Religious
Affairs proposes to slaughter the Supreme Mufti, 2011. K-news. http://knews.kg/2011/12/bak
yit-nurdinov-u-nas-est-zapis-gde-glava-goskomissii-po-delam-religiy-predlagaet-zarezat-verhov
nogo-muftiya/; Mufti of Kyrgyzstan has sued the director of the Commission on Religious Affairs.
Islam in CIS. http://www.islamsng.com/kgz/news/3587; Ormon Sharshenov: “I have never called
anyone to ‘kill’ Mufti Chubak azhy Jalilov”. K-news. http://knews.kg/2011/12/ormon-sharshenov-
ya-nikogo-i-nikogda-ne-prizyival-raspravitsya-s-muftiem-chubakom-ajyi-jalilovyim/; There are
millions around the Hajj organization. May 14, 2015. https://rus.azattyk.org/a/27015292.html.
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6.5.1 Public Discourse and Media
In comparison to other Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan enjoys thus far a relative
free media. Therefore, media analysis can be used to analyze the public perception
of religion. Media content analysis on religious issues for 2012–2013 shows that the
reportingwasmainly related to the requirements to strengthen the control of religious
organizations and to the fight against and prohibition of so-called sects and cults.63
In particular, the nature of the Unification Church’s activity and the connections of
important politicians to it were the subject of heated debate. Another main topic was
the influence of the so-called Islamic factor.
Overall, the rise of extremist religious groups, the increase in the population’s
religiosity and the wearing of visible religious symbols in secondary schools were
discussed among citizens and religious activists groups. Muslim NGOs raised the
question of banning the wearing of headscarves for the leaders and teachers of some
secular schools. This problem contributed to social division not only along religious
but also along ethnic lines. For example, representatives of indigenous ethnic groups
have a rather neutral view when it comes to wearing traditional Islamic clothing,
which is often a requirement for girls from the ninth grade upwards. These groups see
this not only as an expression of ones’ own religious but also as an ethnic identification
as a guarantee for a goodmoral education. On the other hand, representatives of other
local ethnic groups tend to see this as a manifestation of religious extremism and an
attempt to impose Islam on children. This problem is most acute in the northern part
of the country in the Kyrgyzstan provinces of Chui and Issyk-Kul and in the capital
region of Bishkek.
The specific context inwhich the idea of the “Islamic factor” became a particularly
sensitive issue was the (intended) projections of two foreign-produced films.
The movie “I am gay and Muslim” depicting a young Moroccan man and
his struggle for identity, and that was supposed to be screened in 2012 at the
Human Rights Festival in Bishkek, was banned by the local district court as a film
with “extremist views” because it depicted homosexuality among male Muslims.64
Another film that caused massive discontent was the screening of “Muslim Inno-
cence” in 2012. The film was criticized for its presumably blasphemous content.65
Both films had been produced abroad, the first in the Netherlands and the second
in the USA, and both led to widespread negative public response—often without
having watched it because the films had not been screened broadly. Even if these
63 Indira Aslanova, Galina Kolodzinskaya. Forecast of the Development of the Religious Situation
in the Kyrgyz Republic until 2017 (non-Islamic sector). Analytical note, AUPKR, Bishkek 2013.
Unpublished manuscript.
64 The film “I am gay and a Muslim” was declared extremist in Kyrgyzstan. September 28, 2012.
https://www.interfax.ru/russia/268114.
65 Protest against the film “Innocence of Muslims” in Bishkek. September 25, 2012. https://rus.
azattyq.org/a/24719174.html. Innocence of Muslims: a dark demonstration of the power of film.
September 17, 2012. https://www.theguardian.com/film/filmblog/2012/sep/17/innocence-of-mus
lims-demonstration-film.
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films did not reach a broad audience, the responses at that time also reflected the
extent to which Islamization of society had already taken place.
6.5.2 The State Concept and Its Revision
State bodies, including the SCRA, regulating the constitutional setting on freedom of
religion noted the need to revise “The Concept”. They argued that it no longer meets
the new threats and is not consistent with the new version of the Constitution (2010)
in a number of provisions. In the countries’ Sustainable Development Strategy for
2013–2017, this revision was expressed as a necessity to revise the concept of state
policy in the religious sphere of the Kyrgyz Republic as stated in the Law No. 324
from 2006 and to provide for necessary changes in the legislation on the religious
sphere. In essence, development strategy focuses on ensuring security and combating
radical religious movements. It is also indicative that the Defence Council, although
it does not fall within the direct competence of this body, approved of this strategy.
In assessing the government’s new initiatives to reform the religious sphere, the
political scientist Nurgul Esenamanova noted that thus far “no serious or clear state
policy on religion was pursued throughout the independence of Kyrgyzstan”.66 She
argues that the consequences of these processes were manifold. First, the pene-
tration and development of radical ideologies among different population groups;
Second, the stratification of Islamic society under the influence of various currents
that emerged from outside; Third, religious illiteracy leading to dogmatism and a
maximalist understanding of the principles of Islam; Fourth, the manifestation of
extremist organizations with the main purpose of overthrowing constitutional power
and building a theocratic state; Fifth, the active, sometimes intrusive attempts to
convert other citizens to their own forms.67 In this context, the government decided
to publish a new concept of state policy in the religious sphere for the period from
2014 to 2020 that was developed along with representatives of civil society and reli-
gious organizations and signed by the President in 2014 and which emphasizes the
coordination between state and religious organizations in preventing extremism.
6.6 Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be said the process of entanglement of the development of
a secular state and the freedom of religion is counteracted by the interlinkage of
ethnicity with religion in Kyrgyzstan. During the transition period in the 1990s, the
66 Nurgul Esenamanova. To what extent the Concept in the religious sphere can solve the problem
of radicalization of Islam? https://cabar.asia/ru/nurgul-esenamanova-naskolko-kontseptsiya-v-rel
igioznoj-sfere-sposobna-reshit-problemu-radikalizatsii-islama/.
67 Ibid.
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country not only saw a change in the religious landscape of Kyrgyzstan, but also
the first legal regulation of religious organizations. Religious freedoms that were
guaranteed to all religious actors were enshrined in law in 1991. This phase also
saw the beginning of the discourse on the threat of “the spread of non-traditional
religious movements”, such as foreign missionary groups of Christian and Islamic
origin. The climax of the development is the initiative of the Spiritual Administration
of Muslims and the Russian Orthodox Church to withdraw religious rights from the
new religious movements, cults and Islamic extremists. This was followed on the
one hand by the banning of various Islamic and Protestant organizations, and on
the other hand by the establishment of a State Commission for Religious Affairs, in
order to outsource religious affairs from the highest state authorities. These divergent
developments, which were already evident in the first phase, laid the foundations for
ever-increasing ambivalence in this area. It is striking that security problems are
being addressed both by politicians and by representatives of “traditional” religious
organizations in similar ways.Moreover, both sides find in the same actors the danger
for national and inter-religious cohesion.
This is followed by a phase of strengthening conceptual and legal security, and
bringing in the concept of securitization, namely by looking into how religious norms
contradict or reconcile with the state’s interest for safety and security in the country.
During the Presidency of Kurmanbek Bakiyev from 2005 to 2010, several laws were
passed with the intention to combat extremist activities. These laws make it possible
to prohibit financial support for religious institutions from abroad, review religious
content in religious media, and reform the registration procedure to the detriment of
religious communities in terms of numbers. At the same time, however, the question
of which authority can judge what or who is a “sect” and/or an “extremist” remains
open. The Law on Religious Freedom and Religious Organisations of 2008 reflects
an extremely negative attitude toward small organizations of Protestant origin, whose
religious rights were minimized accordingly.
The state Concept on public policy in the religious sphere adopted in 2006
supported the idea that the Islamic Hanafi school represented by SAMK and the
Russian Orthodox Church are traditional religions and close to the state. The
discourse on traditionalism, which had begun in the first phase, experienced not
only a continuation but also a practical anchoring in the mentioned policy. Analyti-
cally speaking, there are different opinions about what aggravated the security threat
at this phase. On the one hand, this lies in “authoritarianism and regionalism”.68 On
the other hand, it lies in external factors, discourses and actors who provide decisive
impulses.69
In the third phase, after the political shifts and reforms in 2011, further elements
can be identified that call for more security and at the same time polarize society.
In his official speeches, the then president linked Sunni Hanafi religious identity
with the Kyrgyz national identity. On the other hand, he tried to strengthen a secular
position by condemning the wearing of religious symbols. By this, the president
68 Personal interview with Ikbol Mirsaitov. 20.05.2017.
69 Personal interview with Emil Juraev. 22.05.2017.
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understood above all the wearing of headscarves. His statements, in which he tries
to combine different positions in the secular state, have ambivalent effect. Even in
the third phase of government policy,70 and in corresponding decrees and discourses
on religion as a factor of threat to national security, the state names and repeats the
same problems as at the beginning of the Republic: lack of control of religion by the
state, missionary work, extremism and terrorism, and “non-traditional” religions.
The results of the analysis point to that the political and the religious field, defined
as traditionalist, are hierarchically related to each other, but that they overlap to some
extent and pursue similar interests. Structurally, politics and religionmeet at the place
of the highest decision-makers. On the one side there are the state institutions, such as
courts, councils and law makers and on the other side, influential leaders of religious
communities, which have shown a high affinity to each other, too. In terms of content,
they overlap at the point where risks and necessary safeguards are interpreted into
society as they assume a similar understanding of the risks and threats. Byminimizing
the number of stately acknowledged “small religious groups”, religious missionaries
but also politicians in state bodies which do not share the “traditional” positions,
the representatives of the state and stately acknowledged religious institutions can
shape the political processes and structures solely among themselves. One of the
results is that state security measures strongly supported by different religious actors
have increased with every phase of the state. However, the desired security effects
are not achieved. On the contrary, the threat to the freedom of religion has been
criticized by human rights organizations but has not been discussed thoroughly at
any governmental level.
As illustrated above, both governmental institutions and parliament on one hand,
and the representatives of “traditional” religious organizations acknowledged by the
state (here SAMK and ROC) on the other, have not only similar understanding of
the meaning of “religious” threats but also similar understanding in regard with the
concept of the state.
At this point, it can be concluded that the question of religious freedom is defined
solely at the position of the highest political and religious power. This confirms
Balzaq’s statement that the power of the elites (political, religious) has a strong influ-
ence on the notion of securitization. In theoretical terms discussed in the introduction,
in Kyrgyzstan we do not find either or situation: Either religion is under threat, or
religion is a threat for society. The case study shows that at the same moment when
certain religious groups are perceived as a threat by the religious actors with the
highest religious power, such as SAMK and ROC, the very idea of religious freedom
is immediately under threat.
Additionally, securitization discourse is representative for the discourse on the
formation of the nation state, with challenges such as high internal and external
heterogeneity, and the struggle to shield the state from threats of any kind. This
“search” for a state ex negativo may be motivating for the state elites for a while, but
it does not offer any further prospects for the future along which development can
70 Compare the Government Decision of 1995, the Security Council Decision of 2007 and the
Defence Council Decision of 2014.
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bring changes in this respect. Both in engaging with the threats through radical reli-
gious groups and with the conception of the state, religious and political stakeholders
deal solelywith collective identities.Consequently, this understanding creates simpli-
fications in the understanding of current issues. The result is that in spite of a local
tradition of ethnic and religious plurality, the nation state that only defines one or two
religions as “traditional”, leads to one in which ethnicity, national and religious iden-
tity overlap. Following this, the state neither allows enough room for the originally
intended religious rights, nor does the state put a stop to religious extremists.
Furthermore, the analysis shows that the control of selected religious organiza-
tions such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, The Local Church of Jesus Christ, The Church
of Scientology and The Unification Church, which are understood as sects, radical
groups and hence threats to national security, is not well thought out. Firstly, it is not
clear on the basis of which elements of numerically small religious organizations
can be understood as a threat to national security. The most important argument is
that their origin is claimed not to be national. Secondly, it is not clear how religious
extremism is exactly defined by the government. The current arguments range from
the wearing of a headscarf to calling for an Islamic state. As a result, an increasing
number of Islamic religious organizations, such as Tablig Jamaat and Yakyn Inkar,
and individuals are perceived as a threat to national security, leading to increased
security activities that affect more and more people. Since this argumentative multi-
plication of threat scenarios is fed by local, regional and international discourse, it
is constantly gaining new legitimacy.
This lack of fit between problem and solution has far-reaching consequences: it
underpins the split between different positions in society and leads to ever more
violations of religious rights. Consequently, the question must be asked whether
the one-sided perception of specific religious groups as a threat that entails more
and more securitization—is the right way. Or whether the securitization is rather
functionalized in order to circumvent other still outstanding questions.
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Chapter 7
The Power Shift from Government
to Organized Crime in Kyrgyzstan
Erlan Bakiev
Abstract Organized crime (OC) groups in Kyrgyzstan have reached a level where
they are competing with governmental authorities and institutions. Leaders of OC
groups can assignmembers of their groups into law enforcement positions and parlia-
ment. It is safe to claim that the absence of rule of law and legal gaps encourage orga-
nized crime groups to flourish. From an economic point of view, privatization and
capitalization of the economic system in the process of democratization have been in
the interest and favor of the development of criminal organizations. Organized crime
gangs can easily fill their chests by benefiting from the legal gaps. For instance, all
the jewelry store owners at the major markets in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan pay fees to an
OC gang for their safety and security. Small business owners have been taken under
control by organized crime to resolve economic disputes or just because they are in
their area of control. Moreover, gangs and groups operating in the South Kyrgyzstan,
as well as in Talas and Bishkek, deal with drug trafficking. The cultural aspect of
this issue focuses on the importance of the clan ties and network connections in
Kyrgyzstan and its use by organized crime. The networking used by the OC also
includes utilization of the Internet and social media, consequently it became difficult
to counter them during the process of globalization and the whole of society being
integrated with the internet and social media, the fight against organized crime has
becomemore difficult. Challenging existing socio-cultural structures, to increase law
enforcement and combat clan-based subculture and informal law practices, such as
the “thieves” “laws” and “brotherhood hierarchies” of organized crime, have been
an almost impossible endeavor over the past 30 years. Consequently, breaking the
network of OC and destroying its nationwide functions is a challenge, not only in
Kyrgyzstan but in many post-soviet countries.
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Since the declaration of independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan has experienced many
turbulent political periods. Recent uprisings in the last decade and bloody ethnic
clashes between Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyz groups, as well as border conflicts in the
south of the country, exhibit those hard times (Hanks 2011; Rezvani 2013). Because
of the economic, social and political instability, organized crime (OC) groups have
always tried to extend their spheres of influence by proclaiming war at the state level.
The Tulip Revolutions led both the first and second presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Askar
Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiev, to fall from power in 2005 and 2010 because citi-
zens demanded an end to corruption. Right after the Tulip Revolution in 2010 that
marked a shift in government andmajor constitutional reforms, the interim president,
Rosa Otunbayeva, had to accept that members of organized crime groups entered
into parliament bymeans of the elections of 2011 (Donis 2011). Her statement “orga-
nized crime groups came to parliament” is a confirmation that criminals have gained
political support and strong influential connections from above (Donis 2011). The
other lamentable situation is in the business arena, where organized crime groups
control the sources of income by intimidating and blackmailing business owners. For
instance, after the revolution in 2005, the Kyrgyz government faced the problem of
unlawful seizures of land and private businesses (Kaputadze 2007). Allegedly over
1,300 businesses were damaged during the revolution, resulting in losses of at least
one billion som (around 24 million US dollars) (Saralaeva 2006). After the cancel-
lation of parliamentary elections in October 2020 and the power vacuum thereafter,
criminal groups attacked and seized several gold and coal mines in Issik Kul, Naryn
and other regions of Kyrgyzstan and blackmailed and intimidated business owners.
In some cases, they set fire to equipment and physically attacked workers (BBC, 8
October 2020).Moreover, Demirtepe (2006) claims that inKyrgyzstan since the 2005
“revolution”—caused by the authoritarianism of President Akayev’s regime—orga-
nized crime gained a level of parallel power with the government. OC groups took
advantage of long-lasting chaos after the 2010 uprising and ethnic clashes through a
complex and dynamic set of goal-oriented processes (illegal activities), such as drug
trafficking, robbery and racketeering.
Despite the large amount of research done on organized crime and criminal orga-
nizations, there is no specific consensus on its definition, namely that organized
crime has various aspects in its definition. The consensus of researchers focuses on
four main elements, a continuing organization, an organization or group that oper-
ates rationally for profit, by the means of force or threats, and the need for weak
and corruption governmental institutions to maintain immunity from law enforce-
ment (Albanese 2000). On the other hand, Maltz (2000) claims that organized crime
leaders need public demand for certain services that they can provide. The aim to
monopolize that sector puts restrictions onmembership, ideology and specialization.
The groups operate in secrecy and are opaque in their planning.
Mcillwain (1999) describes crime organizations in three different paradigms in
his piece on crime organizations. The first paradigm is an institution that appears as a
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criminal organization and reflects the institutional approach. The second perspec-
tive is that there is an exchange between power and the need for power. This
power gap is filled by an OC group that rejects the institutional approach. The third
paradigm focuses more on the work and function of criminal organizations, hence
the outcome (Mcillwain 1999). The earlier paradigm dating from the 1960s, despite
being outdated, perfectly describes the situation in Kyrgyzstan today, where OC
groups switched from street gangs to criminal enterprises.
Heads of OC groups, as Ibraimov (2011) states, have helped financially—after
the 2010 revolution—members of its groups to gain substantial political influence by
becoming members of parliament (MPs) and mayors. Media reporting has alleged
that several MPs have direct connections with organized crime (Demirtepe 2006).
Kaputadze (2008) emphasized the same opinion and claimed that neither the tulip
revolution in 2005 nor the 2010 shift in government could solve the issue of organized
crime and the state, and the government subsequently failed to maintain judicial
reforms. It is safe to claim that after every political crisis, such as in 2020, organized
crime groups try to get involved in the political games of the country.
The recent 2020 parliamentary post-election crisis is evidence of the abovemen-
tioned statement. After the election protests on 5–6 October 2020, the prime minister
and other top officials had to step down, and President Sooronbay Jeenbekov in the
following days left office under pressure of opposition and protestors, leading to a
power gap in the country. Under these circumstances, various political groups were
staking claims on power and the country was thrust into insecurity and instability.
Looters sought to exploit the situation and decision-makers reported being subjected
to pressure by organized criminal groups.
There were concerns about the growing influence of organized criminal groups,
withmembers of parliament claiming that decisionmakerswere subjected to pressure
by such groups. For instance, a week after the cancellation of the parliamentary elec-
tions, on 13 October, 2020, Deputy Parliament Speaker Aida Kasymalieva expressed
support for interim primeminister and later presidential candidate Japarov, while also
saying that she had been intimidated by his supporters. In particular, she said that
members of organized criminal groups had threatened to burn down her house, kill
her and rape her (Kudayarov 2020).
In order to examine the influence of organized crime on Kyrgyz society and
political institutions, this chapter illustrates this issueunder three approaches, first, the
legal; second, the economic development; third, the sociocultural. These approaches
derive from the Theory of Social Capital and Deterrence. It explains how organized
crime leaders fear and at the same time avoid being arrested and serving prison time.
Nevertheless, due to the high level of corruption and low level of rule of law, in
the legal context, the “vigilante groups”, that is to say members of OC, feel safe
and comfortable because of the gaps in the penal codes and criminal judiciary, and
consequently the lack of deterrence and enforcement of criminal law and judicial
sentences. Deterrence theory states that crime can be prevented if organized crime
members believe the costs of committing a crime outweigh the benefits (Zinring and
Hawkins 1973). However, that is not the case in Kyrgyzstan because the law does not
deter criminal organizations. Statute 248 of the Penal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic
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codifies a penalty of seven years for creating and participating in an organized crime
group activity, but which also has various gaps for avoiding punishment.
From an economic point of view, excessive privatization and capitalization of
the economy, such as mining and public services in the process of democratization,
have been in the interest of organized crime in the post-Soviet countries. Criminal
organizations can easily fill their chests bymaking use of legal gaps. Business owners
at the main marketplaces such as the Osh bazaar, the Dordoi market in Bishkek and
small businesses operating in the cities have been extorted by organized crime to
resolve their financial disputes with their debtors or government. Moreover, small
business owners were forced to pay fees just because their businesses were in a
specific area that these gangs controlled.
This sociocultural change is best explained by the Theory of Social Capital which
states that organizations that have better access to valuable social resources are more
successful in their performance (Bordieu 1986; Coleman 1990; Portes 1998). If
we consider a criminal organization as a societal actor that constantly looks for
new strategies to maximize its profit, then we can easily understand the strategy of
organized crime which looks for ways to increase clan ties and network connections.
Needless to say, considering that OC is a global phenomena (Schloenhardt 1999;
Bouchard 2020), especially with the globalization processes, the financial activi-
ties of organized crime have also become a global problem. To better understand
organized crime and take stronger measures, the content of the organization must
first be discovered, and then the legal, social and political situation that causes the
gangs to benefit and still stand. Criminologists in the United States before the 1960s
categorized economic crimes separately from the crimes related to organized crime
(Schloenhardt 1999). As a result of the research analysis in this area, organized crime
tries to increase its income just like other legal organizations. According to Schloen-
hardt (1999), the agenda in a country and the new laws and regulations draw the
path to financial activities of organized crime. These activities can be observed espe-
cially in autocratic and developing countries. The economic activities of organized
crime are very intensive in the countries with antidemocratic laws and governments,
and they are also regularly observed in countries with high levels of corruption.
Kyrgyzstan, which could not reach both socioeconomic and political stability after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, was a very suitable place for organized crime gangs.
7.2 Economic Power of Organized Crime Groups
Since Kyrgyzstan declared its independence and started a free market strategy, the
heavy industry sector that once existed in the Kyrgyz Republic was sold out shortly
after independence in 1991. During the Soviet Union, the Kyrgyz republic with
its dominating heavy and light industry factories had a developed infrastructure,
especially machinery factories and construction equipment factories. The collapse
of the industrial sector that came with the privatization process made Kyrgyzstan
predominantly an agricultural country. Rapid and radical changes, made without
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considering the real economic situation of the state in the agricultural sector, led to
the impoverishment of the villages and caused internal migration (Tugut 2008). The
changes in the legal and economic systems of the USSR in the late 1980s and early
1990s, the privatization process and the formation of cooperatives in all areas were
determined as the starting point of the shadow economy (Valieva 2006). With the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the privatization opportunities led to the formation of
the shadow economy and the worsening of the criminal situation. Moreover, Valieva
(2006) states that one of the social causes of shadow economies in former USSR
countries is extortion.
Van der Hulst (2009) claims that criminal organizations are not different from
private entrepreneurs that operate within the legal frameworks and that constantly
look for new opportunities, structures and strategies to maximize profits. Organized
crime groups recruit employees, cooperate or build unions with business partners,
politicians and even provide social benefits and bridge social structures if this serves
their best interest (Van der Hulst 2009). In order to generate economic income, the
organized crime groups in Central Asia commit crimes related to drug and human
trafficking (Marat 2006). The United Nations report in 2006 states that annually in
Kyrgyzstan there is an approximately 1.2 billion USD shadow economy (UN 2006).
Both in the drug trafficking and human trafficking sector, the city of Osh, located
in the south of Kyrgyzstan, is one of the most prominent locations and a hub for
traffickers and the busiest transit city for human trafficking to theMiddle East, Europe
and Russia. Smugglers and kidnapped persons were caught with Kyrgyz passports
and attributed this to Kyrgyz officials being linked to organized gangs via corruption
(Marat 2006). Consequently, in the fight against organized crime, the economic
resources of these groups should be blocked. The human trafficking and internal
migration process have turned into one of the most important social problems since
the beginning of the 1990s. New slums that are growing around the big cities have
neither the necessary infrastructure nor the right conditions. The unemployed youth
from the settlements that formed because of this internal migration is involved in
all kinds of crimes. For instance, Azat Tinaev, who robbed a betting office and
killed the saleswoman in 2010, was from the slum established in the suburb of the
capital city Bishkek (Kopitin 2010). He was part of an OC group and recruited in
these suburbs to which economic hardship in the villages led him. It also causes the
young population to migrate abroad, especially to Russia and Kazakhstan, but also
to Turkey and Dubai. Moreover, this process caused an internal migration where
the youth who migrated to big cities showed a tendency to get involved in various
crimes. Organized crime members usually acquire their own environment, often by
engaging in wrestling, boxing and other martial arts. Therefore, many organized
crime members and leaders were champions in a sport or individuals who were in
these circles (Kopitin 2010).
Sokolov-Mitric (2007) emphasizes how far such organized crime can reach using
the shadow economy. For example, the organized criminal gang “Uralmash” formed
by young athletes living around the Uralmash machine factory in St. Petersburg,
Russia and the founders of the gang were young athletes (Vorobyev, S., Habarov,
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A., Teerentyev, S., Kurdumov, S. and others) and the Tsuganov brothers (Sokolov-
Mitric 2007). As it was with all the organized crime gangs and mafia groups in the
former USSR states, the “Uralmash” gang initially brought the small businesses and
cooperatives under their control. Lately, they have expanded their activities and were
focusing on larger businesses and larger business owners.
There were dozens of gangs like “Uralmash” in Russia and in the early period of
Kyrgyzstan’s transition process in the 1990s, and the desire to expand their influence
led to bloody clashes and deadly rivalries between the gangs (Sokolov-Mitric 2007).
The “Uralmash” gang turned into the most effective organized crime and business
group of the region, and controlled approximately 200 companies, 12 banks and co-
founded nearly 90 companies. Moreover, the “Uralmash” gang allegedly assisted the
governor of Sverdlov province in Russia, Eduard Rossel in the 1999 elections and
helped Yeltsin in the presidential elections in 1996 (Sokolov-Mitric 2007). Gifts and
favors, for example, have been issued to the former president of the Russian Feder-
ation, Boris Yeltsin, that illustrated how trustworthy he was for the Russian govern-
ment at that time (Mostovshikov 1999). Similar to the Russian Mafia, organized
crime groups in Kyrgyzstan have always operated publicly under government eyes.
They have established their own financial foundations, copying the organizational
structure of the “Uralmash” gang. Members of these criminal gangs became parlia-
mentarian and councilmembers among governmental institutions inKyrgyzstan. The
weak economic security of the country and the powerful organized crime disrupt the
economic reforms and the social, political structure of Kyrgyzstan from the roots.
The lack of political will or fear of governmental officials are just a few reasons
that explain the flourishing of the shadow economy and economic crimes that led to
widespread corruption in all economic and political sectors.
7.3 Rule of Law Against Organized Crime in Kyrgyzstan
One of the most important tools in the fight against OC groups is deterrence, where
a gang member should think about the consequences of his/her illegal activity. The
Deterrence Theory posits that crime can be prevented if the measures force criminals
to think about the outputs and the deterrent effects of crime prevention programs
and policies that are a function of a potential offender’s perceptions of the certainty,
severity, and swiftness of punishment (Nagin 2013). There are two mechanisms of
deterrence, the first is when it is oriented toward the general population and the
second a special deterrence which involves punishment administered to organized
crime members with the intent to discourage them from committing crimes in the
future (Braga et al. 2018).
Against this backdrop, legal deterrence strategies seek to directly influence
perceived sanctions, such as penalties or prison sentences, risks among offenders by
communicating directly with them about the consequences of their actions (Zinring
and Hawkins 1973). In other words, focused deterrence strategies are intended
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to prevent crime through the advertising of the law enforcement strategy and the
personalized nature of its application (Braga et al. 2018, p. 6).
The Soviet criminal and criminal proceedings laws left their legacy in the penal
code of Kyrgyzstan after its independence in 1991. For instance, Kyrgyzstan utilizes
the majority of the statutes of the criminal and criminal proceedings laws of the
former Soviet Union (Berman 1947). In other words, these laws are codified, and
lawmakers stated the exact sanctions to every type of crime. After the collapse of
the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan, as with many other former Soviet states, has inherited
the criminal law and other laws on combating organized crime directly from the old
system. But these new states are no longer closed environments in which courts or
law enforcement mechanisms operate. Chernik (1999) states that the fight against
organized crime and criminal organizations in the USSR was already insufficient
and more so in a globalized world today. Moreover, in the last years of the Soviet
Union there was a consensus among scholars, practitioners and policy makers on the
need for developing a special assessment system for laws on organized crime and
crimes related to corruption (Chernik 1999). In the declaration sent to the President
of the USSR, the Supreme Council of the USSR and the High Council of the Union
Republics, one of the most important issues raised was an organized crime and legal
reform on the fight against corruption (Chernik 1999). However, since then any
serious steps and legal reforms have been done in Kyrgyzstan in this context.
There were two attempts to amend the law on organized crime in Kyrgyzstan
which were expected to be the most important steps in this area (Nochevkin 2011).
For instance, in the 2013 draft law, because of the controversy of the definition
of criminal organizations in the old law, the amended version offered to initiate a
criminal case even for minor crimes if the suspect is to be proven a member of an
organized crime group. Moreover, the draft law offered a labeling mechanism for
registering all members of criminal organizations and gangs. However, the proposed
drafts did not include mechanisms for deterring corrupt prosecutors and judges who
abetted organized crime. Since both law drafts of 2013 and later another one in 2018
did not include preventive measures, these efforts had not deterred organized crime
from committing crimes.
Osmonaliev (2013) states that in the early 2000s criminal organizations reached
an unprecedented scale because they did not see any legal, or otherwise, sanction
regime in the country that could stop them from filling the power gaps explained
earlier. The state could not even protect private business and small enterprises and
that led to the rise of OC. The government failed to launch crime prevention policies
and proactive policing or any form of punitive criminal justice. Consequently, some
25 years after independence, the legal enforcement system was paralyzed in the fight
against organized crime (Osmonaliev 2013).
Because of both political and public pressure, the authorities were rushed in
passing the new organized crime and witness protection laws to untie their hands
in the fight against organized crime. Moreover, because organized crime and corrup-
tion are interconnected, it was important to take into consideration the preventive
measures on corruption in combination with organized crimes within the proposed
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law amendments. However, because of the lack of procedural mechanisms, the new
draft of law on organized crime has remained in suspense until present times.
According to the theory of organizations, an organization, even an OC group, in
order to continue as an institutionmust have a secure environment, informal relations
and an organizational subculture among members of that institution (Selznick 1948;
Hatch 2018). Since the organized crimegroups inKyrgyzstan havebecomea “shadow
state” alongside the official government, they comply with the corporate approach
criteria specified by Selznick in his organizational theory (1948). For instance, in the
beginning of the 2000s there were a bulk of cases where victims of police brutality
applied to organized crime for the protection and safety in the hope of justice. On top
of it, criminal organizations, such as rail-road station gangs, Osh bazaar gangs and
small groups that control and blackmail business owners in the cities throughout the
country became so powerful due to the lack of laws and law enforcement that they
could not be stopped. Today, these groups are interested in the continuous growth of
their financial benefits and desire to ensure their personal security which is possible
only by legalizing their status and taking an active part in local politics (Krasinskij
2008). For instance, every local administration council is controlled or engaged
with two or more members of local organized crime groups. During a summer eve
in August 2014 in Bishkek, a member of the city council of the city of Kara-Kol,
Altynbek Arzymbaev, was shot dead. Arzymbaev himself was allegedly amember of
the Rysbek Akmatvbaev’s gang and elected member to the city council with the Ata-
Meken political party. It is assumed that hewas killed because of his criminal frictions
and unresolved issues with Kara-Kol mayor Ilyas Erkeev (Beishenbek 2014).
The lack of effective regulatory legal and political restrictions on the election of
members of organized crime to state and local governments is a serious concern.
It is important to emphasize that under the current election laws, the availability of
significant information about a candidate’s relations to an organized crime group is
not a reason for refusing to register him/her to the list of candidates nor for excluding
and canceling the registration of a candidate. For instance, Bayaman Erkinbayev,
a member of Kyrgyz parliament who had a reputation as a drug baron, he was
trafficking drugs from Afghanistan to Russia and Europe, was able to be elected to
the parliament with the help of drugmoney (Marat 2006). One could easily argue that
the process of allowing members of OC into parliament and thus politics is the result
of liberalization and political support of illegal activities and trade in the late 1990s
and the beginning of 2000s (Marat 2008). Having power over state property—that
was formerly in the hands of Soviet administrations—opens endless opportunities
for political figures with criminal backgrounds, such as taking over control of border
guards to traffic drugs, illegal job expansion and social control (Marat 2006). The
protests in the aftermath of the 2020 parliamentary elections included the demand
for lustration of political candidates rooted in allegations of widespread irregularities
and abuse of office by previous candidates and politicians. Because the landslide
victory for pro-government parties was seen as yet another attempt by organized
crime groups to exert influence over politics and elections.
Despite the principle of separation of authorities, there is little judicial indepen-
dence in Kyrgyzstan. There were many cases when organized crime leaders were
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released from the courthouses because of pressure from high-level state clerks and
politicians. For instance, the head of an OC group, Kamchi Kolbayev, a member of
an international criminal group that includes the leaders and members of several
Eurasian organized crime groups and one of the most influential drug lords in
the world, had his criminal sentence reduced from 25 years of jail to 3 years and
11 months in 2006, referring to all kinds of amnesties and remissions (Zhuk 2011).
Kolbaev was charged with and convicted for an attempted murder. Because of the
pressure by the people at the top linked to organized crime, the hands of the police
usually are tied, and very often courts and the prosecutor’s office investigators release
organized crime members, despite the robust evidence brought by the police (Marat
2008). Thus, it is safe to claim that criminal groups in Kyrgyzstan have the same
power as the state and have become a latent organizationwhich can affect the criminal
justice system.
As in the case of Kolbaev, due to the fact that there were no effective crim-
inal charges placed by the law enforcement and corruption in the judicial system,
he avoided the punishment. Possible punishments have no deterrent effects due to
failure to fulfill execution of the penalties given by the court. AlthoughMarat (2006)
claims that the penal code and laws of Kyrgyzstan are sufficient in legal terms to deter
criminal organizations, there is no effective enforcement due to the corrupted law
enforcement and the legal system. This corruption is caused by the low wages paid
to lawyers, judges and police officers. In this context, it is safe to claim that devel-
oping strong and active laws will make the fight against criminal organizations more
efficient. If there is pressure on a police investigator from another authority, even
the best penal code and law will have no chance. Consequently, the legal infrastruc-
ture regarding the active fight against organized crime should be revised. Moreover,
effective law enforcement measures should be put in place and police officers should
be allowed to act independently to override the pressure from the top.
7.4 Combating Organized Crime Groups
That combating organized crime is declared as a top priority at the presidential and
government levels has illustrated the seriousness of the issue. Consequently, this
should not be limited to only legal measures related to the law on combating orga-
nized crime, but also to bringing amendments and changes in criminal law, criminal
procedure law, public administration code and judges’ directives. For instance, it
is vital to complement with an additional statute in the Criminal Code “Financial
support for organized crime” (Nochevkin 2011). As a preventive measure, it was
offered to punish the members of organized crime and business owners who provide
financial support and abet organized crime. And as a deterrence, the sanction was up
to 15 years of imprisonment (Nochevkin 2011).
This new draft of the “Fight against organized crime” in the 2011 law was consid-
ering a special operational record, which would give a legal base for initiating a
special registry for the members of organized crime, and this membership would be
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considered as a crime (Gov.kg 2011). Consequently, being an individual related to
an organized crime group gains a legal status and corrupt prosecutors and judges
would not be able to interfere. Furthermore, it is vital to make changes in the penal
correction law. It is not a secret that organized crime turned correctional facilities
and prisons into their own training camps. Consequently, it is important to develop
amendments in the penal correction law, as keeping members of the organized crime
groups in a separate cell to embed restrictive and control statutes. Moreover, most of
the income sources of organized crime come from drug smuggling. The city of Osh
in the south of Kyrgyzstan is the largest transit zone for Afghan drugs to Russia and
further on to Europe (Marat 2006).
There are a bulk of examples that illustrate how countries and governments cope
with mafia, clan, gang or other OC structures that take over governmental tasks
and responsibilities, such as security. For example, the US authorities were highly
affected and undermined by OC structures from the early 1900s to the 1970s. The
public was harmed and feared leaders of organized crime groups, such as Al Capone
and Benjamin Siegel, that operated in large cities such as Chicago, New York and
Boston (Finckenauer 2007). The anti-organized crime law passed through the senate
in 1970 as part of the Organized Crime Control Act. This law provided prosecutors
with the ease of identifying organized crime, people or businesses cooperating with
them and connecting them with the crime because of any illegal act (Finckenauer
2007). In addition, heavy penalties imposed onOCwere designed to deter individuals
from joining the organized crime groups. But it took joint efforts of all institutions
and law enforcement to go against these influential groups.
Consequently, it is very important to adopt laws related to economic crimes such as
tax fraud, illicit financial flows, trafficking of goods and people, and hence economic
spheres in which OC operates. Therefore, organized crime should be brought into
alignment with the laws and regulations of law enforcement in dealing with financial
and economic crimes. Similarly to the US Money-Laundering Control Act of 1986,
such as the 2005 Money Laundering Directive of the European Union, which has
also an outreach to the trade agreements with Kyrgyzstan, prohibits individuals or
businesses from performing a financial transaction with revenues from certain major
crimes referred to as illegal activities in this law (Cassella 2007). Money Laun-
dering Acts and Directives aim to sanction and penalize members of OC and freeze
their assets. Such acts and directives have been a major factor in uncovering illegal
economic activities of the shadow economy and organized crime. The economic
structure and power of organized crime in Kyrgyzstan, which had reached a very
high degree, concerns both law enforcement and citizens. A broader analysis of this
topic will be made in the next section.
7.5 Socio-Cultural Changes
The research on the phenomenon indicates that organized crime has an element of
social relationships or a social network (Xu and Chen 2004; Smith and Papachristos
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2016). Smith and Papachristos (2016) in their research found dependencies between
the criminal and personal networks and the criminal and legitimate networks, and
claim that this multiplexity glued these worlds of organized crime together above and
beyond the personalities of famous gangsters, ethnic homophily, and other endoge-
nous network processes. For Kyrgyzstan that means that clan ties prevail in every
aspect of the livelihood of people. If you have network connections it is easier for
you to get a good position, political support, and a good status in the criminal world.
Xu and Chen (2005) state that criminal networks can be part of the research, and it
is possible to investigate them via several kinds of analytical methods. For instance,
the automated Social Network Analysis method and the Priority-First Search (PFS)
method can be used to measure the degree of connectivity of the organized criminal
organizations. As a theoretical approach, social capital is the most frequently used
approach by non-governmental organizations both in the public or private context
(Putnam 1995; Adler and Kwon 2002; Cohen and Prusak 2001). Cohen and Prusak
(2001) identify social capital as a bundle of active connections between people who
are passionate about networking and community collaboration by sharing trust,
mutual understanding, and values among people. Social capital is a collection of
shared norms, values and understandings among citizens and private actors that trust
each other in their doings and hence co-operate among each other according to these
norms. The more actors, citizens and groups are apart from these norms, the higher
the level of corruption and personal benefits and the lower the social capital. Social
capital is thus a way of achieving common goals through social networks, norms and
trust, and a way of providing collective participation of all actors more effectively in
this process (Putnam 1995).
Lederman et al. (2002) argue that the Social Capital approach is a crime-reducing
mechanism. To cement concepts such as participative democracy, civic engagement
in state relations and good citizen engagement in order to implement social capital
in communities, a strong civil society is essential. However, the dark side of Social
Capital is frequently used by organized crime (Putnam 2000; Arnold 2003; Mead-
owcroft and Pennington 2008). Putzell (1997) criticizes social capital in his own
work, and states that the Ku Klux Klan and the Nazi party are a product of social
capital. The dark side of social capital is a network that reduces overall productivity
because it serves the interests of some segments of organized crime (Ostrom 1997).
Moreover, Ostrom (1997)writes that states governed by the command systemdestroy
other types of social capital and establishes their own system.
Arnold (2003) states that social capital consists of weak and strong bonds, and
he emphasizes that organized crime and crime unions are among the strong ties.
These strong ties are not always used in a good way; an example of it would be it
being used by organized crime (Arnold 2003). It is known that often organized crime
groups make use of clan and kinship connections to reach their goals (Portes 1998).
In the 1990s, during the last days of the Soviet Union, Kofirin warned that the local
gang networks organized by youth would, with time, transform into strong organized
crime groups, and he had offered to save those youth (Kofirin 2011).
Social capital is an important tool for organized crime to boost both its financial
and human capital. Kaputadze states that the 2005 Kyrgyz tulip revolution has failed
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and the cooperation between state and organized crime continues (Kaputadze 2008).
It is safe to claim that clan and kinship ties have a great influence on the formation of
organized crime in Kyrgyzstan (Olcott 2005; Kaputadze 2008). The most important
factors, or the nodes in the formation of criminal gangs, were the connections of those
groups with state senior managers, kinship and lineage networks and regionalism.
Furthermore,Kaputadze (2008) had conducted research inKyrgyzstan and found that
the formation of illegal networks is generally defined by regionalism or brotherhood.
Anexample of clan andkinship ties byorganized crimeand their leaderswas the quick
mobilization of relatives of Rysbek Akmatbayev, a key leader of the criminal groups
in Kyrgyzstan in 2006.Moreover, themobilization of relatives and acquaintances has
become the most important weapon of all the organized crime leaders (members),
prisoners and politicians in Kyrgyzstan. Osmonaliev and Engvall state that in 2005,
Rysbek Akmatbaev gathered his relatives, family members and gang members at
the main square in Bishkek after the assassination of his brother, an MP, Tynychbek
Akmatbaev, in one of the prisons where he went for monitoring and threatened the
government (Osmonaliev and Engvall 2007). Olcott (2005), highlighted in her report
to theOSCE commission that the clanship is of themain sources ofOC in the country.
It is evident that since the independence of the Central Asian states, the kinship
network is an inevitable process in the formation of an administrative network, and
the elites agreed to share the power with the members of these networks to ensure
stability in the region (Olcott 2005; Schatz 2005). In this context, social capital
approach can have a very robust constructive feature, leading groups or networks to
positive or negative consequences (Putnam 1995; Ostrom 1997; Portes 1998; Adler
and Kwon 2002). OC groups in Kyrgyzstan use these networks based on force,
threats, intimidation and blackmailing to maintain them.
According to Ageeva (2001), some ruling parties are using the resources and
networks of organized crime. As gratitude for using these networks, many active
organized crime members were released from prison. For instance, Erkin Mambe-
taliev, a member of an organized crime group, and responsible for various crimes
such as murder, robbery, drug trafficking, money laundering, was exempted from
prison in November 2010, even though he received a life sentence for murder (Niya-
zova 2011). Erkin Mambetaliyev served in the close protection unit of the former
President Askar Akaev, then joined Akmatbaev’s gang, committed many crimes,
including the assassinations of the Parliament member Surabaldiev and the Police
chief Chynybek Aliev (Niyazova 2011). Despite the evidence and the refusal of
the Supreme Court to approve his release, Erkin Mambetaliev managed to get out
of prison using political and organized crime networks. Hundreds of similar cases
can be shown. Of course, such injustices occur because of a failed judicial system,
corruption and most importantly, networks of organized crime that use the black side
of social capital.
For the implementation of social capital, itsmain determining factors are essential.
In other words, it is very important that the masses are part of the decision-making
mechanism and that a participative policy is followed in either political or economic
decisions. The state, civil society and all other stakeholders, in order to stop the
recruitment process of youth into organized crime gangs, must take bold steps to deal
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with the sports clubs and sports schools opened by leaders of organized crime groups.
According to Onyx and Bullen (2001), to establish a strong social capital, an active
and enthusiastic citizenry and civic engagement is necessary. However, the social
capital that is established by the state has been considered very weak, and therefore
the state must hand over this function (Onyx and Bullen 2001). Therefore, it is very
important to carry out the following process by non-governmental organizations, and
of course it is very important that all shareholders are also active participants.
Since independence, political efforts and claims have been endless, but without
significant change or success. After 2010, President Roza Otunbayeva declared
a persistent fight against organized crime, and the first law, “On Counteracting
Organized Crime”, was passed. The document consisted of 19 articles, and such
concepts as “organized crime”, “criminal subculture”, “criminal ideology”, “criminal
lifestyle” were introduced. This law described the principles, causes and conditions
that give rise to organized crime. In addition, parole was prohibited for the members
of organized crime groups by law. Almazbek Atambayev, who had been nominated
for the presidency in 2011, promised to eliminate organized crime. During his presi-
dency, another lawwas passed—“OnCounteracting Organized Crime”, and the 2011
law was canceled. In the new law, the conceptual apparatus was expanded, and the
number of articles increased from 19 to 35. President Sooronbai Jeenbekov imme-
diately after taking office as head of state at a meeting of the Security Council of the
Kyrgyz Republic said that the main reason for the unsuccessful fight against orga-
nized crime is corruption. Considering the existence of a large flow of money in the
criminal environment, it is impossible without the participation of high-ranking offi-
cials in law enforcement and the judiciary. The law “On Counteracting Organized
Crime” finally passed in 2013 during Sooronbai Jeenbekov’s presidency and was
improved and brought in line with all legislation and harmonized the mechanisms
within the framework of the judicial and legal reforms of 2019.
The government finally adopted a concept of goodwill for combating organized
crime for 2015–2020. According to it, within five years, amendments should have be
made to the relevant laws, and an interagency coordination center should be created.
However, by 2020 no such measures have been realized.
7.6 Conclusion
Organized Crime groups in Kyrgyzstan are operating in the legal, economic and
socio-cultural sphere.Throughout the historyofKyrgyzstan, these clan-drivengroups
are closely connected to the former Soviet organized criminal groups, operating
along-aside, in collaboration or beyond state institutions. Today the Russian mafia
operates in 47 countries of the world and in close collaboration with Kyrgyz groups
(Kofirin 2011). Fighting against these transnationally operating groups only by
adopting new national laws, acts or directives, or by freezing assets promises little
success. It is important to take complexmeasures whilst looking at the subculture and
structure of organized crime that have existed for such a long time. Consequently,
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breaking the organized crime network and destroying the nationwide functions will
be a very important step.
By 2020, the organized crime networks in Kyrgyzstan, and the post-election
turmoil and rise of OC crimes in the presidential elections had shown that there
is little fear vis-a-vis law enforcement mechanisms such as court trials or imprison-
ment. It is important to involve in this fight the civil society and awareness-raising
programs which could be a measure against the expansion of OC. They build the
foundation for social capital, and also formally collaborate with informal decision-
makers and law enforcement mechanisms such as the elders (aksakal) committee,
local families, business and other informal and formal actors.
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Chapter 8
The 2020 Violent Change in Government
in Kyrgyzstan Amid the Covid-19
Pandemic: Three Distinct Stories in One
Asel Doolotkeldieva
Abstract The day after the election night, on October 5th of 2020, several thousand
Kyrgyz citizens poured in the direction of the main square of the capital Bishkek
to denounce fraudulent elections. An estimated 1,250 people were injured, and one
young person died. This third violent change of government in Kyrgyzstan’s short
history of independence can be best understood as a combination of three distinct
stories coming together under an unprecedented external shock produced by the
coronavirus. First, a genuine citizen mobilization was triggered by the pandemic-
related economic decline and rigged elections. Second, the initial peaceful protest
was hijacked, to the surprise of the many, by a populist leader capitalizing on long-
existing societal polarization. Third, the spectacular unfolding of the intra-opposition
struggle downplays an important process of oligarchization, underlying the shaky
grounds of patronal presidentialism in pluralist systems.
Keywords Revolution 2020 · Regime change · Populism · Kyrgyzstan
8.1 Introduction
The day after the parliamentarian election night, onOctober 5, 2020, several thousand
Kyrgyz citizens poured in the direction of the main square of the capital Bishkek
to denounce fraudulent elections. After nightfall, this large peaceful protest grew
into an unexpected dramatic storming of the White House1 as police used rubber
bullets and tear gas to attempt to disperse the crowds. An estimated 1,250 people
were injured, and one young person died. In the night between the October 5 and
6, several politicians who were illegally freed from prison joined the protesters to
take advantage of the public discontent. During the week after the storming of the
White House, these forces competed among each other while President Sooronbay
Jeenbekov went missing for a few days, leaving the ruling elite in complete disarray.
1 The White House is a seat of the president and parliament of Kyrgyzstan.
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It is in these days that the former politician, Sadyr Japarov, released from prison
where he was serving a sentence since 2017 for “forcible seizure of power and
alleged kidnapping,” made forceful attempts to get the outgoing parliament to vote
for him as Prime Minister. Fearing further clashes between Japarov’s supporters and
those of the competing camp, the resuscitated President Jeenbekov decided to back
Japarov’s candidacy for Prime Minister while hoping to continue through with his
own mandate. However, on October 13th, in another unexpected turn, Jeenbekov
resigned, leaving power entirely in Japarov’s hands. This third violent change of
government in Kyrgyzstan’s short history of independence conceals more stories
than the surface suggests.
In this chapter, I will provide three distinct accounts that can best explain both
the unexpected eruption and the outcomes of the mass uprising in the fall of 2020.
First, the economic crisis provoked by the Covid-19 pandemic on the one hand,
and the dynamics of patronal politics in the dominant political machine on the
other, have generated a negative public opinion towards the ruling elite, which was
palpable prior to the parliamentary elections in October of that year. These two
crucial factors formed a combustible background against which the perceived rigged
elections served as a trigger to spark an initially peaceful mobilization. Yet, the
subsequent rise of the mid-ranked populist leader Japarov amidst other wealthier and
more established competing politicians cannot be explained fully by the immediate
context leading to the uprising. As the second account unfolds, the rise of Japarov
as an unexpected outcome of the intra-opposition struggle for power is a result of
long-fostered popular anti-establishment sentiments that have played against not
only the regime but also the established opposition. Lastly, the mass uprising and a
spectacular rise of a populist leader conceals a salient regime-oligarchy dynamic that
would destabilize Jeenbekov’s political machine in the future, independent from the
above societal and opposition developments. As this final story suggests, patronal
presidentialism was facing major challenges from within as a powerful oligarchic
group rose to contest the established sources of power thanks to money. These three
separate stories, combined in a historical conjuncture of long-rising anti-elite senti-
ments, boosted by an unprecedented external shock produced by the coronavirus,
and the rise of the power of money as an alternative to the traditional power of
the “administrative machine,” can best explain this unexpected violent change of
government.
The following analysis rests on privileged access to political actors and elites
prior, during, and after the October events. Based on the ethnographic method-
ology, I collected 30 in-depth semi-structured interviews with ordinary participants
of peaceful demonstrations and 5 members of the People’s Defence Groups; 14
elite interviews including 4 MPs, 4 members of political parties, 2 officers of the
Special Security and National Guard, 2 government officials, 2 members of the busi-
ness elite; and 3 interviews with independent journalists. Second, I have conducted
non-participant and participant observation of various protests and civil societymeet-
ings during the October events. Third, I have also conducted mass media and social
media analysis of electoral campaigns and online groups supporting various political
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forces.2 The present chapter follows the method of process-tracing that is helpful to
construct a chain of events and processes that led to and formed the October uprising
(Alexander and Bennett 2005).
8.2 Kyrgyzstan’s Mass Mobilizations and the Limits
of Patronal Presidentialism
The “October” or “Youth” Revolution3 is the third mass mobilization that resulted
in a regime’s ouster. In all of Kyrgyzstan’s uprisings, the system of “patronal presi-
dentialism” has been at the center of societal critique and opposition contestations.
Hale (2005, 2013) interpreted Kyrgyzstan’s first “Tulip Revolution” of 2005, as other
preceding “color revolutions” such as in Ukraine and Georgia, and subsequent revo-
lutions in post-Soviet countries as results of the dynamics within patronal presiden-
tialism. In his reading, revolutions are swings within the regime-elite relationships,
in which elites tend to challenge the patron if the latter is perceived as a lame duck.
Usually, patronal presidents face an intra-elite challenge in times of succession or a
significant drop in popularity.
I draw on the concept of patronal presidentialism as it offers a valid description
of political machines and one of the important sources of change located within
elite contestations in Eurasia. Indeed, despite regular changes in formal rules of the
game, patronal presidentialism remains the main logic ordering power and decision-
making. In Kyrgyzstan, despite the formally enlarged powers of political parties and
the parliament since 2010,4 political actors, inside and outside the political machine,
orient their strategies and tactics around the signals emanating from presidency.
However, if we follow Hale’s explanation of the political change, we need to
concentrate on the dynamics of elite contestations only. The model ends up over-
looking factors lying outside of the political machine, thus reducing contingency
and uncertainty inherent to any polity. Dynamics within the patronal presidentialism
prior to the October uprising do not fully fit the mechanisms of change, described
in Hale’s model. In fact, the dynamics of patronal politics were not connected to a
president’s succession phase since President Jeenbekov was only halfway through
his term and most elites had vested interests in his continuation in connection to
their own re-election into the new parliament. His removal would jeopardize signif-
icant financial investments they made in the parliamentary election. That is why the
2 I am thankful to my colleagues—NargizaMuratalieva, Elmira Nogoibaeva, Nurgul Esenamanova,
Amanda Wooden, Erica Marat, and Eugene Huskey—for thought provoking discussions and
correspondence.
3 In this chapter, I refer to revolution as a category of practice, not a category of analysis, in order
to put forward local understandings of events and usages of the term.
4 For the analysis of constitutional changes, see Fumagalli, M. (2016). Semi-presidentialism in
Kyrgyzstan. In Semi-presidentialism in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Palgrave Macmillan:
London;Huskey,E. (2007). Eurasian semi-presidentialism:Thedevelopment ofKyrgyzstan’smodel
of government. In Semi-presidentialism outside Europe: a comparative study. Routledge: London.
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uprising against patronal presidentialism was unexpected to political actors, both
inside and outside the political machine.5
Also, Hale’s model is not operational as it does not allow to know when exactly
the public perception of president’s unpopularity will tip towards the negative end.
In such highly informal systems, the presidency constantly engages in all sorts of
manipulations to retain its power. To the public andopposition, these developments do
not automatically send clear-cut messages leading to the formulation of a unanimous
public opinion. For example, the situation in which in 2017 the former president
Almazbek Atambaev sought to appoint his political heir Sooronbai Jeenbekov was
presenting an opportunity for elite contestations. The successor enjoyed only 3% of
popularity against his main contender Omurbek Babanov with 35% of popularity
prior to elections, while Atambaev himself earned quite a controversial reputation
by the end of his term with 31% only (IRI 2017). Yet, this perfect constellation did
not produce a strong public opinion that would serve the interests of the opposition
although Atambaev was later sacked by his heir. In other words, perceptions of lame-
duck syndromecanbe articulated outside of the dynamics of patronal presidentialism,
in connection to a wider context, unexpected events, latent societal processes, and
elite strategies whose outcomes might be far from intended.
In my preliminary analysis of the recent regime ouster, I seek to highlight contin-
gency and uncertainty of events as the key element of mass mobilizations in the
absence of regime repression. This approach emanates directly from the empirical
phenomenon that informs the necessity to conceptualize the elite strategies and public
opinion nexus more accurately. Such dramatic events open the door to a multitude
of public perceptions, fears, concerns, hopes and opinions, whose magnitude and
diversity are beyond the reach of elite strategies. For instance, one could hardly
anticipate that a widely popular rich businessman Omurbek Babanov would lose his
popularity under the street pressure within days. The rise of a mid-ranked former
MP, Sadyr Japarov, as a winner of the struggle, was also a complete surprise to the
many. Finally, no one expected that the regime of President Jeenbekov would fail so
quickly, just a weak after the unrest. Neither the elites nor the public could keep up
with the rapidly developing political arena of those days and weeks. Elites could only
partially adjust their strategies to a multitude of public opinions forming at different
levels of society and producing outcomes that no one had a full control of. Thus,
my account is purposefully empirical; new data keeps emerging, and the application
of standard models of explanation tends to risk closing the discussion of unfolding
dynamics at a premature stage.6 I will now turn to the discussion of these dynamics
in the following sections.
5 Interviews with members of elites, Bishkek, 2020–2021.
6 I did not, for example, include the possibility of foreign influences as theymanifested themselves in
various forms and degrees in the previous revolutions. On the foreign influences in previous revolu-
tions, see Ó Beacháin, D., & Polese, A. (2008). American boots and Russian vodka: external factors
in the colour revolutions of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Totalitarismus und Demokratie, 5(1),
87–113.
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8.3 Citizen Mobilization Against Rigged Elections Amid
the Covid-19 Pandemic and Patronal Presidentialism
Two significant factors can best explain popular indignation with Jeenbekov’s rule
which was ultimately expressed in the uprising on October 5, 2020. These include a
sharp economic decline and a negative perception of governmental management of
theCovid-19 pandemic on the one hand, and the perceived usurpation of power by the
presidential political machine in relation to the parliamentary election on the other
hand. Citizen mobilization was triggered by the incoming election results according
to which only ‘parties of power’ were accessing the parliament. In Kyrgyzstan’s
recent history, such socio-economic situations have already generatedmass uprisings
in the past. The “TulipRevolution”of 2005waspartly due to neoliberal reformswhich
created economic inequalities for the rural poor (Pelkmans 2005) and were triggered
by electoral fraud (Tucker 2007). The “April Revolution” was triggered by the energy
crisis and increased electricity tariffs, a situation that was used by ordinary people
to overthrow Bakiev’s dictatorship in April 2010 (Wooden 2014; Reeves 2010).
Although more research is needed into understanding the short and long-term
effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on Kyrgyzstan’s economy and the well-being of
ordinary families, the existing data and my fieldwork suggest that the governmental
management of the pandemic led to a negative public opinion of the authorities.
The existing data shows that the pandemic had a significant effect on people’s socio-
economic situations and consequently in the drop in confidence in the authorities and
the president. According to a recent national survey, 22% of households had at least
one member losing her job in the country or being forced to come back from abroad
due to the loss of a job there. Labor income was reduced by 37%, income from sales
of products from private plots by 16%, and remittances—by 16%.7 Another study
reveals that the levels of unemployment and labor uncertainty among labor migrants
were as high as 49% and 11%, respectively (Vesterbye et al. 2020). Every third
citizen is at the brink of poverty by the end of the first year of the pandemic (World
Bank 2021). Prior to the lockdown, the economic situation was already listed high in
people’s preoccupations. In 2019, unemployment (67%) and corruption (54%) were
highlighted by respondents as top challenges that the country faced (IRI 2019). The
economic decline has produced a significant drop of confidence in authorities. As a
social survey conducted in June 2020 (at the beginning of theCovid-19 summer peak)
demonstrates, only 40% of respondents cumulatively had “a lot of confidence” or
7 See results of the national survey “Ob itogah vyborochnogo obsledovania “Vlianie pandemii
Covid-19 na domashnie hozyastva” [Results of sample survey “The effects of Covid-19 pandemic
on households”], conducted by the National Statistics Committee in cooperation with UNICEF
during the period between 15 October and 15 November 2020. 4954 households participated in the
survey.
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“some confidence” in President Jeenbekov. Whereas in 2019, the same survey found
that 87.5% of respondents had “moderate” and “high confidence” in him.8
Grievances related to human losses and economic insecurities featured promi-
nently in my interviews with ordinary citizens who took part in the October 2020
uprising. In the interviews with the author, they reported that the pandemic has
exposed the “real nature of politicians, their corruption, irresponsibility and incom-
petence.” The pandemic mismanagement was especially highlighted by rural resi-
dents, whose economic activities depend on the openness of borders, as one source
of their indignation in the run-up to the election day: “Since March there is no work
in the village; people cannot go to Russia for work. People have nothing to occupy
themselves. Politicians left people to die but got active again before the elections. But
we saw how dirty the electoral campaign was. Since my propiska [voter registration]
is in the village, I was there during the vote. But after voting, I took a trip to Bishkek
on the same evening and was following news from here. The next day I went to the
main plaza, I knew that there would be a revolution.”9
While the Covid-19 pandemic has worsened individuals’ economic situations,
abuse of power by the ruling elite in connection to the elections and corruption was
another source of people’s anger and motivation to protest. In a 2019 survey, 92%
of respondents believed that corruption was either a “big” or “very big” problem
in the country. 72% assessed the government’s performance regarding this issue as
insufficient. Corruption perceptions have been on the rise showing 93% and 73%
respectively for the same questions in 2015; 68% thought the levels of corruption
were “high” in 2009, and 61%—in 2006 (IRI 2019). These growing perceptions are
partly linked to the increased exposure of corruption cases thanks to journalistic inves-
tigations which focused in recent years on the highest echelons of power, including
President Jeenbekovhimself. The case ofmassive corruption inside theStateCustoms
became the most scandalous example of these public scandals and a ticking bomb
for the past and present presidents. This case and the lack of response from the
authorities were mentioned repeatedly by participants of the October uprising.
In 2019, a consortium of independent mass media published a series of investi-
gations unraveling massive corruption schemes that involved the then head of the
State Customs Service, Raimbek Matraimov, whose illegal business helped him
to allegedly move $700 million out of the country (OCCRP 2019, Radio Azattyk
8 See the results of the social survey “Social and Political Impact of COVID-19 in Central Asia”
conducted by Pauline Jones, Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies at the
University of Michigan, forthcoming.
9 Interview with a local entrepreneur that runs a small guesthouse for tourists in Issik-Kul area,
Bishkek, 2020.
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2019a, Azattyk 2019b, 2020).10 These investigations did not only expose the involve-
ment of state bodies in transnational corruption schemes, but also stressed the
connectionbetweenMatraimovandPresident Jeenbekovhimself. Journalistic reports
revealed strong ties betweenMatraimov’s “customs empire” andmembers of the elite,
suggesting that corruption was covered up at the top. These publications spurred a
series of citizen protests called “ReAksia!” (Russian: ReAction) calling on authori-
ties to launch an official investigation into the case and bring Matraimov to justice
(Kloop.kg 2019, 24.kg 2019). Despite pressure coming from liberal civil society,
the president kept denying Matraimov’s involvement in corruption and even went
as far as “authorizing” his newly established party “Mekenim Kyrgyzstan” to run in
the parliamentary election. Following the election outcomes, three parties of power
including “MekenimKyrgyzstan”won 107 out 120 places thanks tomassive electoral
fraud involving the use of “administrative resources,” vote buying, and others means
(Kaktus media 2020c). The forged victory of three parties of power left popular
opposition parties such as “Butun Kyrgyzstan,” “Mekenchil,” “Chon Kazat,” and
“Ata-Meken” outside of the system. For the protesters it meant that not only their
demands were ignored but that the most controversial figure was going to receive
a mandate and most likely continue his illegal business under a newly received
immunity from prosecution.
Abuse of power by the ruling regime-oligarchy tandem and flagrant electoral
fraud featured prominently as the reasons why ordinary citizens took to the streets
onOctober 5th. In a national poll, conducted in August 2020, only 1% of respondents
stated they would vote for Matraimov’s party, 5% for the President’s party and 2%
for another party of power—“Kyrgyzstan,” if elections were held today (IRI 2020).
However, the official election results demonstrated almost 57% cumulatively for the
three parties, raising questions about the possibility of use of vote-buying prior to the
election and other electoral fraud. Many protesters expressed their distrust towards
the official election results. In interviews with the author, peaceful protesters also
stressed a continuity between this mass uprising and earlier protests of “ReAction,”
thus highlighting a year-long public struggle against corrupt patronal presidentialism:
“I took part in previous protests of “ReAction” and this time cameout to protest again.
Participation in the “ReAction” was helpful as I saw how the President covered up
for Matraimov’s corruption, how the elections were dirty and that only parties of
power got elected. These outraged me deeply in my heart.”11
By the end of the summer peak of the pandemic and prior to the election, 53% of
the Kyrgyz population thought that the country was heading in the wrong direction,
whereas 41% saw it going in the right direction. The poll shows that since 2017,
the year of Jeenbekov’s election, a decline of the positive outlook on the country’s
10 On December 9, 2020, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) designated Raim Matraimov under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability
Act “for being a foreign person who is a current or former government official responsible for
or complicit in, or directly or indirectly engaged in, corruption, including the misappropriation of
state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gain, corruption related to government
contracts or the extraction of natural resources, or bribery”.
11 Interview with a protest participant, Bishkek, 2020.
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development from 66 to 41% took place, whereas the negative outlook went up from
23 to 53%. A similar trend in the decline of the positive outlook from 63 to 28% was
observable in 2010, the year of the “April Revolution” (IRI 2020).
8.4 The “Revolutionary Situation”: Salience of Political
Ideas and Public Perceptions Amid the Mundane
Struggle for Power
While the contextualization of popular discontent clarifies the situation in which the
dominant political machine was challenged, it can hardly explain the unexpected rise
of populist Sadyr Japarov as a new national leader and his subsequent winning of
the presidential elections in January 2021. The immediate dynamics of the struggle
for power, which unfolded among numerous opposition leaders following the mass
uprising, are one element to understanding why other opposition leaders lost to
Japarov. But most importantly, the struggle outcomes were shaped, to the surprise
of competing elites, by the underlying societal cleavages manifested through protest
politics. In recent years, in the absence of genuine party programs, social protests
became important expressions of cleavages existing in Kyrgyz society. In public
discourses, these cleavages were hyperbolically framed as “liberal pro-western urban
middle class” versus the “conservative pious poor class.”Although these frameswere
constructed through years by both social and political actors, they nevertheless reflect
the growing polarization of society due to long-existing problems. Consequently,
the initial contestation of the patronal presidentialism ceased to be a mere struggle
for power and acquired a salient ideational dimension about the ways the country
should develop after Jeenbekov’s demise. Japarov’s victory and the loss of “liberal”
opposition forceswere due to these cleavage politics inwhich conservative nationalist
and religious values prevailed. Below I dissect these ideational and power struggles
that unfolded in Bishkek’s main public squares.
Labeling the October uprising as a “Youth Revolution,” foreign and domestic
media put forward young people who were angry with the results of rigged election
and corruption. The initial peaceful protest attracted citizens from all sectors of
society: liberal Bishkek urbanites, as well as the suburban poor and rural residents
who traveled from the countryside. It was a largely spontaneous, leaderless, and
chaotic mobilization comprised of either solitary individuals or groups of people
based on neighborhood and friendship.12 Protesters began assembling at the Ala-Too
plaza by noon,waiting formore news about the election outcomes and the authorities’
response. Representatives among youth activists, celebrity figures and youthwings of
political partieswere politicizing the crowd.Nomajor opposition leader had yetmade
an appearance. Closer to the evening, when opposition politicians began galvanizing
12 I discuss these dynamics more in detail in Doolotkeldieva, A. (2021a). Power and space in social
mobilizations: Preliminary thoughts about protests that led to a change of government in Kyrgyzstan
in October 2020. Central Asian Program Papers, 251.
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the crowds, a sudden call to storm the White House provoked a split in the peaceful
movement. Part of the protest crowd left themain square, disagreeingwith this violent
development, while others moved toward the White House, which is only a hundred
meters away, and began clashing with the police. Still, more protesters were joining
the evening developments, freshly arrived from the suburbs and the countryside. Cut
off from any Internet connection, their individual and group movements around the
White House andAla-Too square were chaotic and participants reported to the author
that they were not fully understanding the course of actions.
Taking advantage of this major development, supporters of opposition politicians
went to storm the Special Security’s remand prison and other prisons to illegally free
their leaders. The release of prisoners andmobilization of their supporters in the night
between October 5 and 6 might suggest that the uprising was pre-meditated, and not
spontaneous.13 Indeed, both Japarov and former president Atambaev were known
as President Jeenbekov’s opponents and both displayed in the past their potential
to deploy supporters to fight. Moreover, among the visiting protesters, Issik-Kul
residents dominated due to the geographic origins of several opposition leaders such
as the heads of “Mekenchil” and “Chon Kazat” parties. This geographic domination
might also imply the uprising’s pre-organized character. However, not all Issik-Kul
residents were supportive of these parties14 and residents from other regions were
present aswell. Also, therewere reports inmassmedia that Japarov’s supporters were
bused to, lodged at, and fed at one of the capital’s hotels (Kaktusmedia 2020b).15 This
raised questions about the authenticity of his fellowship that came in masses in the
subsequent days after the initial uprising to rally on his side. Finally, the involvement
of the so-called “sportsmen” on the side of politicians during the October events also
challenged the original image of peaceful citizen mobilization. Peaceful protesters
among ordinary citizens reported to the author that groups of “provocateurs” were
operating in the crowds, shouting out calls to storm the White House and support
different politicians. Some urban dwellers were repulsed by these fast developments,
they felt betrayed as if their democratic impulse was hijacked by “regressive forces,”
andmany retracted from the protest: “I came to the protest because I thought it would
be peaceful. I support only peaceful means because I do not want to become a tool in
someone’s hands like in the previous revolutions. I thought that the new generation
of citizens grew up to this conscious level. But our initial movement was stolen. We
lost control over the revolution…I withdrew from it when I saw the unfolding dirty
struggle.”16
13 Russian experts on Kyrgyzstan’s uprising “Protesty v Kyrgyzstane priveli k smene vlasti v
strane” [Protests in Kyrgyzstan led to the change of government in the country], October 7,
2020, https://www.golosameriki.com/a/protests-in-kyrgyzstan-led-to-a-change-of-government-in-
the-country/5611953.html, accessed 24.02.21.
14 Interviews with Issik-kul residents who have participated in the October uprising, Bishkek, 2020.
15 Sportsmen refer to young people, usually members of martial arts clubs who are frequently
mobilized by politicians in power contestations.
16 Interviewwith a protester, 28,Bishkek resident, programmanager at an international organization,
Bishkek, 2020.
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From this moment on, the line between the initial genuine popular mobilization
and organized manpower became blurred. The release of various regime opponents,
which was outside of the regime’s calculus,17 put a beginning to a fierce struggle for
power in the absence of a strong position from President Jeenbekov. The latter was
missing for several days and his press secretary stated that he was working online
(Fergana.ru 2020b).Twoopposinggroups formedaroundanationalist coalitionunder
Japarov’s leadership and a “liberal” coalition including the former Prime Minister
and oligarchOmurbekBabanov, respectively (Fergana.ru 2020a). The latter coalition
was a heterogenous group comprised of politicians and parties who were compelled
to cooperate in the face of their main competitor, Japarov. The coalition involved
liberal right-wing parties “Bir-Bol,” “Reforma,” and “Respublica” on the one hand,
the oldest political parties claiming a socialist leaning—“Ata-Meken” and “SDPK,”
and nationalist parties “Butun Kyrgyzstan” and “Zamandash” on the other hand.
Both Japarov and Babanov were competing to become Prime Minister, but Japarov
was also torpedoing the president’s mandate and pushing for a constitutional reversal
towards strong presidentialism. Babanov’s group, heterogeneous as it is, nevertheless
was united around, and differed from Japarov on, the semi-parliamentary constitu-
tional design, thus earning the public label “liberal.” While Japarov was calling his
supporters to grab power and give it, in a populist move, to the people, Babanov’s
group urged protesters to go back to legality and constitutionality. Yet, these calls
did not resonate with the majority as that very constitution failed to protect the rights
of the poor and benefited the rich only.
The temporary union of liberals proved to be too unnatural, also for the reasons
of generational splits. Youth activists from “Reforma,” “Bir-Bol” and “Ata-Meken”
parties, who were the driving force on the streets and who were seeking to repre-
sent “new politics,” were against cooperation with the old guard. The latter were
denied access to speak up, humiliated by the youth crowds, and ousted from the
public stage. Several youth leaders launched an internal competition, leading even
Tilek Toktogaziev from “Ata-Meken” party to self-pronounce as Prime Minister and
others to take over state ministries. The final blow to the union came when an inde-
cisive Babanov decided to coalesce with former president Almazbek Atambaev, by
now a highly controversial figure.18 This strategy was thought as the only viable
option to offset the rising Japarov. Disagreeing with this move, the youth wing of the
coalition condemned the union with Atambaev and launched street resistance under
the slogan “Out with the oldies!” It was their attempt to not let the old guard appro-
priate the protest movement as it happened in previous revolutions of 2005 and 2010.
As members of these youth wings reported to the author: “We did not launch this
revolution to go back to old politics, to old corrupt politicians! These party bosses
carried out strategies that were contrary to our visions and ideals. If we backed them
up, we would prove that we are no better than them and that nothing changes in our
17 Interviews with members of elites, Bishkek, 2020–2021.
18 Actually, some members of this coalition personally suffered in Atambaev’s hands. Leadership
of “Ata-Meken” party, MP Omurbek Tekebaev, had been imprisoned whereas Babanov himself was
prosecuted under late Atmabaev’s rule.
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country. We also risked losing our followers among the young generation. So, we
wanted to elect our own leader, among the youth, as a Prime Minister.”19
While the liberals were sending mixed signals to the public, exposing a severe
lack of integrity, Japarov’s group had quickly and skillfully moved to consolidate
protesters around their claims for power by framing the uprising as anti-regime and
anti-elite. A combustible mass aggregated the suburban poor, nationalist youth, and
religious conservatives, long ignored by the establishment, in his support. Japarov’s
nationalist language against the corrupt establishment has attracted multiple grass-
roots activists and associations who had been fighting against “irresponsive state”
and corrupt elites through these years.20 During these days, he managed to attract
followers with the help of populist ideas of nationalizing natural resources, giving
power to the people, punishing the rich, reaching territorial sovereignty, etc. His iden-
tity as an “ordinary guy,” a martyr, a “patriot” with a record of fighting for national
interests against global corporations distinguished him as a “true Kyrgyz” against
the liberal coalition which was associated with the rest of the corrupt establishment.
It is via his populist reference to “the people’s power” that he succeeded to pressure
on the parliament to vote him as a Prime Minister after a third attempt, to appoint
his friend to the steer the security apparatus, and to point another friend as a new
Speaker of the parliament. His meteoric rise to power would be impossible without
this early mass support which he skillfully exploited when capturing one bastion of
power after the next. As his supporters, participating in daily rallies that I observed
on the “old square,” stated: “Japarov listens to us, he is with the people. Let’s give
him a chance, let’s give him the power. He promised to clamp down on bloodsuckers
who have been stealing our money and he promised to bring natural resources to the
people’s control. I support these ideas.”21
During the week between October 6 and 13, the public squares of the capital
turned into the battle grounds of two opposing camps rallying to gain supporters and
showing strength in their attempts to grab power. The struggle grew out of control
when representatives of the liberal camp were ousted from Ala-Too square, some
of them were attacked and people allegedly close to Japarov shot at Atambaev’s
departing car (Kommersant 2020b). Facing the risk of destabilization, President
Jeenbekov sought to negotiate his own stay in power by granting legitimacy to one
of these camps. The choice was not complicated: his lasting rivalry with Atambaev,
whom he sacked and imprisoned after being brought to power by him, determined
his option for Sadyr Japarov.22 Russian President Vladimir Putin’s deputy head of
administration, Dimitry Kosak, flew personally to Bishkek in order to seal the deal
19 Interview with a youth activist close to “Ata-Meken” party, Bishkek, 2020.
20 I discuss the rise of nationalist populism amid violent change of government in October 2020
more in detail in Doolotkeldieva, A. (2021b). Populism à la Kyrgyz: Sadyr Japarov, nationalism,
and anti-elite sentiment in Kyrgyzstan. Illiberalism Studies Program Working Papers, 4.
21 Short discussions with a dozen ordinary citizens who participated in rallies in support of Japarov
during the October events, Bishkek, 2020.
22 What is interesting is that the liberals did not seek Jeenbekov’s ouster as they saw in him a
counterbalance to Jaaparov. It was feared that his removal could lead to a major destabilization
along the North/South cleavage and ethnic clashes like in the aftermath of the ‘April Revolution’
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between the president and the newcomer Japarov (Kommersant 2020a). However,
neither the president nor the Russians expected that the group they had helped to
legitimize would breach the agreement soon after and force him to resign.
While initially, the protesters had only demanded the annulation of election
results, Jeenbekov’s removal was unexpected and suspicious. This development
plunged the country into uncertainty about the future and possibleworrisome involve-
ment of organized crime as several members of parliament, journalists, and public
figures hinted at pressure exerted by criminals (Kaktus media 2020a).23 Having the
majority of elite loyalty and international backing, President Jeenbekov could have,
perhaps, avoided his deposing by swiftly conceding to protesters’ initial demands
and acknowledging the electoral fraud. Without popular mobilization, the street
opposition would not have been able to contest the regime.
Theweek inwhich the liberals and the populist Japarov fought for powerwas deci-
sive for the outcome of the uprising and, if not for the strategic mistakes committed
by the liberals, Omurbek Babanov stood a real chance to take over as he was twice as
popular (16%) as Sadyr Japarov (8%) in August 2020.24 Babanov’s alliance with the
old guard and the lack of a political vision repulsed the young generation who sought
to depart from old politics. The latter’s withdrawal demonstrated the strength of anti-
elite moods in society across classes and the urban/rural divide. Yet while united
in anti-establishment sentiments, the initial cross-class and cross-cleavage move-
ment got quickly splintered into divergent visions of politics that formed along more
nationalist and more liberal values. Gabdulkhakov (2020) interpreted this confronta-
tion as a civilizational clash between “the progressives and the orcs” following
public discourses in Kyrgyzstan’s social media and Ismailbekova (2020) saw in
them a generational split. During this week, societal polarization indeed took on the
following divides: language (Russophone vs. Kyrgyz), liberal versus conservative
values, secular versus religious beliefs, cosmopolitan versus nationalist views, and
poor versus middle-class division. Thus, the minority Russophone urbanites rallied
around the liberal forces and the conservative majority of the working class and the
poor—around Japarov. This polarization was decisive for Sadyr Japarov’s victory.
Once President Jeenbekov was removed, the Kyrgyz establishment closed ranks
behind the future President Sadyr Japarov, allowing him a fast capture of the state
in the run-up to the presidential elections. This story is a culmination of increasing
societal inequalities and rising nationalism as a response to the former, which in
the absence of true political representation and left-wing programs became mani-
fested via protest-making. It also shows that money did not guarantee the country’s
of 2010. Interviews with representatives of “Reforma” and “Ata-Meken” political parties, Bishkek,
2020.
23 On the role of mafia in previous revolutions see Kupatadze, A. (2015). Political corruption in
Eurasia: Understanding collusion between states, organized crise and business. Theoretical Crimi-
nology, 19 (2), 198–215; Marat, E. (2006). The state-crime nexus in Central Asia: State weakness,
organized crime, and corruption in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute &
Silk Road Studies Program.
24 His popularity fell to 3% in contrast to Japarov’s 51% in December 2020. See https://www.iri.
org/sites/default/files/iri_kyrgyzstan_poll_dec_2020_eng.pdf, accessed 31.01.21.
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richest and well-established politicians Atambaev and Babanov popular support and
following. Their dramatic fallout with protesters exposed an acute crisis of authentic
figures to an extent that the population was ready to entrust a former inmate with
more credit than the old guard. However, what this spectacular street struggle hides
is the third story of an internal regime-oligarchy dynamic which in all probability
would have shaken the regime stability in the near future.
8.5 Parliamentary Coup in the Making: Regime Versus
Oligarchy?
Kyrgyzstan’s political system has been an oligarchy to the extent that family-type
kleptocracies exercised minority power with a varying degree of inclusion of regime
cronies. With the shift to an emerging party system in 2010, it can be assumed
that this minority power became accessible to wider circles of the country’s richest
citizens. Research in Eurasia accounts for changing regime-oligarchy relationships
as an important dynamic for regime stability (Guriev and Rachinsky 2005; Junisbai
2010). I contend that this critical dynamic was present in the last year of Jeenbekov’s
rule, but the disruption of his political machine by the mass uprising prevented
its full unfolding. In this section, I return to the changing nature of the patronal
presidentialism under increased pluralism, which includes further oligarchic power.
It seems worth expanding on the ways the co-existence of a pluralistic system with
an oligarchy can shift the balance towards the latter’s bigger influence.25
Oligarchization of Kyrgyz politics began in the 1990s and was part of the state-
building processes (Radnitz 2010) leading further to the rise of a rentier class
(Sanghera and Satybaldieva 2020). Previous research indicates how family kleptoc-
racies and their cronies tapped into the state resources to enrich themselves (Cooley
and Heathershaw 2017; Nakaya 2009; Doolotkeldieva and Heathershaw 2015), and
how the state served as an “investment market” to generate direct rents (Engvall
2016). Further research is required to investigate the ongoing oligarchization of poli-
tics, but a preliminary observation suggests that the emergent party system added
new possibilities for the richest class to influence policies and informal decisions
favorable to their interests. This observation accounts for the ways political parties
used their constitutionally increased powers to form the government and potentially
tap into the state ministries as a resource. However, to participate in highly competi-
tive parliamentary elections, parties faced an acute problem of funding. Sponsorship
by businessmen/oligarchs became the sine qua non tomanaging electoral campaigns.
This was practically done by selling seats in closed electoral party lists, with the first
top ten to twenty seats worth between 500 thousand and amillion dollars in a country
with only an $8.5 billion GDP (Current time 2019). The monetization of the elec-
toral party lists led to an increased number of rich people either directly elected to
25 For an account of oligarchy as a global historical norm see Winters, J. (2012). Oligarchy.
Cambridge University Press.
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the parliament (Ukushov 2017) or informally exerting influence on party bosses via
funding. For example, the notoriousMatraimov brothers, one of whomwas elected to
the parliament in 2015 inside the then-PresidentAtambaev’s party, allegedly financed
the electoral campaigns of several political parties (Gezitter.org 2019; Vb.kg 2019),
the presidential campaign of Jeenbekov in 2017, and even Japarov’s recent presiden-
tial campaign (Kloop.kg 2020b). These insights were covered in the press but also
claimed in the interviews with members of the elite.26
Employing their new constitutional powers, the parliamentary groups appointed
theirministers and, in this way, “divided” the state among themselves (Engvall 2013).
Oligarchs who had entered this system began employing their access to the state to
return their prior investments in the elections. However, Jeenbekov’s regime had
allowed for a degree of incorporation of oligarchs into the state system that became a
risk for regime stability. Elite interviews suggest that he was in a much more depen-
dent position vis-à-vis oligarchy than the previous presidents. Because Matraimov,
also known as “Raim-million,” allegedly financed his electoral campaign in 2017,
Jeenbekov could not succumb to public pressures and look into Matraimov’s corrup-
tion case. Due to this relationship of dependency, he also allowed Matraimov’s party
to run in the parliamentary election and win.
However, Matraimovs’ great potential to buy off votes27 in the run-up to elec-
tions and their rising authority among members of parliament provoked fears in
Jeenbekov’s entourage. The president’s brother, MP Asylbek Jeenbekov, was partic-
ularly warry that Matraimov’s party would outbid the presidential party “Birimdik”
and be granted the right to form the government. Enjoying the loyalty of a comfort-
able majority of MPs, this situation could lead to a parliamentary coup.28 Asylbek
Jeenbekov’s concerns were attached toMatraimovs rising authority among the elites.
By relying on the power of money, they succeeded in placing their people inside the
state security apparatus, law enforcement, and the courts. They used access to the
state to also disburse resources to their clients among the elites. By getting things
done for them, they earned the reputation of effective doers in contrast to the “unde-
cisive” and “slow” president Jeenbekov. As oneMP claimed, “President Jeenbekov’s
favourite method was deception. He would promise to fix your issue but would never
do it in reality. Matraimovs, on the contrary, have always fulfilled their promises.
They had loyal people placed everywhere: in the police, courts, regulatory bodies.
Our deputies realized that Matraimovs’ power was far-reaching and more efficient.
Turning to them, rather to the president, was a guarantee of a successful resolution
of your business.”29
26 Interviews with four MPs, Bishkek, 2020.
27 According to the Central Election Commission, Matraimov’s “Mekenim Kyrgyzstan” party has
officially spent $1,659,000 for its electoral campaign making it the richest runner. Figures in U.S.
dollars are approximate due to dramatic fluctuations in the exchange rate. See Kloop.kg (2020).
Odnim grafikom: Skol’ko partii potratili na Vybory-2020 [online]. Available at: https://kloop.kg/
blog/2020/10/04/odnim-grafikom-skolko-partii-potratili-na-vybory-2020/. Accessed February 17,
2021.
28 Informal interviews with members of parliament, Bishkek, 2020.
29 Interview with a member of parliament, Bishkek, 2020.
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By summer 2020, the Matraimov brothers succeeded in co-opting a significant
part of the elites by incorporating them into their electoral party list. According to
an informant inside the government, MPs were competing among each other for a
seat on the list due to the high chances of this party’s electoral success. Although the
electoral lists of all “parties of power,” including theMatraimov’s, was initially coor-
dinated by the president, the growing competition between the president’s brother
and theMatraimovs led to amore chaotic electoral technology than traditionally. The
competition caused confusion among the elites about the locus of decision-making.
As one MP claims, “In spring 2020, deputies were confused about which party to
join. Joining Matraimov’s party was lucrative but that would entail a risk of falling
out with the president. Deputies were confused as to who takes a decision about the
future composition of elites and were afraid of making wrong movements. Everyone
was expecting the election day to see the culmination of this internal fight.”30
Indeed, as the electoral outcomes of the October elections show, the Matraimov’s
party was just 0.71% behind the presidential party “Birimdik,” if one can trust at
all these official results after reported frauds.31 This electoral outcome, perhaps,
validates Jeenbekov’s concerns about the rising challenge from the oligarchy. It is,
of course, in the domain of speculation to ask what would happen to regime stability
withMatraimovs coming just under 1% behind the presidential party. But this case is
useful in showing how the emergent party system has provided additional avenues for
the rich people to influence politics in the absence of a robust system of checks and
balances and weak state institutions. Time will show whether the suspicions hinting
at Matraimov’s possible financing of the new president’s presidential campaign are
false or true, as it would mean the continuous influence of oligarchy on Japarov’s
patronal presidentialism.
8.6 Conclusion
The violent change of government in Kyrgyzstan in October 2020 can be best under-
stood as a combination of three distinct stories coming together under an unprece-
dented external shock produced by the coronavirus. First, a genuine citizenmobiliza-
tion was triggered by the pandemic-related economic decline and rigged elections.
Second, the initial peaceful protest was hijacked, to the surprise of the many, by a
populist leader capitalizing on long-existing societal polarization. Third, the spec-
tacular unfolding of the intra-opposition struggle downplays an important process of
oligarchization, underlying the shaky grounds of patronal presidentialism in pluralist
systems. This last development has exactly led Sadyr Japarov to initiate, in a populist
move, a constitutional reversal to strong presidentialism and away from pluralism.
At the time of writing this paper, a referendum was scheduled to vote for a new
30 Interview with a member of parliament, Bishkek.
31 Officialwebsite of the StateCommission for Elections: https://newess.shailoo.gov.kg/ru/election/
11098/ballot-count?type=NW_ROOT.
172 A. Doolotkeldieva
constitution in which the president becomes the head of the executive, with no rules
governing the electoral systempublicly available and a reduced role of the parliament.
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Chapter 9
Identity and Power—The Discursive
Transformation of the Former Islamic
Revival Party of Tajikistan
Dastan Aleef
Abstract The former Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) underwent a polit-
ical transformation from an Islamist organization, partly responsible for armedmobi-
lizations during the Civil War in Tajikistan (1992–1997), to a moderate and arguably
democratic party from the early 2000s until 2015. The party defined and redefined
its identity to fit both Islamic and secular democratic narratives. This research traced
the evolution of the IRPT’s identity in light of critical events such as the change in
leadership in 2006, and the Arab Spring. A discourse analysis of the IRPT’s main
communication channel, Najot, from 2008 to 2015 has been conducted, which found
three themes where strong articulations about identity were made: secularism, the
CivilWar, and the IslamicWorld. First, they challenged the core legislation regulating
the triangular relationship of state, society, and religion; they justified political Islam;
and they criticized what they called “secular extremism.” Second, the party produced
a counter-narrative of Civil War actors and actions to that of the state. Third, they
expressed solidarity with legal and controversial Islamic parties elsewhere, such as
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, or the Palestinian Hamas. This paper has found
that the IRPT’s ideological transformation was limited due to the remaining Islamist
elements in their discourse and the lack of clarity on the compatibility between
Islamic and secular democratic programs.
Keywords Islam · Secularism · Democracy · IRPT · Tajikistan · Political
opposition
9.1 Introduction
The former IslamicRevival Party ofTajikistan (IRPT)was the only legal Islamic party
in Central Asia. Its origins, historical development, and banishment in 2015 have
marked a number of conflicting ideas and events which drew the attention of regional
and international policy experts and academics. Born in 1973 as a small-circle “puri-
tan” movement of religious Tajiks, it underwent stages of identity reconstruction.
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The movement entered a stage of explicit politicization in the 1980s, opposing the
Soviet regime’s policies on Islamic grounds, and had a decisive part in the creation
of an All-Union Islamic Party in June 1990. At these three critical junctures, the
movement was neither violent nor democratic. They were officially recognized as
a political party in 1991 and re-excluded in 1993, which was the beginning of the
party’s radicalization in rhetoric and practice. From re-inclusion in 1997 until 2015,
the party embarked on its path towards constructing a democratic identity “based on
an Islamic ideology” [dar zaminai aqidai Islomı̄].1
Furthermore, the IRPT is often reported in English-language academic discourses
to have been a non-violent, democratic, and even liberal party (Freedman 1996, 221;
Karagiannis 2006, 13; Heathershaw 2007, 200–201; Khalid 2007, 99–152; Yilmaz
2009, 142; Atkin 2012, 263; Epkenhans 2015; Lemon 2016, 268). This chapter
explores such taken-for-granted assumptions, which in my view are informed by
common disapproval of the Tajik state’s authoritarian ways which makes any oppo-
sitional voice seem benign. The research question of the chapter is about whether
the IRPT moderation was merely tactical, that is, moderation in the means of imple-
menting an Islamist agenda, or ideological, that is, moderation in the values and ends
pursued, namely democratic governance. The argument is that the Islamic Revival
Party of Tajikistan transformed from an Islamist party into a moderate party only
as a political strategy, rather than an ideological commitment, as evident from their
political discourse.
9.2 Formation and Politicization in Late Soviet Era:
1973–1990
The proto-IRP was born in the rural areas of Qarotegin and the Vakhsh Valley of
Tajikistan, among people rejecting the mainstream Soviet lifestyle who sought to
reestablish the normative and practical appeal of Islam within Tajik society starting
from themid-1970s. The founders of what was later called “Revival of Islamic Youth
of Tajikistan” (Nahzati Javononi Islomii Tojikiston) articulated the following three
central concerns of themovement: (1) the reintroduction of Islamic culture and teach-
ings to people; (2) the fight against novelties and superstition gaining popularity; and
(3)CommandingRight andForbiddingWrong in public (Epkenhans 2015, 324–327).
Domestic religious upbringing, underground religious instruction, and observance
of religious rites are considered apolitical expressions of Islam in Tajik society by
scholars like Muriel Atkin (1989: 609–12).
Indeed, almost all the members of the party, especially the older generation, recall
networking in underground religious circles led by the prominent unofficial mullahs
and teachers [ustodon] of the time (Orzu 2013). The discourse of contention at the
beginning was between the then-young activists and established ulamo (scholars)
1 Fišorhoi afzoyanda boloi nahzatiho (Increasing pressure over Nahzat members), Najot, 36 (753),
5 September, 2013, p. 9.
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andmullahs and revolved around the “correct” practice of religion.More specifically,
Said Abdullohi Nuri (1947–2006)—one of the Muslim activists at the time and later
the founder of the current Islamic Revival Party—and some other activists spoke
against rituals they called “innovations” (bid’atho) like costly funerals and shrine
visitations, which “traditionally minded” Muslim clerks, ironically one might say,
were accused of embracing and promoting among ordinary followers (Epkenhans
2016, 188–189). A seemingly apolitical issue quickly escalated into “hot” disputes
which later came to be associated with the Salafiyya movement.2
The politicization of the movement was especially visible in the 1985–1990
period, when the government authorities, particularly and critically the KGB, media,
and generally the public discourse began to dub such increasingly vocal activists
as “extremist,” “fundamentalist,” “Wahhabi” and so on (Bennigsen 1988, 780). The
concern was that they were instigating “Muslim nationalism” (Ibid). S. Nuri had “his
public preaching centered on one idea: the creation on the territory of Tajikistan of
an independent Islamic republic” (as quoted in Bennigsen 1988, 779).
The politicization was also associated with increased exposure of Soviet Central
AsianMuslims to their “Afghan brethren” [barodaroni afghon] either through under-
surveilled information exchange or through the direct Soviet invasion inAfghanistan,
whereby some defected to the neighboring country (Orzu 2013, 63; Bennigsen and
Broxup 2011, 112–114, Yemelianova and Salmorbekova 2010, 217). More impor-
tantly, in fact, the first members of the Revival Movement acknowledge that the
use of literature authored by (in)famous Islamists such as Hasan al-Bannā, Sayyed
Qotb, al-Ghazali, Abu’l-↪Alā Mawdudi, Muhammad Iqbal, etc., contributed to the
politicization of Islam and the Muslim awakening in Central Asia (Orzu 2013, 207).
Except Rahmatulla Alloma—one of the two widest renowned Islamic teachers
in the USSR and the author of the tract describing an ideal Muslim country enti-
tled Musulmonobod (“Muslimland”)—it was the disciples who had shown the first
signs of active involvement in politics and political activism (Khalid 2014, 146).
Interestingly, Revival activists referred to one another as “ikhwan,” in imitation of
the Egyptian Ikhwan’ul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood), whose political influence
was particularly noted (Orzu 2013, 207). Thus, in a raid campaign of 22 June 1986
in Dushanbe and districts of the Vakhsh valley, 40 Islamic Revival activists were
detained (TajInfo, n.d.). The leader of the movement and a fellow disciple—Said
Nuri—was imprisoned in 1986 for opposing the Soviet system (Epkenhans 2011,
85). Moreover, some Tajik Muslim leaders and their followers were arrested for
advocating hostile attitudes, even “a holy war,” against the Moscow center for their
“oppressive rule” (Haghayeghi 1994, 250).
However, after decades of extreme repression, the relative increase in religious
freedom associated with glasnost and perestroika policies of Gorbachev enabled the
like-minded Muslims (revivalists) of the Soviet Union to finally hold a conference
2 Followers of the Salafiyya (which was banned in Tajikistan in January 2009) want to return to an
idealized early-Islamic community (umma)of the era of theProphetMuhammadandhis companions
(the salaf salih) and therefore consider only Koran and hadith as relevant sources. Reports suggest
that the Salafiyya is a network of like-minded Muslim activists without a distinct organizational
structure.
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in Astrakhan in June 1990 to institutionalize an all-Union Islamic Party, despite
opposition by official clerics like Turajonzoda who did not favor the politicization of
Islam (Akiner 2001, 8). The All-Union IRP was mainly made up of North Chechens,
Ingush, Tatars, and Central Asians. The Charter of the All-Union IRP set Muslim
awakening “with the purpose of implementing Qur’anic and Sunnah precepts in life”
as its founding goal (Orzu 2013, 439). In sum, the Tajik Islamic RevivalMovement of
the late 1970s and 1980s was an exclusive club of religious individuals who mainly
concerned themselves withMuslim emancipation. They did not have a clear strategy,
but they did have a political Other—the “godless,” “anti-Muslim” Soviet state.
9.3 Independence and Civil War: 1990–1997
Upon return from Astrakhan, the Tajik revivalists asked for permission from the
government to officially establish the IRPT in October 1990. The application was
rejected on the grounds of its religious orientation. They nonetheless held an unof-
ficial local congress in Chortut near Dushanbe, with the attendance of 500 local
members, which is said to have been the determining factor in the party’s official
recognition in October 1991 (Shapoatov 2004, 53–54). In those years, the party led
a base of over 10,000 active, and over 20,000 passive followers, with a subsequent
engagement in armed conflicts against government forces who mainly represented
Kulyab and Leninabad provinces of Tajikistan (Yemelianova and Salmorbekova
2010, 220–21). In the early 1990s, the IRPT leaders would enter the struggle for
power by accusing their opponents of being the “old Communist apparatchiks with
a new democratic façade,” while declaring their own commitment to the “electoral
route to power” (Haghayeghi 1994, 254). On 26 October 1991, the first official IRPT
congress was held, where 650 delegates and 310 guests took part and the IRPT
program and charter were adopted (Bushkov and Mikulski 1996).
As early as in 1990–1991, anti-Soviet, revisionist, and nationalist sentiments
swept acrossTajikistan, demanding the dissolutionof the nomenklatura government.3
The coalesced opposition (UTO) comprised of theDemocratic Party of Tajikistan, the
IRPT, Rastokhez (Renaissance), and La’li Badakhshon (Ruby of Badakhshan) first
proposed for the country’s first Islamic authority, Hojiakbar Turajonzoda, to run for
presidency, which he refused. They then nominated a Pamir-born cinematographer
and human rights activist Davlat Khudonazarov in the November 1991 presiden-
tial elections, which he lost (Akbarzadeh 1996, 1110–11). The opposition forces
suffered from several irreconcilable ideological elements: the minority Ismailis vis-
à-vis majority Sunnis; self-styledmullos in favor of a Shari’a-based Islamic state vis-
à-vis proponents of “church-state separation” with the maintenance of the “Islamic
character of Tajik society” like Turajonzoda; nationalist members like DPT and
3 Nomenklatura refers to the Soviet ruling elites, who belonged to the Communist Party. Here—the
informal political elites-successors of the Soviet government. For examples of usage, see: Fredholm
2006, 17; Foster 2015, 353–54; Epkenhans 2018, 200.
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Rastokhez vis-à-vis “Islamo-nationalists” like the IRPT itself (Akbarzadeh 1996,
1119–21). However, the view that the party was a “powerful fundamentalist mili-
tant group,” that attempted to Islamize the Tajik state and society prevailed anyway
(Epkenhans 2010, 329).
In May 1992, members of the opposition forces—Islamists and pro-democratic
activists—managed to board the first coalition government, which formed after the
period of protests and lasted until two months after the ousting of President Rahmon
Nabiev on September 7, 1992 (Zainiddinov 2012, 460). In December 1992, Popular
Front forces defeated the coalition government, brought President Rahmon to power,
and banned the IRPT in 1993 (Ibid, 460). Excluded, more radicalized Islamist mili-
tary leaders declared Gharm Valley, where the majority of Islamists came from, an
“Islamic Republic” (Rahnamo 2008, 123). Some commanders enforced an Islamic
order in their narrow districts, prohibiting weddings, music and dance, alcohol
drinking, and punishing acts of disobedience, such as not wearing hijab (Seifert
2005, 20–22).
After the ban on the IRPT in early 1993, the majority of opposition forces fled to
neighboringAfghanistanwhere they established theMovement for IslamicRevival in
Tajikistan (MIRT) headed by SaidAbdullahNuri and his deputies—Turajonzoda and
Himmatzoda, as well as the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) which included the non-
religious opposition groups, also chaired by Nuri (Shapoatov 2004, 55). The intra-
Tajik war was reinterpreted by Tajik Islamists, primarily byNuri, to be a war between
Muslims in Dor-ul-Islam (Land of Islam—Afghanistan), who sought to establish
an Islamic state, and non-Muslims in Dor-ul-Kufr (Land of Unbelief—Tajikistan)
(Kalonov 2020, 79–80). Among the atrocities committed by IRPT commanders
in Tajikistan, mavlavi Abdurahim Karim’s 1993 attack on Border Post 13, which
resulted in the deaths of 25 Russian border guards, is an example (Epkenhans 2018,
213).
Since the movement was not a homogenous movement, there were atrocities
committed by its affiliates in the name of Islam, alongside moderate declarations
by the leadership in Afghanistan. Rahmon Sanginov, a self-styled “Hitler,” was
one of the UTO warlords leading a force of around 150 fighters, with a record
of over 400 serious crimes, including 270 murders perpetrated by his followers
(Nourzhanov 2005, 127). He was also reported to have banned alcohol, enforced
gender-segregated schooling, and introduced corporal punishment. Furthermore, the
Islamists had an 8000-strong militia force outside Dushanbe, some of whom were
armed by Afghanistan’s Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and Ahmad Shah Masoud and who
facilitated the use of the north of Afghanistan as a launchpad for incursions (Rashid
1994, 159, 167, 177; Heathershaw 2009, 30). The leaders of the IRPT at the time—
Himmatzoda and Nuri—however, sought to diminish the responsibility of the party
leadership for the violent atrocities committed by its affiliate field commanders by
conceding that they did not have control over those militias, while the party identity
was tainted ever after due to its cooperation with Afghan Islamists (Epkenhans 2018,
207–8).
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9.4 Post-Conflict IRPT: 1997–2015
The third stage in the discursive evolution of the IRPT began after the signing of
the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Unity Accord in
Tajikistan in 1997. Under the provisions of the agreement, The United Tajik Oppo-
sition, comprised mainly of IRPT members, was allocated a third of the Parliament
seats and government positions (Heathershaw 2009, 33). Its leadership, including
Nuri himself, became more moderate, advocating a nonviolent Islamism that was
compatible with democracy, and participating in the elections of the country as any
other “worldly” political party.
The party was again officially registered in 1999, and its new charter no longer
suggested that Tajikistan should move in the direction of becoming an Islamic state,
instead of aiming at the “development of Islamic, national and human values in
the Tajik society” and loosely mentioning that the “application of Islamic philoso-
phy…can become the basis for the strengthening of state foundation andmaintenance
of peace and unity” (as quoted in Karagiannis 2006, 12). Kabiri—deputy chairman
at the time—proclaimed that their ultimate goal was “to create a free, democratic,
and secular state” (as quoted in Collins 2007, 88).
Already in 1999, the party lost considerable popular support. According to the
independent surveys of the time, only 6% of the populace trusted S. Nuri, and a
mere 0.6%—his deputy, M. Himmatzoda (Collins 2007, 85–86). In the presidential
elections of 1999, the IRPT nominee received 2% of the vote due both to popular
mistrust and electoral fraud. In the parliamentary elections of 2000 and 2005, it won
two seats respectively, while withdrawing from running in the presidential elections
of 2006 altogether (Ibid, 86).
In 2006, Said A. Nuri passed away, leaving space for internal rifts in the party
between conservative, “old-generation” members and young, pro-democracy politi-
cians like Muhiddin Kabiri (Karagiannis 2006, 14–16). According to IRPT reports,
Kabiri was elected by the majority in the party, even though the late Nuri had
already vouched for his candidacy. The new leader differed from traditional high-
ranking members in his interpretation of religion and his politics. He was moder-
ately disposed, pragmatic above all, with a secular education and good knowledge
of Russian and English.
Since then, the IRPT has expanded both territorially and demographically. It
opened branches all over the country and attracted youth aged below 30, and reached
25,221 members by 2007 (Rahnamo 2008, 74–75). There has been no registered
violence on the part of the IRPT, especially having faced electoral fraud, since the
signing of the peace accord in 1997—a conscious development referred to by Kabiri
as “the path of tolerance and restraint” (Khamidova 2016). For example, the party
took part in the elections of 1999, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015, boycotted the 2006
presidential elections, and supported the candidacy of a female secularist human
rights lawyer, Oynihol Bobonazarova, for president in 2013 (Lenz-Raymann 2014,
94–95). In none of these did they resort to violence in response to the rigging of
results in favor of the ruling People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan.
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The aftermath of the parliamentary elections of 2010 was a turning point in the
IRPT’s identity building. The party apparently expected to receive at least 20–25%
of the vote, only to be “shocked” by being granted merely 8.2% (Kabiri 2016, 9–
10). With a mass of IRPT followers gathered at its headquarters demanding public
protests, itwasKabiri’s call.Having received threats ofmilitary retaliation by security
authorities in case of a protest, he had to call off any public demonstrations and
effectively make peace with the results, in an effort to prevent a violent outcome
(Roche 2019, 75–76).
Following the 2011–2012 events of the Arab Spring, the rise of radicalization
in the Muslim World, and the emergence of ISIS, the Tajik government became
more wary of the presence of an Islamic party in the country. Thus, they introduced
stricter control over the religious sphere and embarked on a discreditation campaign
against the party, linking it to terrorist cells elsewhere. In March 2012, a classi-
fied, allegedly government security document, “Protocol 32–20,” was leaked, which
contained strict law enforcement measures against the IRPT. Among others, in para-
graph 2, it instructed security officers (Committee of National Security, Ministry of
Interior, Committee of Religious Affairs and local governments) to keep watch over
the party members, particularly the leaders; determine its “propaganda methods”;
and divert members and potential members away from it (TajInfo 2012). Paragraph
3 calls attention to the concerning increase in membership rates of women in the
party. In paragraph 6, an order is issued to “prepare and publish materials exposing
IRPT leaders’ and activists’ illegal activities in mass media” (Ibid).
On the eve of the 2013 presidential elections, the IRPT came up with the initiative
of proposing a mutual candidate on their own and social-democrats’ behalf, and
Oynihol Bobonazarova was chosen to be the one. According to the Central Electoral
Committee, she received 201,236 signatures out of 210,000 necessary to pass the 5%
threshold, while the “little-known, pocket parties” managed to pass and ballot (BBC
2013). The IRPT and independent observers still managed to criticize the electoral
proceedings, namely the disproportion between the number of actual voters and the
minimum threshold, the scarcity of polling stations for the roughly 1.5 million Tajik
population in Russia at the time (labor migrants and otherwise), the lack of time for
signature collections (50 days) and other bureaucratic obstacles (Ibid).
In the March 2015 parliamentary elections, the results showed that the party
failed to pass the 5% threshold to gain any seats in the Lower House of the Parliament
[Majlisi Namoyandagon] (Epkenhans 2015, 321). Thus, the party was finally banned
as a terrorist-extremist organization, with its leading members either jailed or in
exile. Now, what remains of the party is some of its leading members dispersed
abroad as political refugees. They have been formally aligned with other foreign-
based opposition groups like “Group 24” (Guruhi 24), in what culminated in the
establishment of the National Alliance of Tajikistan (PMT) in Warsaw in 2018,
chaired byMuhiddin Kabiri (RFE/RL’s Tajik Service 2019). As for the IRPT agenda
post-2015, Kabiri’s response was the following: “Whatever plans, ideas, and views
we had prior to 2015 remained there. The crackdown on the party, migration and all
the events of the past 5 years, despite all their tragedy, have a positive side. We can
182 D. Aleef
[now] propose to our nation and country a new plan that takes into account the past
experience without being chained to it (Payom.net 2020).”
9.5 The IRPT Discourse on Secularism
The IRPT members of Parliament (MPs)—Muhiddin Kabiri and Muhammadsharif
Himmatzoda, later replaced by Sayidumar Husayni—were active in debating the
legislature on religion and religious associations. They had proposed the law “On
the Freedom of Faith and Religious Associations” in February 2008 for Parliament
review and in the annulment of the December 1994 law “On Religion and Reli-
gious Associations” (Epkenhans 2009, 98).4 However, it was rejected in favor of the
government-proposed law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations,”
which was adopted on 26March 2009. The party members had particular issues with
the bureaucratic obstacles created by the force of law such as officially registered
religious institutions having the sole permission for public preaching (paragraph 9,
article 4).5 Article 5 stipulates that the state does not interfere “into the activities of
religious associations, except as provided by the legislation,” which raised concerns
in the IRPT ranks.6 By now, we can infer that the party’s definition of secularism
involved ideological autonomy for religious institutions, includingmadrasas (Islamic
schools). The party draft was also more liberal than its government counterpart on
matters of religious minorities and public worship. It had a separate article (10)
devoted to churches, monasteries, synagogues, and missionaries, granting them the
freedom to establish religious associations if they had at least 50 followers.7 As for
worship in public institutions, the IRPT proposal leaves it up to citizens [šahrvandon]
to establish worship sites in any institution, including military units and universities.
In contrast, article 20, paragraph 4 of the adopted law states that “religious asso-
ciations have the right to make suggestions” for worship in hospitals, dispensaries,
nursery houses, places of detention and imprisonment (emphasis added).8 In other
words, the party proposal would reduce the role of the government in administering
religion.
In IRPT’s definition, the core assumption of secularism—the separation of church
and state—is false. The publication repeatedly discussed the inherence of politics
in Islam, calling it a “religion of politics” that represents “a complete system to
4 Loihai Qonuni Ǧumhurii Toǧikiston «Dar Borai Ozodii E’tiqod va Ittihodiyahoi Dinı̄» (Proposal
of the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On the Freedom of Faith and Religious Associations),
Najot, 7 (464), 14 February, 2008, pp. 2–3.
5 Qonuni Navi Din ba Talaboti E’tiqodii Mardum Ǧavobgū Nest?! (The New Religion Law Not
Suitable To People’s Spiritual Demands?!), Najot, 16 (525), 16 April 2009, pp. 4–5.
6 Emphasis added.
7 Law Proposal, Najot, 14 February 2008, p. 2.
8 Law on Freedom of Conscience, 26 March 2009.
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govern social, cultural, and economic life.”9 As such, they saw Hanafi Islam as
containing political principles closest to the Tajik culture, [durust va sozgorand], and
thus publicly supported the alignment of Tajik politics with Hanafi teachings.10 In
another interview with Hikmatullo Sayfullohzoda, a member of the IRPT board and
editor of Najot, the question of public promotion of Islam was raised. It was often
assumed by pro-government critics that the party’s role was merely promoting Islam
as a cultural legacy in the public space, so when the government declared 2009 as
a commemorative year of Abu Hanifa (the founder of Hanafi law school in Sunni
Islam) along with a series of events, it was meant as a counter-hegemonic move
against the IRPT (Nozimova and Epkenhans 2019, 138). In response, Sayfullohzoda
rejected such a “reductionist” view of the party by reminding that it was primarily a
political organization with an Islamic ideology [aqidai Islomı̄].11 On a related note,
the IRPT used to consider proselytization of other faiths as a “threat to national
unity,” as stated in a newspaper report from 2008.12 So, in some ways, the IRPT’s
secular project was a polar opposite of “assertive secularism” (removal of religion
from public space) practiced by the state, while in others, it strangely resembled the
state in its monocultural Islamic narrative.
The party’s vision of secularism did not include moral neutrality. In fact, on
various occasions the party members and its close affiliates were quick to employ
“judgmental” language regarding female clothing, public expressions of impropriety,
the media and so on. For example, in an article about public morality, the author
regrettingly states that “it would be better if the police were active in preventing
young women’s night walks [šabgardii duxtaron]…,” complaining about alleged
double standards in the government’s defense of democracy and freedom in that
respect, and the shortage of the same democratic standards when prohibiting teenage
religious activities.13 In a different article of the same year, the author reflects on the
Islamic notion of “Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong” [“amri ba ma’ruf
va nah’yi az munkar] as a principle of political accountability.14 Throughout the
article, one can trace a repeated juxtaposition of Sharia and (secular) law [šar’ı̄ va
qonunı̄], as though the two do not pose any mutual conflict. It also invites increased
9 Mardi nakūnom Namirad Hargiz (Good Man’s Legacy Never Dies), Najot, 10 (467), 6 March,
2008, p. 3.
10 Din va Siyosat (Religion and Politics), Najot, 40 (549), 1 October, 2009, p. 13; M. Kabiri:
HNIT Ba Fitna Kashida Nameshavad (IRPT Will Not Succumb In Affliction), Najot, 48 (610), 1
December, 2010 p. 3.
11 H. Sayfullohzoda: Agar Tamomi Rohhoi Fa’oliyat Basta Shavand Ham… (Even If All Avenues
For Action Are Blocked…), Najot, 14 (628), 6 April, 2011, p. 9.
12 Paygirı̄ Az Siyosati Payvandi Aqidatı̄ (Follow-upOn the Policy of Ideological Bonding), 30 (487),
24 July, 2008, p. 12; A. Collin Young: “Bo Islom qanoat kardam” (“Satisfied through Islam”), 16
(525), p. 12.
13 Islom—Rohi Najot Az Ǧinoyat (Islam—The Solution To Crime), Najot, 24 (741), 13 June, 2013,
p. 11.
14 “Amri ba ma’ruf va nah’yi az munkar”—farizai faromuššuda (“Commanding right and
forbidding wrong”—a forsaken precept), Najot, 45 (762), 6 November, 2013, p. 14.
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public oversight over officials’ conduct to ensure their conformity to Sharia and law
requirements.
The IRPT members’ secular project, in other words, was based on two premises.
First, religious values inform national values. This premise derived from their pecu-
liar, and in my opinion honest, view of Islam—namely that it is not solely a private
affair, but one that, at least in theory, claims to regulate worldly and social affairs of a
Muslim society. As such, national values should pass a “religious filtration” [poksozii
dinı̄] to be legitimate.15 For example, in a 2011 article disputing a government law
proposal “On Parents’ Responsibility for Children’s Upbringing and Education”
(2 August 2011), the author states that “in the Islamic East, there is no need for
[this] law because Islamic upbringing and Muslim duty render such a law unnec-
essary.”16 Second, they had to decide if they supported democracy in “substance”
[muhtavo], or in form [šaklı̄] only.17 The first has an ideological base to it—secu-
larism, humanism, individualism and other -isms, so it should ideally lead to a fairly
homogenous outcome across cultures, while for the second—freedom, elections, rule
of law, equality and other minimal principles of democracy would suffice. The party
clearly chose the second as they advocated for an authentic “democratic” model of
Tajik-Islamic civilization.18 This minimalist conception of democracy is reminiscent
of a viral quote of Turkey’s Erdogan saying “Is democracy a means or an end?…We
say that democracy is a means, not an end.” (Mecham 2004, 347). In sum, for the
IRPT there were not and could not have been any conflicts between democracy and
political Islam.
Lastly, the IRPT articulated its version of secularism in opposition to its radical
Other—“radical secularism” [ifrotgaroii dunyavı̄], allegedly practiced by the Tajik
government.19 The party constructed an equivalence between the government and
its Soviet counterpart in its discourse. More specifically, they repeatedly criticized
government policies targeting religion and religious institutions, such as impeding
the public promotion of Islamic values and symbols, strict surveillance over mosque
activities, as resembling the Soviet anti-religious, atheist secularism. Being the
target of Islamic radicalism charges, the IRPT articulated the “reverse discourse”
of secular radicalism (Lemon 2016, 218–19). Originally termed “assertive secular-
ism” by Charles Taylor, it refers to the state’s role as the “agent of a social engi-
neering project that confines religion to the private domain.” (Kuru 2007, 571). The
increasing state-induced bureaucratic obstacles before religious organizations, tight
15 Din, arzišhoi millı̄ va demokratiya (Religion, national values, and democracy), Najot, 1 (770), 2
January, 2014, p. 11.
16 Mas’uliyat Yo Mahrumiyat? (Responsibility or Deprivation?), Najot, 5 (619), 2 February 2011,
p. 13.
17 [Religion, national values, and democracy], Najot, 2014; These are analogous to the ‘procedural’
and ‘liberal’ conceptions of democracy mentioned in the Conceptual Framework, i.e. the IRPT
endorsed the first but rejected the second.
18 M. Kabiri: Rušdi Demokratiya—Ǧilavgirii Tundgaroı̄ [Development of Democracy—Prevention
of Extremism], Najot, 1 (615), 5 January, 2011, p. 9.
19 Mukolama Az Rohi Amal (Dialogue About The Course of Action), Najot, 6 (515), 5 February,
2009, p. 9, 12.
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control of religious practices, the ban on hijab and beard in public institutions, and
other policies fueled grievances addressed by the party (Thibault 2013, 180). In
doing so, the party promoted the thesis that moderate Muslims are the victim of both
Islamic radicals and secular radicals.20 Their discontent was that instead of rooting
out socio-economic and political problems leading to increased public religiosity,
the government suppressed the “symptom” itself. The potential outcome, as envis-
aged in party statements, was a positive correlation between secular radicalism and
Islamic radicalism.21 However, this assumption was proven false by surveys that
found insignificant correlations between poverty and authoritarianism on the one
hand, and radicalization on the other (Montgomery and Heathershaw 2016, 17–18,
50). Furthermore, the party inadvertently admitted that there were pro-theocracy
members in its ranks, who found the statement “in Islam nobody has the right to rule
people in the name of God” controversial.22 In a genuine exploration of Islamic poli-
ties, however, one can find Islamic rule under different pretexts, be that the Islamic
Republic of Iran for whose politics the IRPT nurtured respect or theOttoman Empire,
leading to the conclusion that theocracy is a legitimate system in Islam, and that these
silenced members were honest about it.
9.6 The IRPT Discourse on the Civil War
The IRPT were invested in articulating a counter-narrative to the hegemonic narra-
tive of the government about the events and actors of the Civil War. They did so by
providing their story of the “struggle for freedom,” “Islamic awakening,” “oppo-
sition,” and “violence.” In the process, they drew chains of equivalence among
otherwise diverse “subject positions”—Islamists and their democratic (DPT) and
nationalist (Rastokhez) allies, and even the very government at some point, and
they reduced their political “Other” (Popular Front) down to “armed criminals” and
“communists” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 21).
To start with, the IRPT defined their identity through the goal they claimed to
have pursued: political independence and freedom [istiqloliyattalabı̄ va ozodixohı̄].23
From the two “maydans” of protester congregations, Ozodı̄ (Freedom) and Šahidon
(Martyrs), the first belonged to the proponents of the communist successor-
government made of Kulobis and Soghdis, while the second was 70% made up
of supporters of the IRPT and Qaziyyat.24 The latter was organized on March 26,
20 M. Kabiri: Tolibon Ba Osiyoi Miyona Demokratiya “Meorand” (TalibanWill „Bring “Democracy
to Central Asia), Najot, 36 (649), 7 September: 2011, pp. 8–9.
21 Hamai Kadrhoi Millı̄ Kadrhoi Nahzatand (All National Experts Are IRPT’s Experts), Najot, 36
(701), 5 September, 2012, p. 10.
22 Širkat Dar Intixobot Ba Manfiati Hizb Ast (Participation In Elections Is To The Benefit Of The
Party), Najot, 49 (714), 6 December, 2012, p. 12.
23 Mardi nakūnom Namirad Hargiz (Good Man’s Legacy Never Dies), Najot, 6 March, 10 (467),
2008, p. 2.
24 HNIT Dar Masiri Ta’rix (IRPT On The Path Of History), Najot, 30 (487), 24 July, 2008, p. 6.
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1992, in Dushanbe, and allegedly attracted more than 1 million people, including
an insignificant portion of Uzbek minorities, in the span of 46 days, before getting
dispersed at gunfire (Epkenhans 2018, 211).25 So when describing the “invasion”
of Safarali Kenjaev—one of the Popular Front’s field commanders—into the capital
and his “victory” speech, the author of the narrative refers to the enraged and ready-
for-action supporters of the opposition as “liberation forces” who were composed
of “free-thinking youth of Dushanbe, with Islamic and national dignity.”26 Quite
tellingly, the protesters of Šahidon were chanting Muhammad Iqbal’s revolutionary
poetry intended to “awaken” the Muslim Ummah from “slumber sleep.”27 However,
they still identified with the “nation” as far as their raison d’être was concerned.
For example, in a one-page article titled “Islamic Revival and National Dreams,” the
editor describes the movement along the lines of “reformist” [islohotı̄], and uses a
configuration of the phrases “national” or “national-religious” interests and values
as being the driving force behind the party ideology 16 times.28
Najot is full of “responses” to accusations of hardline Islamism. One of these is
a common “strawman” attack against the IRPT, namely that “Islamists would seize
power andmurder their opponents, force hijab and home arrest onwomen, ban educa-
tion and other nonsense…”29 The party newspaper repeatedly emphasized efforts
of the leadership of the Islamic opposition, especially Nuri, Himmatzoda, Davlat
Usmon, and Mahmadalii Hayit, to “suppress” militant and jihadist field comman-
ders.30 For instance, after the signing of the decisive Khostdeh ceasefire agreement
in Afghanistan in the winter of 1996, many field commanders of the Islamic opposi-
tion felt disenfranchised. Concerned about the potential futility of their jihad and lost
blood, “God’swrath against retreat,” and the fate ofmujahids in the upcoming regime,
these field commanders confronted the IRPT leaders.31 The leadership response
allegedly drew both on “scriptural evidence” (Qur’an and Hadeeth) for abstinence
from violent jihad, and legal basis against politically motivated persecution.
Another jihadist group that did not welcome the ceasefire news was that of
the Sadirov brothers (Rizvon and Bahrom). Their group was known for numerous
terrorist acts during the Civil War, involving the kidnapping of French aid workers,
taking UN and foreign media personnel hostage, and other armed attacks across
Dushanbe and the south of the country (CNN 1996; Reuters 1997). The IRPT were
25 Panfilov, Oleg. Tojikiston: Inqilobi Noma’lum (Tajikistan: Undefined Revolution), Najot, 49
(819), 4 December, 2014, p. 4.
26 HNIT Dar Masiri Ta’rix (IRPT On The Path Of History), Najot, 45 (502), 6 November, 2008,
p. 6.
27 Az Yak Gurūhi Pinhonkor To Hizbi Parlumonı̄ (From A Clandestine Group To A Parliamentary
Party), Najot, 18 (735), 2 May, 2013, p. 13.
28 Nahzati Islomı̄ va Ormonhoi Millı̄ (Islamic Revival and National Dreams), Najot, 31 (593), 5
August, 2010, p. 6.
29 HNIT Dar Masiri Ta’rix (IRPT On The Path Of History), Najot, 40 (497), 2 October, 2008, p. 6,
emphasis added.
30 Ustod Nurı̄ Siyosatmadori Durandešu Voqe’bin Bud (Doctor Nuri Was A Shrewd and Realistic
Politician), Najot, 35 (597), 2 September, 2010, p. 8.
31 Sulh Hadyai Xudo Bud (PeaceWas A Gift From God), Najot, 44 (657), 2 November, 2011, p. 12.
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careful to avoid any discursive association with his group, and so were vocal in
denouncing his group’s acts, such as devoting an article of the “Peace Was a Gift
from God” series to “bloody atrocities of Rizvon” and the fact that he was rightly
destroyed.32 In fact, a battle was planned and executed between the Islamic Revival
troops (who constituted approximately 10,000 “mujahids” in total) and government
forces on the one hand, and Sadirov’s band on the other, on 25 February 1997 in
Romit Valley.33 This is an ironic illustration of articulated equivalence between the
government and the opposition, and the difference between Islamic opposition and an
armed “jihadist” group at play. Interestingly, the party comfortably used the subject
positions of mujahid and šahid, but in reference to “noble defenders of Islam by
political means,” so rebels like the Sadirovs would not qualify.
9.7 The IRPT and the Islamic World
The IRPT’s post-Islamist discourse was indeed inspired by their counterparts in
Turkey (Justice and Development Party), Malaysia (Malaysian Islamic Party), Egypt
(MuslimBrotherhood), and Tunisia (RenaissanceMovement). Throughout the news-
paper issues, one can notice the language of admiration for these “Muslim demo-
cratic” parties. At the same time, accounts of Islamist violence on the part of groups
such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas are deliberately silenced.
First, the party emphasized the democratic means by which Islamic groups
competed for, and came to, power. One of these was Hamas—an analytically contra-
dictory case—since it had a long record of political violence against Israel and
Fatah, its political rival, while it managed to win the 2006 legislative elections fairly;
it campaigned for Sharia law while its leaders were mostly secular professionals,
and other contradictions (Gunning 2007, 1). The IRPT discourse placed Hamas in
the category of “grievances-driven” anti-colonialist organizations, as they “fought
for the independence and freedom” of the Palestinians, thereby using apologetic
language.34 The West is accused of wrongly classifying this “resistance political
group” as terrorist, while the political Other of Hamas—the “Zionist regime” is
abundantly mentioned for its atrocities against the Palestinians.35 In honor of the
21st anniversary of Hamas, the newspaper describes it as a “popular and national…,
jihadist movement” [ǧunbiši mardumı̄ va millı̄], which performed “some remarkable
military operations” [amaliyoti nizomii barǧastaye], such as the two Intifadas.36
32 Xunxorihoi Rizvon va Rohzanii Askaroni Labi Ǧar (Rizvon’s BloodyAtrocitiesAndTheAmbush
of Labi Ǧar Soldiers), Najot, 1 (666), 4 January 2012, p. 10.
33 Muzokiroti Sulh Dar Maskav (Peace Negotiations In Moscow), Najot, 14 (679), 4 April, 2012,
p. 11.
34 Bahori Xunini Falastin (Palestine’s Bloody Spring), Najot, 10 (467), 6 March, 2008, p. 10.
35 Falastiniyon Charo Ba Sulh Narasidand? (Why Did Palestinians Not Achieve Peace?), Najot,
49 (506), 4 December, 2008, p. 10.
36 “Hammos” 21-Sola Šud (Hamas Turned 21), Najot, 1 (510), 1 January, 2009, p. 10.
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Sections devoted to the Palestinian plight contain anti-Semitic discourse and words
of praise for the Islamist Hamas and its leaders, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin—the spiritual
leader of themovement, andKhaledMeshaal—its international representative (Ency-
clopaedia Britannica). For example, in an introduction to Sheikh’s achievements, the
editor says “he stood up against the Jew(s)…”37 Not only did the IRPT wholeheart-
edly support Hamas with unambiguous rhetoric, but it also provided “humanitarian
aid” to it. In an interview with “Ozodi” (RFE/RL), Muhiddin Kabiri confirmed a
leading question about 32,000 USD “collected by Nahzat brothers and sisters” in a
humanitarian initiative for Hamas in the 2007 Gaza strip war.38
Another Islamist current for which the IRPT had special admiration was the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan’ul Muslimin). A leading member of this
group in the 1950s and 1960s, Sayyid Qutb, who was the radical Islamist ideologue
behind the theological justification for violent (offensive) jihad, receives unequiv-
ocal respect in Najot articles. The IRPT articles describe him in fairly positive terms,
as a model of a courageous and devout Muslim, who resisted tyranny.39 The news-
paper also spoke of Umar al-Tilmisani, Muslim Brotherhood’s 3rd General Guide
(1972–1986), known for his relatively moderate stance on electoral politics. Unlike
his predecessors, Al-Tilmisani believed in a non-violent implementation of Sharia
law, through political means. As such, he initiated the first political alliance of the
group on the eve of 1984 parliamentary elections, between the Muslim Brothers and
the nationalist liberal Wafd Party, winning 8 seats for Ikhwan candidates.40 He is
described in the IRPT publication as having “healthy and constructive thoughts…in-
vested in spreading the truth and guiding people towards unity.”41 The party paid
homage to yet a third Muslim Brotherhood scholar, Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, for
his contribution to da’wah (proselytization) and politicization of Islam.
However, such Najot articles and public statements, that set these otherwise
controversial figures in an unequivocally positive light, either seem unaware of the
barely concealable implications of their radical ideas and/or the active encourage-
ment of religious violence, or are deliberately silencing these inconvenient realities.
For instance, Sheikh Qaradawi supported Hamas financially through charity orga-
nizations in the latter’s military endeavors against the Palestinian Authority (Bartal
2015, 586). He was an outspoken critic of all leaders of the Islamic world who did
not take a public stance against the Israeli state and was openly calling for a joint and
“uncompromising jihad” against Israel (Ibid, 595–96). Another is the leader of the
Malaysian Islamic Party Abdul Hadi Nawangwho spoke, upon his visit to the IRPT’s
37 Maǧrūhi Muboriz (Injured Fighter), Najot, 31 (593), 5 August, 2010, p. 7., emphasis added.
38 Intixoboti oyanda oson naxohad bud (The upcoming elections will not be easy), Najot, 36 (806),
4 September, 2014, p. 12.
39 Sayyid Qutb—islohotxoh va muborizi rohi Xudo (Sayyid Qutb—reformer and fighter on the path
of God), Najot, 24 (586), 17 June, 2010, pp. 7, 13.
40 Al Jazeera English, “The Brotherhood andMubarak | Al JazeeraWorld.”May 23, 2012. YouTube
video, 47:36, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VwBEzxXs0cI, min. 8:15–10:39, Accessed 18
Nov, 2020.
41 Umari Tilmisonı̄—Do’ı̄ va Murabbı̄ (Umar Tilmisani—Missionary andMentor), Najot, 31 (635),
3 August, 2011, p. 10.
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9th Congress in 2011, about his party proudly implementing Islamic law and justice
in regions they won, banning “alcoholic, obscene places” as well as “gambling sites,”
allegedly to non-Muslims’ content.42 Seen from this angle, the fact that the IRPT
upheld such figures may have been a worrisome prospect for the secular segment
of the Tajik public who took their time to read through the newspaper and for the
government which was notoriously irritable at any sign of support for political Islam.
9.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, it was aimed to empirically illustrate to what extent and in which
context the IRPT transformed to a moderate party. This transformation was part of a
political strategy, informed by the incentives and disincentives of democratic politics.
However, one ought to be skeptical about the IRPT’s ideological transformation, that
is, the acceptance of democratic norms and standards as an end. The party members’
acceptance of the democratic procedure and the selective use of democratic rhetoric
were to signal to observers inside and outside the country that they would conform
to their expectations, be they from the “Islamic World” or from the so-called West,
or from the Tajik government. That is where the problem lies. In an attempt to suit
all audiences, the IRPT failed to present a coherent ideological program. Instead, it
was an incomplete mix of (liberal) democratic and Islamist elements. The IRPT’s
democratic identity depended on reiterating the importance of concepts like human
rights and equality but failed on providing a theoretical substance to them. To be
fair, political parties are not typically demanded to give a detailed account of how
they conceptualize universal democratic values—as these should be universal and
uniform—except if the political party was founded on an undemocratic past and
has been associated with violence. In that case, the public should have the right to
“interrogate” the party’s purported commitment to democracy and secularism. The
interrogation shows that only the leadership from the mid-2000s until 2015 partly
nurtured an ideological endorsement of democratic and secular standards, though
even they did not elaborate on controversial issues like (non)religious minorities,
secular education, and polygamy.
The party did not hesitate to acknowledge their “past mistakes,” namely aggres-
sion in the Civil War. However, instead of qualifying it as violent Islamism, they
attribute it to a “situation out of control” scenario, whereinmost atrocities from rebels
opposing the government, including fundamentalist militias like Rizvan Sadirov’s,
were “falsely” attributed to the “moderate” IRPT leadership. Second, most demo-
cratic discourses can interchangeably be called “post-Islamist,” as they signaled a
commitment to democracy as an acceptable and even preferred system for Islam,
42 Abdul Hadi Awang: Demokratiyai Malaysia Az Demokratiyai Tojikiston Farq Dorad (Malaysian
Democracy Is Different from Tajikistan’s), Najot, 40 (653), 6 October, 2011, pp. 5–6.
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while some Islamist discourses could also be called “illiberal.” This strategy also
ensured consistency in the IRPT’s transformation path, as they did not uphold democ-
racy in its own terms, but as a system compatible with the Islamic narrative. Third,
they assumed that their Islamic identity should not have been an “anomaly” but
an anticipated rule, as their oft-quoted “97–98% Muslim population” statistic was
supposed to eliminate all questions as to the popular desirability of an Islamic party,
even though that has not been proven so far. Fourth, their discourse on violence,
particularly perpetrated in the name of Islam, sometimes reminds of the “No True
Scotsman Fallacy” in that they assumed the authority to decide, in an unfalsifiable
manner, what it took to be a proper Muslim so that an individual claiming to be a
Muslim would not suffice, hence the “No True Muslim Fallacy” (Manninen 2019,
374–77). At last, a reservation has to be made about the level of the bar for deter-
mining secular, moderate religious organizations. Calling ISIS a terrorist group is
too low of a bar to be content. For what it’s worth, even al-Qaeda denounced ISIS
(Dearden 2017). So, positive and even neutral language in remarks about Islamist
groups like Hamas and leaders like Qutb and Qaradawi should not be overlooked
and remain unquestioned.
To be clear, this is not to suggest that the IRPT would in fact Islamize the Tajik
social structure, especially given the preponderance of the few pragmatic voices
in the leadership—like Muhiddin Kabiri and Mahmadali Hayit. But the IRPT was
supposedly more than these figures. Their avoidance from these topics in favor of
“mundane” problems like elections and political freedommeant that they were either
not ideologically prime to provide a definitive answer on those issues, or they simply
harbored intentions of “bottom-up Islamization,” rephrased into “Islamic society.”
In either case, this should suffice to question the limits of the IRPT’s ideological
moderation.
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organizations. Middle East Stud 51(4):585–599. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2014.989998
BBC Russian Service (2013) Tadzhikistan: Kandidat Ot Oppozitsii Ne Dopushena k Vyboram
(Tajikistan: The Opposition Candidate Not Allowed to Run). https://www.bbc.com/russian/int
ernational/2013/10/131011_tajik_election_candidates.amp. Accessed 24 Nov 2020
Bennigsen A (1988) Unrest in the world of Soviet Islam. Third World Q 10(2):770–786. https://
doi.org/10.1080/01436598808420081
9 Identity and Power—The Discursive Transformation … 191
Bennigsen A, BroxupM (2011) The Islamic threat to the Soviet state, 2nd edn. Routledge Revivals,
New York
Bushkov VI, Mikulskiy DV (1996) Islamskiye Politicheskiye Dvizheniya i Struktury. Musul-
manskaya Pechat, Propaganda. [Islamic Political Movements and Structures. Muslim Press,
Propaganda. In: Gubareva LG (ed) Anatomiya Grazhdanskoy Voyny v Tadzhikistane (Etno-
Sotsialnyie Protsessy i Politicheskaya Borba, 1992–1995) [Anatomy of Tajik Civil War (Ethno-
Social Processes and Political Struggles, 1992–1995)]. Moscow. https://www.ca-c.org/datarus/
st_08_bush_11.shtml
CNN (1996) U.N. Observers Taken Hostage in Tajikistan. http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9612/
20/tajikistan.hostage/. Accessed 16 Nov 2020
Collins K (2007) Ideas, networks, and Islamist movements: evidence from Central Asia and the
Caucasus. World Politics 60(1):64–96
Dearden L (2017) Al-Qaeda Leader Denounces ISIS ‘madness and Lies’ as Two Terrorist Groups
Compete for Dominance. Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/
al-qaeda-leader-ayman-al-zawahiri-isis-madness-lies-extremism-islamic-state-terrorist-groups-
compete-middle-east-islamic-jhadis-a7526271.html?amp
Epkenhans T (2010)Muslims without learning, clergy without faith: institutions of Islamic learning
in the Republic of Tajikistan. In: Kemper M, Motika R, Reichmuth S (eds) Islamic education in
the Soviet Union and its successor states. Routledge, New York, pp 313–348
Epkenhans T (2011) Defining normative Islam: some remarks on contemporary Islamic thought
in Tajikistan—Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda’s sharia and society. Central Asian Surv 30(1):81–96.
https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2011.554056
Epkenhans T (2015) The Islamic revival party of Tajikistan: episodes of Islamic activism, postcon-
flict accommodation, and political marginalization. Central Asian Affairs 2(4):321–346. https://
doi.org/10.1163/22142290-00204001
Epkenhans T (2016) The origins of the civil war in Tajkistan: nationalism, Islamism and violent
conflict in Post-Soviet space. Lexington Books, London. https://doi.org/10.1093/fh/2.2.187
Epkenhans T (2018) Oblivion, ambivalence and historical erasure: remembering the civil war in
Tajikistan. In: Laruelle M (ed) Tajikistan on the move: statebuilding and societal transformations.
Lexington Books, Lanham, Maryland, pp 195–221
Epkenhans T (2009) Regulating religion in Post-Soviet Central Asia: some remarks on religious
association lawand ‘Official ’ Islamic Institutions inTajikistan. SecurHumanRights 20(1):94–99.
https://doi.org/10.1163/187502309787858183
Foster D (2015) Cleansing violence in the Tajik civil war: framing from the dark side of democracy.
Natl Identities 17(4):353–370. https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2015.1083967
Fredholm M (2006) Asian cultures and modernity. Stockholm
Freedman RO (1996) Radical Islam and the struggle for influence in Central Asia. Terrorism Polit
Violence 8(2):216–238. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546559608427355
Gunning J (2007) Hamas in politics: democracy, religion, violence. Hurst & Company, London
HaghayeghiM (1994) Islamic revival in the Central Asian republics. Central Asian Surv 13(2):249–
266. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634939408400858
Heathershaw J (2007) Peace as complex legitimacy: politics, space and discourse in Tajikistan’s
peacebuilding process. University of London
Heathershaw J (2009) Post-conflict Tajikistan: the politics of peacebuilding and the emergence of
a legitimate order. Routledge, London and New York
Kabiri M (2016) Birth and death of democracy in Tajikistan: memories and reflections about
elections from 1990 until 2016, vol 174. CAP Papers
Kalonov A (2020) Political Islam and democracy: moderation and the Islamic revival party of
Tajikistan? Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg
Karagiannis E (2006) The challenge of radical Islam in Tajikistan: Hizb Ut-Tahrir Al Islami.
Nationalities Papers: the J Nationalism Ethn 34(1):1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/009059905005
04806
192 D. Aleef
Khalid A (2014) Islam after communism: religion and politics in Central Asia, 2nd edn. University
of California Press, London
Khamidova P (2016) Interview with Muhiddin Kabiri, Leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party of
Tajikistan in-Exile. Central Asia Policy Brief 33:1–5
Kuru AT (2007) Passive and assertive secularism: historical conditions, ideological struggles, and
state policies toward religion. World Politics 59(4):568–594. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2008.
0005
Laclau E, Mouffe C (2001) Hegemony and socialist strategy: towards a radical democratic politics,
2nd edn. Verso, London and New York
Lemon EJ (2016) Governing Islam and security in Tajikistan and beyond: the emergence of
transnational authoritarian security governance. University of Exeter
Lenz-Raymann K (2014) Securitization of Islam: a vicious circle. counter-terrorism and freedom
of religion in Central Asia. University of Zurich. https://doi.org/10.1093/jis/etx035
Manninen TW (2019) No True Scotsman. In: Arp R, Barbone S, Bruce M (eds) Bad arguments:
100 of the most important fallacies in western philosophy. Wiley, pp 374–377.
Mecham RQ (2004) From the ashes of virtue, a promise of light: the transformation of political
Islam in Turkey. Third World Q 25(2):339–358
MontgomeryDW,Heathershaw J (2016) Islam, secularism&danger. Religion, State Soc 44(3):1–56
NourzhanovK (2005) Saviours of the nation or robber barons?Warlord politics in Tajikistan. Central
Asian Surv 24(2):109–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634930500154867
Nozimova S, Epkenhans T (2019) The transformation of Tajikistan’s religious field: from religious
pluralism to authoritarian inertia. Central Asian Affairs 6.https://doi.org/10.1163/22142290-006
02004
Orzu M (2013) 40 Soli Nahzat. Xotira, Andeša, Didgoh [Revival’s 40th Anniversary: Memory,
Thought, Vision]. Muattar, Dushanbe
O Partii [On the Party]. n.d. TajInfo.Org. http://tajinfo.org/pivt/page/%D0%9E-%D0%BF%D0%
B0%D1%80%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B8
Payom.Net (2020) Taammule Bar Usul va Ruykardhoi ‘Islomgaroyona’-i Hizbi Nahzati Islomi (A
Reflection on the Principles and ‘Islamist’ Approach of the Islamic Revival Party). https://payom.
net/taammule-bar-usul-va-rujkardhoi-islo/. Accessed 11 Feb 2021
Rahnamo A (2008) Hizbi Dini va Davlati Dunyavi [Religious Party and Secular State]. Irfon,
Dushanbe
Rashid A (1994) The resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or nationalism? Zed Books, London &New
Jersey
Reuters (1997) Tajikistan: Rizvon Sadirov, leader of armed group which kidnapped two french aid
workers, killed in an armedoperation. https://reuters.screenocean.com/record/1003157.Accessed
16 Nov 2020
RFE/RL’s Tajik Service (2019) Tajikistan Labels EU-BasedOppositionAlliance as Terrorist Group.
https://www.rferl.org/a/national-alliance-tajikistan/30215881.html. Accessed 11 Feb 2021
Roche S (2019) The faceless terrorist: a study of critical events in Tajikistan. Springer, Cham
SeifertA (2005)On thebenefits of confidence-buildingbetween Islamists and secularists. In:Bitter J,
Guérin F, Seifert A, Rahmonova-Schwarz D (eds) From confidence-building towards cooperative
co-existence: the Tajik experiment of Islamic-secular dialogue. Nomos, Baden-Baden
Shapoatov S (2004) The Tajik civil war: 1992–1997. Middle East Technical University
Tajinfo (2012) Protocol 32–20. https://www.tajinfo.org/pivt/page/635787048302941224
Tesch, Noah. n.d. Khaled Meshaal. In: Encyclopaedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/bio
graphy/Khaled-Meshaal
Thibault H (2013) The secular and the religious in Tajikistan: contested political spaces. Stud
Religion/sciences Religieuses 42(2):173–189. https://doi.org/10.1177/0008429813479297
YemelianovaG, SalmorbekovaZ (2010) Islamand Islamism in theFerghanaValley. In:Yemelianova
G (ed) Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union. Routledge, New York, pp 211–243
Yilmaz I (2009) An Islamist party, constraints, opportunities and transformation to Post-Islamism:
The Tajik Case. Uluslararası Hukukve Politika 5(18):133–147
9 Identity and Power—The Discursive Transformation … 193
Zainiddinov H (2012) The changing relationship of the secularized state to religion in Tajikistan. J
Church State 55(3):456–477
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Chapter 10
From Landlocked to Land-Linked?
Central Asia’s Place in the Eurasian
Economy
Richard Pomfret
Abstract TheOrganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), while
primarily a security organisation, has always included economic and human baskets
or dimensions. Currently, the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and
Environmental Activities operates in four main areas: (1) good governance and anti-
corruption, (2) money laundering and financing of terrorism, (3) transport, trade and
border-crossing facilitation, and (4) labour migration. This chapter addresses devel-
opments in Central Asia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union that are relevant
to the third area of OSCE operations. The chapter’s focus is on the potential for the
landlocked Central Asian countries to become land-linked, using improved trans-
port connections between East Asia and Europe to promote economic development
through export diversification and growth.Rail services acrossCentralAsia improved
considerably during the 2010s. They have been resilient, despite strained political
relations between Russia and the EU since 2014, and rail traffic between Europe
and China continued to increase in 2020 despite the shock of COVID-19. Further
infrastructure improvements are promised under China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
However, the expanded network has been little used by Central Asian producers to
create new international trade, and the improved infrastructure represents a potential
opportunity rather than a past benefit. If the Central Asian economies are successful
in taking advantage of the opportunity, it will stimulate their trade across the Eurasian
region and help economic diversification. The main determinant of success will be
national policies and national economic development. The chapter concludes with
a discussion of the role of multilateral institutions and, in particular, the prospects
for OSCE collaboration with existing fora to promote cooperation and economic
development in Central Asia.
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Until 1991 the Central Asian republics had open economies integrated into the Soviet
economic space but with no connection to the global economy.1 Their role in the
Soviet economywas as suppliers of natural resources, primarily cotton,minerals, and
natural gas. Transport networks reflected this focus, with effective rail and pipeline
links running north to the Russian republic but no rail links to the south or east, until
the first rail line between the Kazakhstan and China opened in 1990 and the first rail
line between Turkmenistan and Iran opened in 1997.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, demand and supply links
collapsed.During the 1990s, the new independentCentralAsian countries established
customs posts at their borders. As exporters of raw materials, they entered global
markets for cotton,minerals, and energy products, but they failed to diversify exports.
The Kyrgyz economy became open and developed as an entrepôt for imported goods
(Kaminski and Mitra 2012), and Kazakhstan had a fairly liberal import regime. The
other countries became more autarchic and largely closed to direct imports; Uzbek-
istan and Turkmenistan maintained state control over key exports (cotton, gold, and
gas) as well as foreign exchange controls.2
During the 1990s, the Central Asian countries signed many economic coopera-
tion agreements, all of whose impact was minimal (Pomfret 2006, 183–95; Laruelle
and Peyrouse 2012). The principal regional arrangements had secretariats outside the
region: the Eurasian Economic Community (Union of Five) inMoscow, the Shanghai
CooperationOrganization in Beijing, and the Economic CooperationOrganization in
Tehran. Other fora for cooperation included the regional development banks (Asian
Development Bank in Manila and European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment in London) and the UN regional commissions in Bangkok and Geneva. The
lack of regional cooperation and difficulties for trade, transport, and transit were
highlighted in reports by the UNDP (2005) and ADB (2006).
10.2 Landlockedness and Trade in Central Asia
Explanation of Central Asian countries’ inability to diversify their exports beyond
natural resource products was often ascribed to the countries’ landlockedness.3 This
disadvantage was highlighted in a paper based on a PhD thesis by Raballand (2003)
and in work at the World Bank (Cadot et al. 2006; Grigoriou 2007). The difficulties
1 IMF estimates showed that, measured by trade/GDP, the Central Asian republics were roughly as
open as Canadian provinces in the 1980s but whereas Canadian provinces’ trade was divided about
equally between trade within Canada and trade with other countries, 85–90% of the Central Asian
republics’ trade was within the USSR (Pomfret 1995, 37).
2 Tajikistan was wracked by civil war until 1997 and the central government did not fully control
the national territory until after the turn of the century.
3 Uzbekistan has the distinction of being double-landlocked, i.e. all its neighbours are landlocked.
The only other double-landlocked country is Liechtenstein, which like its landlocked neighbours
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facing landlocked countries were acknowledged in the establishment of the United
Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Land-
locked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS)
in 2001 and adoption by the UN General Assembly of the “Almaty Programme of
Action: Addressing the Special Needs of Landlocked Developing Countries within
a New Global Framework for Transit Transport Cooperation for Landlocked and
Transit Developing Countries in 2003. Neither the office nor the programme had
much impact.”
Measures of the costs of doing international trade, such as in the World Bank’s
Doing Business reports, indicated that trade costs were higher in Central Asia than
anywhere else in the world. The World Bank reported that in June 2014 for Ease of
Trading across InternationalBorders, theKyrgyzRepublic ranked 183rd,Kazakhstan
185th, Tajikistan 188th, and Uzbekistan 189th of the 189 countries surveyed (World
Bank Doing Business 2015); Turkmenistan was not included but would have scored
more poorly than the other four.4 Other evidence reinforces the impression that the
costs of international trade in Central Asia were high, with long delays and often
arbitrary fees at borders and restrictions on transit such as requirements for trucks to
travel in convoy or variations in maximum axle size (Pomfret 2019, 215–23).
Especially during the 1999–2014 resource boom, high trade costs did not hamper
exports of oil, gas, gold, and other minerals, but they did discourage export diversi-
fication. In those years, there was little incentive to lower trade barriers or to pursue
economic cooperation to reduce trade costs. The energy exporters Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan benefited directly from high prices for their exports, Uzbekistan to
a lesser extent, while the poorer countries received large remittance flows from
migrantworkers inRussia andKazakhstan.5 While theCentralAsian countries gener-
ally upgraded their domestic infrastructure, little attention was paid to international
connectivity, apart from oil and gas pipelines.6
Austria and Switzerland does not appear to have suffered from geography, suggesting that land-
lockedness per se is not the problem. It depends on which countries you are locked next to and how
open your country is to trade.
4 Behar (2010) and Sourdin and Pomfret (2012, 26–28) have criticized the Doing Business method-
ology for relying on opinions of people who do not trade and for referring to laws and regulations
rather than actual conditions on the ground or at the border. Sharafeyeva and Shepherd (2020) have
questioned the Doing Business indicators’ applicability to Central Asia.
5 In 2013, Tajikistan had the world’s highest ratio of remittances to GDP and the Kyrgyz Republic
had the third highest ratio.
6 Kazakhstan enjoyed a perfect storm after 1999 as its Tengiz oilfield started to produce large
amounts just as oil prices began their rise from under $20 a barrel to over $140 and discovery
of the offshore Kashagan oilfield in 2000, the world’s biggest new oilfield in thirty years, led to
high levels of investment. Under such conditions, new pipelines to the Black Sea, from Baku to
the Mediterranean and from Kazakhstan’s Caspian oilfields to China profitably reduced transport
costs and diversifiedmarkets. However, these infrastructure projects did not impact on the other four
Central Asian countries’ connectivity. The gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China via Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan completed in 2009 was the other major pipeline.
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10.3 Coming Together Again After 2006
An early indicator of the benefits of cooperation was the pipeline constructed from
Turkmenistan to China via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan between 2006 and 2009,
which had win–win outcomes for all four countries. The Northern Distribution
Network, by which the USA provisioned its troops in Afghanistan after 2009, also
encouraged cooperation among the Central Asian countries (Yuldasheva 2013).7
However beyond these ad hoc cooperation initiatives, cooperation remained limited,
and personal relations among the autocratic presidents were rarely warm.
The only economic cooperation initiativewith any success in the first decade of the
twenty-first century was the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program
(CAREC). CAREC had its origins in 1997 as a joint initiative of Central Asian
countries and six multilateral institutions.8 The secretariat was established at the
Asian Development Bank inManila in 2000, but progress was slow and cautious; the
Transport and Trade Facilitation Strategy was not endorsed until 2007. Nevertheless,
with a focus on meetings of senior officials, CAREC proved more useful than the
regional organisations that were initiated at a higher level in the 1990s. CAREC
identified major transport corridors in Central Asia and focussed on improving the
hard and soft infrastructure in order to reduce travel times and money costs along
those corridors.9 It also played an important role in gathering information about
trade costs through the Corridor PerformanceMeasurement andMonitoring program
(ADB 2014).
In 2010 Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia formed a customs union, which moved
to deeper integration in 2015 as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU); Armenia
and the Kyrgyz Republic joined the EAEU in 2015. Although a web of bilateral trade
agreements continued to exist among Soviet successor states within the Common-
wealth of Independent States, the EAEU was the first effective regional trading
7 The Manas Transit Center near Bishkek was the main air facility used by the USA for troops
until 2014. Freight mainly came through Baltic Sea ports and via various combinations of Central
Asian countries, especially after transiting Pakistan became less convenient in 2009. By late 2011
most non-lethal shipments to Afghanistan went by rail from Latvia through Russia, Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan or from Kazakhstan by road through the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan.
8 The Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) andWorld Bank. The broad division of labour sawADB respon-
sible for the secretariat and transport, trade and trade facilitation, IMF for macroeconomic, trade
and financial policy coordination, the World Bank for energy sector, the EBRD and IFC for private
sector engagement, and theUNDP for overall assessments and coordinationwith otherUNagencies.
Cooperation issues were raised in a review of CAREC by Linn and Pidufala (2008).
9 The original intent was to bring together the six multilateral development institutions, Central
Asian countries and Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China. By 2020, they had been joined by
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Mongolia, Pakistan and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region of
China. The CAREC 2030 long-term strategic framework endorsed in 2017 invited any multilateral
or bilateral agency to join CAREC if it has the capacity to engage in a constructive way.
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arrangement. Operation of the EAEU became associated with competition for poten-
tial future members who might also be seeking deeper integration with the Euro-
pean Union under the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) program; Armenia withdrew
from EaP negotiations in 2013 in order to negotiate EAEU membership and, when
Ukraine appeared to have shifted closer to the EU in 2014, Ukraine’s relations with
Russia deteriorated. The conflict in Ukraine led to sanctions by the EU and others
on Russia, followed by Russian counter-sanctions, which cast a shadow over the
EAEU’s operation as sanction-busters routed trade through Belarus or Kazakhstan.
10.4 The Eurasian Landbridge and the Belt and Road
Initiative
During the 2010s, political relations across Eurasia often seemed fraught. At the
same time, economic connectivity improved as overland transport links that had
stagnated for centuries were revived. Starting in 2011, the expansion of the Eurasian
Landbridge rail services between China and Europe benefited Kazakhstan, which
earned substantial transit fees, and encouraged future rail construction (e.g. between
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and Iran) and a denser long-distance rail network with
the potential to reduce transport costs for international traders in Central Asia. This
development has become associated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the
promise of external infrastructure funding.
Trade between Europe and East Asia has been dominated since 1500 by maritime
transport. At the start of the twenty-first century, several rail lines physically
connected China and Europe, but none was considered competitive to sea freight.
The most prominent, the TransSiberian Railway, was little used for international
traffic after the 1960 Sino-Soviet split. A rail line between Kazakhstan and Xinjiang,
completed in 1990, mainly took Kazakh coal, steel, iron ore and other minerals to
China in return for Chinese manufactured goods. After a Turkmenistan-Iran railway
opened in 1997, a line south of the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan through Iran
and Turkey to Europe featured on UN maps as a TransAsian main line but was
unused as a China-Europe link; indeed, the line operated at far below capacity due
to cumbersome change of gauge operations at the Turkmen-Iran border, excessive
regulations for transiting Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and poor track maintenance
in western Iran and eastern Turkey. As its flagship aid programme to Central Asia
during the 1990s, the EU promoted the route from Central Asia across the Caspian
Sea to Baku and then across the Black Sea from Georgia to Europe, but changes of
mode (rail-sea-rail-sea-rail) made this route commercially unattractive.
In 2008–9, block trains were commissioned by German car companies to carry
components via the TransSiberian Railway to their joint venture assembly operations
in northeast China (VW/Audi in Jilin and BMW in Shenyang). Similar bespoke rail
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services were provided from Lianyungang to car assembly operations in Uzbek-
istan.10 These trips showed that overland rail transport was feasible, but they were
not useful for other potential customers because they were not run to a schedule, and
overland freight was still believed to be uncompetitive with sea transport apart from
these special cases. The situation changed dramatically between 2011 and 2016.
The stimulus for change was China’s Go West policy that had been launched
in 2001 but whose impact was only felt after a bonded train link between Shen-
zhen and Chongqing opened in 2010. This facility, providing imported components
with minimum delay and cost, encouraged Foxconn, HP, Acer, and others to build
large assembly facilities in Chongqing for laptops, printers, and other electronic
equipment. The initial intention was to export the products via the Yangtze River
and Shanghai, but the Yangtze River route soon became congested, especially with
delays at the locks in the Three Gorges. An alternative was to send the goods by
train to Europe. In 2011 and 2012, individual trains connected Sichuan Province and
ChongqingMunicipalitywithEurope,much like the block trains on theTransSiberian
Railway. The important additional development was the establishment of regular rail
service between Chongqing and Duisburg in 2013, with increased frequency to three
times a week in 2016 and daily in 2018.
The rail companies of China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, and Germany
combined to offer a faster transport service than sea and lower cost than airfreight. It
was attractive to electronics firms inWestern China supplying EUmarkets and to EU
firms shipping components to their operations inWestern China. Cars and electronics
have been the two principal industries producing along international value chains that
were often referred to as global value chains (GVCs) but were, in fact, regional (i.e.,
European or East Asian value chains); the rail Landbridge linked the Eurasian value
chains.
The Chongqing-Duisburg route was so successful that other cities in China
and Europe trialled rail connections. In 2012–15, routes from Yiwu, Chengdu,
Zhengzhou, Wuhan, and other Chinese cities to Europe were offered. Some routes
would be successful with regular services established (e.g. Yiwu-Madrid), and some
termini would become hubs, for example Łódź (Poland) became an Eastern Euro-
pean hub and Klaipéda (Lithuania) a hub for southern Sweden, while other routes
would be unprofitable. ByMay 2017, China Railway Express trains were connecting
37 cities in China to destinations in eleven EU countries. China Railway reported
over 6,000 trips in 2018.11
10 Although the Daewoo joint venture became GM-Uzbekistan after the bankruptcy of the Korean
company, the factory was still using Korean components which were sent by sea to Lianyungang
in Jiangsu Province of China and then by rail to Andijan.
11 Global Times China sees expanding China-Europe freight rail services posted 15 September
2019 at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1164438.shtml. The Eurasian Rail Alliance (UTLC),
founded by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia in 2014 to provide services for container trains running
between China and Europe Traffic on the China-Kazakhstan-Belarus route, reported growth in the
number of containers shipped by rail from 46,000 TEUs in 2015, to 100,500 TEUs in 2016, and
175,800 in 2017 (Table 10.1).
10 From Landlocked to Land-Linked? Central Asia’s Place … 201
The creation of the Eurasian Landbridge was market-driven as rail companies
responded to demand by coordinating service and agreeing on transit procedures
(Pomfret 2019b). Little investment in physical capital was required. The revenues
to Deutsche Bahn and China Railway Express and transit fees to Kazakhstan,
Russia, Belarus, and Polandwere substantial. Freight forwarders and courier services
responded by offeringmore services, for example, arrangingmultimodal connections
and improved tracking, consolidating part-container loads, organising clearance for
goods subject to EU-Russia mutual sanctions, and including refrigerated containers
in trains. It is through such service provision that hubs such as Duisburg, Łódź, and
Yiwu have become popular termini. The added services appeal to GVCs, such as
agribusiness, where goods may be perishable and require refrigeration, or to non-
GVC traffic, while the original drivers (car and electronics GVCs) remain important
as the lead firms transformwhat have been regional value chains in Asia or in Europe
into Eurasian value chains.
In an October 2013 speech in Astana, President Xi Jinping announced the Silk
Road Economic Belt, an overland connection that would be supported by funding
from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank which was established shortly after-
wards. Chinese maps showed the Belt following a route south of the Caspian Sea
through Iran and Turkey, in contrast to the Landbridge routes through Russia.12
Together with the Maritime Road announced soon afterwards, this would become
theBelt andRoad Initiative (BRI). InMay 2017, representatives of over 130 countries
attended the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing for the formal launch of the BRI.
Although the BRI is often presented as a grand overarching plan, China’s actions
can be opportunistic. One week after UN sanctions on Iran were lifted in January
2016; President Xi visited Tehran.13 On 28 January, the first train left Yiwu for
Tehran with 32 containers; the train bypassed Uzbekistan by crossing Kazakhstan
before following the Caspian coastal line from Kazakhstan to Turkmenistan and
Iran that had been opened in 2013. Yinchuan-Tehran train service was initiated in
September 2017, and by the end of 2017, two trains per month were running to a
regular schedule. Reports circulated that China, Iran and Turkey were discussing an
extension to a Tehran-Europe service.
A rail link between Kashi (Kashgar), the most western point on China’s rail
network, and Andijan via the Kyrgyz Republic is under active discussion. That
would complete a continuous line from China via Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran
12 The contrasting routes have important differences beyond linking China to western Europe: the
route through Russia is important for Scandinavia and Poland, while the southern route is easily
linked to the Arab world. One interpretation of Chinese aims is that the second route may reduce
hold-up possibilities; with a single route crossing several countries, one of the countries may raise
its transit fees in the belief that the service will not be discontinued as a result of their cost increase.
Alternatively, the two routes may be mutually exclusive as China-EU mainlines, especially if the
intention is to construct a high-speed rail line which would be too expensive a project to support
multiple routes. Whatever China’s motivation, the multiplication of routes is important for Eurasian
connectivity.
13 China’s $1.5 billion loan for electrification of the Meshed-Tehran rail line was the first loan to
Iran after the lifting of sanctions, although the contract to start work on electrifying the line was not
signed until August 2019.
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and Turkey to Europe, cutting out Kazakhstan and hence entirely independent of the
current main Landbridge route. This southern route is actively supported by Uzbek-
istan, which is no longer seen as a transit-unfriendly bottleneck since the election of
President Mirziyoyev in December 2016.14 Turkey’s rail tunnel under the Bosporus
that opened in 2013 added an important piece to the southern route to Europe as
transfer to a ferry across the Bosporus is no longer required.15
However, the Kyrgyz Republic is wary of contracting debt, even on concessional
terms from China; the proposed line passes through sparsely populated regions and
would be unlikely to generate sufficient transit revenue to service a loan.16 Potential
debt dependence became a major criticism of the BRI in 2018, largely based on Sri
Lanka’s experience with Chinese loans for uneconomic infrastructure projects and
highlighted in Hurley et al. (2018). At the Second BRI Forum in April 2019, China
promised to address concerns about the original concept by establishing a BRI Debt
Sustainability Framework and a panel of international mediators from BRI countries
to resolve disputes arising from BRI projects.
The Belt portion of the BRI builds on the already successful market-driven
Eurasian Landbridge. However, the BRI still matters because it publicises the new
Eurasian connectivity, and China is offering finance to improve the infrastructure
on existing routes and to create alternative routes. Both the Landbridge and the BRI
emphasise efficient cross-border services and exclude countries that cannot guarantee
such efficiency, for example, Uzbekistan when the China-Iran link was pioneered in
2016. Current traffic along these routes transits Central Asia without stopping, but
with the hard infrastructure in place and in regular use, there is an opportunity for
Central Asian countries to use the rail system to increase exports.
The biggest recipient of funding under the BRI has been for projects along the
China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that runs fromKashi to the Indian Ocean
port of Gwadar.17 This is a potentially important route not only for western China but
also for the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, some of whose exports already travel
by road over the Karakoram Highway in order to avoid transiting Afghanistan, even
though the KarakoramHighway is a difficult road, especially in winter. However, the
CPEC faces strong opposition from India for passing through disputed territory in
Jammu andKashmir and security threats fromBalochistan Liberation Army fighters,
who killed ten Chinese construction workers in May 2017, and completion of the
14 The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) had sponsored a daily Almaty-Tashkent-Tehran
rail service in 2002, but it was abandonedwithin a fewweeks due to difficulties transitingUzbekistan
(Peyrouse and Raballand, 2015, 415).
15 In October 2019, a 42-container train from Xian crossed the Caspian Sea to Baku and then ran
via the Marmaray Tunnel to Prague. The need to transfer the train to a boat for the Caspian crossing
reduces the attractiveness of the Middle Corridor, while the choice of that route reflected the poor
condition of the Tehran-Turkey railway line. However, the pieces of a competitive SouthernCorridor
are apparent.
16 The Kyrgyz position is confused by the political uncertainty following the October 2020
parliamentary elections and resignation of President Jeenbekov.
17 Joy-Pérez and Scissors (2018, 3) reported that, up to mid-2018, Pakistan had received $31.8
billion for BRI construction expenditure while no other country had received $20 billion.
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rail link is a distant project. Even when the rail link is completed, Gwadar is not
convenient to major trade routes, for example, the Kyaukpyu-Colombo route is a
more convenient Indian Ocean crossing from most of China.
The important point about the BRI projects is that, even if only a fraction are
implemented, China is on the cusp of greatly improved rail connectivity to the west
and south, and these routes will benefit other Eurasian countries.18 The economics
literature, although subject to many methodological caveats, consistently supports
the hypothesis that improved infrastructure is positively related to increased trade,
diversification and growth. The strongest evidence is for a market integration link
facilitating greater specialisation and gains from trading by comparative advantage;
in the Central Asian context, that could mean diversification into a wider range of
exports. Recent studies also identify an infrastructure-growth link via agglomeration
benefits and related labour movements which have the potential to create losers as
well as winners; the losers tend to be people stranded in depressed geographical
regions, while the winners will be not only internal migrants to the big cities, but
also international migrants whose journeys are eased.19
10.5 Will Central Asia Jump Through the Window
of Opportunity?
Whether Central Asian countries take advantage of the improved transport infrastruc-
ture or not will depend upon whether governments improve the soft infrastructure of
international trade and the conditions of doing business in general. Since the end of
the resource boom, there have been signs of increased desire to integrate into global
trade networks, reflected in theWTO accession of Tajikistan in 2012 and Kazakhstan
in 2015 (and increased WTO interest of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) and by the
participation of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic in the Eurasian Economic
Union.20 The EAEU offers smoother travel between the China-Kazakhstan border
and the Belarus-Poland border and into Schengenland, while the BRI could speed
up travel along a rail route south of the Caspian Sea and other spurs from and links
18 It should be noted that the optimism is not universally shared. India strongly opposes the BRI as
a threat to the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean. The USA switched from benevolent neutrality
under President Obama to open hostility since 2017; in October 2018 Vice President Pence warned
countries participating in the BRI of the “constricting belt” and “road to obscurity.”
19 A World Bank project to assess winners and losers from BRI projects at the subnational level
found that Kyrgyz provinces would be the biggest winners (de Soyres et al. 2019; Bird et al. 2020).
However, this estimation of benefits assumed completion of all China’s official BRI projects and
did not assess the likelihood of projects’ completion or include the cost, which is a major obstacle
to completion of the rail link through the southern part of the Kyrgyz Republic.
20 Uzbekistan applied for WTO membership in 1994 but after the introduction of foreign exchange
controls the application languished until it was revived after the election of President Mirziyoyev in
December 2016; aWTOworking party meeting in July 2020 was the first since 2005. Turkmenistan
was the only former Soviet republic to have shown no interest in the WTO, until July 2020 when
the country applied for observer status, the first step to membership.
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between themain lines. Presidential change in the two largest economies, Uzbekistan
in 2016 and Kazakhstan in 2019, may also facilitate economic reform.
Many studies have found a significant positive relationship between infrastructure
and international trade, typically using fairly general indicators of infrastructure, such
as perceptions of port quality or the length of railways or paved roads. In this tradi-
tion, Portugal-Perez and Wilson (2012) used a gravity model to identify the impact
on trade of indicators of hard infrastructure (physical infrastructure, and informa-
tion and communications technology networks) and soft infrastructure (border and
transport efficiency, and the business environment) in 101 countries over the period
2004–7. Physical infrastructure and the business environment had the largest positive
impact on bilateral trade flows; border efficiency and the business environment were
more important at lower per capita GDP levels, and ICT and physical infrastruc-
ture increasingly important as per capita GDP increased. Portugal Perez and Wilson
(2012) also found less robust evidence of complementarity between hard and soft
infrastructure.
More recent literature emphasises the complementarity between hard and soft
infrastructure and their impact on the intensive and extensive margins of trade (i.e.,
whether infrastructure improvements stimulate greater levels of existing trade or trade
diversification into new products) and on the nature of growth (e.g. whether favouring
the rich or inclusive of poorer people). This is relevant to Central Asia and other
landlocked Asian countries. High trade costs have hampered diversification beyond
primary product exports with a strong comparative advantage, such as cotton, oil and
gas, or minerals, and have been prohibitive for small and medium-sized enterprises.
Reducing trade costs by the improved hard and soft infrastructure can promote trade
at the extensive margin and stimulate inclusive growth.
As long as the better hard infrastructure is supported by appropriate soft infras-
tructure, improved rail connectivity will stimulate economic growth through market
integration and agglomeration effects across Eurasia. The rapid growth of rail freight
between China and Europe since 2011 implies that it is economically viable. Non-
transparent subsidies offered by different levels of government in China cloud assess-
ment, but it seems probable that the Landbridge is sustainable and China’s BRI
commitment reinforces that conclusion.21 Despite the disruption to trade due to
COVID-19, the volume of traffic continued to increase in 2019, and especially in
2020, when it was almost double the 2018 level (Table 10.1).22
The pattern of costs of rail, sea and air transport across Eurasia suggests that there
may be opportunities for rail transport to gain market share as speed, reliability and
associated services improve. The relative attractiveness of rail vis-à-vis sea transport
betweenChina and Europe increased substantially during the 2010s as better services
21 The non-transparent subsidies are offered by sub-national authorities. China’sMinistry of Finance
has mandated that all block train subsidies must end by 2022 (CAREC 2020, 39).
22 According to the Maersk CEO for Eastern Europe, China-Europe maritime trade fell by 10% in
the first half of 2020, while trade by rail increased by 25% (reported 12 November 2020 at https://
www.utlc.com/en/news/rates-are-oriented-towards-overland-routes/).
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Table 10.1 Volume of traffic
on China-EU-China container
trains, 2015–20







Source Eurasian Rail Alliance at www.utlc.com (accessed 7
January 2020)
Fig. 10.1 Time and cost of shipping a 40-foot container from China to Europe by Air, Rail and
Sea, 2006 and 2017 SourceHillman (2018), reproduced from Zhang (2017). Note: based on data in
Land Transport Options between Europe and Asia: Commercial Feasibility Study, U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, Washington DC, 2006, and in Zhang (2017—reported in Schramm and Zhang 2018)
were offered, journey timeswere reduced, and efficiency improvements pushed down
rail freight rates (Fig. 10.1).23
Meanwhile, sea freight rates fell by less and shipping times increased due to
slow steaming.24 Schramm and Zhang (2018) estimated the price in 2017 in US
dollars of sending a full 40-foot container from Shanghai to Hamburg: by sea the
cost was $2,410 and time 32 days, by rail $6,350 and 16 days and by air $32,490 and
23 The current market share of rail is still small, no more than five percent of containers between
Europe and East Asia. Ultra large container ships have a capacity over 20,000 TEU and the entire
load transported by rail in 2020 could be carried on 25–30 ships. However, freight travelling by rail
has higher value/weight ratios, and market share by value is much larger.
24 Container ships operate at less than their maximum speed to save money on fuel and to reduce
emissions. Costs may increase over the coming decades as environmental regulations require use
of more expensive low-sulphur fuel.
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four days. From inland cities, the rail advantage would be greater with lower price
and shorter time, for exmaple Chongqing-Duisburg 12 days and $3,700–4,500. Ship
times between China and Europe are also much more variable than train times due
to weather, delays at chokepoints like the Suez Canal and the possibility of piracy.
More reliable delivery time adds to the attractiveness of rail transport, especially
for firms operating complex supply chains and aiming to minimise inventory costs.25
If Eurasian value chains displace regional value chains in East Asia and Europe,
potential GVC participants in Central Asia could find niches in new Eurasian GVCs.
The COVID-19 pandemic may have been a catalyst for accelerated change. Traders
reported that difficulties with maritime transport as ships became stranded and crews
quarantined forced them to usemore expensive rail services in the first half of 2020, to
the extent thatMay 2020was the busiest month to date for Landbridge traffic (Walton
2020). Once accustomed to reliable delivery times, many traders were reluctant to
return to sea transport.
As with most economic changes, there are potential losers from reduced trans-
port costs as well as gainers. Reduced trade costs subject import-competing firms
to greater competition. Locations off the main rail lines may decline as economic
activityflourishes in better-connected locations andworkersmigrate. Thepolicy chal-
lenge for Central Asian governments is to implement economic reforms to increase
the ease of doing business and to improve the soft infrastructure of international
trading without being distracted and obstructed by beneficiaries from the status quo.
In sum, it is hard to forecast the economic impact of the BRI rail projects with
any precision, but the international evidence suggests that improved hard and soft
infrastructure could promote desired economic diversification and generate inclu-
sive growth. At the same time, the BRI could exacerbate some less-desirable long-
term economic development trends through migration, agglomeration and path-
dependence effects. While soft infrastructure improvements tend to be low-cost
and win-win, hard infrastructure projects can be expensive, and many projects
have become symbols of poorly managed public spending. The potential for
debt-dependency due to misguided spending is particularly acute for the smaller
economies, and in the BRI context is especially relevant to the Kyrgyz Republic.
10.6 Conclusion
In the 2020s, theCentralAsian countries could seize the opportunity to be land-linked
through an expanding Eurasian rail network. The promise is that lower trade costs
will encourage export diversification as agricultural and manufacturing producers
exploit their comparative advantage to establish new export markets. For this to
25 Relevant inventory costs vary. For the car firms sending components to their Chinese assembly
plant, reliable delivery times reduce the need to keep stocks of components in the factories. For
electronics companies sending finished products from China to marketing centres in Europe, the
time spent in transit is the important inventory cost.
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be realised, the many obstacles to doing business in Central Asia and to trading
across international borders in the region will need to be reduced. Improved transport
infrastructure can kickstart the process, but the hard infrastructure will have to be
accompanied by improved soft infrastructure, that is, transport, trade and border-
crossing facilitation.
This chapter’s positive view of the Landbridge and, by extension, of the overland
part of the BRI contrasts with the view of many political analysts who see the BRI as
essentially a zero-sum game. Ishnazarov (2020, 79), for example, concludes that the
BRI “will give significant strategic dominance to China” and even if other countries
do receive some economic benefits, that will be at the cost of increased dependence
on China. However, the history of the Landbridge as a forerunner of the “Belt” part
of the BRI suggests that cooperation in operating infrastructure can be beneficial
to all participants; the rail companies of China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and
Poland have profited, as have the freight forwarders and other service companies,
and the customers, including firms sourcing inputs internationally, have benefited
from increased choice on price, speed and reliability. Looking forward, there is
no reason why Central Asian participants should not benefit from future improved
connectivity if they implement appropriate facilitating policies.
Given the regional geography, improvement of soft infrastructure should include
international cooperation as currently fostered by CAREC and potentially including
further multilateral institutions, such as the OSCE. As highlighted in the Introduction
to this chapter, transport, trade and border-crossing facilitation is one of the fourmain
areas of operations of the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Envi-
ronmental Activities. At the December 2016 OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting
in Hamburg, Decision No. 4/16 Strengthening Good Governance and Promoting
Connectivity encouragedOSCEmembers to cooperate in creating “a conducive envi-
ronment for promoting connectivity within the OSCE area” and specifically called
on states “to further promote transparency, integrity and the fight against corrup-
tion in customs, cross-border operations and infrastructure development, including
by improving border-crossing procedures and processes.” Such measures are at the
heart of the soft infrastructure improvements emphasised in this chapter.
There is, of course, a potential gap between aspirations and achievements. The
OSCE has limited funds. This impediment can be overcome through collaboration
with other institutions, such as the CAREC partners. Mayer (2020) highlights poten-
tial benefits from closer collaboration on Central Asia between the OSCE and the
European Union, whose 27 members are OSCE participating states; the EU has
deeper pockets, but the OSCE has the advantage of being a member-driven organi-
sation and the Central Asian countries are themselves all OSCE participating states.
This advantagemay be especially useful in addressing sensitive issues such as corrup-
tion at border posts and the vulnerability of foreign traders. Placing emphasis on
economic as well as security matters could also help to reverse a twenty-first century
pattern, identified by Mayer, of more confident Central Asian host governments
exerting increasing pressure on OSCE field missions to curtail activities based on
human rights, democratisation and civil society empowerment mandates. The focus
would continue to be on good governance, but the emphasis on a link through trade
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facilitation to economic diversification and higher living standards is likely to be
perceived as less confrontational.
This chapter has focussed on economic cooperation and the link to security is
more tenuous. However, the Landbridge has provided an ongoing example of posi-
tive cooperation even as political relationships between the EU and Russia and China
have deteriorated. For the Central Asian countries, a denser network of interna-
tional economic connections is likely to improve the often-frosty bilateral relations
within the region and reinforce strategies of multivector diplomacy vis-à-vis external
partners.
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Chapter 11
Gender Difference in Households’
Expenditure on Higher Education:
Evidence from Mongolia
Tansaya Khajikhan
Abstract The existing evidence suggests that there is a reverse gender gap in higher
education in Mongolia. Prior studies on the reverse gender gap in education were
basedon the gross enrolment rates anddid not delve deeper in termsof using empirical
data analyzed over an extended time-period. This paper investigates gender bias in
the households’ expenditure on higher education and tracks changes over the ten-year
period from 2008 to 2018 using empirical data. In this regard, this study examines the
factors and determinants responsible for the gender bias in the households’ expen-
diture on higher education. To address these questions, the study employs the Engel
Curve approach (unconditional educational expenditure) and Hurdle model, which
estimates bias in the enrolment decisions and bias in the conditional educational
expenditure, both at the household and individual level in 2008 and 2018, using the
Household Socio-Economic Survey of Mongolia. Its findings illustrate that gender
bias in households’ expenditure on higher education does exist, and it favors girls
over boys at the household and individual levels in 2008 and 2018. The findings
show that households allocate a greater share of education expenditure to females
aged 16–18 and 19–24 than to their male counterparts. Statistical analysis suggests
that households’ residence and the occupation of household heads are two important
factors affecting this gender bias. Thus, if a household resides in the countryside
and its head is employed in the agricultural sector, female offspring are more likely
to receive higher education than male offspring. Traditional gender roles and the
Mongolian way of life, which centers around attending to livestock and requiring
a male labor force and the wage gap, are contextual factors that help explain this
gender bias.
Keywords Gender bias · Household‘s expenditure on education · Hurdle model ·
Engel‘s curve · Mongolia
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Intra-household gender bias exists in different forms regarding the household
decision-making process, asset ownership, allocation of food, health, education
expenditure, etc. One such bias that is particularly applicable to Mongolia is the
gender bias in higher education. According to the OECD’s Centre for Educational
Research and Innovation, trends in gender inequality in higher education is defined
as “examining the changes in the composition of the student population in higher
education, the relative share of degrees awarded to women each year, the levels of
education attained bymen andwomen and lastly, the differences between the subjects
studied by men and women” (Lancrin 2008). Female participation in all levels of
education was discriminated against to some degree in almost all countries in the
past centuries. Therefore, until the 1990s men’s participation in higher education
was more common than females in the OECD countries (Lancrin 2008).
However, the trend has changed over the years, and it has become a “reversal
of the gender gap in higher education” in recent decades (Riphahn and Schwientek
2015). For instance, in 2005, there were more female students than men in higher
education in the 16 OECD countries than in the 1990s (Lancrin 2008). Moreover, the
increasing number of students entering higher education has been one of the impor-
tant factors contributing to the country’s development (Woolhouse and Cramphorn
1999). Although education plays an important role in any country’s economic and
sustainable development, the gender imbalance of all types of educational levels is
becoming a phenomenon in many countries. This also applies to Mongolia, in terms
of the higher composition of female students in higher education.
The evidence for the inequality in higher education enrolment rates within the
country shows that males are less favored than females to receive higher education.
The “Gender ProfileMongolia Report,” which is prepared by the Swiss Development
Corporation, concluded that the government should impose quotas for male students
in higher education (SDC 2014). “The Gender Profile Report” also indicated that
reverse gender gap exists in higher education inMongolia and noted that “the gender
imbalance in favor of girls persists at the tertiary level” (SDC 2014). In light of these
findings, however, the Government of Mongolia has not undertaken any measures to
address the gender misbalance in higher education.
Moreover, even though there are more highly educated women in the country, it
does not promise to convert their higher level of education into the highest social
position or higher level of income. In addition, Japan International Cooperation
Agency considered the wage gap and unemployment rates between the two genders
and concluded that girls are expected to have a higher education than boys in order
to be employed in better workplaces. However, the educational advantage for girls
does not hold the promise of stable work or a better salary(Guillén Soto 2011).
According to the “Institute of Labor Economics Report” about the gender gap
in careers in Mongolia, women have better access to education. The young men in
the countryside tend to look after the animals while living at home, whereas girls
have an advantage to pursue higher education (Pastore 2008). It might be one of
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the rational explanations for the widening gender gap. Stereotypes of employment
opportunity for both genders, family decisions for withdrawing boys from school
and low quality of vocational education quality might be the contributing factors to
this gender imbalance. However, there are not approved statistical results or findings
for these assumptions and plausible explanations at the household-level.
Pastore (2008) studies the returns to education of young people inMongolia using
the School to Work Transition Survey in Mongolia which is carried out in 2016. He
found that there is a sizeable gender pay gap in which the median wage of women is
about 25% lower thanmenwith the same characteristics.However, in general,women
have much higher levels of education than men; therefore, on the whole, they should
have higher income. Moreover, estimation results demonstrate that females’ average
return to education is much higher than for males with secondary level education
(11% vs. 20.6) and almost the same at the university level (Pastore 2010). These
findings suggest that females have a higher rate of return to education than men.
There were many programs aimed at decreasing the inequality in gross enrolment
rates in higher education in Mongolia. However, up to now, very little has been done
to examine the gender differences in higher education in Mongolia. Considering
the research gaps, understanding and finding the household influences on higher
education, attendance is very important to develop further policy recommendations
to the Government of Mongolia. Trends in the higher education reverse gender gap
are expressed in terms of raw numbers of the gender gap in related articles about
Mongolia. In order to find more plausible explanations and differences in enrolment
rates for this reverse gender gap, it is important to choose household-level data and
do more quantitative and alternative econometric analyses.
Gender inequalities are not only reflected in the number of highly educated men
and women. In the long term, they hinder efforts to develop the country in many
aspects, such as inclusive economic growth and equal opportunities for both genders
and equity. Furthermore, it will lead to inequalities in the labor market and in society,
such as single-parent homes (headed by women), more single women and less qual-
ified men for jobs. Moreover, it will affect life expectancy and mortality. In other
words, men who have less education than women might find themselves socially
excluded. Therefore, decision makers and governmental actors should consider the
promotion of equal higher education for both genders.
The purpose of the present study is to examine gender differences in higher educa-
tion expenditures within Mongolian household’s decision-making about investing in
higher education. Identifying gender differences in the allocation of households for
investment in higher education in Mongolia is important to understand what policy
measures should be taken to reduce gender inequality in the country. This study iden-
tifies two main research questions. Are there gender differences in the allocation of
higher education expenditures within Mongolian households? What factors explain
households’ educational expenditure and gender difference?
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11.2 Background on Mongolia’s Educational Policy
The importance of education in the overall development of a nation is now recognized
on the global stage (Forum 2016). Furthermore, the quality of education determines
labor productivity and economic growth (Hanushek and Woessmann 2008). There-
fore, since the education index is considered a part of the “Human Development
Index” in most countries, public education is strongly emphasized. Public education
is compulsory up to the basic educational level in many countries, and governments
have committed themselves to guaranteeing opportunities for all students who want
to pursue their education. Thus, to understand the Mongolian context, it is important
to discuss the education system in Mongolia. This will allow for showcasing how
the education system works in the country, how it shows its neutrality in terms of
being universal, and how it does not favor the enrolment of any particular gender,
eliminating any notions that gender bias is a structural issue that stems from the
education system.
Looking back at the history of education, since gaining its independence in 1921,
Mongolia has provided free and universal access to primary, secondary and higher
education to its citizens (Banzragch and Bayanjargal 2018). Meantime, while devel-
oping higher education, Mongolia adopted the Soviet style education system and
“shared a number of cultural characteristics with Central Asia countries” (Weidman
andChapman2004). The language of instructionwasmainlyMongolian and partially
Russian during the socialist period of the history of Mongolia (Worden and Savada
1991). The first university was established in 1942, and since then, the country has
developed its own unique education system with a mixture of the Russian style
education system.
The transition to a market economic system during the early 1990s brought
dramatic changes to the economic and social sphere of the country overall. After
the transition, the higher educational framework, including funding, tuition fees,
academic curriculum and ownership of universities, has been reshaped again by
the Government of Mongolia (IMF 2003). Prior to the transition, “The govern-
ment owned, financed and operated all higher education institutions in Mongolia”
(Weidman andBat-Erdene 2002). Since the adoption of the newConstitution in 1992,
the private sector provision of higher education in Mongolia increased rapidly and
tuition fees for public and private universities increased year by year. As a result,
currently, there are currently 71 private and 21 public and 3 international universities
(NSO 2020a). The introduction of tuition and fees brought considerable financial
burden to families that have many children and thus may lead to gender preference
decisions. Especially poor households are faced with decisions regarding whom to
enroll to tertiary education, boys or girls.
A new Law of Education was introduced after the peaceful democratic revolution
in 1990 and dramatic political shifts in 1991, and in light of constitutional reforms,
and passed with several amendments in 1995 (Banzragch and Bayanjargal 2018). In
Mongolia, kindergarten, elementary, secondary, high school andvocational education
are fully funded by the government and free of charge. Moreover, the Mongolian
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education system was a 10-year system (4 + 4 + 2) up to 2004, and shifted to an
11-year system (5 + 4 + 2), then to a 12-year system (5 + 4 + 3) in 2015. This
was in compliance with international standards (ADB 2017). At the same time, the
official general education age shifted from 7 to 17 years old to 6 to 18 years old.
On the other hand, Mongolian people have the right to free high school education
for 12 years. Note that compulsory education is up to secondary education, which
is nine years, and almost all primary, secondary and high schools in Mongolia are
co-ed, and they enroll both boys and girls together.
After high school graduation, students have two choices to continue their educa-
tion. One is enrolling in technical-vocational schools, and the other is enrolling in
colleges and universities within the country or abroad. The academic length of time
for vocational school is two years, while colleges and universities take from four
to seven years, depending on majors. Vocational schools are also funded by the
government and students received monthly stipends. However, higher education in
the country is financed by students’ households, and partially by the government.
The tuition fee was introduced in 1993, and higher education financing started to be
covered by the tuition payment (Bat-Erdene et al. 2010).
Statistics of gross secondary enrolment rates starting from 2005 to 2018 show
that both genders are almost equally enrolled in basic education (NSO 2020b). It
indicates that parents can send their children without any gender preferences up
to secondary education. Figure 11.1 shows official statistics of enrolment in higher
education institutions by gender between 2002 and 2019 period. In 2002, the numbers
of female students were at 62% of the total number of students. Up to now, in 2019,
the share of female students is 61% (NSO 2020c). In other words, in 2002, there
were 1.66 (female-to-male ratio) females for every male graduating from the higher
educational institutions in Mongolia. After 2002, to the present, relatively small
changes have occurred in higher education enrolment by gender, and the female-to-
male ratio decreased by 0.1. As a result, in 2019, there were 1.56 females for every
male graduating from the higher educational institutions in Mongolia.
The enrolment among the twogenders is different for each academic year, showing
more women obtaining higher education thanmen. From the available statistical data












































Fig. 11.1 Share of students in tertiary educational institutions, by gender, 2002–2019 year. Source
1212.mn (Mongolian Statistical Information Service)
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students’ enrolment rates have hardly increased. It also shows there is a big gender
discrepancy in terms of educational attainments and differences between the levels
of education among males and females. Although the fact is not widely known, the
ratio of female-to-male students in higher education is not balanced in Mongolia.
Therefore, it is worth drawing attention to educational policies to aim at closing the
gap between the level of education between female and male students.
11.3 “Engel and Hurdle Curves” in the Mongolian
Education Sector
An Engel Curve describes a household’s expenditure on a particular good as a
function of the household’s total expenditure and other household characteristics,
assuming that prices are fixed. This model was taken from (Deaton 1997). This
study uses the Working-Leser model for the linear budget share specification, to test
for gender biases within households. The Working-Leser specification is as follows:










⎦ + η‘z j + ui (11.1)
where: si is the budget share of the education expenditure of ith household (education
expenditure/total expenditure), log(xi/ni ) is the log of per capita monthly household
expenditures, xi is the totalmonthly household expenditures; ni is the household size,
ni j
ni
. The household age-gender composition variables (ni is the number of household
members in age-sex category j, for instance: females aged 16–25 as a proportion
of all household members), z j a vector of other household head’s characteristics
including household head’s education in years, gender and age, a dummy variable
for location and household’s occupation, and ui is the error term.
The household age-gender composition variables ni jni can be used to test for gender
biases within the household, where ni j is the number of members in household i in
the jth age-gender category. There are 14 age-gender compositions that are used in
previous studies (such as Subramanian and Deaton 1991; Wongmonta and Glewwe
2017; Datta and Kingdon 2019), which are 0–4 years, 5–9 years, 10–14 years, 15–
19 years, 20–24 years, 25–60 years, and 61 years and more for both males and
females. This study uses 10 age-gender groups: males and females aged 0–5 years,
6–15 years, 16–18 years, 19–25 years, and 25 years and above for both males and
females. Since the ni jni add up to one, 25 years and above is omitted from the estima-
tion. The categories of most interest are males and females aged 16–18 (high school
age) and 19–25 (higher education age), as this paper is concentrated on students
who study at a higher level of education. Thus, the age group under focus mostly
belongs to the 16–25 bracket. The age-gender category is based on children who are
going to join university and studying at the university. And after that age, this paper
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assumes that many people complete their education and start a professional life or
start a family life. The marriage and gender roles in the family might have an impact
on a household’s education expenditure pattern.
The θ j coefficients measure the impact of household age-gender composition on
the share of the household’s budget allocated to education expenditure. One would
expect that the θ j coefficients for age groups 16–18 and 19–25 will be positive, and
that gender biases are likely to exist (Datta and Kingdon 2019). In a separate model,
the gender difference is tested using an F test to see whether (2): (θ j,m = θ j, f ).
In this study, θ j,m stands formale age groups 16–18 and 19–25. θ j, f for female age
groups 16–18 and 19–25. Testing, for example, whethermales aged 16–18 are treated
differently from females aged 16–18, the paper simply seeks whether the coefficient
on m16_18, that is, the proportion of males aged 16–18 years in the household. It
is significantly different from the coefficient on m16 to 18, that is, the proportion of
females aged 16–18 years in the household.
For further analysis, this study adopts the methodology utilized by Datta and
Kingdon (2019) and employs the Hurdle model to explain households’ educational
expenditure patterns. Datta and Kingdon (2019) apply a Hurdle model to Indian data
on education expenditures and compares the results of those obtained with an OLS
estimation. They used the Tobit model as a standard solution for the above-mentioned
problem. However, a Tobit suffers from the problem of heteroskedasticity and it also
assumes that a single mechanism determines the decision whether to spend anything
at all (s = 0 vs. s > 0), and the decision of how much to spend, given positive
spending (s | s > 0). Alternative to the Tobit model is the Hurdle model, which is
widely used as a two-part model. The first part of the Hurdle model is to estimate
the probability of positive educational expenditures. The second part of the model
uses OLS regression of educational expenditure for households with positive levels
of expenditures, mentioned as conditional OLS (Wooldridge 2010).
In particular, the marginal effects ∂P(s > 0|x)/∂x j and ∂E(s|x, s > 0)/∂x j are
constrained to have the same sign.
An alternative to censored Tobit that allows the initial decision of s = 0 versus s
> 0 to be separate from the decision of how much s is, given that s > 0, is the “Hurdle
model” (Wooldridge 2010). These models allow the effect of a variable to differently
affect the decision s = 0 versus s > 0, and the conditional decision of how much
to spend (s|s > 0). A simple Hurdle model can be written down as (from Datta and
Kingdon 2019):
P(s = 0|x) = 1 − (xγ ) (11.2)
log(s)|(x, s > 0) ∼ Normal(xβ, σ 2) (11.3)
where s is the budget share of education, x a vector of household characteristics, β
and γ are parameters to be estimated, and σ is the deviation of s. Equation (11.3)
estimates the probability that s is a zero or positive. Equation (11.4) presents—a
conditional—positive education expenditure and follows a lognormal distribution.
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Note that Eq. (11.2) is simply a probit regression, while Eq. (11.3) is the conditional
OLS.
The conditional expectation of E(s|x, s > 0) and the unconditional expectation
of E(s|x) are easy to obtain using properties of the lognormal distribution (from
Datta and Kingdon 2019). This is shown below:














Therefore, the marginal effect of x on s can be obtained by transforming the
marginal effect of x on log(s) using the exponent. Thus, the marginal effect of x on
s in the OLS regression can be obtained by transforming the marginal effect of x on
log(s) using the exponent. Thus, the marginal effect of x on s in the OLS regression
of log(s) conditional on s > 0 is obtained by taking the derivative of the conditional
expectation of s with respect to x (from Kingdon 2005). This is shown below:
∂E(s|x, s > 0)
∂x
= β.exp(xβ + σ 2/2) (11.6)
Using the product rule and taking the derivative of the unconditional expectation


















.exp(xβ + σ 2/2)
(11.7)
where(.) is the standard normal density function, and(.) is the cumulative normal
distribution function.
Equation (11.7) refers to the combinedmarginal effect of an independent variable.
Estimates of γ, βandσ 2 are obtained from the Hurdle model.
The main question of this study is the presence of gender differences in house-
holds. Thus, the presence of the gender difference will be tested using the difference
in marginal effects and combined marginal effects of selected age-gender categories.
These calculationswill provide the answer for gender bias in amore nuancedmanner.
The standard errors of the coefficients and the combined marginal effect standard
error are estimated by bootstrapping in STATA (from Kingdon 2005).
Inmanyother studies, researchers used regional dummyand ethnicity.However, in
Mongolia, regional cluster and ethnicity do not havemuch significance, as the country
is quite homogeneous ethnically, with the majority of the population comprised of
the same social and ethnic groups. The Mongolian language is spoken by more than
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95% of the population, and the second largest ethnic group is Kazakh, consisting 4%
of the total population. In this regression estimation, I used herder for occupation
and a rural dummy for the location since 31.4% of the population lives in rural areas
(NSO 2021). Moreover, 26% of households from total households account for herder
households (NSO 2021). Thus being a herder and this occupation plays a significant
role in this country. Moreover, people who live in the countryside tend to spend
less on their male children’s education (Diffendal and Weidman 2011). As a result,
dropping out of high school is more common in male students.
In addition to estimating the Engel Curve andHurdlemodel using household-level
data, this paper will use individual level data to test for gender bias. The dependent
variable of the individual model is “total higher education expenditure” in absolute
terms rather than the budget share of the household’s expenditure onhigher education.
The difference between the individual level model and the household-level model is
that the gender dummy variable “female” is used instead of age-gender categories.
However, the remaining variables of the individual level model are identical with
household-level variables. The methodology presented above allows one to examine
the effects of child gender on higher education expenditure, controlling for other
relevant characteristics. Since the pattern of the allocation of educational resources
within a household would depend on the child’s level of education, the equation for
each education expenditure category is estimated separately for the three age groups
of interest.
The data used in this analysis is extracted from the Household Socio-Economic
Survey (HSES) conducted in 2008 and 2018. The datawas obtained from theMongo-
lian National Statistics Office (NSO) from the publicly available platform 1212.mn.
The NSO conducts the survey every year, and data collection covers a 12-month
period to capture seasonal variations. The HSES 2008 and 2018 is a nationally
representative survey that intends to evaluate and monitor households’ income and
expenditure and measure poverty and consumer price index analysis. The survey
has the following components: basic socio-economic information about household
members, education, health, migration, employment, payment of jobs and other
income, savings and loans, housing and energy, durable goods, non-food expen-
ditures and food consumption (30 days’ daily food diary for urban households and
7 days’ food diary for rural households and eating out).
For the 2008 HSES, data was collected from 11,172 households, which consists
of 44,510 individual level data. The analysis of the 2008 HSES was limited to house-
holds that have at least one child aged 16–24, which decreases the data size to 4,518.
For the 2018 HSES, data was collected from 16,454 households, which consists of
59,820 individual level data. The sample sizewas reduced from the 16,454-household
data size, the sample size was reduced to 5,183 households that have at least one
child aged 16–24. Education expenditure was available at the individual level for
the past 12 months. It consists of the following subparts: tuition fees, accommoda-
tion, books and other stationary supplies, transportation, and other expenses such as
private tutoring.
Since this paper is aimed at estimating the higher educational expenditure, data is
limited to households with male and female children aged 16 to 24. The age group
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16 to 24 years old was selected based on the Mongolian education system year and
official age of education. Moreover, Pastore, professor of Economics at Seconda
Università di Napoli, classified the age groups as teenagers (aged 15–19 years),
young adults (aged 20–24 years), and the oldest segment of young people (aged
25–29 years). The breakdown of the age group 20–24 belonged to mostly students
studying at higher educational institutions. Based on this information, this study
refers to an age group of 16–18 old pupils. I this age group, it is critical for parents
to decide whether to invest extra resources in their children’s education, in order for
them to continue their studies. In this regard, it is at this age that parents have to
decide whether to arrange private tutoring for general entrance exams or motivate
their children to keep growing by sending them to private schools. Therefore, the age
group of 19–24 by gender is considered to be the most essential part of this paper.
Each age group will be explained separately after the estimated results to give more
of an understanding of the gender bias issue.
Before estimating the factors impacting household higher educational expenditure
in Mongolia, it is useful to present some descriptive statistics. Thus, Table 11.2
presents the variable names and their definition and also the mean, the standard
deviation of variables used in the analysis data from the 2008 and 2018 HSES.
The dependent variable in the Engel Curve analysis is the share of educational
expenditure in total household expenditure. The key variables of interest are the
age and gender category of 16–18 years and 19–24 years above for both males and
females. The share of male and female children aged between 16 and 18 years old
and 19 to 24 years old are comparable from Table 11.2. In the 2008 HSES data, male
and females aged 16–18 are shown to have the same mean equal to 8.1% and quite
similar mean for the 19–24 age groups. Furthermore, in the 2018 HSES data, 6.4%
for males and 5.8% for female 16–18, whereas 10% for males and 9.3% for female
19–24 age group.
The proportion of females aged 19–24 years old in the household was used to
investigatewhether budget shares for education increasewith the addition of a female
aged 19–24 years to a household. Education expenditure as a share of total expen-
diture for all households with at least one child aged 16–24 is reasonable at approx-
imately 9% in 2008 and was lowered to 6.4% in 2018. Because higher education
is not free, and we expect that the expenditure on higher education will increase.
Moreover, the Table 11.1 shows that almost half of the households live in rural areas
for the two years of study. It means that people who live in rural areas significantly
affect the nationwide interpretation of the current estimation result. In addition, urban
households’ decision also matters most. As mentioned above, the rural areas’ house-
holds tend to invest more in their daughters’ education than their sons (Mongolian
Education Alliance 2005). This is due to the labor force deficiency in the agriculture
sector for the men. In addition, child labor could explain the education gender gap
in higher education since in rural areas, the dropout rate is high for male students
compared to females.
Male and female responsibilities within the household can be a reflection of social
norms that determine—often for the rest of their lives—the future of many women
and men. It should be noted that most rural families tend to participate in livestock or
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Table 11.1 Description of variables and summary statistics at the household-level
Variable Definition of variables 2008 2018
Mean SD Mean SD
Dependent





9.0 10.2 6.484 9.446
Independent
lnpcexp Log of household
expenditure per capita
12.11 0.615 15.11 0.717
lnhhsize Natural logarithm of
household size
1.52 0.35 1.478 0.349
Age-gender category
m16 18 Share of male children
16–18
0.081 0.123 0.064 0.115
m19 24 Share of male children
19–24
0.109 0.146 0.109 0.147
m25 Share of male children 25
and above
0.198 0.121 0.208 0.129
f16 18 Share of female children
16–18
0.081 0.121 0.058 0.109
f19 24 Share of female children
19–24
0.106 0.142 0.093 0.133
f25 Share of female children
25 and above
0.251 0.112 0.259 0.115
Household Head’s characteristics
hheadage Household head’s age in
years
49.138 8.952 49.148 8.636
sqhheadage Square of household
head’s age in years
2494.06 978.66 2490.10 941.74
headgender Gender of the household
head, dummy (male = 1)
0.772 0.42 0.771 0.42
marital Household head’s marital
status, dummy
0.739 0.42 0.753 0.431
sec higher Household head’s level of
education, dummy (if
secondary and high
education = 1, 0
otherwise)
0.612 0.487 0.669 0.471
livestock A dummy variable = 1
where household’s head






Variable Definition of variables 2008 2018
Mean SD Mean SD
Rural Location, dummy (1 if
rural, 0 if urban)
0.413 0.492 0.481 0.5
Table 11.2 Descriptive statistics for education expenditure per child aged 16–24, by gender,




Male Female Total Male Female Total
Tuition and school fees 217,327 222,650 220,283 1,136,513 1,249,069 1,196,257
Accommodation 30,188 37,615 34,314 208,856 225,915 217,911
Books and stationary 46,487 49,358 48,081 105,919 116,598 111,588
Uniforms 9521 9502 9510 32,250 24,830 28,311
Expense on
transportation
43,442 47,342 45,608 86,491 84,790 85,588
Other education
expenditures
104,090 108,713 106,658 72,963 66,078 69,309
Total education
expenditure
451,055 475,181 464,457 1,642,992 1,767,280 1,708,963
Source Compiled by the author from the 2008 and 2018 HSES data
Notes These figures include children aged 16–24 within the household, respectively
animal husbandry. For this reason, the number of men in the household matters for
raising and maintaining the livestock numbers and are typically most affected when
it comes to rural areas. On the other hand, it is likely that rural areas’ households,
which have a higher poverty level, may need to use their sons to earn money for
their families, while young female members can attend to school due to their lack of
capability to work as herders (Diffendal and Weidman 2011).
Table 11.2 presents descriptive statistics on detailed education expenditure cate-
gories, calculated from the 2008 and 2018 HSES at the individual level. Since the
data is at the individual level, the present paper divided expenditure categories by
gender. The survey results show that the total education expenditure per child aged
16–24 is about 464,457 MNT in 2008 and 1,708,963 MNT in 2018. The mean
education expenditure per child aged 16–24 shows tuition fee, dormitory, books,
and equipment, which is higher for female students than for male students. Table
11.1 suggests that male students have less total education expenditure by 24,126
tugrug/year (one percent) than females in 2008. Moreover, in 2018, this figure shows
that male students have less total education expenditure of 1,642,992 tugrug/year
comparing to female students 1,767,280 tugrug/year. In terms of tuition fee, in 2008,
it was 220,283 tugrug total in 2008 and increased by 5.5 times in 2018. In the mean-
time from 2008 to 2018, the tuition fee of tertiary education had increased around
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five times in the report prepared by NSO ofMongolia (NSO 2019).Hence, the tuition
fee results were consistent with the NSO report about tuition fee information from
2000 to 2018.
However, the budget share of the education expenditure decreased by 2.5% from
2008 to 2018. Therefore, tuition fees account for around 48% of the total education
expenditure, and female students have higher total education expenditure than male
students in 2008. However, it soared by 70% of the total education expenditure as of
2018.
School uniforms had the least share at 2% of total education expenditure. It shows
most students do notwear special uniforms during the academic year, except for some
majors (nurses, doctors). Unfortunately, on the questionnaire, the clothing expendi-
ture question does not distinguish between adults and children clothes. Hence, this
paper could not include clothing inside the individual level expenditure. In addition,
other education expenditures show less amount comparing to the other expenses. It
might be the reason students at that age do not need additional schooling or private
tutoring since they are enrolling at paid universities. Furthermore, there is no need to
enroll in extra activities, whereas high school students mostly prepare for the General
Entrance Examination, to gain enrolment in universities and often prefer to get extra
schooling, which is paid in general.
11.4 The Household-Level
More than 80% of the households with children aged 16–24 in the HSES 2008 and
2018 had positive total education expenditure; for this reason, ordinary least squares
(OLS) were applied for the household-level of higher education expenditure. Table
11.3 represents the Engel Curve of higher educational expenditure for households
with at least one child aged 16–24 (those with either positive or non-educational
expenditure). From the estimation results, the log of total household monthly expen-
diture per capita is not significant and negative in 2008, whereas it was both positive
and significant in 2018. In 2018, per capita monthly expenditure indicates that when
per capita expenditure increases, the education budget share also increases because
the higher educational expenditures are usually costlywhen households have children
to pay for their tuition fee.
In other words, the coefficients of the higher education elasticity are positive,
which states that it is treated as a luxury good. The log of number of household
members is significant and positive in both years, which indicates that larger house-
holds are certain to have extra educational expenditures compared to smaller house-
holds. It suggests that the larger households will havemore resources or money as the
demand for higher education increases. This matches that theoretical explanation,
which argues that larger households are better off due to per capita resources (Press
2010). However, note that household heads with higher education levels are more
likely to have smaller families and extra educational expenditure.
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Table 11.3 OLS estimation results of Engel‘s Curve estimation, educational budget share, 2008
and 2018
Variables 2008 2018





−0.265 0.192 8.342b 1.997
Log of household
members
2.079b 0.588 1.583b 0.548
f16_18 15.23b 1.702 12.84b 1.721
f19_24 20.32b 1.563 14.78b 1.571
f25_ 1.400 2.034 −0.662 1.571
m16_18 10.73b 1.589 7.04b 1.715
m19_24 13.47b 1.469 9.14b 1.472
m25_ −3.946a 1.769 −3.80a 1.568
sec_highe 2.385b 0.353 0.83a 0.307
Maritalstatus 1.973b 0.671 −0.377 1.155
Headgender 0.649 0.807 0.809 0.441
Household head’s
age in years
0.151 0.149 −0.1241 0.115
Square of household
head’s age in years
−0.00155 0.00140 0.000893 0.00104
Livestock 0.464 0.446 −0.578a 0.347
Rural 0.115 0.397 −0.968a 0.304
Constant −3.754 4.651 −5.293 4.249
Observations 4,084 5,183
Robust standard errors in parentheses (Significant at 10%, aSignificant at 5% or better, bHighly
Significant at 1% or better percent)
The most crucial result for this paper was to observe the age-gender categorical
variables and compare these coefficients with females and males of the same age
group. As expected, the coefficients for the female aged 16–18, and 19–24 is statisti-
cally significant and positive in both years. The same goes for the males’ coefficients
aged between 16 and 18 and 19–24. Another interesting finding is that the coefficient
of females aged 25 and above turned out to be not statistically significant and nega-
tive signs, which means after reaching 25, females are less likely to spend on higher
education. This can also explain that after the age 25, females are more likely to get
married and do not continue pursuing a higher level of education. On the other hand,
males aged 25 and above have negative significant higher education expenditure and
are less likely to spend on education compared to the other age groups.
Having an education level higher than the secondary level for the head of the
household is also positively significant for both years. This indicates that household
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headswith a higher level of education tend to investmore in their children’s education
expenditure and suggest a higher preference for children’s education among educated
heads of households. This result is consistent with past studies that show that the
head of the household’s years of education is a significant determinant of de mand
for children‘s education (Datta and Kingdon 2019; Kenayathulla 2016; Wongmonta
and Glewwe 2017).
Moreover, the gender, age, and age squared of the household head have no effect
and non-significant on the budget share of household higher education in both years.
These are consistent with the results of the studies consulted (Datta and Kingdon
2019; Himaz 2010; Kenayathulla 2016; Wongmonta and Glewwe 2017).
The occupation of herder was not statistically significant and positive in 2008.
However, the occupation of a herder was negatively significant in 2018. It indicates
that if a person is a herder and household head, there will be a decrease in the
budget share of education rather than an increase. Therefore, the location dummy,
which is rural areas, is negatively significant, and it goes in line with the occupation
of the herder. This suggests that rural households, which are mostly involved in
animal husbandry, are more likely to spend less on a household’s higher educational
expenditure.
Coming to the point of whether there is a gender bias in the household higher
educational expenditure, the coefficients on the proportion of males and females
demonstrates that: (1) households are more likely to allocate higher educational
expenditure for females than males, (2) the gender discrepancy exists in age groups
16–18 and 19–24.
According to the estimation results in Table 11.4. Table 11.5 gives an outline of
the bias in gender coefficients for a budget share of higher educational expenditure.
From Table 11.4, the differences in gender coefficients for ages 16–18 and 19–24 are





Female coeff Male coeff Female-male
diff
Female coeff Male coeff Female-male
diff
16–18 15.23b (1.702) 10.73b (1.589) 4.5b 12.84b (1.721) 7.03b (1.715) 5.81b
19–24 20.32b (1.563) 13.47b (1.469) 6.85b 14.78b (1.571) 9.14b (1.472) 5.64b
Robust standard errors presented in parentheses (Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%or better, bHighly
Significant at 1% or better percent)
Table 11.5 F tests Age groups 2008 2018
16–18 9.17 (0.0025) 16.06 (0.0001)
19–24 19.37 (0.000) 18.07 (0.000)
Notes The F-tests refer to a testing for the equality of coefficients,
for instance, f16_18 and m16_18
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statistically highly significant and positive in 2008 and 2018, respectively. Moreover,
it means if a child had been a female rather than male in the age group 16–18 within
the same household, families would have spent 4.5% more on her higher education
expenditure in 2008 and 5.8% more in 2018, respectively.
In addition, if a child had been a female rather than male in the age group 19–24
within the same household, families would have allocated 6.85%more on her higher
education expenditure in 2008 and 5.64% more in 2018, respectively. It should be
pointed out that the scales of the differences in the age group 16–18 became larger in
2008 than in 2018. It seems, on the contrary, the magnitude in the age group 19–24
coefficient decreased by 1.21 in 2018. These results show that there is a significant
gender bias in the allocation of household higher education expenditure in Mongolia
in both years. These findings are consistent with previous findings that reveal that
gender bias favoring females in intra-household education expenditure allocation for
Thailand and Sri Lanka (Himaz 2010; Wongmonta and Glewwe 2017).
Another important approach to detect gender bias in household higher educational
expenditure is the method using the F test. The F test compares the difference of the
coefficients in males and females of the same group. If there is no gender bias, then
coefficients of male and female age groups would be equal to each other. Table 11.6
shows F tests the equality of the coefficients, which computes F-statistics and p-value
presented in brackets.
The F tests are shown in Table 11.5 suggests that the female age group 16–18
coefficient is not equal to the male age group coefficient 16–18 in both years. Hence,
the statistical significance reveals a gender bias favoring females aged 16–18 and
19–24 in 2008 and 2018. These estimation results from Tables 11.4 and 11.5 provide
evidence for gender bias favoring females aged 16–24 over males aged 16–24, espe-
cially in the allocation of higher educational expenditure within the households.
These estimates of F tests are consistent with those of Himaz (2010) for Sri Lanka;
her estimates ranged from 4.23 to 12.15 in school-age groups (Himaz 2010).
In summary, the Engel Curve Method is able to pick up the gender bias within the
household’s higher educational expenditure in 2008 and 2018. Moreover, over the
ten-year period from 2008 to 2018, the gender bias in household higher education
expenditure has not disappeared; it still exists. Before jumping to conclusions, it is
important to note that the Engel Curve cannot explain the gender bias itself alone.
As the Engel Curve is mainly interested in education expenditure once children are
enrolled in a higher education institute or university. Hence, it is better to explore
the other approaches to offer more plausible explanations.
Another way to detect gender bias at the household-level is by using the Hurdle
model by dividing a household’s education expenditure into two parts. Many
researchers have used this approach, such as Kingdon, who applied this model
first in 2005 for estimating gender differences in household’s education expendi-
ture (Kingdon 2005). The main technique of this model is to have two parts: (1) a
binary probit of whether the budget share of a household’s higher education expen-
diture is positive or zero; (2) linear regression of the natural log of higher education
budget share and incurred conditional on positive higher education expenditure. In





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































addition, this model is fitted for households with at least one child aged 16–24 years.
Table 11.6 represents the first and the second part of the Hurdle model.
From Table 11.6, the probit model estimates “anyexpend,” and explains the
first decision about enrolment and whether any positive education expenditure was
incurred or not. Therefore, conditional OLS estimates “logedushare,” about how
much to spend on education and shows the natural logarithm of budget share of
education. The Table 11.6 columns show that the log of per capita monthly house-
hold expenditure (lnpcmonthly_hh_exp) have a significant positive impact on budget
share of education in the probit of anyexpend in 2008 and 2018. However, in the
conditional OLS model, it is negative and significant for both years.
This shows that the tertiary education tuition fee is not free and that higher educa-
tion enrolment might depend on a household’s economic status, as better off house-
holds allocate a bigger share to education. The effect of the number of household
members on the higher education budget share is significant and positive in the probit
estimates in both years. It suggests that the larger households have more children to
send to higher educational institutes, which is in line with the theoretical considera-
tion about per capita resources. These are consistent with estimates from the Engel
Curve Model presented in Table 11.3 and previous studies (Aslam and Kingdon
2008; Kingdon 2005; Malik et al. 2018).
In the probit and the conditional OLS model, the household head’s education
dummy variable “sec_higher,” whether the education level is above secondary level
or not, is positive and statistically significant in 2008 and 2018. It demonstrates that
the household head’s level of education significantly increases the budget share of
household’s higher education expenditure in the both models. For instance, in the
conditional model the household’s level of education increases the budget share of
the household’s higher education expenditure by 2.5 in 2008 and by 3.6 in 2018,
respectively. It reveals the higher demand for the education of children among more
educated parents. These findings are consistent with the Engel Curve estimation
results and also with past studies (Aslam and Kingdon 2008; Datta and Kingdon
2019; Himaz 2010; Kenayathulla 2016).
For the household head’s occupation, the “herder” variable is chosen to explain
the household’s main activity, whether they are involved in animal husbandry or not.
In other words, it stands for herders who live in rural areas. In both models, the effect
of being a herder is negative and significant for both years. Also, it suggests that being
a herder decreases the budget share of higher education expenditure and tends to lead
to less spending on higher education in 2008 and 2018. This finding is consistent with
the result from the Engel CurveModel in the previous section at the household-level.
Therefore, the finding from Ghana in 2018 suggests that households whose heads
work in the agricultural sector have a lower budget share of education as compared to
other sectors. Moreover, it was significant, too, as it indicates that households whose
heads have agriculture-related jobs tend to spend less on education than others (Malik
et al. 2018). This is also applicable to Mongolia, where most people are engaged in
the agricultural sector.
Turning to the point of gender bias in the household higher education expenditure,
the coefficients of the age-gender category variables are presented in Table 11.8 with
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Table 11.7 The difference in marginal effects (DME) × 100 of gender variables by age group

















9.6c 9.98c 8.33c 2c 11.57c 6.59c
Notes In Col.3 Combined means Probit + Conditional OLS (aSignificant at 10%, bSignificant at
5% or better, cHighly Significant at 1% or better percent)
their significance level. The variable “f16_18” is the proportion of females aged 16–
18 compared with the variable “m16_18,” the proportion of males aged 16–18. All
these demographic variables, which show the gender bias, are statistically significant
in 2008 and 2018. The impact of these variables’ marginal effect help to detect the
gender bias within the household education expenditure. This paper computes the
difference in marginal effects from Table 11.6 and presents separately in Table 11.7
for further interpretation. The DME of the combined marginal effects, or the Hurdle
model results, are reported in Table 11.7.
Since themain focus of this paper is gender bias, the analysis in this section focuses
on the difference of the age-gender categorical variables f16_18 and m16t_18 (share
of female and male children ages 16–18), and f19_24 and m19_24 (share of female
and male children ages 19–24). Table 11.7 presents the difference in marginal effects
(DME) of these variables for the ages 16–18 and ages 19–24 for 2008 and 2018.
The method used to calculate the DME is based on the approach by (Datta and
Kingdon 2019). Table 11.7 presents the Probit Model in the marginal effects form
in both years. First, in order to calculate the DME of the Probit Model, the marginal
effect of m16_18 (0.0342) was subtracted from f16_18 (0.205), and then the result
was multiplied by 100 to obtain the 17.08 (0.1708 × 100). A positive DME demon-
strates a favor of female bias, whereas a negative DME demonstrates a favor of male
bias in the budget share of higher education. The associated p-value is presented of
the t-test of the DME.
TheDMEof conditional OLS required a different approach than the ProbitModel.
The dependent variable of the model is presented in the logarithm form as the log
of educational shares. First, retransformation of the log of educational shares was
needed before calculating differences between the marginal effects of the two vari-
ables (for instance, f16_18 to m16_18). So, the DME of the conditional OLS can be
compared with the difference in gender coefficient of the Engel model and also with
the Probit Model. For 2008, the coefficient on the variable f16_18 in the conditional
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on the m16_18 is 0.697. Applying the method of retransformation, the log transfor-
mation is estimated using the property of the log normal distribution expectation of







(Datta and Kingdon 2019).
Moreover, the calculation command on the STATA is taken from Cameron
and Trivedi estimation example (Cameron 2009). The exp(.) for this sample is
0.131472. Second, the transformed marginal effect for the f16_18 is calculated
f16_18*exp(.) = 0.9424901*0.131472 = 0.123911. For the males, m16_18* exp(.)
= 0.6970488*0.131472 = 0.091642. Hence, the difference of the marginal effect
between f16_18 (share of female children aged 16–18) and m16_18 (share of male
children aged 16–18) is 0.0322. In Table 11.10, the DME is multiplied by 100, and
the DME, in this case, is 3.23. These computing procedures were repeated for the
age group 19 to 24 and for both years.
The DME of the combined marginal effects from the probit and conditional OLS
model is calculated differently from the above-mentioned DMEs. The estimation is
calculated in theway shown inEq. (11.7) andusedSTATAcommand for the combined
marginal effect. For the coefficient on the variable f16_18 combined marginal effect
is 11.5336 and for themalem16_18 is 6.892937. TheDMEof the combinedmarginal
effect of the age group 16–18 is 4.641 in 2008. The same procedures were repeated
for the age group 19–24 and also for both years.
From the DME results reported in Table 11.7, a comparison of 2008 and 2018
results for the 16 to 18 age group shows that in 2008 the DME of the Probit Model
was 17.08. There was statistically significant pro-female bias in positive education
expenditure and enrolling a child in higher education. Furthermore, in 2018, the
DME of the Probit Model coefficient was 17.7, which is similar to the result of 2008.
Overall, it indicates that having an additional female child aged 16–18 increased the
probability of the household having “positive education expenditure,” significantly
more than having an additional male child aged 16–18.
In addition, the conditional OLS is significantly positive in both years for the age
group 16–18. It suggests that the households spend 3.23% less for males aged 16–18
than for females of similar age, once the decision on “how much” to spend has been
made in 2008. By 2018, the coefficient of the DME was 11.64, which increased by
8.41 after ten years in the age group 16–18. Thus, the DME of the combined probit
and the conditional OLS or “the Hurdle model” for the age group 16–18 also detects
gender bias in 2008. Moreover, the DME of the combined model was positive and
highly significant in 2018 in the age group 16–18 too. It leads to the conclusion that
both the Engel Curve approach and Hurdle model detect the existence of gender bias
in both years.
Moving to the 19–24 age group in 2008, the coefficient of the DME in the Probit
Model is positive and highly significant. However, in 2018 the DME of age group
19–24 shows different signs than 2008. It suggests that a pro-male bias exists in 2018
for the age group 19–24 in the Probit Model. Nevertheless, it is important to draw
a conclusion after the combined marginal effects of the probit and the conditional
OLSmodel. Furthermore, theDME in the conditionalOLSmodel shows significantly
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positive signs in both years. This result has increased by 1.59%over a ten-year period.
It illustrates the decision on how much was spent per household’s on education.
Similar to the DME of the age group 16–18, the gender bias favoring a female
child was also detected in both reported years. Additionally, it indicates that after
enrolling the male and female children alike, households may spend or allocate more
expenditure on the female children’s education than on male children’s.
The DME of the combined marginal effects or the Hurdle model results reported
in Table 11.7, column 3 and 6 for the year 2008 and 2018, respectively. In the age
group 19–24 in 2008, unsurprisingly, this paper detects a pattern of gender difference
and reports significantly positive results. It also has been reduced over ten years’
period by 1.74. This finding is consistent with the result of Engel Curve Method’s
difference in the coefficients of age group 19–24, which is also reduced by 1.21 over
time. Therefore, the Hurdle model is expected to detect the gender bias better than
Engel Curve in many resources (Aslam and Kingdon 2008; Datta and Kingdon 2019;
Himaz 2010).
In summary, the estimation results of using the household-level data suggest that
the gender bias in households’ higher education expenditure in the age groups 16–18
and 19–24 have remained over the ten years from 2008 to 2018. Therefore, in the age
group 16–18 in both years, the gender difference is high in the enrolment decision or
in the Probit Model. It indicates that the most important decisions have been made
about whether to enroll children or not at this particular age. Besides that, the DME
for the age group 16–18 is positive and highly significant in the Probit Model in both
years. It indicates that the probability of having positive budget shares for education
increases 17% more with the addition of a female child aged 16–18 than with the
addition of a male child aged 16–18 in 2008 and 2018, respectively.
11.5 Gender Bias and Individuality
Marginal effects of the individual and household-level estimation results cannot be
compared because age-gender categorical variables in the household-level data do not
exist in the individual level data. Moreover, the dependent variable of the individual
level is estimated in absolute terms in conditional and unconditional OLS methods
rather than the budget share of the education from the total household expenditure.
For this reason, this paper cannot compare the estimated results of the household-
level data (Table 11.6) with individual level estimated results (Table 11.9). However,
since the main interest of this paper is to investigate the gender difference of the
households education expenditure, the individual level data analysis included the
gender dummy variable “female” to detect gender bias. Thus, the individual level
data estimation results are presented with the statistical significance on the Hurdle
model and Engel Curve.
On the individual level analysis, the age groups are divided into 16–18 and 19–24
groups to get more rigorous results and to capture gender bias at different age groups.
Thus, the estimation results of the year 2008 and 2018 are presented in separate tables
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for space reasons (see Tables 11.9 and 11.10). Moreover, descriptive statistics for
each year at the individual level are also presented in Tables 11.13 and 11.14.
The individual level analysis results suggest some important perceptions about
the gender bias in household education expenditure. In 2008, the probit estimation or
the enrolment decision (anyexp) in the age group 16–18 and 19–24 was statistically
significant and positive. It suggests that gender bias in the enrolment decision at
the individual level still exists, which favors female children. Moreover, it goes in
line with household-level findings which showed pro-female bias. In other words, it
means that having an additional female child aged 16–18 and 19–24 increased the
probability of the household having “positive education expenditure” significantly
more than having an additional male child aged 16–18 and 19–24.
Comparing the 2008 results with the 2018 findings at the individual level also
shows a similar gender bias trend, which is pro-female. It is also positive and highly
statistically significant. However, themarginal effect of the “female” dummyvariable
has decreased by 0.02379 in the age group 16–18 and by 0.02837 in the age group
19–24, respectively, from 2008 to 2018. In the conditional OLS model the “female”
dummy variable is insignificant in the age group 16–18 in 2008. However, it is highly
significant in other age groups of 2008 and 2018. It shows that once the decision is
made on “how much to spend,” the pro-female bias exists in the age group 19–24 in
2008, and 16–18 and 19–24 in 2018.
In the unconditional OLS method or Engel Curve approach, the “female” dummy
variable is insignificant in the age group 16–18 in 2008 and age groups 16–18, 19–24
in 2018. From these findings, it can be stated that the Engel Curve approach fails
to detect gender bias at the individual level in some ways. The failure of the Engel
Curve approach was also presented in the household and individual level in India
(Datta and Kingdon 2019).
The present paper has shown strong empirical evidence of gender bias in house-
hold’s higher education expenditure in favor of females inMongolia. Other empirical
studies have found gender bias in higher education at a national level, reflecting raw
numbers (Nozaki et al. 2009). This section tries to explain the factors responsible for
gender bias in higher education in Mongolia.
There is no single answer that can explain the above-mentioned gender bias.
In traditional Mongolian society, the dowry or bride payment has little importance
among theMongolian people. Therefore, the national study on gender-based violence
inMongolia survey (2018) conducted by the UNFPA inMongolia included the ques-
tions about the dowry and concluded that there is not much evidence that marriage
involves a dowry (Nations and Fund 2018). However, in other countries such as
Thailand and Sri Lanka, which have a female preference in education, there is an
evidence that dowry plays an important role in this gender bias (Wongmonta and
Glewwe 2017). Because for the better-educated girls, the payment will be higher
compared to the less-educated girls.
Historically, Mongolian households were patriarchal, so that a bride moved to her
husband’s parents’ home and lived with them. The youngest son and his wife are
expected to take care of his parents (Rogers 2020). In addition, therewas noobligation
for married women in Mongolia to support their parents and live with them. This
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also applies to current Mongolian society. In this case, there is no evidence that
girls were favored in terms of inheritance. However, because the male workforce is
more needed in the livestock sector, parents prefer to send their daughters to higher
education institutes rather than boys (Diffendal and Weidman 2011).
Another important aspect of this factor could be the different returns to education
for men and women in the labor market in Mongolia. Because there is a wage gap
between men and women, in order to get paid equally with men, women are required
to have more education and more competence (Pastore 2010).
The 2018 HSES used the Mincerian wage equations for men and women sepa-
rately for estimations to address this possibility. The analysis is limited to men and
women who work full time because theMincerian wage equation captures the male–
female wage gaps (Heckman et al. 2003). There are 12,206 individuals who work
full time and received a salary in the HSES 2018, 5,879 (48%) women.
The descriptive statistics of the main variables for men and women used in
estimating the Mincerian wage equation are presented in Tables 11.11 and 11.12,
respectively. Note that women have more years of schooling or education than men;
however, the monthly wage is less than men. This indicates that women need to be
more educated than men to get paid equally.
To examine the returns to education for men and women, the Mincer’s earning
regression is used (Heckman et al. 2003). This is shown below:
log(yi ) = α + ρ1si + β1expi + β2exp2i + n‘Zi + ui (11.8)
where yi is the monthly wage earnings, α measures the returns to education, si is
years of education (schooling), expi is years of work experience, exp
2
i is the square of
work experience, and Zi is an additional control variable (rural, region, occupation).
Table 11.11 Descriptive Statistics of returns to education for male, 2018
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
lnmonthlysalary 6260 13.248 0.598 9.903 15.895
education 21,013 8.168 4.864 0 22
exp 21,013 15.977 16.237 −6 84
expsq 21,013 518.897 763.678 0 7056
rural 29,283 0.458 0.498 0 1
West 29,283 0.215 0.411 0 1
East 29,283 0.106 0.308 0 1
Central 29,283 0.231 0.421 0 1
Ulaanbaatar 29,283 0.223 0.416 0 1
Industry 29,283 0.053 0.225 0 1
livestock 29,283 0.132 0.338 0 1
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Table 11.12 Descriptive Statistics of returns to education for female, 2018
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
lnmonthlysalary 5946 13.093 0.479 9.903 16.604
education 22,750 8.978 4.933 0 22
exp 22,750 16.944 16.796 −6 98
expsq 22,750 569.18 851.707 0 9604
rural 30,537 0.439 0.496 0 1
west 30,537 0.206 0.405 0 1
east 30,537 0.11 0.312 0 1
central 30,537 0.228 0.42 0 1
Ulaanbaatar 30,537 0.233 0.423 0 1
industry 30,537 0.019 0.138 0 1
livestock 30,537 0.091 0.287 0 1
Table 11.13 Descriptive statistics at the individual level, 2008
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
highedu1 2084 998,865.35 1,722,080.7 0 30,800,000
highedu2 1407 2,760,735.5 1,841,906.3 0 30,460,000
female 59,820 0.51 0.5 0 1
lnpcmonthly hh exp 24,094 1.253 0.06 1.04 1.634
lnhhsize 24,094 1.594 0.332 0.693 2.773
sec higher 24,094 0.662 0.473 0 1
maritalstatus 24,094 0.799 0.401 0 1
headgender 24,094 0.808 0.394 0 1
hheadage 24,094 48.7 8.511 29 93
sqhheadage 24,094 2444.107 925.791 841 8649
rural 24,094 0.48 0.5 0 1
herder 24,094 0.601 1.069 0 6
Two separate OLS regressions are estimated: (1) a logarithm of monthly salary as
dependent variable and education, work experience, region and rural dummy vari-
ables and (2) adds additional control variables such as certain professions’ dummy
variables (indicating whether a person works at industry or livestock sector) to the
first OLS, separately, for each gender.
The estimation results are presented in Table 11.9. Without adding the control
variables to the OLS estimation, the return to an additional year of education is 8.2%
for women and 6.5% for men and is statistically significant. For comparison, the
difference in the return to an additional year of education for men is lower by 1.7
percentage points. One more year of schooling raises the wage rate by about 10%.
After the additional control variables, the returns to an additional year of education
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Table 11.14 Descriptive Statistics at the individual level, 2018
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
highedu1 2084 998,865.35 1,722,080.7 0 30,800,000
highedu2 1407 2,760,735.5 1,841,906.3 0 30,460,000
female 59,820 0.51 0.5 0 1
lnpcmonthly hh exp 24,094 1.253 0.06 1.04 1.634
lnhhsize 24,094 1.594 0.332 0.693 2.773
sec higher 24,094 0.662 0.473 0 1
maritalstatus 24,094 0.799 0.401 0 1
headgender 24,094 0.808 0.394 0 1
hheadage 24,094 48.7 8.511 29 93
sqhheadage 24,094 2444.107 925.791 841 8649
rural 24,094 0.48 0.5 0 1
herder 24,094 0.601 1.069 0 6
decrease from 8.2 to 7.9% for women and from 6.5 to 5.9% for men. These findings
are consistent with the study on returns to education in Mongolia, showing that
women have higher rates of return than men (Pastore 2010).
Since the professional choice dummy variables are exogenous and correlated with
the error terms, it is recommended to use the instrument variable (IV)methodology to
deal with the endogeneity problem of education. The IVmethodology can be used to
get more precise estimates of the returns to education. In this regard, following Gong
(2018), the father’s and mother’s education are chosen as instruments (Gong 2018).
The IV estimates for the returns to education is higher than the OLS estimates results
and for women is higher than men. This finding is consistent with Gong (2018).
These results suggest that Mongolian males have more opportunities to earn a
higher salarywith a lower level of education compared towomen. Therefore,Mongo-
lian females use higher education as an instrument to decrease the wage gap. Because
of the wage gap, parents are likely to spend more on their daughters’ education.
11.6 Conclusion
This study illustrates the gender differences in households’ expenditure on higher
education in Mongolia. It addressed two specific questions related to the house-
hold allocation of educational expenditure. (1) Are there gender differences in the
allocation of higher education expenditures withinMongolian households? (2)What
factors explain household educational expenditure and gender difference? To answer
these questions, this study used the Household Socio-Economic Survey (2008 and
2018) for regression analysis.
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This study has detected and showcased the gender bias at the household and
individual levels for both 2008 and 2018 using the Engel Curve approach and the
Hurdle model method.
First, in the Engel Curve approach at the household-level, the study has shown
that the gender bias does exist in both years. The main finding has been that if a child
was a female rather than male in the age group 16–18 within the same household,
families would have spent 4.5% more on her higher education expenditure in 2008
and 5.8% more in 2018, respectively.
Moreover, in the Hurdle model, the results reported two distinct processes by
which gender bias occurs (the probit or enrolment decision and the conditional OLS
or the conditional educational expenditure decision) in both years. The combined
marginal effects of these two regressions in both years have shown that the gender
bias exists in the age group 16–18 and 19–24, at the household and individual levels.
The difference in coefficient at the household-level by the Engel method revealed
that the gender gap has not changed over the years. Positive difference in marginal
effects at the household-level by the Hurdle model showed a favor of female bias in
2008 and 2018. Moreover, the gender bias in households’ higher education expendi-
ture in the age groups 16–18 and 19–24 have remained over the ten years from 2008
to 2018 in the Hurdle model.
The most plausible explanation for the gender bias in the allocation of higher
education expenditure at the household-level might be related to the household
head’s profession and residence. The fact that household heads worked in live-
stock/agricultural sector and resided in rural areas had a negative and significant
result on the education of male children. Since the herder households need more
labor power that could be provided only by a man, they tend to allocate more house-
hold resources to their daughters’ education than to sons’ education. Supporting the
male students from rural areas with financial support and allocating greater resources
in their education budget is likely to improve the educational outcomes and gross
enrolment rate.
At the general level, per capita monthly expenditure was highly significant in all
findings and in both urban and rural areas. It suggests that the number of members in
the household and income is the most consistent predictor of education expenditure.
It is fair to conclude that any policy that aims to increase the income of households is
likely to positively impact a household’s education expenditure on higher education.
Apart from the household analysis, the individual level analysis also assessed the
research question, and the findings were consistent with the Hurdle model estimates
at the household-level in 2018 and 2018. However, the Engel Curve approach failed
to detect the gender bias at the individual level in some ways. Because the “female”
dummy variable is insignificant in the age group 16–18 in 2008, and age groups
16–18 and 19–24 in 2018. The “female” variable here is the variable of the interest
which takes the value of one for female and zero for the male child. However, the
Hurdle model estimation results showed the gender bias in enrolment decision at the
age groups 16–18 and 19–24, and in “how much to spend” on a child for both years.
Therefore, this study concludes that being female is more favored than male
when it comes to intra-household higher education expenditure. It could be linked
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to parents’ tendency to invest less in the education of a male child. Since the reverse
gender gap trend has not changed the over the ten-year period (2008–2018), Mongo-
lian parents are likely to continue their propensity to give better education to their
daughters than to their sons.
One of the contributing factors to this gender bias in higher education could be
the female-male wage gap. More specifically, the fact that women are expected to
obtain higher education in order to stake their claim for equal pay. Put differently,
whereas men can get away with lower-level education at the workplace, women in
Mongolia must have higher education in order to be compensated at the level of their
less-educated male counterparts. However, it needs further investigation with more
in-depth analysis.
Another implication of increased education of women is that it may positively
impact health and education of their own children and life expectancy and is likely to
decrease child mortality. There are many research projects done in this field. Further-
more, considering gender bias in the households’ expenditure on higher education,
the policies aimed at maintaining equality in education should aim to change the
household’s attitude toward the importance of male education. This is perhaps the
most important implication of this research in terms of developing education policies
and eradicating inequality in education.
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Part II
Further Research and Debates
Chapter 12
Transitional Justice in Post-communist
Societies—The Case Study of Albania
Ines Stasa
12.1 Background
Post-communist and post-totalitarian Albania is an interesting case study in the
framework of Transitional Justice (TJ) modelling, due to widespread “amnesia”
since the start of regime change in the 1990s. Forgetting and covering over what
happened during the totalitarian dictatorship of 1944–1990 under the communist
dictator Enver Hoxha has left political shadows until the present day. The lack of
implementation of TJ measures can be linked to the fact that Albania has a high level
of political corruption and scores low on international democracy indices.
One of the outcomes of a weak democratisation process in the 1990s is what
scholars underline when it comes to the application of any TJ measure, the rule of
law. This chapter seeks to explain whether there is any causal link between the TJ
measures and substantive legal reforms that could have strengthened the rule of law
in this post-totalitarian country. Studies of the impact of TJ measures on Albania are
rare, so this case study will summarize some of the TJ measures before 2020 that led
to any significant legal reforms within the new political regime since 1990.
Rule of Law and Transitional Justice (TJ) measures are not copy-cat formulas
that every society should follow in order to achieve a certain status. The time-
line of events and political decisions taken during the past 30 years of transi-
tioning in Albania reflect the one size fits all approach to creating institutions of the
“under-democratisation” process to which TJ can contribute in terms of enhancing
transparency, accountability and hence also to the rule of law.
Transitional Justice measures in Albania are part of the whole transitioning path
towards a more accountable, fair, reconciled society. That is a particular reality that
political actors, international organizations, such as the OSCE or Council of Europe,
and civil society have neglected tomention or include as part of a national agenda. The
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2015 OSCE Survey “Citizens understanding and perceptions of the Communist past
in Albania and expectations for the future,” highlights the low concern of Albanian
respondents about the Communist past (Project “Supporting a Platform for national
dialogue about the human rights violations of Albania’s former Communist regime,”
OSCE 2016). The first finding reflects one of the most important concerns that every
society in transition should have: the one that condemns past wrongdoings. This
is especially the case in a country like Albania where the regime was considered
totalitarian.
The lack of interest expressed by the survey respondents in past human rights
violations gives impetus to a feeling and a thought that part of the failure of TJ
in Albania is both public indifference as well as a failure of political leadership in
Albania since 1991. Another interesting finding of this survey is that almost half of
the population considered the role of the former communist dictator and totalitarian
leader Enver Hoxha in the history of Albania as positive (ibid: 75). Main findings
have shown that respondents have labelled order/security as less problematic when
compared with past communist Albania but still is more significant as a problem
than facing legacies of the past. The communist past is not highly ranked as “big
problem” issues, while on the other hand, corruption, bad governance, economy and
impunity hold the gross weight of the problem. Given this finding, it is shown that
transitional waves in Albania have been crashed after the same rocks for thirty years,
without dealing with the roots of the storm in the political environment. What is
surprisingly reflected in this survey, is the fact that 53% of respondents were aware
of the law passed in 2015 on Opening the Files of Former Secret Service, but that
did not make any difference among persecuted people and other respondents. In
other words, persecuted people were not significantly more informed on the law
than other respondents. Another interesting finding is that over 2/3 of respondents
or 69% of them, stated that the opening of files was more significant for Albania
than for themselves. It is a sign of awareness that there is no winner or single loser
from dictatorships, thus, respondents have directed the benefits of this process to the
whole country, not to their individual trauma. On the other hand, it might be a sign
of reconciliation with the past showing that the personal suffering is no longer more
important than dealing with the whole legacy as a society. Even though survey results
show that 90% of people that had read the law on Opening Files of former Secret
Service in Albania support it, there is a string mistrust for the process. This mistrust
is also an attribute to the failure of these 30 years to develop trustworthy institutions
and rule of law. The lack of trust to conduct a fair and transparent process of dealing
with the past is as a result of the perception that 64% of respondents have on former
secret service files; that is, either they are damaged or destroyed by interested people
of the regime, or there will be people and institutions trying to stop the activities of
the Authority of Former Secret Service Files.
According to the findings, I will focus on two theoretical approaches and tran-
sition paradigms. One can argue, of course, that TJ does not automatically lead to
strengthening the rule of law in a country, despite its efforts to reform the legal
system. Scholars such as McAuliffe (2013), Mendelski (2015), Teitel (2000), and
Carothers (2002) argue that transitional justice itself is conflated often with the rule
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of law. Although transitional justice and the rule of law are defined as two contested
concepts when it comes to defining them properly and targeting respective outcomes,
both of them have evolved during contexts of political changes, thus should not be
taken as a causal link in analysis. This part will explore these concerns and be put
into the analysis context of Albania, even though there is a fundamental research gap
in this respect. Proper analytic and academic research lacks both in reflecting on any
transitional justice reality and in rule of law development.
12.2 Transition Paradigm
The “transition paradigm” mindset, which was enhanced after the Cold War,
was reliant on theoretical assumptions that, according to Carothers, “constitutes a
dangerous habit of trying to impose a simplistic and often incorrect conceptual order
on an empirical tableau of considerable complexity” (2002:15). In order to under-
stand this statement, I will draw comparisons on those assumptions which, for the
sake of “context,” were aligned to global changes that occurred in other regions of
the world.1 In the 2020 Nations in Transit report, Albania’s overall score was 47.02
out of 100 and its score on democracy was 3.82 out of 7. Albania was given the
status of being a transitional/hybrid regime (Nations in Transit 2020). Hence, even
30 years after regime change the level of democracy, let alone rule of law, is low.
There are several attempts aiming to explain this. For example, according to
Skaar et al. (2015), there were reasons for a growing criticism in Albania in terms of
the application of successful Transitional Justice mechanisms and initiatives, such
as “the lack of theorizing, the passing of unverified claims as universal truths, the
muddled and inconsistent use of terms and variables” (Skaar et al. 2015: 1). Contrary
to the transition paradigm, Lundy and McGovern (2008: 273) on other ideas of
transitional societies, imply that even in “circumstances where, in theory at least,
the norms of liberal democratic accountability prevail” transitional justice measures
may be taken. This statement demolishes one of the points of the transition paradigm,
apart from the set-up of democratic institutions and the separation of powers, and
broadens theway for the conceptualisation of transitional justice in the field of human
rights.2 Transition paradigms are manyfold, andMihr (2018), for example, advanced
the analytical research on regime change in relation to democratic or autocratic
1 For example: The fall of right-wing authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s;
The replacement of military dictatorships by elected civilian governments across Latin America
from the late 1970s through to the late 1980s; The decline of authoritarian rule in parts of East and
South Asia starting in the mid-1980s; The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe at the
end of 1980s; The breakup of the Soviet Union and the establishment of 15 post-Soviet Republics
in 1991; The decline of one-party regimes in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa in the first half
of the 1990s; A weak but recognizable liberalizing trend in some Middle Eastern countries in the
1990s, as outlined in: Carothers 2002: 5.
2 Carothers defines five core assumptions of the ‘transition paradigm’, such as, any country moving
away from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition toward democracy; Democrati-
zation tends to unfold in a set sequence of stages (the opening, the breakthrough, consolidation); The
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regime consolidation, defining the respectively transitional and transformative eras
of a political landscape. As such democratisation is not a process that can be taken
for granted and which is automatically established once a regime changes, nor is it a
process that passes steps of development. She argues that “the difference is grounded
in the way powers and institutions use TJ measures for their political goals” (Mihr
2018: 8). Evidence shows that none of these explicit assumptions correlate with the
state of Albania’s transition during the period from 1990 until 2020. Albania is a
country which still has been scored as a transitional or hybrid regime, with features
of an autocratic system where the polarisation of political parties and of society is at
the highest point, sometimes followed by a compliant policy towards international
standards and in other times with no point of orientation (Nations in Transit, 2020).
The evaluation of Albania as a transitional/hybrid regime in this report strengthens
the case for there being “grey zone” countries that Carothers (2002) saw as a category
of stateswhich are seen to have “feckless” pluralism. She considered the symptoms of
this political syndrome to be an “elite-dominated domain, stale and corrupt politics,
with a permanent weak state” (2002: 11).
Political transitions and transformations after dictatorship have drawn a lot of
attention over the past decades, and Albania is just one of many cases that fit in many
of these schemes. One of them is the paradigm that Fletcher et al. (2009) outline,
when they state that contrary to the transition paradigm that had been applied after
the Cold War, there are other assumptions and theoretical reference points. They
highlight the “dynamic relationship among the racial, ethnic, and religious identity
of those persecuted, their political power, and the social values to which political
leaders could appeal in crafting the state’s response to the violence” (2009: 207).
Within the basket of this conceptual framework, we come to terms of significant
differences of TJ processes in developed and less developed countries. Given this,
TJ mechanisms applied in these societies are influenced by the nature of conflict and
its length; reflect the legacy of the regime type and its leadership modus operating
in particular for the post-communist countries. The political and societal culture and
traditional norms of a given country have to be taken into account (2009: 166).
The most challenging part of politics and political leadership is to commit to
addressing past wrongdoings by choosing a contextualized approach that would lead
to a national consensus to allow for any TJ and reconciliation process to start in the
first place. There is a huge political and societal responsibility to protect one’s own
society from the many skeletons of the past. It is necessary to be able to control
and manage this delicate process in order to achieve trust, a stable society, local
ownership and a turning point in the history of politics. A point to consider when
belief in the determinative importance of elections; The underlying conditions in transitional coun-
tries—their economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, sociocultural
traditions, or other structural features—will not be major factors in either the onset or the outcome
of the transition process; The democratic transitions make-up the third wave are being built on
coherent, functioning states. The process of democratization is assumed to include some redesign
of state institutions—such as the creation of new electoral institutions, parliamentary reform, and
judicial reform—but as a modification of already functioning states”, see in: Carothers 2002: 8.
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analysing the TJ process in Albania is to question whether justice reforms and tools
are conceptualised as transitional justice or not.
Over the past three decades, the bonds of legitimacy have been eroded in Albania
by the state of political discourse, by political boycotts and the non-recognition of
elections by all political parties, by the fragile state of institutions, by massive waves
of emigration, by tendencies, actions and/or initiatives that enforce an authoritarian
attitude, by regional instability and by inconsistent policies which sometimes are not
in the national interest. The question which should be asked is “transitioning to what
political regime?”.
Democratic institution-building does not lead automatically to democracy, and its
transitioning paths taken by political and civil stakeholders in society alike should
not be taken for granted. These paths require willingness and commitment as well
as functioning political parties and leadership. Transition and transformation of the
institutions and society are often speculated about in Albanian political circles and
seen as the finish of a gloriousmarathon.Many eminent scholars have emphasised the
role and place communities have as a condition to transformative change. Both public
interest and public participation influence the direction of the transition, whether it is
towards an accountable and stable society, or towards a political façade of democracy
and rule of law. Transitional justice measures are merely tools to balance public
interests after times of conflict and violence (Mihr 2018:102); and the tendency to
exclude local communities as active participants in transitional justice measures is
a primary flaw, raising fundamental questions of legitimacy, local ownership, and
participation (Lundy andMcGovern2008: 266). Fletcher et al. highlight that the “goal
of transitional justice is to initiate a process that allows for a dynamic interaction
between the society’s culture and practices to develop responses that reflect what is
unique in that society (Fletcher et al. 2009: 210); and the increased participation of the
public is necessary to ameliorate the alienation in the relationship of the individual
to governance and government” (Frasheri 2011: 63).
12.3 The Rule of Law in Context of Transitional Justice
The relationship between transitional justice and the rule of law is their “transitional”
path in the same context and during the same time period (McAuliffe 2013). In the
case of Albania this is to better and properly understand the interconnection and/or
cross-cutting issues of both concepts in a country that lacks TJ measures and where
the rule of law has been scored lower during the last five years. Information on the
status of the rule of law in Albania is largely missing, apart from the findings and
scores of thewell-known Indexes for theRule of Law,which provide data annually on
the performance level of issues, studies and policy briefs on this subject. Teitel (2000)
highlighted that the rule of law is shaped by political circumstances, law here is not
mere product but itself structures the transition” (2000: 6). This claim helps to better
understand the rhythm of the transitional waves in Albania when considering the
noisy, partisan, politicised legal initiatives, driven by the usual business for electoral
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interests. It has happened so since the inception of the post-communist Constitution
and so on and so forth. In the same context, McAuliffe tried to establish comparative
grounds on these two concepts, in order to bring innovative thinking that it should
not be taken as a fact that this relationship is “mutually beneficial” (McAuliffe 2013:
4). The key issues in McAuliffe’s transitional justice versus rule of law debate rest
for example on the differences in focus and the different scales of implications in
society. Transitional justice, as opposed to the rule of law, does not raise concerns
about the ends of any mechanism, while the rule of law considers the effects “beyond
the vague intuition that accountability is necessarily useful” ( ibid).
Ekiert and Hanson (2003) have deconstructed the communist legacy of former
socialist state regimes in different East European countries. They concluded that
political developments and transformations occurred differently in different coun-
tries, and this happened due to the “initial conditions, timing and sequencing of
reforms, quality of policies, institutional choices, the extent of external support”
(Ekiert and Hanson 2003:104). The same conclusion can be drawn for the Balkans
region, where there were different patterns of political developments in the former
Yugoslav Federation with its dissolution into independent countries. The domestic
political environment in these states showed signs of having different logic of conse-
quences, and there were disparities among them which were fuelled by conflicts and
ethnic disputes. The modes of relationship between the state and society frame what
we simply put as the rule of law.
The state of the Rule of Law in Albania today can be extracted from the data of the
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2020 and the World Justice Project (WJP)
Rule of Law Index 2020. According to these indices the rule of law in Albania, which
is part of the same regional picture, is still under construction. The latest BTI report on
Albania published in 2020 states that “the country has short experience of indepen-
dent statehood, lack of democratic experience, socioeconomic underdevelopment,
the prevalence of authoritarian leadership and lack of autonomous civil society—
are often cited as explanations for Albania’s difficult transition to democracy” (BTI
2020: 4).
Albania has faced a difficult path transitioning to a rule of law-abiding country
because of the compromising relationship between the executive and the judiciary,
where the executive takes advantage of the judiciary, and secondly due to the lack of
legal certainty due to high levels of judiciary corruption (Elezi 2017). Thus,Albanians
are left to think that the reconstruction of the rule of law in Albania started in 2016
with judiciary reform with the vetting process as its mechanism. This is to say that
for the first 25 years after the regime changed, Albania failed to engage with legal
transformation.
The Institute forDemocracy andMediation (IDM) inAlbania presented its opinion
poll findings on trust in institutions in 2020 by stating that in 2019, Albanian citizens
continued to trust religious institutions (65.6%) and the army (59.4%) the most,
followed by educational institutions (57.3%), civil society organisations (56.3%),
state police (54.6%), healthcare institutions (51.4%), and the media (50.7%). Central
and local government, parliament, prosecution, the President, and the courts continue
to receive low trust ratings with political parties receiving the lowest rating (22.5%).
12 Transitional Justice in Post-communist Societies—The Case Study of Albania 253
The executive, as compared to the legislative and judicial branches, maintains a
higher level of trust” (IDM 2020:28). The overall results of this opinion poll show
that the rule of law in Albania is still transitioning despite deep reforms to its judicial
institutions, fundamental changes to theConstitution and foreign technical assistance
which has provided legal experience. There is also nomentioning of TJ in the context
of legal reforms, trials of former communist leaders, vetting or lustration. It also
shows that any reforms based on compliance and not on their contextual parameters,
and the lack of a leadership style that takes responsibilities and commitments, are
part of the reason transitional justice in Albania has been delayed so long. According
to the WJP Rule of Law Index, another international index measures adherence to
the rule of law by examining eight factors. The four factors that are of interest to
Albanians are “constraints on government powers,” “absence of corruption,” “civic
justice,” “criminal justice” (WJP Rule of Law Index 2020). In Albania, the factors
which scored low points and are most concerning are: “government powers are
effectively limited by the judiciary” which scored 0.30 out of 1; and “government
officials are sanctioned for misconduct” which scored 0.39 out of 1. The “constraints
on government powers” factor highlights issues such as the lack of accountability,
the intervention of the executive in the judiciary, and the authoritarian tendency of
the government.
The scoring on the “absence of corruption” factor highlights a highly corrupt
judicial branch, as does the “legislative officials that use public office for their own
private gain” factor which scored 0.23 out of 1, and the “government officials in
the executive branch that use public office for their own private gains” factor which
scored 0.39 out of 1. This data proves the claim that “officeholders who break the
law and engage in corruption are generally not prosecuted. The political patronage
networks within the judiciary have helped to cover up and even facilitate widespread
abuses of public office, including within judicial ranks” (WJP 2020: 11).
12.4 Politicization of Legal and Judicial Reforms
in the Context of Transitional Justice
One of the many concerns on the legality and legitimacy of the Albanian way of
doing politics is the doubt felt about what the relationship between the judiciary and
politics has on reforms and other processes in terms of the rule of law. Of course, a
country in transition cannot stay in transition for an indefinite time, it has to transform
and consolidate rules within its own society. In the case of Albania, uniquely, there
is too much transitioning into legalisation without transformation. Shifting from the
legal does not mean that laws do not possess the power of transformation, but it varies
from country to country, depending on the nature of the process and of the actors
involved in the transformation process (Frasheri 2011: 70). According to Frasheri
(2011: 72), the exact definition of the rule of law in countries in transition is constantly
shifting according to the exclusive function of what an organisation needs to do to
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justify legal reform projects. He explains the Albanian case through the “inflation
of legislation” which from the very first sight might seem to have a very positive
and transformative impact on the legal domain, but are actually “devoided from
any significant impact on how society functions” (2011: 63). I claim here that this
tendency to produce as many laws as possible is superficial, ostensibly to look good
in the international community. It has created a large distance between the citizens
and representative politics. In my opinion, it has created a dictatorship of laws that
emphasise “technical procedure rather than political or social nature of expertise”
(2011: 65) and where citizens are treated like recipients rather than participants and
agents in the law-making process.
It is a widely accepted fact that the legacy of the very atypical communist regime
in Albania has had an excessively and enduring influence on the leadership style
and on the whole legal and institutional system in the country. The last attempt to
reintroduce lustration legislation was rejected by the governing Socialist Party due
to it not be distinct enough from the previous lustration law which had been ruled
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 2010.
There are two ways to interpret this failure to successfully reintroduce lustration
legislation. The first interpretation is the fact that the previous lustration law had
become highly politicised and had been misused by political parties; a reflection of
unwillingness by the political leadership of main parties to align the Constitution
with measures of a transitional justice mechanism which would put first dignity and
fairness for the people who had suffered under the communist regime. The second
interpretation of this failure is that since the early days of a pluralist regime, there has
not been a force for transitional justice in Albania—one that would bring into politics
another narrative about unity, national reconciliation and the culture of compromise.
Against this backdrop, Frashëri points out that in contrast to other post-communist
countries, the case of Albania is worth studying due to its complexities and the
“experiments done and still being done today in reforming the political landscape,
economy, society and the legal system; associated with differing political wills and
legacies of the multitude of domestic and international actors” (2011: 65).
12.5 External International Actors
Evidently, in international comparison, not all former communist countries drove
with the same speed and vehicle through liberalization, democracy or into a relapse
into authoritarianism (Mendelski 2018), in particularwhenwe lookat former commu-
nist countries inCentralEuropeor theBaltic countries.Amongagroupof states called
“laggard,” Albania within the Western Balkan countries, “deal with a weak separa-
tion of powers, presence of judicial corruption, politicised judicial system” (2018:
116). The road that would have led to the rule of law is under expensive construction
both in terms of social costs and legitimacy. Hence the “notion of the rule of law
is reduced to the empowerment of the judicialization of politics, a worrying trend
towards juristocracy” (2018: 117). External factors such as the European Union, the
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Council of Europe and the OSCE play a not to be underestimated role when it comes
to TJ measures and legal reforms and law enforcement.
12.5.1 The European Union
The European Union (EU) has considered the lack of rule of law in Albania since
the country sought closer partnership with the EU. Since 2012 the EU has allocated
around 100 million euro to rule of law sectors and pledged around 34 million euro
for justice reforms in the period 2019 to 2021” (BTI 2020: 35). The international
“investment” in legal reform processes and other initiatives which aim to embrace
the norms, values and standards of liberal democracy has been hindered by several
factors, which Mendelski (2018) has related to, for example, the lack of a well-
elaborated methodology to allow objective evaluation of the rule of law, and the
fact that more reforms do not mean more progress in the rule of law. According to
Mendelski “legal reforms have failed due to their disempowerment by politicians
and the legal incoherence which means contradictory and incoherent legislation”
(Mendelski 2018: 118–119, 334–339). For Frashëri, the EU is key if Albania ever
escapes the vicious cycle of corruption. The desire for closer integration with the
international community and for greater Europeanization has provided a powerful
incentive to adopt more laws according to EU norms and standards than the country
is able to absorb and enforce (2011: 68). This political style on “compliance” for their
political purposes has ignored the context and capacities that Albania provides. This
stance is not only hypocritical to both the international community and citizens, but
it further illustrates an unaccountable political attitude, which escalates the political
crisis and society division. Yet, authoritarian legacies, one-man style of political
leadership, hierarchical political organisations, weak civil society, post-authoritarian
political culture, and a dominant system of patronage and corruption continue to
hinder the country’s progress (BTI 2020: 32).
But the most symbolic way of how the rule of law is mirrored over years is
the constitution-making process, from its inception after the fall of the communist
regime, until the most recent changes of July 2020. At the height of the pandemic
the parliament in Tirana passed constitutional amendments related to the electoral
system which aims to eliminate clientelism. Previous reforms had failed to leverage
the rule of law.3
3 1992: Establishment of the first Constitutional Court in Albania., May 1991: Law on the Major
Constitutional Provisions. The initiative of President Berisha to draft the new Constitution of the
Republic of Albania was contested. The opposition Socialist Party did not participate in the special
commission. 1994: The popular referendum failed to ratify the draft Constitution which led to
highly divided and partisan decision-making leadership. November 1998: The new Constitution
of the Republic of Albania was officially ratified after being developed with much international
assistance and civil society participation. The new Constitution was considered as a new beginning
that would have marked the rule of law ‘territory’. 2007, 2008, 2012: There was no consensus
between the political parties for constitutional amendments. International actors insisted upon most
of these constitutional amendments, which imposed new rules and strategies on the judiciary, the
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12.5.2 The OSCE
In 1997 at its 108th Plenary Meeting, the Permanent Council of the Organisation for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) took Decision Nr 106 to establish an
OSCE Presence in Albania. The Albanian authorities made this request as it was felt
necessary to have international assistance due to the civil conflict in 1997. Initially the
two main tasks of the OSCE Presence were democratization, the media and human
rights. These aims fit with the context of the internal situation in Albania at the time,
and its primary initial efforts were principally responding to unexpected situations
and challenges (Everts 1999: 271). The OSCE Presence in Albania was actively
involved during these difficult times in the country, seeking to promote democracy,
to facilitate and mediate conflicting political discourse and to reconstruct the post-
communist country with rule of law reforms. The OSCE Presence in Albania has
developed its programmes of intervention in several ways as Albania has evolved,
due to the different liberalising and democratisation processes being implemented
and its transitioning to democracy. It is worthmentioning that theOSCEPresence has
made great efforts to put the issue of transitional justice at the centre of the national
agenda. It has transformed its mission into a more accomplished and transformative
one. In terms of initiatives of dealing with the past and of the communist legacy
in Albania, the OSCE Presence has remarkably accomplished significant steps that
other international and/or local actors have not been aware of before. To give the
full perspective on this, the latest project was the establishment of the Transitional
Justice Centre within the premises and faculties of the University of Tirana, which
marks the first academic effort to institutionalize Transitional Justice in its kind as a
proper academic tool to navigate thoroughly into the past.
12.6 Further Research
Despite a number of legal and constitutional reforms and attempts to launch TJ
measures, Albania scores low in rule of law and democratic performance. For the
sake of European integration and compliance with OSCE standards, the country
aims to meet the demands made by other international stakeholders. This compli-
ance does not make Albania different from the other post-communist states in the
region, but Albania is different and unique to them when it comes to deliberating
administrative division of the country and the electoral system on the local political domain. The
Constitution changed in 2008 in an unusual political environment that is often considered as a turning
point in the feckless pluralism of Albania. The electoral changes altered the democratization process
and put it in the hands of political leadership. July 2016: Major constitutional amendments were
necessary to align theConstitution to the newpackage of legal reform legislation. These amendments
introduced the Vetting Process for the judiciary in Albania and were financially supported by the
international community through its donors, actors, and representatives. The amendment process
was characterized by intense lobbying by the EU and the US embassies and other political actors.
They were finally adopted with a joint vote in Parliament.
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on introducing any TJ mechanism—to which there is still widespread reluctance.
The ongoing government propaganda on the rule of law does not make up for the
lack of political responsibility and willingness to address past massive human rights
violations.
Attempts to design a contextualized transitional justice programme have been
undermined and its scope has been limited due to lack of interest by civil society
to advance the transitional justice discourse on the political agenda and lack of a
national strategy on ways the nation can come to terms with its communist past.
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Chapter 13
Covid-19-Pandemic Measures in Conflict
Zones in 2020 and 2021—The Case




The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on ongoing political and societal transforma-
tions deserves closer attention in all areas of social science research. In this short
entry, I will highlight the impact that the pandemic had in the conflict zone and occu-
pied territory of South Ossetia in Georgia in 2020 and to what extent the absence of
international organizations, such as the OSCE and the WHO, had an impact on the
level of vulnerability of people living there.
The systematic interlinkage between international organizations and people living
in occupied but non-recognized territories and conflict zone deserves more attention
and needs more in-depth and comparative research.
In the following paragraphs, I will illustrate the case of South Ossetia, a conflict
zone and a territory that has regularly claimed independence from Georgia since
1992. Despite the fact that Georgia is a country in which governmental authorities
responded quickly to the needs of the people, there are regions in this small country
that are being especially harmed by Covid-19. In this spirit, the main target of this
research is the people who live near the administrative border in South Ossetia, a
region on the border between the Russian Federation and Georgia. South Ossetia is
only one of the two breakaway regions of the country. People living there have either
Georgian or Russian citizenship and often perceive themselves as abandoned by
the Georgian government. For example, locally, there is a lack of hygienic products,
sanitation, primary care clinics,medicines and so on. People are often obliged towalk
several kilometers in order to find a doctor or medicines, which during the pandemic
has become a major challenge. Their social conditions had been bad and became
worse in the midst of Covid-19. Such a state of affairs increases the perception of
the vulnerability of the people living in the fragile and conflict torn region. In sum,
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it affects not only these people themselves but also the security of this region and of
Georgia in general. Therefore, during the 2020 Pandemic people in South Ossetia
were more affected than people in other regions. But how can both the impacts be
measured?
13.2 Case Study
The first case of Covid-19 in Georgia was attested to on February 26, 2020. The
new coronavirus is a serious threat to the economic development of Georgia, directly
affecting themost vulnerable population in the country. Like other countries, Georgia
faces a choice between economy and health care. Social distancing and a global lock-
down, on the one hand, can help the country to tackle the pandemic and, on the other
hand, limit economic activity and hinder the economic growth of Georgia.1 All of
these factors are especially sensitive for Georgian citizens living near the adminis-
trative border with South Ossetia, which is not officially recognized as a separate
or independent state. The matter includes not only the actual context, composed of
security issues, public policies and local problems, but also the background of the
conflict situation in which the OSCE actively engaged until 2009.
Taking into account the developments in the conflict areas of Georgia, in both
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, especially after the OSCEmission and its observers left
the occupied territories in May 2020, we have been testing the following hypotheses.
First, I argue that during the Covid-19 pandemic, without the support of a neutral
international organization such as the OSCE, the Georgian government was less able
to handle the pandemic alongside the administrative borderline with South Ossetia.
The OSCE monitoring mission in Tbilisi has no mandate and access to the Russian-
occupied region and the staff was evacuated inMay 2020 fromSouthOssetia, leaving
a security vacuum. Second, I argue that collaboration with the OSCE mission would
have been an important tool to handle the pandemic in order to gain access to the
vulnerable and non-state protected population in that zone, namely those who do not
see themselves as Georgian or who are non-Georgian citizens.
In order to understand the context and the essence of this research, one must ask
the question, what has so far been the main role of the OSCE observer mission in
South Ossetia and how did the withdrawal of the Mission staff worsen the situation
of the local population along the occupation line?
The OSCE mission has been in the region for over 28 years since its launch in
1992, and was one of the first established by the newly founded OSCE in 1992. Thus,
to test the impact and effects of the pandemic on the conflict situation without having
OSCE observers and staff in the region, we apply qualitative methods, such as qual-
itative content analysis, and the case study method, in particular the segment of the
1 Georgian Parliament Research Center (2020). “Possible impact of covid-19 on economy of Geor-
gia”. Accessed August 19, 2020. http://www.parliament.ge/ge/ajax/downloadFile/136520/08_Vie
wpoint_2020-05-04_Covid_19_and_Georgian_economy.
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population living along the administrative borderline that has no Georgian citizen-
ship. I will also look into the OSCE OM mandates such as the political and military
dimension of security, including conflict resolution, destruction of surplus stockpiles,
assisting police reform and enhancing anti-terrorism capacities, strengthening border
management capacities and security. Furthermore, the OSCE mandate includes the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which are embedded in the
human dimension policies of ODIHR, as well as the economic and environmental
dimension of security and co-operation with other international organizations—even
if the latter are also absent in the region.2
The research is principally conducted in an empirical way using facts, personal
experiences, official and media reports, and context analysis. Certainly, especially
regarding the situation of people living along the borderline with separatist South
Ossetia, the present research outline has its significant limitations and constraints
because of the certainty of analysis of the actual conditions during the Covid-19
pandemic. Also, this is due to the fact that all the data are not available at this
moment—making it an important matter for future research papers.
13.3 Background
By the end of December 1990, Ossetian separatists backed by the Russian authorities
decided to hold elections for the Supreme Council, centering around the arrange-
ment of the Soviet Republic of South Ossetia. Naturally, the Georgian authorities
considered this illegal and condemned such an aspiration because it was a serious
threat to the territorial integrity of Georgia. On December 11, 1990, the Supreme
Council of the Georgian Republic adopted the 363th law Regarding Abolishing the
Autonomous District of South Ossetia, declaring that “the separatist forces in the
Autonomous District of South Ossetia try to commit usurpation of the state authority
bymeans of creating the so-called ‘Soviet Republic of SouthOssetia’.”3 Shortly after,
in 1992, the situation in the area of Georgian Ossetia became seriously strained. In
May 1992, the so-called Supreme Council of South Ossetia adopted an act of state
independence for South Ossetia. In the Russian parliament in Moscow, the Kremlin
was aware of the need to make an immediate decision to search for a possible cease-
fire and stop military actions in the conflict area. Following brief discussions, the
Sochi Agreement was reached between the Russian Federation and Georgia in June
of that year. The agreement became a certain guarantee for the further regulation
of tensions between Georgian and Ossetian parties; many of the latter wanted to
become a part of Russia or an independent country. The agreement was a cease-fire
2 OSCE (2008).”Overview”. Accessed November 20, 2020. https://www.osce.org/georgia-closed/
43383.
3 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (2009). “Georgian Foreign Policy: The Quest for Sustainable Secu-
rity”. Accessed August 20, 2020. http://gip.ge/georgian-foreign-policy-the-quest-for-sustainable-
security/.
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and did not mean that the conflict would be settled in favor of Georgia’s territorial
integrity. Rather, the situation deteriorated through the years and in 2008 the August
War between Russian and Georgia was a culmination of Russia’s foreign policies
and for Georgia’s further disintegration.
13.4 OSCE Mission in Georgia
The OSCE has worked in Georgia for almost 17 years, but its mission was suspended
on January 1, 2009 because the 56 member states did not achieve a consensus to
continue the mission mandate. Indeed, it was the result of a Russian endeavor—and
a consequence of the August 2008 war—to not allow the OSCE representatives in
the conflict zones of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Instead, the Russian government
asked the OSCE to recognize the two breakaway regions as independent states after
the Russia-Georgia August War in 2008. Russian deputy foreign minister Grigori
Karasin stated that “What happened with the OSCE mission to [Georgia] and the
UN Security Council resolution on the UN mission in the region is a supreme act
of diplomatic cynicism… Our impression is that Tbilisi—and perhaps some other
capitals—have decided to seek a solution to the problem in thewaters of instability.”4
It seemed that the suspension of the OSCE mission in that part of Georgia was in
the vital interests of Russian foreign policy in the region. The Georgian govern-
ment responded and claimed that in August 2008 military observers of the OSCE
had to suddenly leave the capital city of the autonomous district of South Ossetia,
Tskhinvali, and that this leave was very harmful to any peaceful resolution of the
Georgian-Ossetian conflict. And up to now, they have not been able to return there.
It was seen as a failure of conflict resolution on all sides because, as journalist Silvia
Stőber stated, “all the OSCE’s efforts over the years to build confidence between
Ossetians and Georgians, to work together with international organizations to build
up the economy and infrastructure, and to develop civil society were negated.”5 But
the suspension of OSCE confidence-building efforts was the greatest loss for both
Georgians and Ossetians. The then OSCEChairman-in-Office at the time, Alexander
Stubb, condemned Russia’s policies and stated that “Russia should follow OSCE
principles by respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia. Russia
should immediately withdraw all troops from Georgia and implement the cease-
fire agreement, including the modalities defined in the 16 August letter of French
President Nicolas Sarkozy. The international community cannot accept unilaterally
established buffer zones.”6 It was aggravated by the fact that “the South Ossetian
4 EurasiaNet (2009). “Georgia: OSCE terminates its 17-year Georgian mission”. Accessed August
21, 2020. https://www.refworld.org/docid/4a532cc419.html [accessed 21 August 2020.
5 Stőber (2011). “The Failure of the OSCE Mission to Georgia—What Remains?” OSCE Year-
book, 204. Accessed August 21, 2020. https://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/10/
Stoeber-en.pdf.
6 OSCE (2008) (August 26). “OSCE chairman condemns Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia,
Abkhazia independence”. Accessed August 28, 2020. https://www.osce.org/cio/50011.
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conflict, more than the Abkhazian conflict, was treated in Western capitals as a local
problem and its potentially explosive nature underestimated.”7 The government in
Tiflis however, considered Abkhazia and South Ossetia as two separatist regions
that are part of the territory of Georgia. The cease-fire agreement adopted as of
September 2008 was a supplementary document of an earlier Six-Point Agreement
and provided for the continuation of the OSCE observers’ activity within the territory
of South Ossetia like before August 2008, taking into account further corrections in
their mandate. As a consequence, the Russian government blocked any possibility
of continuation of the OSCE Mission mandate and aimed for “new realities” to be
reflected in a newmandate, namely the recognition of the separatist regions’ as inde-
pendent ones. Georgia, on the other hand, has stated ever since that it would be the
equivalent to crossing the “red lines.”
13.5 Covid-19 and People Living Near the Administrative
Border with So-Called South Ossetia
The Covid-19 pandemic hit strongly the people living in the capital city Tskhinvali.
On May 10, 2020, two months after the first Covid-19 cases in Georgia, the self-
declared authorities of South Ossetia closed their border with the Russian Federation
and to Georgia. From the outset, the Georgian authorities did not trust coronavirus
statistics both in Abkhazia and in so-called South Ossetia but had no access to the
region. At the same time, in social media, many people from Tskhinvali reported
on the deficiencies of the local health care system and did not trust doctors’ profes-
sionalism.8 It was assumed that several thousand had been infected and many people
died.9 The International Crisis Group (ICG) published a report reviewing the coro-
navirus situation in these occupied territories of Georgia. As for Tskhinvali, the
ICG mentioned that “South Ossetian authorities have even been reluctant to work
with the WHO and other international organizations. Because these organizations
are accused of collaborating with the Georgian government, the de facto leadership
in Tskhinvali and elsewhere sees collaboration with the WHO as undermining their
own demand for international recognition of the region’s independent status. Hence,
South Ossetia arguably is at greatest risk and, as elsewhere, a significant part of
the population, namely up to 20 per cent, is elderly. Hospitals are severely under-
equipped. One of the few doctors in the region refused to work due to a lack of basic
protective gear at the hospital. A local official said disinfectant was in short supply,
7 Eiff (2009). “The OSCE Mission to Georgia and the Status of South Ossetia”. OSCE Yearbook,
43. Accessed August 21, 2020. https://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/08/Eiff-en.
pdf.
8 Radio Liberty (2020) (May 7). “11 infected in Tskhinvali, de factoRepublic totally closes so-called
border with Russia”. Accessed August 22, 2020.
9 Gukemukhovi (2020) (November 5). “Tskhinvali in terms of Russian Restrictions”. Accessed
November 20, 2020. https://netgazeti.ge/news/495540/.
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and de facto authorities have asked local clothing makers to sew masks and protec-
tive gowns for medics.”10 The issue is complicated due to political considerations
because the de facto authorities worry that co-operation with officials arriving from
government-controlled Georgia would undermine their claim to independence.”11
Only in September 2020 did the Russian Federation provide supplies and medical
aid to South Ossetia, but this step could not replace proper state policies to deal with
the pandemic.12 Officials from South Ossetia received help from Russia in October
2020 after the first wave of the pandemic, according to media agencies.13 There
are no official data about infected people that could be investigated by international
observers.
At the same time, one could also argue that the security vacuum and the ‘moder-
ating role of the OSCE’ that was left behind since its withdrawal in March 2020
especially made it harder to respond to the needs of people during the pandemic
despite the fact that some international organizations are actively engaged in the
process.14 This may have increased the casualties and death rate of those affected by
Covid-19 during the pandemic in the region.
In this way, the response of local authorities in Tskhinvali was very destructive
and did not go in line with Georgian governmental policies. There has been no
access to the sick and vulnerable people by international organizations, except for
the International Red Cross that could irregularly distribute hygiene items and food.
An especially vulnerable population was in the community of Akhalgori, an adjacent
municipality of the conflict zone between Georgia and South Ossetia. The place was
in total isolation, and they did not have access to basic health care services.
The day-to-day conditions of people have dramatically worsened during the
pandemic, and both improvement efforts by international organizations such as the
OSCE or the Georgian government are far from being seen. In many villages, there is
no pharmacy and food store. People walk several kilometers in order to buy products
and necessities.15 In this matter, there are two examples of the villages of Tvaurebi
and Odzisi. The Democracy Research Institute (DRI) reported that in Tvaurebi, there
is no school or kindergarten in the village. The village has an outpatient clinic but does
not have a pharmacy or a grocery store. People have to walk about four kilometers
10 International Crisis Group (2020) (May 7). “The Covid-19 challenge in post-Soviet breakaway
statelets”. Accessed August 22, 2020. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/b89-covid-
19-challenge-post-soviet-breakaway-statelets.
11 Ibid.
12 Russian News Agency TASS’ Russian medics arrive in South Ossetia to help it fight coronavirus
‘ https://tass.com/society/1202381 28 September 2020.
13 Jam News ‘S. Ossetian officials turn to Russia for help following coronavirus outbreak’ https://
jam-news.net/coronavirus-south-ossetia-outbreak-russia/, 29 October 2020.
14 Lomsadze (2020) (July 2). “UNICEF Helps Vulnerable Families Affected by Covid-19
Pandemic”. Accessed February 13, 2020. https://www.unicef.org/georgia/stories/unicef-helps-vul
nerable-families-affected-covid-19-pandemic.
15 Democracy Research Institute (2020) (June 26). “The needs of people living along the occupation
line (Tvaurebi, Odzisi)”. Accessed August 23, 2020. http://www.democracyresearch.org/eng/330.
13 Covid-19-Pandemic Measures in Conflict Zones in 2020 and 2021 … 265
to buy essential products in another village of Lamiskana.16 The situation deterio-
rated during the pandemic when the administrative borders to Russia and Georgia
were closed for months. As for the village of Odzisi, for example, it is reported that
there is no pharmacy or shop, although it is possible to buy bread in several private
houses. Locals have to go to a nearby village to buy food and other essentials.17 The
2020 pandemic worsened the situation in South Ossetia. Hence this case study only
illustrates the failures and shortcomings of domestic vis-à-vis international politics
in similar regions.
13.6 Consequences of Covid-19
To test the hypotheses on the interconnection or causal links between the absence of
an OSCE mission (independent variable) since 2008 and the higher vulnerability of
non-Georgian citizens (dependent variable) in South Ossetia, especially since 2019,
during the Covid-19 pandemic, led to a higher number of people in risk near the
administrative border with so-called South Ossetia. The pandemic has led to the
evacuation of the OSCE mission due to health risks, and hence left a moderating
vacuum that could have provided access to people in need during the pandemic.
The impact of the pandemic can be measured by the absence of the OSCE and the
rise of cases of Covid-19 affected people, and the day-to-day public needs, such as
health and human security for people living near the occupation line. Security condi-
tions deteriorated for the population near the so-called borderwith SouthOssetia after
the OSCE observers left the region, after Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia, after
Abkhazia’s independence, and recentlywith the hardships of living along the occupa-
tion line during theCovid-19 pandemic.All of these lead to a cause-effect relationship
in the conflict area situations before and after the OSCE mission evacuation.
13.7 Further Research
This case study illustrates how the Covid-19 pandemic has affectedGeorgian citizens
and, in particular, those living in regions that are not internationally recognized, and to
which international humanitarian aid either has no access or is totally absent there—it
can be evidenced among people living along the occupation line with South Ossetia.
Such a state of affairs is particularly harmful to those vulnerable people affected by
conflict tension for years.
The effects of the pandemic are tangible in ordinary people’s daily life even today.
Responsibility for this situation can be found on all sides of the spectrum, including




so on, not to mention the lack of attention from the central government of Georgia.
It is the most vulnerable part of the population that suffers the consequence of not
having access, inmany cases, towater, food, health and other needs. There is no doubt
that in 2008 the suspension of the OSCE mission to Georgia, and the evacuation in
2002 from the mission office in Tbilisi, largely influenced the conditions of people
living along the occupation line, in a negative way of course. Other missions in the
region, such as the European Union Monitoring Mission was not able to take these
specific functions due to similar policies as the OSCE and because Russia is not a
member of the EU.
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In 1988, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) declassified a research paper
with the title, “Unrest in the Caucasus and the challenge of Nationalism” on the
Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast time when the conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan was emerging. It lasted until 1994.
The 44-page document from 1988 provided insights into the US intelligence
knowledge of this region at the heart of Armenian-Azeri tensions. Over 30 years
ago, the paper underlined the difficulties for the Soviet leaders to keep the status quo
of peace and stability established during the Soviet period. This strategic intelligence
paper from 1988 is an important piece of the puzzle in understanding contemporary
politics and peace-building in the Caucasus. It highlights the ethnic and religious
tensions that existed across the Soviet Union and continue to be one of the main
reasons for outbreaks of violence.
Therefore, it is instructive to look back to the 1980s and the strategic choicesmade
at that time by the United States and the USSR to understand the current context in
the region.
The Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020 highlighted the growing disparities between
Armenia and Azerbaijan in the post-Soviet order, resulting in a modern Azer-
baijan capable of conducting advanced military operations while Armenia relied
on Soviet equipment. Moreover, Azerbaijan had a strategic advantage over Armenia
and Nagorno-Karabakh, due to the support by other emerging powers in the region,
such as Turkey.
Since the collapse of theUSSR,Bakuhasmanaged to develop its economy through
the sale of oil and gas on the international market and develop partnerships with
countries such as Israel, a supplier of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), into action
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during the conflict in 2020.On 9November 2020, theAzeri attack on aRussianMi-24
helicopter on Armenian territory prompted Moscow to provide some peacekeepers,
in total 1,960 soldiers and 90 armoured personnel carriers. The aim is to remain for
at least 5 years, which reverses earlier Russian government decisions not to send
soldiers during and after the 1988 to1994 war between these two countries.
The 2020 pro-active approach by Moscow changes the dynamics in Nagorno-
Karabakh. That this would happen was already mentioned by the CIA in 1988.1
Nevertheless, and contrary to the Soviet era, in 2020, the Russian government could
have an economic advantage in intervening in the region because it will push both
countries to purchase more Russian equipment in an attempt to develop relations
with Moscow. Furthermore, it confirms Russia’s return as a major power on the
international scene and changes relations within the OSCE. As such, Russia is now
the only co-chair in the Minsk Group to have troops in Nagorno-Karabakh, unlike
other members, such as France and the United States. Thirty years after the collapse
of the USSR, the US administration does not officially recognise Nagorno-Karabakh
as a territory independent from Azerbaijan. There are nevertheless nine American
states, namely California (2014), Georgia (2016), Hawaii (2016), Louisiana (2013),
Maine (2013), Massachusetts (2012), Michigan (2017), Rhode Island (2012) and
Colorado (2019) that passed separate bills on the state level recognising the “Republic
of Artsakh,” another name given to Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent country on
the basis of the Montevideo Convention.2 This discrepancy between the diplomatic
position of theUSadministration versus its federal states has alreadybeenhighlighted
in the 1988 CIA research paper and helps to understand contemporary American
diplomacy with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh.
The events of 27 September to 10 October 2020 have changed the dynamic
between Baku and Yerevan in Nagorno-Karabakh with the return of certain occupied
territories to the control of Azerbaijan. Russian peacekeepers are also developing an
option presented already by the CIA in 1988. The CIA already had documents,
namely the “Who’s Who—Political, Military,” 1949, that was declassified in 2011,
and the “Indication of Psychological Vulnerabilities,” 1952, declassified in 2003,
and the “History of Animosity between Armenians and Azeris,” 1988, declassified
in 2012, as well as “Unrest in the Caucasus and the Challenge of Nationalists,”
1988, declassified in 1999, published in order to understand what the CIA knew and
how this continues to influence the US Department of State’s policy in international
organisations, including the OSCE.
1 Central Intelligence Agency (1988) Unrest in the Caucasus and the Challenge of Nation-
alist (declassified in 1999) https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91B00776R000600
150001-9.pdf
2 This recognition was supported by members of the Democratic Party in each of the U.S. states
mentioned above, without any evidence of a common strategy within the Democratic Party.
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14.2 Territorial Conflict Over Nagorno-Karabakh and US
Position
A policy brief written by William Webster3 for the American Vice President dating
back to 16 June 19884 on the “History of Armenian-Azeri Animosity” attempts to
explain the reasons for the conflict between Armenians and Azeris over control of
the region. According to the document, the ethnic and religious differences between
Azeris, that are an ethnic group of Turkic origin, mainly following Shiite Islam,
and Armenians, followers of Orthodox Christianity and the Armenian Church, have
always existed but with even greater intensity in Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia and
Azerbaijan became two independent states after World War I from 1917 to 1920.
But the animosity, which was also related to ethnicity and religion, culminating in
the Armenian Genocide during WWI in 1915 by the Turkish Sultanate, played into
the favour of the Red Army. The Soviet government took advantage of this division
to increase its hegemony and integrate both countries into the Soviet Union.
In 1920, the Bolsheviks wished to incorporate Karabakh into the Azerbaijan
Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan SSR), before deciding in favour
of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (Armenian SSR) on the basis of the
ethnic composition of Karabakh. According to the CIA,5 the decision to incorporate
Nagorno-Karabakh, a predominantly ethnic Armenian territory, into Azerbaijan is
linked to the apprehension of Turkish leaders who did not wish to witness the birth
of a Greater Armenia.6 Moscow’s choice to separate Karabakh from Armenia by
turning it into the Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh in 1923 would there-
fore be the result of Turkish influence in the USSR rather than a Stalinist policy
aimed at bringing together antagonistic groups. At that time, Webster’s brief to the
American vice-president did not fail to add to the apprehension of the inhabitants
of the South Caucasus. Despite Moscow’s choice to attach Karabakh to Azerbaijan
instead of Armenia, the Azeris consider that Moscow nevertheless exercises a form
of favouritism towards the Armenians because the latter are Orthodox Christians like
most of the Russian elite.
14.3 Multi-Lateral Favouritism in the Region
In addition to territorial conflicts, the 1988 CIA paper, “Unrest in the Caucasus
and the Challenge of Nationalism,” mentions the faster population growth of the
3 Ronald Reagan chose him to be Director of the CIA from 1987 to 1991.
4 Declassified in 2012.
5 Central Intelligence Agency (1988) Unrest in the Caucasus and the Challenge of Nation-
alist (declassified in 1999) https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91B00776R000600
150001-9.pdf.
6 A Greater Armenia might lead to more territorial claims, including former Armenian territories
located in post-First World War Turkey.
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Azerbaijani SSR compared to the Armenian SSR. That would, according to the
authors, make it difficult for young Azerbaijanis to find adequate employment and
housing in an economically troubledUSSR in the 1980s. TheUSSRhas not been able
to invest in new infrastructure for young people inAzerbaijan, and thiswould increase
resentment towards Armenians who enjoy a better quality of life. It further states, that
the “Economic dissatisfactions further aggravated by dramatic population growth
particularly in the age group seeking employment. In the last decade Azerbaijan has
experienced a youth bulge (20 percent or more of the population in the 15–24 years
old age group) which could not be easily absorbed. This problem was compounded
by the general lack of labour minority. Azeri youth, even when well trained, showed
little inclination to move to labour short Slavic regions. According to Soviet media,
there are 250,000 people in Azerbaijan who are ‘not employed in social production’
one-fourth of these live in the city of Baku.” Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Unrest in the Caucasus and the Challenge of Nationalist, 1988 and declassified in
1999.7
In order to reduce tensions between Armenians and Azeris and to maintain the
status quo in theSouthCaucasus, conservativeSoviet leaders, includingLigachev and
KGB Director Chebrikov, adopted a strict line to restore order with the intelligence
services and a constant military presence, which is fuelling the debate on the future
of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan in 1988.8
The CIA report mentions the beginning of discussions between Azeris and Arme-
nians in Moscow, and the possibility of bringing the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh
under direct Moscow control instead of giving it to one side or the other. This would
have been a solution that would not satisfy either Azeris or Armenians, but could have
avoided the outbreak of a conflict, according to the authors. It all came to be evident,
when, in 2020, the arrival of the Russian peacekeeping forces was not welcome to
the Armenians even though the latter were losing the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Russian military intervention came at a time when Baku had regained control of the
emblematic city of Susha/Sishi. And in accordance with the agreements signed on
November 9, 2020, a large part of the territories occupied by the Armenians will
return to Azerbaijan’s control, which therefore amounts to a territorial loss without
fighting.
14.4 The Role of the Armenian Diaspora in the US
Back in 1988 the CIA paper portrays glasnost and perestroika as an attempt to
satisfy the Russian people’s growing need for freedom in the USSR. However, the
7 Central Intelligence Agency (1988) Unrest in the Caucasus and the Challenge of Nation-
alist (declassified in 1999) https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91B00776R000600
150001-9.pdf.
8 Central Intelligence Agency (1988) Unrest in the Caucasus and the Challenge of Nation-
alist (declassified in 1999) https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91B00776R000600
150001-9.pdf.
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same report points out that this freedom of expression could have unintended conse-
quences for non-Russian ethnic groups such as Armenians and Azeris. While Soviet
leaders attribute the sudden rise in violence and nationalism in Nagorno-Karabakh
to foreign influence, the CIA has also noted the laissez-faire attitude of local actors
such as Azeri and Armenian police who provided assistance to people of the same
ethnic background. In October 1987, for example, a rally in the Armenian capital of
Yerevan inOpera Square for the “Return ofArtsakh” to theArmenian SSRunderlined
the growing tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh’s membership, and the resurgence of
identity tensions in the context of glasnost. And later, in February 1988, a vote was
held in the Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh, which resulted in a majority
in favour of a transfer from the Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian SSR. Amonth later,
in March 1988, the former head of the Russian State and leader of the communist
party, Mikhail Gorbachev, received in Moscow the Armenian and Azeri representa-
tives Karen Demirchyan and Kamran Baghirov to discuss Nagorno-Karabakh and
its future.9
The then classified CIA report was drawn up in this context, aware of the possi-
bility of Moscow’s military intervention in an ethnically troubled Soviet Caucasus,
which could have consequences for stability on the border with Turkey—a NATO
member and US ally. The US intelligence agency compared the context of the Soviet
AutonomousOblast of Nagorno-Karabakhwithwhat was happening in theAbkhazia
SSR. In contrast to the Abkhazia SSR, relations between the Azerbaijan SSR and
Turkey suggest that Turkey might support Baku (Azerbaijan SSR) in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict lead to the first post-cold war between USSR and NATO in the
Caucasus. Consequently, the CIA had a direct interest in focusing its attention on
this part of the USSR—unlike the Soviet Baltic states which soon became indepen-
dent states and later joined the European Union—in order to avoid a direct conflict
between Turkey and the newly established Russian Federation. During the war of
2020, Turkey, to no surprise, adopted a pro-Azeri attitude and Western allies like
France criticised this choice, which led to further degraded relations between Paris
and Ankara that had already existed due to French anti-terrorism policies in respect
to Islamist groups.
Not surprisingly, the Armenian Diaspora around the world in Russia, France
and the US, with an estimate of between 500,000 and 800,000 in the US alone,
became nervous. The CIA analysis mentions elements to be taken into account and
directly related to political stability in the United States, including the influence of
the Armenian diaspora in California, above all.10 According to the report, members
9 Central Intelligence Agency (1988) Unrest in the Caucasus and the Challenge of Nation-
alist (declassified in 1999) https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91B00776R000600
150001-9.pdf.
10 The first major wave of Armenian immigration to America took place in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Thousands of Armenians settled in the United States - mostly in
California—following the Hamidian massacres of the mid-1890s, the AdanaMassacre of 1909, and
the massacres of 1915 in the Ottoman Empire. Since the 1950s many Armenians from the Middle
East migrated to America as a result of political instability in the Middle East. It accelerated in the
late 1980s and has continued after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Armenians have an emotional
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of theArmenian diaspora could have an influence on the position of certain American
states on the diplomatic line to adopt regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. US citizens of
Armenian origin could interfere with relations between Washington and Ankara if
Washington, and above all the Democratic Party, decided to assume a pro-Armenian
diplomatic position to satisfy voters of Armenian origin in the two American federal
states which later recognised Nagorno-Karabakh as independent. Consequently, the
two NATOmembers US and Turkey disagree on the support to be given to Nagorno-
Karabakh. Consequently, the CIA report anticipated the conflict within the USSR
in the late 1980s and its repercussions on relations within NATO. Turkey is also
presented as a power that does not wish to become involved in theNagorno-Karabakh
conflict. Turkey supported and has continued to do so also in 2020, Azerbaijan. In
the CIA report it was stated that “Turkey no doubt especially feared that transferring
Nagorno-Karabakh toArmeniawouldwhetArmenian appetites and lead to increased
pressure to change the status ofNakhichevan and to acquire formerArmenian regions
in Turkey.’ Concluding ‘… Turkish officials are not unduly alarmed by events in the
Caucasus and may even derive some pleasure from seeing the Soviet wrestle with
their Armenian problem.11”
In light of thewar in 2020,Turkey nowhas amore pro-active approach inNagorno-
Karabakh, supporting Baku diplomatically, and offering Azerbaijan the possibility
of asking for direct military assistance. Turkey announced that it would respond
favourably. We are thus witnessing the emergence of a Turkey which is displaying
its ambitions on the periphery and does not hesitate to disturb the balance within
NATO by opposing France rather than the United States.12
14.5 The Allies Turkey and Azerbaijan
As illustrated above, the heated tensions between these conflicting parties date back
to the Soviet era. The official recognition of the Armenian Genocide by the Supreme
Council of the Armenian SSR on 20 November 1988 fuelled new emerging tensions
with Turkey that had been kept under control during the Cold War. This partly
explains the support of Turkey that the latter gave to Azerbaijan. It also explains the
CIA’s interest in Nagorno-Karabakh in the 1980s to understand Turkey’s diplomatic
position in the region.
attachment to their homeland. TheArmenianAmerican community is themost politically influential
community of the Armenian diaspora. The Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA)
and Armenian Assembly of America advocate for the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by the
American government and support stronger bilateral relations. The Armenian General Benevolent
Union (AGBU) is providing financial support and advertising Armenian culture worldwide.
11 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Unrest in the Caucasus and the Challenge of Nationalist,
1988 (declassified in 1999).
12 This situation could not have been foreseen by the CIA in 1988 because Sarkozy announced
France’s return to NATO’s military command in 2009.
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In the 1990s, the Turkish government in Ankara took a more pro-active approach
and provided economic and military assistance to Baku, as the return of an indepen-
dent Armenia allowed it to take a position on the conflict without offendingMoscow.
Turkish intelligence and armed forces crossed the border with 350 officers and volun-
teers who joined Azerbaijan’s armed forces in the fight against post-Soviet Armenia
in Nagorno-Karabakh during the 1988–1994 war.13 A two-sided conflict emerged
with Armenia supported by Russia and Greece against Azerbaijan, supported by
Turkey, the Chechens of Itchkeria and the Afghans of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin.14
It was assumed then by the US administration that Ankara’s diplomatic choice
to engage in moderation, even after the collapse of the USSR, is partly due to its
ambiguous relations with post-Soviet Russia—also bearing in mind that today all
the countries involved are members of the OSCE.
Supporting Azerbaijan would be tantamount to inciting Moscow to increase its
military presence in Armenia to counterbalance that of Turkey in Azerbaijan in order
to restore a balance of power and preserve the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh and
the South Caucasus in general. Moreover, Russia’s military presence in Transnistria
(1992) in Moldavia and in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (1992) in Georgia attests to
Moscow’s ability to carry out military actions to ensure stability in the post-Soviet
space. A large-scale conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh could threaten bilateral relations
between Moscow and Ankara in the post-Soviet world order.
Although Turkey gave its rhetorical support to Azerbaijan in 2020, thus disrupting
relations among NATO member states and at the OSCE, Ankara nonetheless did not
object to the announcement of Russia’s choice to send peacekeeping troops. In this
respect, as described by the CIA in 1988, Turkey is more active diplomatically but is
still fearful of Russia, which remains the main military power in the South Caucasus.
14.6 Role of Kin State: Moscow’s Ambiguous Presence
in Nagorno-Karabakh
In the Caucasus, the presence a kin-state like the Russian Federation is exogenous
and perceived by the peoples there as a form of interference in regional conflicts.
Consequently, forging an alliance with Moscow makes it possible to implement
a status quo and prepare for the next conflict, in particular by strengthening the
demographic situation in a country. The 1988 CIA paper already highlights this
dynamic with the statistics on demography in Nagorno-Karabakh. The latter attests
to a decrease in the Russian presence in favour of Azeris and Armenians.
Yet, previous Soviet policies directed at the Caucasus under communist dictator
Josef Stalin, he himself Caucasian, from the 1920s till his death in 1953, took into
13 Flanagan Stephen, Brannen Samuel (2018). Turkey’s Shifting Dynamics: Implications for U.S.-
Turkey Relations, United-States, Center for Strategic and International Studies, page 17.
14 Hunter Shireen (2004). Russia and the Transcaucasus: The Impact of the Islamic Factor. Islam
in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security, M.E. Sharpe, page 349.
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account the ethnic, religious and linguistic divisions within the Caucasus peoples to
push them against each other and impose Moscow’s presence other than by the use
of force.15 Stalin knew how to play on the oppositions between peoples and stemmed
the emergence of a Soviet State on the basis of a single ethnic group, language, or
religion, namely Russian and Russian language and Orthodox Christian—although
any religion was kept low to be slowly replaced by communist ideology.
Alongside the integration of Abkhazia into the Georgian SSR or Transnistria
into the Moldovan SSR, the choice of integrating Karabakh into the Azerbaijan
SSR made it possible to stem the emergence of an overly autonomous Armenia and
Azerbaijan. During the Soviet period, the fear that Nagorno-Karabakh would lose its
autonomous oblast status led the Armenian SSR to accept demands from Moscow.
Similarly, the Azerbaijan SSR, fearing the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, was ready
to accept Moscow’s demands and move away from Turkey, and Iran with which it
shares the same religion of Shiite Islam.
Yet since the mid-1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies challenged the balance
of power established by Stalin in the USSR, including in Nagorno-Karabakh. The
opening and changing of the Soviet Union under Glasnost and Perestroika led to a
dialogue on nationalism and identity, and eventually to a debate onwhether Nagorno-
Karabakh should belong to Azerbaijan or Armenia.
The return of the debate on national identity at the end of the 1980s revived ethnic
and religious conflicts, leading to violence that Moscow was unable to contain with
the local police, the only solution being the permanent presence of a peacekeeping
force. Permanent troops stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh would be similar to the
USSR’s approach in Afghanistan (1979–1989) and would be expensive16 and not
approved by Soviet citizens. Hence, it was stated in the CIA paper, that “in retrospect,
Gorbatchev may have miscalculated the impact of glasnost. His actions and speeches
during the past years suggest hemayhavebeenunduly optimistic that diverse interests
of national groups can be accommodated and reconciled within the framework of
the Soviet unitary state. Glasnost has led to an expanded discussion by minorities
of legal, economic, and cultural rights, as well as greater public discourse on the
past ‘wrongs’ perpetrated against them. Since the beginning of the year there have
beenmajor national demonstrations in nine of the 15 republics and numerous smaller
incidents elsewhere.” Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Unrest in the Caucasus
and the Challenge of Nationalist, 1988 (declassified in 1999).
In 2020, Russia came back to this decision and sent peacekeepers. For Moscow,
this choice is not an easy one, both financially and diplomatically, and announces
multiple upheavals on an international scale. To begin with, the government in
Moscow will henceforth be responsible for the protection of civilians in Nagorno-
Karabakh on both sides. The withdrawal of Russian troops would lead to a return of
hostilities which will target inhabitants on both sides.
15 MadelWilliam (1985). Soviet but not Russian: The other peoples of the Soviet Union. University
of Alberta Press.
16 The USSR was already struggling with Chernobyl’s nuclear disaster and other economic
difficulties after 1986.
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Furthermore, the Russian government will once again appear to be a disruptive
force in the eyes of the West and in particular the Minsk Group at the OSCE. Russia,
the United States and France are co-chairmen of the Minsk Group, and the presence
of Russian troops means that the Kremlin is, therefore, the only country able to
decide the future of the conflict, giving the Kremlin an undeniable advantage that
France and the United States are unlikely to appreciate. Finally, on a financial level,
ensuring a permanent military presence comes at a financial cost. Moscow is going
to have to invest in a force on the ground, without being able to withdraw it and not
gaining any benefit from it as the two countries will continue to hate each other. This
is why the USSR was reluctant to send troops to Nagorno-Karabakh during and after
the 1988–1994 war.
In the end, the Russian government would notably benefit indirectly from a mili-
tary presence in a region of the world where it was otherwise absent, but also
through the export of arms to the two protagonists. Armenia has all the interest
in aligning itself with Moscow’s diplomatic position and continuing to purchase
Russian equipment in order to win the Kremlin’s favour and avoid a withdrawal
of peacekeepers. Azerbaijan might have a diplomatic interest in doing the same
to obtain Russia’s endorsement and request the return of more occupied territories
during future negotiations with Moscow.
14.7 Further Research
One could argue that the causal link between the frozen conflicts in the 1980s and
silencing of the past, and the unresolved ethnic and religious discrepancies, including
the Armenian Genocide, will lead to the re-emergence of the conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh.
Interestingly, back in 1988, the CIA research paper posited the options available
to Moscow to alleviate tensions between Yerevan and Baku, namely to first maintain
the status quo, which required questioning Gorbachev’s policies (glasnost and pere-
stroika), and secondly, to grant economic benefits to the conflicting parties in order
to ease tensions, similar to what was done in the Abkhazian SSR.
This strategy did not seem to have been efficient becauseArmenians andAzeris are
fighting for land almost as a proxy for unresolved religious and ethnic issue, making
this conflict more complex than in Abkhazia or Transnistria. But to simply increase
the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan, which seems temporary as
it does not satisfy anyone in the capital cities of Yerevan, Baku, or Stepanakert in
Nagorno-Karabakh.
Hence, it is worth looking back to the prediction in the 1980s to better understand
current and ongoing conflicts in the region, its key actors and geopolitics, beyond
the 2020 war.
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Numerous solutions have been mentioned, even the possibility of bringing the
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh under the direct control of the Russian government.
Back in 1988 it was even proposed that the government of Azerbaijan could adopt
the “Extraterritorial Native Cultural Institutions,” which proposed more autonomy
in the linguistic and cultural field for the Armenian minority of Nagorno-Karabakh
without changing its level of autonomy within Azerbaijan. The authors of the paper
recommended attaching Nagorno-Karabakh to the Armenian Republic. This option
was perceived as too “radical” according to the CIA, and difficult because it creates
tensions with Azerbaijan. Already in 1988, giving more autonomy to Nagorno-
Karabakh within Azerbaijan would require direct military interference by Moscow
andwould stir up tensions betweenArmenians andAzerbaijanis, but to a lesser extent
than the transfer of the territory to one of the protagonists. It could only bring tempo-
rary stability toNagorno-Karabakh, butwould remain costly andwould require going
against Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost and perestroika in order to put an end to the
debate on national identity in Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The developments and the war until 1994 showed that post-Soviet Russia and the
Western Allies, let alone members of the OSCE Minsk Group have failed to find a
permanent solution satisfying Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 2020 Russia refused to
send peacekeeping troops to Nagorno-Karabakh, unlike to the other partially and
unrecognised states in the post-Soviet space, namely Transnistria, Abkhazia, South
Ossetia, Eastern Ukraine, which are monitored or observed by the OSCE.
The CIA research paper remains relevant to the US Department of State today
for understanding the conflict and in particular the complexity of the relationship
betweenAzerbaijan andTurkey, aswell as that betweenArmenia andRussia.Overall,
the CIA research paper shows continuity between Soviet and Russian policy in
Nagorno-Karabakh, with difficulties in supporting either side, in contrast to Turkey’s
indirect involvement in the region in the post-Soviet order, which was not the case
before the collapse of the USSR.
The contemporary context confirms the CIA’s analysis but requires more in-depth
research on today’s situation and the causes for the ongoing conflict. Some 30 years
later, Russia remains an ambiguous exogenous power in the Caucasus. Moscow does
not wish to interfere militarily in Nagorno-Karabakh, in contrast to Abkhazia, South
Ossetia and Transnistria, because it would push Azerbaijan to turn towards Turkey
and the Euro-Atlantic community to recover control over the territory. Nowadays, it
is difficult to understand the disputes in the South Caucasus without looking at other
regional actors, such as Turkey and Iran.
However, Moscow is not in a position to leave Armenia alone to defend Nagorno-
Karabakh becauseYerevan lacksmilitary capabilities compared toAzerbaijan.17 This
attitude of the Russian government highlights a discrepancy between the rhetoric in
the OSCE seeking a compromise between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Russia’s
17 Baku is enjoying some income due to gas and oil industries making it able tomodernise its Armed
Forces, which is not the case of Armenia.Murad Ismayilov (2014) Power, knowledge, and pipelines:
understanding the politics of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, Caucasus Survey, 2:1–2, 79–129, https://
doi.org/10.1080/23761199.2014.11417304
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pragmatic attitude in the South Caucasus of not expecting the conflict to end. Russia
is not in a position to unilaterally send peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh because
it would not satisfy Armenia, Azerbaijan or Nagorno-Karabakh to establish a tempo-
rary status quo. The CIA’s analysis and the notion of “unrest” mentioned in the title
of the research paper remains accurate in 2020.
Russia will have to stay close to Nagorno-Karabakh with its military installation
in Armenia to ensure that Azerbaijan and Turkey remain cautious when it comes to
military intervention in the region.
For the US Department of State, the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh by ten
American states also shows the relevance of the CIA’s analysis to evaluate the influ-
enceof theArmeniandiaspora in theUnitedStates andhow it couldweakenAmerican
diplomacy within NATO and in other international organisations such as the United
Nations and the OSCE.
The CIA’s analysis was relevant until the outbreak of the conflict in September
2020, and seems to be less relevant since the arrival of Russian troops in Nagorno-
Karabakh on 10 November 2020. Russia has therefore decided to adopt a more
pro-active approach in the region in response to the attack on its Mi-24 helicopter
by Azerbaijan, and because it will enable it to reaffirm its status as a great power
while at the same time reaping economic benefits from the sale of arms to the two
protagonists who wish to attract Moscow’s favours. Contrary to the Soviet era when
Soviet peacekeeping troops would have been expensive, the contemporary context
makes Russia an arms supplier, and Azerbaijan and Armenia two potential buyers.
With this strategic choice, Moscow ensures that it will be the main player within
the OSCE Minsk Group, since France and the United States do not have troops on
the ground and are not in a position to determine directly whether or not hostilities
will resume, unlike Russia.
American diplomacy seems to remain similar to that of 1988, with an Armenian
diaspora influencingUSnational policywithmore than ten states that have recognised
Nagorno-Karabakh. The 2020 conflict occurred during theAmerican election period,
with Republicans and Democrats preferring to keep their attention on other issues,
making it difficult to know to what extent Washington would have reacted outside
of the election period.
The main opposition that emerged in 2020 was not between Washington and
Ankara but between France and Turkey, two NATO and OSCE member countries.
This situation could not have been foreseen by the CIA in 1988, because Sarkozy
announced France’s return to NATO’s military command in 2009.
The CIA’s analysis and the report “Unrest in the Caucasus and the Challenge of
Nationalist” were relevant before September 2020, which seems to be only partially
the case today as Russia has reversed its decision not to send peacekeeping troops.
278 M. Lambert
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Chapter 15
The Corona Pandemic in Central Asia
Shairbek Dzhuraev
15.1 Background1
The Covid-19 pandemic has proved to be a stress test in nearly all policy areas in
Central Asian states since 2020. While healthcare, education and economics were
some of the early targets, the novel coronavirus also upended nations’ international
agendas. Leaders’ summits, now in an online format, focused on the pandemic.
More broadly, Covid-19 has turned into a major variable in debates on globalisation,
institutions or global inequality that can also be illustrated by looking at cases in
Central Asian countries. The pandemic has exposed the pre-existing conditions of
international relations in the region, hampering regional cooperation and significantly
impacting Central Asia’s relations with key extra-regional powers.
Although there is no right time for a pandemic, Covid-19 spread at a time when
the world seemed best prepared to tackle it. Being a global problem by definition, a
pandemic requires a global response. The proliferation of international institutions
and cooperation regimes since the end of the Cold War, in this respect, should have
prepared the world to effectively cope with problems such as Covid-19. However, the
year 2020 demonstrated the above was not the case. The novel coronavirus quickly
spotted and exposed significant “pre-existing conditions” in the current international
system. The biggest of ills included competitive relations between major powers of
the world and growing isolationism.
Covid-19 struck when the “global village” mode of international cooperation was
under pressure. In 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, the
role model of international cooperation. A few months after Brexit, the US elected a
1 The paper evolved from a presentation at a conference “The COVID-19 Crisis and Its Impact
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newpresidentwho championed anAmerican exit from its international engagements.
The events revealed the resurgence of nationalism and the crisis of international
institutions that many took for granted. Thus, the populist-nationalist isolationism
of the world’s chief enabler of globalisation marked a consequential “pre-existing
condition” of the international system, preceding the news from Wuhan.
Once a pandemic, Covid-19 quickly tilted the balance. If globalisation was about
international trade and travel, both got hit early and badly. Stay at home rules
swiftly came to also imply staying in the home country. The US, already scep-
tical about its international engagements, pulled out of the World Health Organiza-
tion, questioning its credibility and accusing it of being Beijing’s puppet. Covid-19
also exposed “deeper fractures, both within Europe and between Europe and the
United States,” as Dominique Moisi argued.2 More recently, “vaccine nationalism”
has grown prominent as nations rushed to book jabs for their population.
15.2 Regional cooperation in Central Asia
International (non-)cooperation has long been one of Central Asia’s most severe
“health conditions.” Despite much talk of regional integration in the 1990s, the five
post-Soviet states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbek-
istan, have never managed to institutionalise regional cooperation. Spoilers included
both Central Asian states sceptical of regionalism and extra-regional powers too
eager to be part of anything Central Asian. National leaders’ power posturing also
contributed to recurring disputes over borders, water resources, or energy supplies.
In 2016, when the West got Brexit and Trump, Central Asia received a boost
for greater regional cooperation. The change came following the power transition
in Uzbekistan, a geographically central state of Central Asia. The new president,
Shavkat Mirziyoyev, declared Central Asian cooperation was the top priority for
Tashkent, a dramatic departure from his predecessor’s policy. Border checkpoints,
closed formany years,were reopened in Ferghana valley. In 2018, the region’s leaders
resumed annual “consultative meetings.”
The pandemic in 2020 and 2021 halted the just emerging positive trend. The third
consultative meeting of Central Asian leaders, scheduled in Bishkek, was postponed
due to Covid-19.3 Strict travel restrictions were imposed within the region. At an
early phase, countries also resorted to unilateral trade restrictions in a bid to redress
the food panic among the population.
However, at a broader level, the damage from the pandemic to regional cooperation
among the Central Asia governments was relatively small. First, the starting point
was low.Occasional restrictions on travel or trade are anything but novel in the region.
2 Moisi, Dominique. ‘The West’s Pandemic of Fear | by Dominique Moisi’. Project Syndicate, 30
March 2020. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/covid19-could-halt-western-decline-
by-dominique-moisi-2020-03.
3 Later, it was postponed again, this time due to political turbulence in Kyrgyzstan.
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Central Asian states do not have functioning regional cooperation platforms. In other
words, there was little substance in regional cooperation that the pandemic could
have tested. Second, and on a more optimistic side, Central Asian states maintained
a positive spirit in their communication. The Uzbek president led by reaching out on
the phone to each counterpart in the pandemic’s early stage. Furthermore,Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan joined a larger group of “supporters” of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,
sending medications, food and construction materials.
15.3 Less Competition—Less Free-Riding
Competition between nations is another significant “feature” of international rela-
tions, inevitable for some and unfortunate for others. In the past, pandemics
could significantly affect power competition by depopulating empires or weakening
armies.4 For all the statistics, Covid-19 does not appear to pose an existential threat
to troops, and international power rivalry is less about manpower anyway. What was,
then, the Covid-19 impact for international competition, and particularly in Central
Asia, a beloved spot of great-gamers?
In 2015, well before the Covid-19 pandemic, Graham Allison wrote that the
biggest geopolitical question of the day was the impact of “China’s ascendance […]
on the U.S.-led international order.”5 The pandemic might have turned the question
more urgent for the US, not less. Instead of forcing collaboration, the pandemic
“added fuel to the simmering U.S.-China rivalry.”6 The pre-Covid trade war between
the two had little impact on trade, while the pandemic reminded everyone that half
of the world’s masks were produced in China.7
Central Asia is not one of the battlegrounds of the above power transition.
Following the pullout of most troops from Afghanistan, the US left the region to
two other powers, China and Russia, as authoritative American experts argued back
in 2016.8 In other words, there was little of a great game in Central Asia before
4 Drezner, Daniel W. ‘The Song Remains the Same: International Relations After COVID-19’.
International Organization 74, no. S1 (December 2020): E18–35. https://doi.org/10.1017/S00208
18320000351.
5 Allison, Graham. ‘Destined forWar: Can China and the United States Escape Thucydides’s Trap?’
The Atlantic, 24 September 2015. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/uni
ted-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/.
6 Hill, Fiona et al. ‘Balancing Act: Major Powers and the Global Response to US-China Great
Power Competition’. The Brookings Institution, July 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/research/
balancing-act-major-powers-and-the-global-response-to-us-china-great-power-competition/.
7 ‘How China Won Trump’s Trade War and Got Americans to Foot the Bill’. Bloomberg.Com,
11 January 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-11/how-china-won-trump-s-
good-and-easy-to-win-trade-war; Bradsher, Keith, and Liz Alderman. ‘The World Needs Masks.
China Makes Them, but Has Been Hoarding Them.’ The New York Times, 13 March 2020, sec.
Business. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/business/masks-china-coronavirus.html.
8 Rumer, Eugene, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski. ‘US. Policy toward Central Asia 3.0’.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2016.
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the Covid-19. What was, then, the Covid-19 impact on the state of Central Asia’s
relations with its big extra-regional partners?
Covid-19 demonstrated that less geopolitical competition meant less free-riding
for Central Asian states, particularly the smaller and poorer ones. Finding easy and
quick external solutions to domestic problems proved to be problematic during the
pandemic. The most notable “cold shower” was China’s silence on Kyrgyzstan’s
repeated, if false-started, pleas for debt relief in view of Covid’s economic damage
throughout 2020.9 Since 2010, Beijing became Kyrgyzstan’s biggest lender, with its
loans praised as quick and flexible. However, the loud silence on debt relief appeals
meant Central Asia now sawChina’s other side, not as benign and generous as known
in the past.
On the one hand, the above change was a direct implication of the current crisis.
The pandemic has severely affected Central Asia’s external partners, too. Thus, in the
recent past, following some domestic upheavals, Kyrgyzstan’s leaders could summon
large “donor conferences” for emergency fund-raising.10 Now, the pandemic has hit
all, and the world’s richest and most ambitious actors have their own wounds to
heal first. On the other hand, the global health crisis highlighted the already evident
decrease in the “competition index” in Central Asia that left little reason for the
extra-regional patrons to keep playing softly.
15.4 Widening Gap Within the Region
The third “health condition” in international relations that Covid-19 exposed was the
gulf between richer and poorer parts of the world. The coronavirus hit first and worst
the older and weaker people. Similarly, the pandemic highlighted how vulnerable
were the developing countries of the world. The Economist’s calculations on Covid-
19 vaccination progress suggested that Central Asian states, except Kazakhstan, were
at the bottom of the four-tier hierarchy.11 This group would vaccinate the population
no earlier than 2023, while the first group (the US and most of Europe) would
complete the task by the end of 2021.
Covid-19 has also amply demonstrated the widening gap within Central Asia.
Several factors illustrate the case. First, the pandemic exposed the unhealthy
9 Kyrgyzstan’s president, Soornbay Jeenbekov appealed for debt deferral in April and September
2020. See Asanov, Bakyt. ‘Kyrgyzstan poprosil u Kitaya otsrochki po dolgam. Chto otvetit
Pekin? (Kyrgyzstan asked China for a debt deferral. What will Beijing answer?)’. Azattyk, 15
April 2020. https://rus.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan-kitay-kredit-otsrochka/30557585.html, and Toro-
geldi uulu, Bakyt. ‘Kyrgyzstan prosit Kitay otsrochit’ vyplatu dolgov (Kyrgyzstan asks China to
delay payment of debts)’. Azattyk, 14 September 2020. https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30838154.html.
10 Pannier, Bruce. ‘Donors Pledge $1.1 Billion For Kyrgyzstan’. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
27 July 2010. https://www.rferl.org/a/Kyrgyzstan_Seeks_1_Billion_In_Aid/2110729.html.
11 Economist Intelligence Unit. ‘More than 85 Poor Countries Will Not Have Widespread Access
to Coronavirus Vaccines before 2023’, 27 January 2021. https://www.eiu.com/n/85-poor-countries-
will-not-have-access-to-coronavirus-vaccines/.
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economies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. These two are among the top countries of
the world in terms of the share of remittances in the country’s GDP. When Covid-19
closed businesses worldwide, labour migrants suffered badly, leading to a significant
drop in Central Asia-bound remittances. Also, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan stood out
for their massive debts to China and were listed among a few countries facing the
risk of debt distress.12 Pandemic-related business closures shrank already miserable
government revenues, pushing the leaders to seek debt relief.
Second, Covid-19 has marked a deepening gap between the richer and poorer
states in the region. In 2020, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan took proactive measures to
assist cash-strapped neighbours, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. A helping hand was
offered on more than one occasion, including medications, protective gear, and
grain. Uzbekistan also funded the construction of several mobile medical facili-
ties in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to support fighting Covid-19. The divide between
richer and poorer parts of Central Asia is not a novelty. However, for most of the
past decades, the region’s countries managed to have transactional relations while
aid mostly came from outside the region. Covid-19 contributed to a more visible
hierarchy in the region.
15.5 Concluding Remarks
The Covid-19 pandemic has exposed several vulnerabilities in Central Asia’s inter-
national relations. The first was a lack of any regional cooperation framework. Ad
hoc meetings of state leaders aside, Central Asia lacked effective instruments to
coordinate the response to crises, such as Covid-19, whether in medical, economic
or political aspects. Second, the pandemic demonstrated the limits of free-riding that
some Central Asian states enjoyed for most of the past decades. Covid-19, combined
with dwindling great power competition in the region, reminded that benign and
generous “big friends” could not be taken for granted. Finally, the pandemic vividly
reminded about the precariousness of smaller and weaker Central Asian economies.
Simultaneous drops in remittances, external aid and domestic revenues, compounded
by colossal debt repayments might look an unusual combination. However, the
pandemic demonstrated that it was not an impossible one.
On a positive side, Covid-19 had not exacerbated relations between Central Asian
states. Although leaders’ face-to-face meetings were put off, high-level communica-
tion maintained the spirit of mutual support. Obviously, the starting point of regional
cooperation was very low, and it would take an effort to generate a negative trend.




Nevertheless, the pandemic reminded us that Central Asia’s priority must be on
building resilience through deeper cooperation, healthier economies and smarter
policymaking.
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Chapter 16
“Glocal” Governance in the OSCE
Region: A Research Proposal
Anja Mihr
16.1 Background
“Think global, act locally,” is the essence of glocalization and of glocal gover-
nance. Glocal governance means that local stakeholders, such as business, civil
society, city councils, authorities and activists actively participate in decision-making
processes. Different stakeholders, local, international and domestic ones, make deci-
sions on common rules and regulations while operating, controlling, implementing
and enforcing them locally—andwherever needed.Many of these decisions are taken
in light of and in accordance with global or international standards. Such standards
can be universal UN human rights norms that are, for example, enshrined in interna-
tional human rights treaties and agreements, andWTO trade norms on tax regulation
or copyrights and laws. Global norms can be international customary law, such as
humanitarian law or the law of the sea, general guidelines, recommendations or rules
and standards on security and elections as set by the OSCE.
But for these universal and global norms and standards—often manifested in
international treaties—to become locally accepted and implemented, they need also
to be shaped, proposed, and suggested by local actors and different stakeholders.
Glocal governance, hence, defines a decision-making process in which local and
global actors collaborate, often without including national authorities or only when
using them as mediators between local and international levels of governance and
organizations.
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During the 2020–2021 world pandemic, city mayors around the world, not only
in corrupt and dysfunctional autocratic states in the OSCE region—often took inde-
pendent and quick decisions according to global WHO health standards and recom-
mendations. City mayors, hospital directors and CEOs of companies bypassed or
simply ignored national authorities that were not willing or capable of adapting to
the pandemic and making effective decisions. Stakeholders and local actors directly
took global advice, copied them from other countries and enacted them locally in
their own community. Glocal actions and governance saved people’s lives. Local
volunteers and CSOs provided aid and support for vulnerable groups and elderly
people, and local businesses became innovative in maintaining basic infrastructure
during that period. And it has been the city councils and CSOs who reported back
to the WHO via ICT channels and a glocal reporting system. National ministries
of health were not even aware of what happened in their communities or hospitals.
This is not the first time that we see in countries in the OSCE region that the state
was absent, incapable, unwilling or not interested to intervene and solve problems,
State authorities were often not visible in some regions, and governments do not even
have de facto authority. During and after the 44-days war over Karabakh between
Azerbaijan and Armenia in fall 2020, it was Facebook who offered special services
to find and identify POWs and missing persons with the help of the local population
in the conflict zone. In the so-called independent republic of Abkhazia in Georgia,
authorities refused to take any help from the Georgian government in light of the
pandemic and instead called upon the International Red Cross and other external
actors, including Russian aid services. Examples of these kinds are multiple not only
in conflict torn societies. When governments are incapable of dialogue with their
counterparts on a local or international level, and to respond to the basic rules of
international humanitarian law, private stakeholders jump in to fill the gap.
For decades now we see how glocal agreements and collaboration create new
forms of governance. Private enterprises, businesses, CSOs and ICT companies are
seen as steady collaborators and stakeholders to realize global norms, as last seen
with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (2015). They become glocal actors
that engage, help and often benefit from operationalizing international agreements,
such as the UN Global Migration Compact (2018), and the New Green Deal by the
European Union (EU) from 2019. All these agreements can only work in collabo-
ration with local stakeholders. Without the engagement and active participation of
city mayors, refugee organizations, environmental movements, business and private
enterprises, international organizations and agencies, and governments, none of these
glocal agreements could ever work. Glocal governance hence is not a vision, and
glocalism not a mere ideology, but a reality.
Yet, the slogan “thinkglobally, act locally,” first emerged in the 1980s along the rise
of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) around the world, and the demise of nation-
states. The end of the ColdWar in 1990 gave the notion a newmeaning, often in light
of the rise of globalization (Robertson, 1994) and turned glocalization into an analyt-
ical conceptual framework (Routometof 2016). Before Routometof summarized and
conceptualize glocalization, which he paraphrased as a flowof ideas, products, events
or technologies that “refraction” our individual glocal identity and actions, he drew
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on the 1993 argument by Ritzer (2000). He argues that not only Western democracy
and desire for rule of law and social mobility were the intriguing idea and desire of
millions of youngpeople around theworld to adhere to human rights normsorwestern
life styles. These life styles and standards fueled the grobalized and capitalist world
and coined the term McDonaldization of the world. Robertson, who himself took
glocalization a step further, contradicts Ritzer and called the glocalization of soci-
eties a temporarily, yet always permanent, diffusion between local-global-local and
hence the process of diffusion of global ideas into local cultures and vice versa. But
Ritzer’s grobalization has given us all the vision of an almost homogeneous way of
lifewhenwe listen tomusic, go to coffee shops, wear fashion and aim to enjoy similar
lifestyles. Grobalization is gaining momentum through global trade and mobility as
well as technology. Similar, Ulrich Becks’ observation of cosmopolitization of the
world since the 1990s, and Francis Fukuyama’s assumption in his bestseller “The
End of History” (2002), assumed that after the end of the Cold War, democracy
prevails as the most successful and intriguing concept by which people choose to
be governed. These views were widely shared in the 1990s because after the defeat
of totalitarian regimes, it was the desire for freedom, self-determination, democracy
and modernization that united people around the globe. This motion simultaneously
emerged in the light of the World Society Theory by John Meyer which dates back
even earlier into the 1980s (Krueken and Drori 2010). World Society Theory is
closely intertwined with the idea of glocalization and global citizenship, going all
the way back to Immanuel Kant’s concept of “Perpetual Peace” and the idea of a
World Republic from 1795. Needless to say, the World Society enthusiasm as prop-
agated by Meyer and others has not been shared by everyone, let alone in social
science research. The numerous and atrocious civil wars, genocides, mass atrocities,
expulsions, and re-autocratizations and reemergence of totalitarian states and state
leaders, anocratic regime types as well as land-sliding election outcomes for ethno-
nationalist populist leaders around the world since the turn of the millennium, seem
to tell the exact opposite story. Namely that democracy, the striving for freedom and
independence, and human rights are not the most convincing model to live by. But
these conflicts and apparent backslides of freedoms should not be confused with
the cry for more individual safety and social justice and security. Both can mutu-
ally reinforce themselves and do not need to contradict each other. Yet it also does
not necessarily contradict glocalization as a concept, which only aims to describe a
process of governance paradigm shifts. Glocalization does not propagate automati-
cally democracy, albeit, if glocal governance is applied in a human rights and good
governance manner, democracy might be the logical outcome.
For example, Jan Arart Scholte in his essay on “Whiter Global Theory” (2016)
defines glocalization as a process that leaves organizational levels of governmental
governance and hierarchies as we know them behind. He calls glocalization as a
transscalar process. Transscalarity conveys the notion that social relations involve
spatial complexity by abandoning the idea of “levels” and hierarchies between state
institutions, countries, regions, federal or local versus national, private versus public
actors, etc. The borders of exchange, decision making, groups, authorities and ideas
are fluid. Postmodern “liquid modernity,” as Bauman (2000) calls our era, shows that
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the increasing privatization of the economy spills over to the private sector and civil
society. Business and enterprises, ICT companies, CSOs and public sectors such as
the security, education or health sector become as an integral part of decision making
and governance on all levels of governance.
Another way of looking at these paradigm shifts in governance is Multi-level
governance. It resembles the way the European Union (EU) works has scales and
operates onhierarchies and local, federal, regional, national and international levels of
governance. By dissolving levels, especially those that are dysfunctional, governance
becomes “transscalar,” which is also often assessed through the Multi-Stakeholder
Approach (MSA). The MSA aims to include all relevant private, public, local,
national or international stakeholders and actors that are necessary to resolve a
specific problem or issue, and hence aims to govern or fill a governance gap, wher-
ever needed. Against this backdrop, transscalarity is the case when glocalization
is replacing separate concrete domains and makes them closer connected and inter-
twined.With this premise, the “transscalar”methodologydoes not distribute causality
between discrete spaces, such as the global. For example, WTO or EU decisions
do not alone determine national trade policies, but rather a mutually interrelated
and collaborative decision-making process in which all sides—local, private and
public—take their share of implementation and enforcement. Indeed transscalarity,
as Scholte argues, does not stipulate in advance what geographical or multi-level
dimensions or actors dominate in a given situation (Scholte 2016).
One of the research questions to follow would be whether any type of local-
ization, globalization and grobalization (Ritzer 2000) and subsequently glocaliza-
tion (Routometof 2016) has formed new glocal identities among people (Fukuyama
2018)? Furthermore, one may ask the question of whether and to what extent this
global identity has led to a transscalar way (Scholte 2016) of governance?
16.2 Glocalization as a conceptual analytical framework
The analytical concept of glocalization can be used as a scientific research tool in
social science research and humanities, aiming to better illustrate, understand and
even explain paradigms shifts and changing ways of political decision making. This
concept can show how decision-making and implementing decisions have changed,
and whether or not this is only the case when governments fail to deliver, or whether
this is a more permanent shift in the way things will be governed in the future.
Implementing the UN FCCC decision on carbon reduction and combating global
warming, for example, can best work on local levels when city councils take actions
in cooperation with local energy providers, fossil fuel plants, automobile and local
mobility policies and others. Reducing global warming is a local and joint—and
hence glocal—endeavor to realize global goals. How are cities and communities
responding to it? How do different industrial sectors, the health sector and civil
society, respond to and participate in decisionmaking?Are citizen-dialogues, the idea
of sanctuary cities or other forms of direct consultation and democracy alternative
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models to glocal governance? Who is excluded, and who is included and at what
stage in the MSA, fluid, glocal and transscalar decision-making process?
There is a plethora of research questions to be answered in the context of glocality
and glocalization, and social science research is still at the beginning of it. To inves-
tigate how decisions are made, implemented and enforced can best be done on
community and national levels and by using quantitative process tracing methods
over a longer period of time, decades ideally. Using social and critical theories as
well as governance theories gives guidance of direction to triangulate the method.
Process tracing and triangulation, hence mixed methods, are a way to assess and
measure changes, differences and similarities among manners of governance on
local, domestic and international levels.
To see whether glocal governance takes place, who are the actors, when did
they get engaged or excluded, ignored or involved? In order to assess or evaluate
institutions and mechanism that are used by the different stakeholders and actors to
take a decision and respond to citizens’ needs, a researcher needs to compare various
forms and units of glocal governance, for example, in cities and villages, among faith-
based communities, private sector or on federal-state levels. Key stakeholders are
those who deliver the basic needs of people: income, health, education and security.
The question is to what extent trans-national, local, virtual and global movements,
and the exchange of ideas and values, norms and standards have changed the way
societies and communities live today. One observation commonly shared is that
global norms, such as human rights and fundamental freedoms, have diffused into
our day-to-day thinking, attitudes and behavior and hence mark the way we make
decisions. Because norms such as freedom of conscience and movement, right to
health, to be entitled to choose your work and education and to be free from want
and slavery, are easy to identify with for everyone. At the same time, a growing
mode of anti-Western sentiments is rising around the world, often targeting exactly
the norms that are identified as “western and global norms” and not only in the
OSCE region. One of the consequences is that “freedom” and human rights are seen
as a danger to stability and safety and not as a solution to threats and instability.
In some way this rapidly anti-Westernization contradicts Fukuyama’s assumption
of the intriguing power that freedom and human rights and self-determination have
for people globally, no matter their faith or ideology (1992). I would argue, that the
strife for more security, safety and predictability in today’s rapidly changing world
is understandable and does not automatically contradict our desire for freedom.
Furthermore, one could argue, that the difference of opinions towards the same
universal values, such as friendship, justice, peace, love or trust and dignity, have
always existed and so have their multitudes of ways of interpretation and articulation.
People may share the same value of freedom and dignity but live them differently
in their communities. They also choose, elect or determine their leaders differently,
leaders who use the same values to govern in very different manners (Morlino 2004).
Hence, another open question remains, in what manner of glocal leadership, and
hence governance, are people currently drifting? And is this fundamentally different
from what we have seen over the history of mankind (North et al 2009)?
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A region that provides an excellent ground for research is the countries, societies,
political regimes, and hence member states of the OSCE. The 57-member states
together face similar challenges such as climate change, migration and Internet
security. Among the members states are those that range from some of the most
democratic countries, like Norway, Finland or Canada, to some of the most auto-
cratic ones such as Tajikistan or Turkmenistan, and conflict torn regions such as
Kosovo and Chechnya and the Fergana Valley in Central Asia; and therefore, pose
one of the most intriguing laboratories of research for glocal governance. The OSCE
states show different stages of development and economic regimes, some are highly
industrial and capitalistic countries, and some are resource-dependent, subsidiary
and agricultural economies. But all state governments adhere to a set of universal
and UN principles and standards such as human rights and fundamental freedoms, as
well as OSCE standards in terms of good governance principles, rule of law, human
rights, elections and security.
Many OSCE countries including Ukraine, France, Estonia, Serbia, Kyrgyzstan,
Mongolia and Armenia and the USA have experienced the dramatic rise and shifts
that civil society can pose. CSOs and private enterprises have often become the
new “bosses in town,” as have capitalistic industry and enterprises, and autocratic
and populist leaders strike back. But in order to solve common problems, these
actors and stakeholders often form alliances and comply with international norms
and standards, including UN environmental and health standards, EU standards for
trade and logistics, and OSCE standards of anti-corruption, participation, and rule
of law.
Exchange of ideas, values, norms, products, fashion, beauty styles, pop art and
our understanding of violence, harm and wrongdoings are truly globally and instant.
We may agree on the big notions of these values and norms, but often have differing
views on how to implement them in our day-to-day lives, which leads us again to the
question how glocalization is materialized?
Thanks to ICTs everyone can be a reporter today on domestic violence and child
abuse, on forced evictions and suffering patients in hospitals; and thanks to open
borders and cheap airline carriers, global mobility allows us to share our experience
directly. As a consequences the nation-state has become a hollow ground, providing
a power gap that is filled with populist-nationalist and organized crime leaders who
call upon imaginary—and often never existing—traditions and values for those who
feel lost in this rapidly and dramatically changing globalized and mobile world. On
the other hand, city mayors and community leaders, including religious ones, have
filled governance gaps on local levels, providingminimal standards of social security,
income, education and health. They govern with much success, often using coercion,
intimidation and keeping the population ignorant to a certain degree, but in the end,
they enjoy more trust by citizens than state authorities or foreign aid workers.
The call for glocal solutions to universally shared challenges and problems and
effective responses to our basic human needs, such as security, health, educa-
tion/empowerment and decent income in order to live a dignified life, is what is
the motor for glocal governance. Immanuel Wallerstein (2004), in his World System
Analysis, described the modern democratic state as one that has to deliver three
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services that frame basic needs, since antiquity, namely (1) public education, (2)
access to health and a (3) guarantee of livelong solid income (Wallerstein 2004,
p. 94). They compose, today, what we describe as the public sector.
Anyone who provides these deliverables, no matter whether this is a warlord or
a human rights defender, an oligarch or democratically elected parliamentarian, can
for some time or longer establish a stable governance regime. Most of the time, those
leaders, not legitimized by democratic elections as they are members of organized
crime and warlords or autocrats, will fail to keep the regime running without the
need to use force, intimidation or coercion over a longer period of time. Neverthe-
less, they ought to be taken into consideration when we aim to understand how glocal
governance works. Generally speaking, we need to look at who delivers to the needs,
and what methods are used to do it? Parliamentarian and liberal democracies gener-
ally speaking are the most successful in delivering over longer timeframes but have
also often failed in parts and sectors that have been dysfunctionality and corrupt
(Morlino 2004). Good Governance (GG) principle hence adds to the assessment
scheme when investigating how glocal governance works. GG today often replaces
the big wording of democracy but means the same, namely to make public decisions
and elections transparent, hold stakeholders accountable and allow for private and
public participation of citizens and enterprises. Those stakeholders who deliver the
three basic needs according to GG principles have a good chance to replace corrupt
state authorities—if basic liberal freedoms are guaranteed. Often that is not the case
where organized crime groups and mafia-style regimes have infiltrated governments
and turned the state into a farce. But what does this glocal paradigm shift mean for
governance?
16.3 Glocal Governance
Conceptualizing research in the area of glocal governance means to work with the
notion and idea of glocalism. Glocalism is a generic idea and Routometof names it a
“blueprint” that can serve as an ideology (2016). Glocalism aims to illustrate or show-
case how ICTs and the global economy, including Ritzer’s example of grobalization,
have been shaping our glocally different ways of life in all sectors of society and on
all levels. Glocalization, instead is the process, the different steps and the stages to
reach a level or condition of “glocality.” Glocality describes the state of the art and
hence the situation or condition we live in.
Glocalism does not have the characteristics of a theory, yet it serves for some as
an ideology or blueprint for framing an ideal scenario by which society can enjoy a
higher quality of basic needs fulfillment. This can be, for example, lead to a higher
level of and free education for all, a social security regime and a decent income and
a good health care regime for all based on accountable, transparent and participatory
decision making, and hence GG principles and human rights norms. Many annually
published value and governance barometers such as the Bertelsmann Transformation
Index, the Polity V Index, Democracy Index or World Value Survey and Varieties
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of Democracy Index, measure global trends and shifts based on these indicators and
criteria. Their data has well illustrated over the past decades, how global values and
norms, diffuse locally and become part of day-to-day decisionmaking on local levels.
But against this backdrop, Roudometof denies any theoretical claim that the
concept glocalization may have because glocalization only describes the stages and
paradigm shifts we currently observe. Glocalization or glocality cannot theoretically
explain or justify (yet) why we would live better or more sustainably, more peace-
fully and prosperously under a glocal governance system? Glocalization is simply
an analytical concept to better understand governance paradigm shifts.
Thus far, glocalism describes what can be seen, and hence it is a conceptual
framework that helps us to analyze and understand the dramatic shifts, triggered by
migration, climate change and population growth paired with the rapid pace that ICT
provides in exchanging ideas, norms, values and goods. Glocalism is the blueprint
and glocalization is a fluid process. It is an ever-changing concept that shows and
illustrates how we solve local or domestic or global problems. To become glocal
consequently changes the way we make decisions, consult, advise, participate and
determine hierarchies. Last but not least, glocalization has changed the way in how
we want to be governed, namely in a respectful, equal and participatory way.
Local action and engagement by civil society and private actors, but also
local councils and individual engagement, is the essence of glocalization, namely
connecting local actors with global norms, standards and best practices—and vice
versa. Such norms can be universal human rights norms, quality assurances or good
governance principles. Local actors can be representatives of cities or community
councils, youth groups, human rights defenders, non-governmental and civil society
organizations, teachers, lawyers, volunteers, health care or communication tech-
nology providers and business owners. They are private, civil or corporate organized
groups or individuals, engaging with the formal and informal sectors of public policy
alike. Most prominently we find local engagement in the education and health sector,
in small and medium enterprises and in the health sector (North et al. 2009).
Glocal actors and stakeholders are the basis of MSA, in which private and corpo-
rate actors interact with domestic, national or other transnational actors and institu-
tions, such as state governments and authorities as well as with international govern-
mental organizations (IGOs) such as the EU, UN or OSCE. Their numbers are
growing. Today, the International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that over 2
billion people work in the informal economic sector alone, which is predominantly
local, that is approximately 60% of all work forces globally. If at all, they are orga-
nized in glocal communities and associations in their labor sectors. People who work
in the informal sector are below the radar of state authorities, often pay no income
taxes and do not enjoy national and domestic labor or employment rights, pension
funds, insurances or other ways of protection given by state governments—and hence
no safety net. They have to organize themselves individually as a group and family
or clan and patronage regime and often depend on corrupt, exploitative and abusive
leaders. Local small and medium enterprises, local markets, and farmers, make up to
40%of theGDP in Sub-SaharaAfrica and up to 10%of theGDP inNorthAmerica. In
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many countries, most of the GDP comes from the informal sector and from transna-
tional corporates that exploit natural resources. Both sectors are not sustainable and
less resilient to the economic or environmental crisis, let alone to a pandemic.
Furthermore,CSOs, international and local relief and aid organizations and donors
make up 60% of public policy engagement in solving problems locally and globally.
For example, providing primary education across the planet, first aid and health,
filing claims for environmental damages and cleaning up polluted areas. The power
of individual engagement and group activism in the area of climate change, education
and in the health sector can be witnessed around the world. In sum, over 60% of our
public goods and basic needs are in the hands of informal and non-formal actors
and institutions, and so are our safety and security. One may conclude that it is
without much surprise that people more and more mistrust their governments and
that populist leaders can fill this governance gap by fueling the fears of people living
without a safety net, and promising them a better and safer live.
Most prominently, the power of CSOs and private stakeholders has been striking
during the Arab Revolution beginning in 2011, the same year that “We are the 99%”
and Occupy Wall Street movement triggered worldwide protests against economic
and financial inequality and corruption. Euromaidan protesters in Ukraine in 2014
brought down a regime and yearlong protests occurred from Hong Kong, to Minsk,
to Tel Aviv, Bangkok and Santiago de Chile against state corruption and the failure
to deliver. The global movement “MeToo” (2017) fighting for equal gender equality,
and the “Fridays for Future” youth protest to end climate change since 2018, all
of which have reached the remote corners of the OSCE region and beyond. CSOs
and local movements today enjoy many millions of followers and supporters, who
help them via online petitions, civil disobedience and active opposition. They trigger
glocal governance, but they are only one part of the decision-making process.
The list of stakeholders and actors who bypass or surpass governments is long,
almost endless, and today there are several millions of local and domestic, as well
as internationally organized groups, using the lingua francas English or Arabic or
Russian. A common language—even when it is translated by apps on smartphones—
helps to mobilize stakeholders to make changes on the ground (UN Department for
Economic and Social Affairs 2020). The different actors and stakeholders have,
however, one thing in common, they often refer to global norms and standards, such
as human rights or a healthy environment, the fundamental freedom to migrate, and
the right to education or health, to solve their local problems and organize their day-
to-day living. Claims for law and norms compliance, for fair elections and public
health care, come from the local, not from national governments. Why? Because
people even in the most remote corners of the world, as we can view from the Tian
Shan Mountains in Central Asia to the Karabakh in the Caucasus, the Pyrenees in
Europe and the Saint Elias mountain range in North America have—thanks partly to
the Internet—have learned and seen elsewhere in the world that getting fair trials or
equal treatment and health care and giving their children education is possible. Both
universal human rights norms and standards, as well as good governance dimensions,
are the two guiding sets of principles that lead to a “blend of the local and the global”
as Roudometof phrases it (2016, p. 79).
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16.4 Further Research
Glocal governance means consensus-building among all relevant stakeholders and
joint implementation and enforcement mechanism. It is decision-making based on
consensus during the planning, implementing and enforcing stage of governance.
By this, glocal governance is different from multi-level governance, which is based
on consultative procedures between stakeholders. Albeit different stakeholders hold
the different tasks and enjoy different autonomy, multi-level governance is predomi-
nantly a procedure by which governmental authorities consult with external or other
governmental stakeholders and actors on different levels.
To study and investigate cases and initiatives of glocal governance the analytical
concept of glocalization can help us to better understand current paradigm shifts of
government and nation-state building or demise in the OSCE region. The so-called
weakness, end, decline, failure, crisis or hypocrisy of Western democratic concepts
have been undermuch scrutiny over the past two decades—and discussed extensively
elsewhere (Merkel and Kneip 2018). Glocal governance research does not aim to add
to this debate but rather to look at side effects and alternative avenues of governance
that have been emerging since the 1990s. Merkel et al highlight that democracy is not
in crisis, but that some systems and regime types are. It is up to them how they reform
and adapt to the needs of people, including theway to be governed, thatwill determine
whether they survive. Fueled by the rise of populist and ethno-nationalistic leaders,
regional conflict and high levels of state corruption, the parliamentarian democratic
regimes are much disputed. Whether glocal governance can turn into a new regime
type or an entirely new governance system is yet to be seen. Personally, I doubt it.
But to answer this question, we need more research, case studies and data allocation
on how glocalization has actually led to a replacement of nation-state governmental
regimes, brought to light modes of Mafia states or whether it simply complements
and completes and adds values to existing governance regimes of whatever type.
This chapter aims to encourage more research in this subject matter in the OSCE
region. The region provides a unique, diverse and yet under similar norms and stan-
dards operating cities, states and communities. Special attention deserves the new
democracies andmember states in the Balkans, as well as Central and Eastern Europe
and Central Asia, including Mongolia. Comparing new democracies with older and
consolidated ones in Western and Northern European and North America would
illustrate some results that might show more similarities when measuring glocality
than expected.
Lastly, the debate about glocal governance adds to the current democracy versus
autocracy debates and in the decades to come.
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